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PREFACE 
 
The title of the thesis is “Whether a disciplinary 
action is a weapon in the hands of the 
employer in India – Judicial superstructure & 
Constitutional perspective”. 
 
Utility: This is an original research work. It reveals the 
critical evaluation and analysis of the procedure, judge 
made law and substantive and procedure law relating to 
Disciplinary Enquiry and as to whether it is really a 
weapon I the hands of the employer?. The form, content 
case law discussed thereof and the findings arrived and 
suggestions made in this research work is extremely 
useful for private employers, public organizations, 
personnel managers, Industrial Relations Managers, legal 
executives / mangers, legal researchers, law lecturers / 
professors / students, legal fraternity and last but not least 
law makers. 
 
The present research work will make distinctive 
contribution to create awareness of lack laws / procedure 
in the arena of Disciplinary / Departmental Enquiry and 
highlight the lack of transparency, fairness therein. This 
research work is also touched upon and law and  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The buzz word of the day is the requirement of paradigm shift in 
labour laws. To facilitate this concern, accordingly, the 2nd 
National Labour Commission was set up. However, even the 
2nd National Labour Commission-2002 have not touched on any 
of the points related to vital issues of codification and 
personification of rules and procedure related to Disciplinary 
Enquiry.  The oft-repeated word “discipline” has a wider 
connotation than what we actually mean in the context of the 
work place where the workers assemble to do their duties. 
Every organization whether private or public, governmental or 
statutory, has its own code of conduct and discipline, which are 
intended to regulate the conduct of the employees. Breach of 
rules and regulations is, therefore, treated as misconduct, 
which is punishable under the disciplinary rules.  Minor or Major 
penalties depending on the nature of the misconduct are 
imposed on the delinquent employee in accordance with the 
prescribed procedure and the principles of natural justice. More 
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or less same pattern is followed by the all organizations, private 
or public. 
 
Enforcement of rules and regulations under the fear of sanction 
is an essential factor in the maintaining discipline. It is 
necessary because all people are not naturally law abiding. A 
standard of behaviour is to be maintained at work place by such 
code of conduct and discipline. In modern times, the 
introduction of sophisticated machinery and electronic devices, 
work patterns has undergone a sea change resulting in a 
change of old standard and behaviour pattern of the working 
class. The languid pattern of work has been replaced by high 
speed in production requiring a greater alertness and 
carefulness. It follows therefore more discipline is required at all 
levels of production pari passu, the conduct and behaviour 
pattern must conform to the work pattern. 
 
In India there are more than 175 Labour Legislations but none 
of these legislations deal with procedure and nitty-gritty of 
holding of enquires. That apart, the main pit-fall in the matters 
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of Disciplinary Enquiries is relating to appointment of enquiry 
officers. Invariably in every disciplinary proceeding, the enquiry 
officers appointed by the employer dose not inspire the 
confidence of the delinquent employee.   
 
It must be mentioned here that the development of legal system 
and the decisions of the Law Courts play a very important role, 
particularly the ratio decidendi. Some times obiter dicta  verdicts 
also help to arrive at a plausible conclusion. This is why we see 
that in spite of the absence of the provisions of the domestic 
enquiries have now become almost obligatory for every 
employer. 
 
There is maxim that nobody should be condemned unheard. In 
view of this, the need of the domestic enquiry is fully justified 
because they are held in accordance with the principles of 
natural justice in the absence of codified law. In domestic 
enquiries opportunity is given to the person against whom 
certain actions are proposed to be taken to defend himself and 
tell the enquiry officer who records the evidence of the parties 
 16
and gives its findings to the effect whether the charges levied 
have been proved or not. In Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P 
State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd., and Anr.1, it was 
observed – purpose of the enquiry is to find out the truth of the 
allegations with a view to punish him and not merely to gather 
evidence for a future regular departmental enquiry. 
 
As of today, more than 90 percent of cases pending for 
adjudication pertain to dismissal and discharge of workmen. 
Gone are the days when the employer could dispense with the 
service of an employee at his whims and fancies. With the 
disappearance of the principle of lassie faire  which were 
governing the relationship between an employer and employee, 
an employer cannot dismiss or discharge an employee 
howsoever undisciplined, undesirable or unwanted he may be. 
The current labour legislation, judicial pronouncements which 
have for their objective the amelioration of the lot and the 
betterment of the service conditions of the working class, have 
                                                 
1 (1999) 2 SCC 21 
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to a great extent restricted rights of an employer and secured to 
the corresponding extent the job security of a workmen. 
 
When we talk of disciplinary proceedings in private 
employment, a domestic enquiry is that of mistrust which arises 
essentially because the charge sheet is given by the employer 
and the enquiry is also held by an officer or an outsider 
appointed by the employer. The employer, as such, represents 
the both, the prosecutor and the judge. A suspicion of bias is 
inevitable in such a situation. This is the main reason that the 
delinquent employee does not have faith in the enquiry officer. 
They participate reluctantly and take every possible step to 
frustrate the enquiries. They raise number of objections 
including that of the validity of the appointment of the enquiry 
officer. They also demand to be represented either by the 
lawyer or the union leader. They ask for number of documents, 
whether relevant or not. Also the delinquent employees or their 
representatives do not restrict the cross examination of the 
witnesses and enquiry officer has to take decision under the 
given circumstances. 
 18
 
In the existing set of procedure / practice espouses the 
suspicion in the minds of the workmen that the management 
has already taken a decision to get rid of them and the enquiry 
is only a postmortem to comply with legal formalities, the 
enquiry officer, howsoever impartial he may be, does not 
inspire the confidence of the delinquent workman. This feeling 
frustrates the very essence of natural justice. 
 
No written Rule exists to guide enquiry proceedings: 
 
To regulate employer and employee relations which includes 
the formation of trade unions, defining, with reasonable degree 
of precision, the conditions of service and communicating them 
to workmen; provisions for machinery for the investigation and 
settlement of Industrial disputes and regulation of industrial 
actions such as strikes, lockouts, lay-off and retrenchment. 
Among the existing Statutes, the following constitute the 
Industrial Relations legislations: 
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(1) Trade Unions Act, 1926 
(2) Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 
(3) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 
 
It is pertinent to mention here that none of the afore-said 
legislations provide any kind of procedure to be followed during 
the enquiry proceedings much less to say about the language 
and forms / contents to be pressed in to service. The existing 
setup and scheme of things on the subject under context are 
not adequate and full proof to say that the same is free from 
bias, free from social stigma, free from prejudice. 
    
Every employer / entrepreneur is free to adopt his own frugal 
rules / procedure to conduct disciplinary enquiry until and 
unless the same is held void by the law courts.  Protection 
available against the said purported action of the employer is 
equal to nil, save and except desolate remedy provided under 
section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. All the more, the 
said remedy is only restricted to “workmen” category as defined 
under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, rest of the workforce left 
virtually with no remedy. 
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It has been rightly said that efficiency and discipline are two 
essential factors for successful Industrial set-up. The big is the 
industry and the task of enforcement of disciple among 
thousands of workmen who belong to different ethnic groups is 
the hefty. There are different ways of effective disciplinary 
control. No organization can go without it whatever be the 
consequences. The main purpose of the disciplinary 
proceedings is just to find out the truth of the allegations made 
against the concerned worker, and if the truth of the allegation 
is established after an ‘impartial’ enquiry. However the 
regulatory set up provided for as stated supra apparently does 
not contain the nitty-gritty / procedure of the disciplinary 
enquiry. 
 
Under reference to the context of peculiar employment situation 
and the grounds and norms regulate the relationship of ‘master 
and servant’ the purported power vested with employer to 
dispense the services of employee under the nomenclature of 
 21
‘disciplinary enquiry’ throws open flood of questions about its 
legality, propriety and its procedure.  
The Scheme of Thesis writing and compartmentalization / 
Chapterization has been arranged in the manner provided 
herein below. Chapter – 1 to chapter 7 and chapter 8 deals-  
?? Meaning of the term misconduct and how it has been 
read and presumed under Industrial Jurisprudence, 
Constitutional perspective, master – servant relationship  
 
?? Scope and purpose of Disciplinary Enquiry and 
applicability of principles of natural justice 
 
?? Initiation of Disciplinary proceedings, charge-sheet, 
Enquiry officer, Presenting officer, stay of Enquiry by law 
courts 
 
?? Delinquent employee represented by legal practitioner, 
disciplinary proceedings vis-à-vis criminal proceedings, 
witness, bias in the enquiry 
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?? Form and content of enquiry report by the enquiry officer, 
supply of enquiry report, imposition of penalty and 
remedies available 
?? Practice and procedure adopted by the employers – 
collection of data through structured questionnaire as well 
as oral interface / interview with professionals and people 
associated with the subject under context. 
 
?? Critical analysis of the existing practice and procedure of 
the Disciplinary Enquiry. 
 
?? And Chapter -8 of the research work deals with 
conclusion and suggestions. 
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Chapter 01:  MISCONDUCT 
1.1 Concept of the term ‘misconduct’ 
1.2  Literary meaning of the word ‘misconduct’ 
1.3  Perception of the word ‘misconduct’ in the 
industrial jurisprudence 
1.4  Judicial perspective on the word ‘misconduct’ 
1.5  Constitutional perspective of the term 
‘misconduct’ 
 
MISCONDUCT:  
It is true that the relationship between the employer and 
employee is contractual, it can be said to be a private bilateral 
contractual arrangement. Un-noticingly the state becomes party 
to the said contract by way of enforcement and implementation 
of various Social Security and Social welfare Legislations. In 
view of the tripartite contract between employer, employee and 
the State, it is quite difficult for employer to dispense with the 
services of the employee without the knowledge of the State or 
violating the laws of State which have guaranteed security of 
employment on the reason of misconduct. Again the term 
misconduct is relative term which is not defined any of the 
legislations in India.  
 24
 
1.1 Concept of the term ‘misconduct’- 
Misconduct is a transgression of some established rules of 
action, where no discretion is left except what necessity may 
demand. It is a violation of definite law, a forbidden act. It differs 
from careless2.  Misconduct is a specific connotation. It cannot 
be mere inefficiency or slackness. Something more than a 
positive and deliberate disobedience of any order of a superior 
authority will be one species of misconduct – Presidency 
Talkies vs. N.S. Nagarajan3.  
Any conduct on the part of an employee inconsistent with the 
faithful discharge of his duties towards his employer would be 
misconduct. Any breach of the express or implied duties of an 
employee towards his employer, therefore, unless it is of a 
trifling nature, would constitute an act of misconduct. However, 
the act of misconduct must have some relation with employee’s 
duties towards his employer – Victoria Co. Ltd., vs. P.O 
Industrial Tribunal.4   
Misconduct comprises positive acts and not mere neglect or 
failure. It differs from carelessness. Every breach of discipline 
may amount to misconduct, the penalty for which varies with 
gravity thereof. It is difficult to lay down exhaustively what 
constitutes misconduct and indiscipline. The conclusion 
depends on the examination of the facts in each case. 
                                                 
2 Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, Edn.1948 
3 (1968) II LLJ 801 
4 (1970) Lab IC 337 
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Misconduct, even it is an offence under the Indian Penal Code, 
is equally misconduct – Assam Oil Company Ltd., vs. L. N. 
Mohan5. The Supreme Court held that acts of employees who 
were detrimental to the interest and prestige of the employer 
amount to misconduct6.   
In Industrial Law there are two types of misconduct viz: 
i. major misconducts which justify the punishment of 
dismissal or discharge,  
ii. minor misconducts which do not justify punishment 
of dismissal or discharge but may call for lesser 
punishments.7,  
The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules framed 
under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 
under clause 14 (3) provides limited list of misconducts. 
However, the employer is at liberty to frame his own standing 
orders to the peculiar to their nature and status of their 
industries and establishments. It is not possible to provide for 
every type of misconduct in the standing orders for justifying 
disciplinary action against the workmen held in Express 
Newspaper (P) Ltd., vs Industrial Tribunal8. 
In the absence of standing orders, however the question will 
have to be dealt with reasonably with commonsense. Acts of 
                                                 
5 1952 IAC 488 
6 M.H Devendrappa vs. KSSIDC, AIR 1998 SC 1064 
7 Caltex India Ltd., vs. Labour Court, Patna, AIR 1966 SC 1729. 
8 (1961) I LLJ 100 
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misconduct would then depend on the facts and circumstances 
of each case- Agnani vs. Badri Das9.  
In the case of workmen of Dewan group of Tea Estate vs. P.O 
Labour Court, Assam10, and his Lordships of the Supreme 
Court11 , observed that the Standing Orders of the 
establishment  describes a class of misconducts and the same 
cannot be exhaustive  of all the species of misconduct which a 
workmen may commit. Even though a given misconduct may 
not come within the specific term of misconduct describes in the 
standing orders, it may still be misconduct, in the special facts 
of the case and if the workman is held guilty of such 
misconduct, appropriate action can be taken by the employer. 
The following acts have not been considered as misconduct:- 
(1) In the case of Bawa Gockery House vs. RN. Bhowmick12, 
it has been held that absence for a short time from the 
place of work has not been treated as misconduct. 
(2) In the case of Northern Railway Co-operative Credit 
Society Ltd., vs. Industrial Tribunal13 it has been held that 
refusal to carry orders which are not enforceable under 
any rule cannot be the basis discharge or dismissal. 
                                                 
9 (1963) I LLJ  684, 690(SC) 
10 (1981) Lab.IC 713 
11 in AIR 1967 SC 2962 
12 (1954 LAC 293), 
13 (1967) II LLJ 46 (SC) 
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(3) In the case of agnani vs. Badri Das14 it has been held that 
a private quarrel between the employee of an 
establishment and a citizen outside the factory premises 
cannot ordinarily fall within the category of misconduct. 
(4) In the case of Andhra Scientific Co., Ltd., vs. Sheshagiri 
Rao15 it has been held that refusal of a workman to do the 
work, which he is not obliged to do would not constitute 
misconduct. 
(5) An order to do work which involves a reasonable 
apprehension of danger to the life or person of the 
workman or unlawful order would not constitute 
misconduct. 
(6) In the case of Banchelal vs. State of UP16, it has been 
held that the passing of a resolution or seconding a 
resolution to resort to pen-down strike will not constitute 
misconduct. 
(7) In the case of Itti Cheria vs. State of kerala17, it has been 
held that acts constituting mere irregularities are not 
misconduct. 
(8) Impossibility, illegality or ambiguity of orders or mistake in 
the orders would be valid defence against the charge of 
insubordination or disobedience of orders held in 
M.C.Donald vs. Moller line (UK) Ltd18 
                                                 
14 (1963) I LLJ 46 (SC) 
15 (1961) II LLJ 117 (SC) 
16 (1957) II LLJ 231 
17 (1958) II LLJ 724 
18 (1953)2 Lloyds Rep 662 
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(9) A speech exhorting workmen to take steps for the 
removal of the manager or any officer is not a misconduct 
amounting to insubordination or subversion held in Laxmi 
Debi Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Nand Kishore19,  
 
(ii) What is not a ‘misconduct’: The Supreme Court in the case 
of Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. Habibulla20, held that is would be 
difficult to accede to the argument that if the evidence given by 
an employee in an industrial adjudication is disbelieved that is 
self without anything more would constitute misconduct. 
 
In another case the Supreme Court held21, that the private 
quarrel between an employee and a stranger with which the 
employer is not concerned falls outside the categories of 
misconduct. 
 
1.2   Literary meaning of the word ‘misconduct’- 
Black's Law Dictionary22, defined 'misbehaviour' as "ill conduct, 
improper or unlawful behaviour. 'Misconduct' was defined at p. 
999 as "A transgression of some established and definite rule of 
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful 
behaviour, willful in character, improper or wrong behaviour; its 
synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehaviour, 
                                                 
19 AIR 1957 SC 7 
20 1960(I) LLJ.522 
21 1978 (I) LLJ 508 
22 6th Edition, p. 998 
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delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offence, but not 
negligence or carelessness. 'Misconduct in office' was defined 
as "Any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation to the 
duties of his office, willful in character. The term ‘misconduct’ 
embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, 
acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an 
affirmative duty to act".  In Encyclopedic Law Dictionary23, at p. 
720 'misbehaviour' was defined as "improper or unlawful 
conduct, generally applied to a breach of duty or propriety by an 
officer, witness, etc. not amounting to a crime. P. Ramanathan 
Aiyar's 'The Law Lexicon24, defines 'misbehaviour' as "ill 
conduct; improper or unlawful behaviour. 'Misconduct' was 
defined at p. 821 as "the term "misconduct' implies a wrongful 
intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not 
necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral 
turpitude". The word 'misconduct' is a relative term, and has to 
be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the 
context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of 
the Act or statute which is being construed. 'Misconduct' literally 
means wrong conduct or improper conduct", 'Misconduct in 
office' was defined as "unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public 
officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected ".  
 
 
                                                 
23 3rd Edition 
24 Reprint Edition, 1987 at page 820. 
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1.3 Perception of the word ‘misconduct’ in the 
industrial Jurisprudence - 
 
The expression ‘misconduct’ has not been defined either in the 
Industrial Disputes Act or the Industrial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Act, 1946. The Industrial Employment (standing orders) 
Central Rules, 1946 under clause 14 (3) inter-alia denotes 11 
kinds of acts and omissions as ‘misconduct’. 
 
The employers are at liberty to have such terms and condition 
of employment depends upon the kind of employer under whom 
the employee is working. Rule 14 (1) of the said Rules inter-alia 
empowers the employer to add such omissions as 
misconducts. In the Indian context an aspect of employment 
covers Public Employment comprising Government employees, 
employees of statutory corporations, Public Sector 
Undertakings, Banks, Educational Institutions and employees of 
Private Organizations and Private companies.  Employees 
associated with non-governmental bodies, private organizations 
and private companies and their service conditions are 
governed by the Standing Orders or the respective State Shops 
and Commercial Establishments Acts. So for as kinds of 
punishment are concerned Industrial Law basically recognizes 
two kinds of misconduct, viz; 
a) major misconducts which justify the punishment of 
dismissal or discharge, and  
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b) minor misconduct which do not justify punishment of 
dismissal or discharge, but may call for lesser 
punishments,  as held by the Supreme Court in the case 
of Caltex India Ltd., vs, Labour Court, Patna25. 
Further, ‘misconduct’ in Industrial employment can be broadly 
be dealt with under three categories, viz:- 
(i) misconduct relating to duty, 
(ii) misconduct relating to discipline, 
(iii) misconduct relating to morality, 
However, the said categorization is an illustrative and cannot be 
treated as watertight compartments.    
Any action with regard to initiation of disciplinary proceedings 
against an employee on the charges of misconduct and on 
other lapses generally be under the relevant rules of the 
institution. Whereas, with regard to employees holding public 
employment comprising Government employees, employees of 
statutory corporations, Public Sector Undertakings and other 
Governmental bodies shall have service rules to regulate the 
terms and conditions as well as conduct of the employees. 
Simultaneously, such service rules are amenable to judicial 
scrutiny when they are alleged to be inconsistence with 
provisions of the Indian Constitution. In the case of M. H. 
Devendrappa, vs. The Karnataka State Small Industries 
Development Corporation26, the Supreme Court has observed 
                                                 
25 AIR 1966 SC 1729 
26 AIR 1998 SC 1064 
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that, where the appellant Asst. Manager of Karnataka State 
Small Industries Development Corporation had made a direct 
public attack on the head of his organisation and had also, in 
the letter to the Governor, made allegations against various 
officers of the Corporation with whom he had to work, his 
conduct is clearly detrimental to the proper functioning of the 
organisation or its internal discipline. Making public statements 
against the head of the organisation on a political issue 
amounted to lowering the prestige of the organisation in which 
he worked. On a proper balancing, therefore, of individual 
freedom of the appellant and proper functioning of the 
Government organisation, which had employed him, the 
employer was entitled to take disciplinary action under Rule 22. 
Rule 22 of the Service Rules is not meant to curtail freedom of 
speech or expression or the freedom to form associations or 
unions. It is clearly meant to maintain discipline within the 
service, to ensure efficient performance of duty by the 
employees of the Corporation, and to protect the interests and 
prestige of the Corporation. Therefore, under Rule 22 an 
employee who disobeys the service Rules or displays 
negligence, inefficiency or in-subordination or does anything 
detrimental to the interests or prestige of the Corporation or 
acts in conflict with official instructions or is guilty of 
misconduct, is liable to disciplinary action. R. 22 is not primarily 
or even essentially designed to restrict, in any way, freedom of 
speech or expression or the right to form associations or 
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unions. A Rule which is not primarily designed to restrict any of 
the fundamental rights cannot be called in question as violating 
Art. 19(1) (a) or 19(1) (c). The restraint is against doing 
anything which is detrimental to the interests or prestige of the 
employer. The detrimental action may consist of writing a letter 
or making a speech. It may consist of holding a violent 
demonstration or it may consist of joining a political 
organisation contrary to the Service Rules. Any action, which is 
detrimental to the interests or prestige of the employer, clearly 
undermines discipline within the organisation and also the 
efficient functioning of that organisation. Such a Rule could be 
construed as falling under "public order" clause under Art. 
19(4). The same requirements of R. 22 can be better looked at 
from the point of view of Art. 19(6) as requirements in 
furtherance of the proper discharge of the public duties of 
Government service. Rules which are directly linked to and are 
essential for proper discharge of duties of a public office would 
be protected under Art. 19(6) as in public interest. If these 
Rules are alleged to violate other freedoms under Art. 19, such 
as, freedom of speech or expression or the freedom to form 
associations or unions or the freedom to assemble peaceably 
and without arms, the freedoms have to be read harmoniously 
so that Rules which are reasonably required in furtherance of 
one freedom are not struck down as violating other freedoms. 
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1.4 Judicial perspective of the word ‘misconduct’ - 
The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the term 
misconduct in the case of State of Punjab and others, vs. Ram 
Singh ex-constable27, and thus observed “The word 
`misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, its 
reflection receive its connotation from the context, the 
delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline 
and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it 
must be improper or wrong behaviour, unlawful behaviour, 
willful in character, for bidden act, a transgression of 
established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but 
not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in 
performance of the duty, the act complained of bears forbidden 
quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with 
reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the 
term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and 
the public purpose it seeks to serve. The term misconduct is 
perse inter-linked to the word ‘misbehaviour’   
There is a sharp conflict of opinion upon the meaning to be 
given to the word "misconduct" amongst the various High 
Courts as was illustrated by the numerous decisions cited at the 
bar. Three views, which have been taken, are set out in the 
judgment of Venkataramana Rao, J., in N. M. Roshan Umar 
Karim and Co. vs. M. and S. M. Rly. Co. Ltd,28. One view is that 
                                                 
27 AIR 1992 SC 2188 
28 AIR 1936 Mad 508 
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taken by Guha J. in M. and S. M. Rly. Co. Ltd. vs. Sunderjee 
Kalidas.29 There the learned Judge had said - 
 
"It may be taken to be well settled now, that 'misconduct 
is not necessarily established by proving even capable 
negligence. Misconduct is something opposed to accident 
or negligence. It is the intentional doing of something 
which the doer knows to be wrong, or which he does 
recklessly, not caring what the result may be." 
 
A similar view has been taken in some other cases. The second 
view is that expressed in Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. vs. 
Moolji Sicka and Co.,30, and certain other cases. There, 
Suhrawardy, J. has observed at p. 593 (of ILR Cal): (at p. 819 
of AIR), as follow: 
 
"Misconduct is distinguished from accident and is not far from 
negligence not only gross and culpable negligence and involves 
that a person misconducts himself when it is wrong conduct on 
his part in the existing circumstances to do, or to fail or omit to 
do (as the case may be), a particular thing or to persist in the 
act, failure or omission or acts with carelessness. . . , the word 
'misconduct' as used in the new risk note is wide enough to 
include wrongful commission and omission, intentional or 
unintentional any act which it wrongfully did or which it 
                                                 
29 ILR 60 Cal 996 at p. 1000: (AIR 1933 Cal 742 at p. 744) 
30 ILR 58 Cal 585 (AIR 1930 Cal 815) 
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wrongfully neglected to do, or, to put it in another way, did what 
it should not have done or did not do what it should have done. 
. . . . . . I am not inclined to accept the view that misconduct 
only refers to acts of gross or culpable negligence and the term 
does not ordinarily cover acts of mere negligence. In my 
judgment the word 'misconduct' denotes any un-business like 
conduct and includes negligence or want of proper care which a 
bailee is to take under S. 151 of the Indian Contract Act. The 
immunity which the risk note brings to the railway company is 
by shifting the burden of proof." 
 
The third view is represented in the judgments of Fawcett, Ag. 
C. J. in M. and S. M. Rly., vs. Jumakhram 31, and Kemp, Ag. C. 
J. in B. B. and C. I. Rly, vs. Rajnagar Spinning Co. Ltd.,32 
 
In the latter it was observed: 
"I am not prepared to accept the test of the meaning of the word 
'misconduct' as what a reasonable man would have done under 
the circumstances. I think the word suggests that a railway 
servant had been guilty of doing something which was 
inconsistent with the conduct expected of him by the rules of 
the company." 
The aforementioned three facets of ‘misconduct' has been 
discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of S. Jeet Singh 
vs. The Union of India33.   
                                                 
31 AIR 1928 Bom 504, 
32 AIR 1930 Bom 129 
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 With view to avoid confusion, misuse of charging misconduct 
against employee by the employer, every employer is bound to 
list out the misconducts in his administrative rules or conduct 
rules. The Supreme Court In the case of M/s. Glaxo 
Laboratories (I) Ltd, vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut 
and others34, had occasion to observe that “numerous acts of 
misconduct such as drunkenness, fighting indecent or 
disorderly behaviour, use of abusive language, wrongfully 
interfering with the work of other employees etc. are not per se 
misconduct. Each one of them has correlation to the time or 
place where it is committed. Such acts of misconduct would be 
misconduct punishable only if committed within the premises of 
the establishment or in the vicinity there of. What constitutes 
establishment or its vicinity would depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case.  To enable an employer to 
peacefully carry on his industrial activity the Industrial 
Employment Standing Orders Act confers powers on him to 
prescribe conditions of service including enumerating acts of 
misconduct when committed within the premises of the 
establishment. The employers have hardly any extra territorial 
jurisdiction. Employer is not the custodian of general law and 
order situation nor the Guru or mentor of his workmen for there 
well regulated cultural advancement. If the power to regulate 
the behaviour of the workmen out side the duty hours and at 
any place wherever they may be was conferred upon the 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 AIR 1965 SC 1666 
34 AIR 1984 SC504 
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employer, contract of service may be reduced to contract of 
slavery. The employer is entitled to prescribe the conditions of 
service more and less specifying the acts of misconduct to be 
enforced within the premises where the workmen gather 
together for rendering service. The employer has both the 
power and jurisdiction to regulate the behaviour of workmen 
within the premises of the establishment, or for peacefully 
carrying the industrial activity in the vicinity of the 
establishment. Where the standing order of an establishment 
provide that certain acts would constitute misconduct if 
"committed within premises of the establishment or in the 
vicinity thereof" then any misconduct committed anywhere 
irrespective of the time-place content where and when it is 
committed cannot be comprehended to be the misconduct 
within the meaning of the Standing Orders merely because it 
has some remote impact on the peaceful atmosphere in the 
establishment. The words 'committed within premises of the 
establishment or in the vicinity thereof are words of limitation 
and they must cut down the operation of the standing order. 
The misconduct prescribed in a Standing Order which would 
attract a penalty has a causal connection with the place of the 
work as well as the time at which it is committed which would 
ordinarily be within the establishment and during duty hours. 
The causal connection in order to provide linkage between the 
alleged act of misconduct and employment must be real and 
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substantial, immediate and proximate and not remote or 
tenuous.   
 
In the said case the Supreme Court has further observed that 
some misconduct neither defined nor enumerated and which 
may be believed by the employer to be misconduct ex-post 
facto would not expose the workmen to a penalty. It cannot be 
left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto  that 
some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be 
enumerated in the relevant Standing Order is nonetheless a 
misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct 
in the relevant Standing Order but yet a misconduct for the 
purpose of imposing a penalty. 
 
The Bombay High Court in Sharda Prasad Onkar Prasad 
Trivedi vs. Central Railway,35 the divisional bench has 
enumerated broadly the following specific illustrative cases of 
acts of misconduct, commission of which would justify dismissal 
of the delinquent employee:   
(i). an act or conduct prejudicial or likely to be 
prejudicial to the interest or reputation of the master 
(ii). an act or conduct inconsistent or incompatible with 
due or faithful discharge of his duty to his master; 
(iii). an act or conduct making in unsafe of the employer 
to  retain him in service; 
                                                 
35 (1960) 1 LLJ 167, 170, 
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(iv). an act or conduct of an employee so grossly 
immoral that all reasonable men may say that they 
cannot be trusted; 
(v). an act or conduct of the employee which may make 
it difficult for the master to rely on the faithfulness of 
the employee; 
(vi). an act or conduct of the employee opening before 
him temptations for not discharging his duties 
properly; 
(vii). an abusive act or an act disturbing the peace at the 
place if employment; 
(viii). insulting or insubordinate behaviour to such a 
degree as to be incompatible with the continuance 
of the relation of master and servant; 
(ix). habitual negligence in respect of the duties for 
which the employee is engaged; and 
(x). an act of neglect, even though isolated, which tends 
to cause    serious consequences. 
1.5  Constitutional perspective on the term 
‘misconduct’ - 
Relevance & importance of the term ‘misconduct’ under Indian 
Constitution, Instrumentalities of ‘State’ and others: - The terms 
and condition of employment depends upon the kind employer 
under whom the employee is working. In the Indian context an 
aspect of employment covers Public Employment comprising 
Government employees, employees of statutory corporations, 
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Public Sector Undertakings, Banks, Educational Institutions and 
employees of private organizations and private companies.  
Employees associated with non-governmental bodies, private 
organizations and private companies and their service 
conditions are governed by the Standing Orders or the 
respective State Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. 
Action with regard to initiation of disciplinary proceedings 
against an employee on charges of misconduct and other 
lapses that with regard to employees holding public 
employment comprising Government employees, employees of 
statutory corporations, Public Sector Undertakings and other 
Governmental bodies shall have service rules to regulate the 
terns and conditions as well as conduct of the employees. 
Simultaneously, such service rules are amenable to judicial 
scrutiny when they are alleged to be inconsistence with 
provisions of the Indian Constitution. In the case of M. H. 
Devendrappa, Appellant vs. The Karnataka State Small 
Industries Development Corporation36, the Supreme Court has 
observed that, where the appellant Asst. Manager of Karnataka 
State Small Industries Development Corporation had made a 
direct public attack on the head of his organisation and had 
also, in the letter to the Governor, made allegations against 
various officers of the Corporation with whom he had to work, 
his conduct is clearly detrimental to the proper functioning of 
the organisation or its internal discipline. Making public 
                                                 
36 Supra  
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statements against the head of the organisation on a political 
issue amounted to lowering the prestige of the organisation in 
which he worked. On a proper balancing, therefore, of 
individual freedom of the appellant and proper functioning of the 
Government organisation, which had employed him, the 
employer was entitled to take disciplinary action under Rule 22. 
Rule 22 of the Service Rules is not meant to curtail freedom of 
speech or expression or the freedom to form associations or 
unions. It is clearly meant to maintain discipline within the 
service, to ensure efficient performance of duty by the 
employees of the Corporation, and to protect the interests and 
prestige of the Corporation. Therefore, under R. 22 an 
employee who disobeys the service Rules or displays 
negligence, inefficiency or in-subordination or does anything 
detrimental to the interests or prestige of the Corporation or 
acts in conflict with official instructions or is guilty of 
misconduct, is liable to disciplinary action. R. 22 is not primarily 
or even essentially designed to restrict, in any way, freedom of 
speech or expression or the right to form associations or 
unions. A Rule which is not primarily designed to restrict any of 
the fundamental rights cannot be called in question as violating 
Art. 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(c). The restraint is against doing anything 
which is detrimental to the interests or prestige of the employer. 
The detrimental action may consist of writing a letter or making 
a speech. It may consist of holding a violent demonstration or it 
may consist of joining a political organisation contrary to the 
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Service Rules. Any action which is detrimental to the interests 
or prestige of the employer clearly undermines discipline within 
the organisation and also the efficient functioning of that 
organisation. Such a Rule could be construed as falling under 
"public order" clause under Art. 19(4). The same requirements 
of R. 22 can be better looked at from the point of view of Art. 
19(6) as requirements in furtherance of the proper discharge of 
the public duties of Government service. Rules which are 
directly linked to and are essential for proper discharge of 
duties of a public office would be protected under Art. 19(6) as 
in public interest. If these Rules are alleged to violate other 
freedoms under Art. 19, such as, freedom of speech or 
expression or the freedom to form associations or unions or the 
freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms, the 
freedoms have to be read harmoniously so that Rules which 
are reasonably required in furtherance of one freedom are not 
struck down as violating other freedoms. 
Further the employees form part of latter, either directly or 
through respective service rules of the undertaking invariably 
protected under the Constitutional protection of Article 311 of 
the Indian Constitution, under clause (2) of Article 311 “No such 
person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced 
in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of 
the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of 
being heard in respect of those charges. Provided that where it 
is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such 
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penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the 
evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be 
necessary to give such person any opportunity of making 
representation on the penalty proposed.   In this context it is 
imperative to have a birds eye view on the land mark judgment 
delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, where in the court has 
traced the history of public employment and Doctrine of 
Pleasure and the provisions enshrined in the Indian 
Constitution in the following manner37 : 
 
Civil Servants: 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his book "The Common Law", 
consisting of lectures delivered by him while teaching law at 
Harvard and published just one year before he was appointed 
in 1882 an Associate Justice of the Massachusetts, Supreme 
Judicial Court said: 
 
"The law embodies the story of a nation's development through 
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained 
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In 
order to know what it is we must know what it has been and 
what it tends to become." 
 
It will not, therefore, be out of place to begin with a brief 
historical sketch of the civil services in India as also of the law 
                                                 
37.Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel AIR 1985 SC 1416 
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applicable to civil servants and the changes, which have taken 
place in it from time to time.  
 
Civil servants, that is, persons who are members of a civil 
service of the Union of India or an all-India Service or a civil 
service of a State or who hold a civil post under the Union or a 
State, occupy in law a special position. The ordinary law of 
master and servant does not apply to them. Under that law, 
whether the contract of service, is for a fixed period or not, if it 
contains a provision for, its termination by notice, it can be so 
terminated. If there is no provision for giving a notice and the 
contract is not for a fixed period, the law implies an obligation to 
give a reasonable notice. Where no notice in the first case or no 
reasonable notice in the second case is given, the contract is 
wrongfully terminated and such wrongful termination will give 
rise to a claim for damages. This is subject to what may 
otherwise be provided in industrial and labour laws where such 
laws are applicable. The position of civil servants both in 
England and in India is, however, vastly different. 
 
The Civil Service in England: 
Our civil services are modelled upon the British pattern though 
in some respects there are important differences between the 
two. In England, except where otherwise provided by statute, all 
public officers and servants of the Crown hold their 
appointments at the pleasure of the Crown or durante bene 
 46
placito ("during good pleasure" or "during the pleasure of the 
appointer") as opposed to an office held dum bene se gesserit 
("during good conduct"), also called quadiu se bene gesserit 
("as long as he shall behave himself well"). When a person 
holds office during the pleasure of the Crown, his appointment 
can be terminated at any time without assigning cause. The 
exercise of pleasure by the Crown can, however, be restricted 
by legislation enacted by Parliament because in the United 
Kingdom Parliament is sovereign and has the right to make or 
unmake any law whatever and all that a court of law can do 
with an Act passed by Parliament is to interpret its meaning but 
not to set it aside or declare it void. Blackstone in his 
Commentaries has thus described the unlimited legislative 
authority of Parliament: 
 
"It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, 
confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, 
reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all 
possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, 
military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that 
absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside 
somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. 
All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that 
transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach 
of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new-model the 
succession to the Crown; as was done in the reign of Henry 
 47
VIII, and William III. It can after the established religion of the 
land; as was done in a variety of instances, in the reigns of King 
Henry VIII and his three children. It can change and create 
afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments 
themselves; as was done by the act of union, and the several 
statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do 
everything that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some 
have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, 
the omnipotence of Parliament. True it is, that what the 
Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo." 
 
Jean Louis De Lolme, the eighteenth-century Swiss 
constitutionalist in his "Constitution de 1 "Angleterre" 
("Constitution of England"), which gave many on the Continent 
their ideas of the British Constitution, summed up the position 
of Parliament in the English constitutional law in the following 
apophthegm quoted in Dicey's Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution38 
"It is a fundamental principle with English lawyers, that 
Parliament can do everything but make a woman a man, 
and a man a woman." 
 
So far as the pleasure doctrine in England is concerned, Lord 
Diplock in Chelliah Kodeeswaran vs. Attorney-General of 
                                                 
38. See 10 th Edition, P. 43 
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Ceylon 1970 AC 1111, 1118, (PC) has succinctly stated its 
position in English law as follows: 
"It is now well established in British Constitutional theory, 
at any rate as it has developed since the eighteenth 
century, that any appointment as a Crown servant, 
however subordinate, is terminable at will unless it is 
expressly otherwise provided by legislation." 
 
In practice, however, a dismissal would take place only as the 
result of well-established disciplinary processes.   
 In recent years though the Crown still retains the right to 
dismiss at pleasure, the legal position of civil servants has 
radically changed as a result of legislation, and legally binding 
collective agreements can be entered into between the Crown 
and representatives of its staff and those representatives can 
sue for breaches of any conditions of service covered by these 
agreements. Further, a civil servant can bring an action for 
unfair dismissal or sue on his conditions of service. But just as 
an ordinary employee cannot insist on continuing in 
employment, so also a civil servant cannot insist on continuing 
in employment. The remedy in both cases is to recover 
damages for wrongful dismissal39.  
 
                                                 
3
9. Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 8, paras 1106 and 1303. 
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The Pre-Constitution Civil Services in India: 
It is unnecessary to go back more than two centuries to trace 
the origin and development of the Civil Service in India. The 
East India Company sent out to India its own servants and so 
did the Crown, and from the earliest times, under the various 
Charters given to the East India Company, the Crown could at 
its pleasure remove any person holding office, whether civil or 
military, under the East India Company. The Court of Directors 
of the East India Company had also the power to remove or 
dismiss any of its officers or servants not appointed by the 
Crown. Section 35 of the Act of 1793 (33 Geo. III, C. 52) made 
it lawful to and for the King's Majesty,  his heirs and successors, 
by any writing or instrument under his or their sign manual, 
countersigned by the President of the Board of Commissioners 
for the affairs of India, to remove or recall any person holding 
any office, employment or commission, civil or military, under 
the East India Company; while section 36 of that Act provided 
that nothing contained in that Act should extend, or be 
construed to extend, to preclude or take away. the power of the 
Court of Directors of the East India Company from removing or 
recalling any of its officers or servants and that the Court of 
Directors shall and may at all times have full liberty to remove, 
recall or dismiss any of such officers or servants at their will and 
pleasure in the like manner as if that Act had not been passed. 
Similar provisions were made in the Act of 1833 by sections 74 
and 75 of that Act. Section 74 made it lawful "for His Majesty by 
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any Writing under His Sign Manual, countersigned by the 
President of the said Board of Commissioners, to remove or 
dismiss any person holding any office, employment or 
commission, civil or military, under the said Company in India, 
and to vacate any Appointment or Commission of any person to 
any such office or employment." Section 75 provided that 
nothing contained in that Act would take away the power of the 
Court of Directors to remove or dismiss any of the officers or 
servants of the Company "but that the said Court shall and may 
at all times have full Liberty to remove or dismiss any of such 
officers or servants at their will and pleasure." 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century a well-organized civil 
service has developed in India, the control over it being vested 
in the executive, and the members of the "civil service of the 
Crown in India" were governed in the matter of their 
appointments as also the regulation of the conditions of their 
service, such as, classification, methods of recruitment, pay 
and allowances, and discipline and conduct, by rules made by 
the executive. 
 
The Government of India Act, 1858, which vested in the British 
Crown the territories under the government of East India 
Company, repealed certain sections of the Government of India 
Act, 1853 in so far as they applied to or provided for the 
admission or appointment of persons to the Civil Service of the 
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East India Company and conferred upon the Secretary of State 
in Council the power to make regulations for the admission of 
candidates to the Civil Service of India as also with respect to 
other matters connected therewith. Three years later the Indian 
Civil Service so envisaged received statutory recognition by the 
enactment of the Indian Civil Service Act, 1861  
 
The above Acts were repealed by the Government of India Act 
of 1915. Part VIII of the 1915 Act conferred upon the Secretary 
of State in Council, with the aid and advice of the Civil Service 
Commissioners, the power to make rules for the Indian Civil 
Service examination. 
 
None of the above Acts nor the Government of India 
(Amendment) Act, 1916 made any reference to the tenure of 
members of the civil service in India. This was for the first time 
done by the Government of India Act, 1919 which introduced 
several amendments in the 1915 Act including the insertion of 
Part VII A consisting of sections 96B to 96E. 
 
Section 96B provided as follows: 
96B. The civil services in India. - (1) Subject to the provisions of 
this Act and of rules made there under, every person in the civil 
service of the Crown in India holds office during His Majesty's 
pleasure, and may be employed in any manner required by a 
proper authority within the scope of his duty but no person in 
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that service may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to 
that by which he was appointed, and the Secretary of State in 
Council may (except so far as he may provide by rules to the 
contrary) reinstate any person in that service who has been 
dismissed. 
 
If any such person appointed by the Secretary of State in 
Council thinks himself wronged by an order of an official 
superior in a governor's province, and on due application made 
to that superior does not receive the redress to which he may 
consider himself entitled, he may, without prejudice to any other 
right of redress, complain to the governor of the province in 
order to obtain justice, and the governor is hereby directed to 
examine such complaint and require such action to be taken 
thereon as may appear to him to be just and equitable. 
 
(2) The Secretary of State in Council may make rules for 
regulating the classification of the civil services in India, the 
methods of their recruitment, their conditions of services, pay 
and allowances, and discipline and conduct. Such rules may, to 
such extent and in respect of such matters as may be 
prescribed, delegate the power of making rules to the 
Governor-General in Council or to local governments, or 
authorize the Indian legislature or local legislatures to make 
laws regulating the public services.  
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Provided that every person appointed before the 
commencement of the Government of India Act, 1919, by the 
Secretary of State in Council to the civil service of the Crown in 
India shall retain all his existing or accruing rights, or shall 
receive such compensation, for the loss of any of them as the 
Secretary of State in Council may consider just and equitable. 
 
(3) The right to pensions and the scale and conditions of 
pensions of all persons in the civil service of the Crown in India 
appointed by the Secretary of State in Council shall be 
regulated in accordance with the rules in force at the time of the 
passing of the Government of India Act, 1919. Any such rules 
may be varied or added to by the Secretary of State in Council 
and shall have effect as so varied or added to, but any such 
variation or addition shall not adversely affect the pension of 
any member of the service appointed before the date thereof. 
 
Nothing in this section or in any rule there under shall prejudice 
the rights to which any person may, or may have, become 
entitled under the provisions in relation to pensions contained in 
the East India Annuity Funds Act, 1874. 
 
(4) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that all rules 
or other provisions in operation at the time of the passing of the 
Government of India Act, 1919, whether made by the Secretary 
of State in Council or by any other authority, relating to the civil 
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service of the Crown in India, were duly made in accordance 
with the powers in that behalf, and are confirmed, but any such 
rules or provisions may be revoked, varied or added to by rules 
or laws made under this section." 
 
The Fundamental Rules, the Civil Service (Classification, 
Control and Appeal) Rules of 1930 and the Civil Service 
(Governors Provinces Classification) Rules are instances of 
rules made under authority conferred by section 96B. Section 
96C provided for the establishment of a Public Service 
Commission. Sub-section (1) of section 96D provided for an 
Auditor-General to be appointed by the Secretary of State in 
Council who was to hold office during ”His Majesty's pleasure", 
and conferred upon the Secretary of State in Council the power 
to make rules providing for the Auditor-General's pay, powers, 
duties and conditions of employment.  
 
Thus, after the 1919 Act, the civil services of India continued to 
be under the control of the Secretary of State in Council who 
was to regulate by rules the classification of the civil services, 
the methods of recruitment, the conditions of services, pay and 
allowances, and discipline and conduct. Such rules could also 
provide for delegation of the rule-making power to the 
Governor-General in Council or the local Governments or 
authorize the Indian Legislature or Local Legislatures to make 
laws regulating the public services but only to the extent and in 
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respect of matters as were prescribed by the rules. Thus, even 
the power of making rules as also the authority to the Indian 
Legislature and the Local Legislatures to enact Acts regulating 
the public services was derived by delegation of power made 
by the Secretary of State in Council. 
 
What is really material for the purposes of the present Appeals 
and Writ Petitions is that section 96B of the Government of 
India Act, 1919, for the first time expressly stated that every 
person in the civil service of the Crown in India held office 
"during His Majesty's pleasure". This was, however, made 
subject to three safeguards, namely – 
 
(1) a civil servant could not be dismissed by any authority 
subordinate to that by which he was appointed; 
(2) the Secretary of State in Council had the power, unless 
he provided to the contrary in the rules, to reinstate any 
person in service who had been dismissed; and 
(3)   if a civil servant appointed by the Secretary of State in 
Council thought himself wronged by an order of an official 
superior in a Governor's Province and on due application 
made to that superior did not receive the redress to which 
he considered himself entitled, he could, without prejudice 
to any other right of redress, complain to the Governor of 
the Province in order to obtain justice and the Governor 
had to examine such complaint and require such action to 
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be taken thereon as might appear to him to be just and 
equitable. 
 
The position which prevailed with respect to the civil services in 
India during the intervening period between the Government of 
India Act, 1919, and the Government of India Act, 1935 was 
that the top echelons of the important services, especially those 
working under the Provincial Governments, consisted of what 
were known as the "all India services", which governed a wide 
variety of departments. There were, in the first place, the Indian 
Civil Service and the Indian Police Service, which provided the 
framework of the administrative machinery.  
 
The said position received legislative recognition and sanction 
under the Government of India Act, 1935   often cited with the 
year and chapter of the Act in pursuance of which it was 
reprinted, namely, the Government of India (Reprinting) Act, 
1935. Part X of the 1935 Act dealt with the services of the 
Crown in India. Chapter II of Part X made provisions with 
respect to the civil services. Section 240 provided for the tenure 
of office of persons employed in civil capacities in India and 
conferred upon them certain statutory safeguards as regards 
dismissal or reduction in rank. Section 241 dealt with their 
recruitment and conditions of service. Under that section power 
to make appointments was vested in respect of central services 
in the Governor-General and in respect of the Provincial 
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services in the respective Governors. In the same manner the 
power to regulate conditions of service of the members of these 
services was conferred upon the Governor-General or the 
Governor, as the case may be. The Governor-General as also 
the Governor could authorize such person as he might direct to 
make appointments and rules with respect to the conditions of 
service. Provision was also made for enactment of Acts by 
appropriate Legislatures to regulate the conditions of service of 
persons in the civil services. It is unnecessary to look into the 
details of these provisions as the federal structure envisaged by 
the 1935 Act never came into existence as it was optional for 
the Indian States to join the proposed Federation and they did 
not give their consent thereto. Chapter III of Part X provided for 
the setting up of a Federal Public Service Commission and a 
Public Service Commission for each Province. A provision was 
also made for two or more Provinces to agree to have a joint 
Public Service Commission or for the Public Service 
Commission of one of these Provinces to serve the needs of 
the other Provinces. 
 
Section 240 of the 1935 Act provides as follows:  
"240. Tenure of office of persons employed in civil capacities in 
India. 
(1) Except as expressly provided by this Act, every person 
who is a member of a civil service of the Crown in India, 
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or holds any civil post under the Crown in India, holds 
office during His Majesty's pleasure.  
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed from the 
service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to that 
by which he was appointed. 
(3) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or 
reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable 
opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed 
to be taken in regard to him: 
Provided that this sub-section shall not apply – 
(a) where a person is dismissed or reduced in rank on the 
ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal 
charge; or 
(b)where an authority empowered to dismiss a person or 
reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be 
recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably 
practicable to give to that person an opportunity of showing 
cause. 
(4)   Notwithstanding that a person holding a civil post under the 
Crown in India holds office during His Majesty's pleasure, 
any contract under which a person, not being a. member 
of a civil service of the Crown in India, is appointed under 
this Act to hold such a post may, if the Governor-General, 
or, as the case may be, the Governor, deems it necessary 
in order to secure the services of a person having special 
qualifications, provide for the payment to him of 
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compensation, if before the expiration of an agreed period 
that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not connected 
with any misconduct on his part, required to vacate that 
post." 
 
While under the 1935 Act, as under the 1919 Act, every person 
who was a member of the civil service of the Crown in India or 
held any civil post under the Crown in India held office "during 
His Majesty's pleasure", greater safeguards were provided for 
him under the 1935 Act than under the 1919 Act. Those 
safeguards were: (1) under sub-section (2) of section 240, such 
a person could not be dismissed from service by any authority 
subordinate to that by which he was appointed, and (2) under 
sub-section (3) of section 240, such a person could not be 
dismissed or reduced in rank until he had been given a 
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action 
proposed to be taken in regard to him. 
 
The safeguard as regards a reasonable opportunity of showing 
cause provided for in section 240(3) did not exist in the 1919 
Act. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 240, however, 
took away this safeguard in the two cases set out in clauses (a) 
and (b) of the said proviso. These two cases were: (a) where a 
civil servant was dismissed or reduced in rank on ground of 
conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge, 
and (b) where an authority empowered to dismiss him or 
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reduce him in rank was satisfied that for some reason, to be 
recorded by that authority in writing, it was not reasonably 
practicable to give to that person an opportunity of showing 
cause. 
 
The Civil Services under the Indian Constitution - 
Provisions with respect to services under the Union and the 
States are made in Part XIV of the Constitution of India. This 
Part consists of two Chapters, Chapter I dealing with services 
and Chapter II dealing with Public Service Commissions for the 
Union and the States. Article 308, as originally enacted, defined 
the expression "State" occurring in Part XIV as meaning, unless 
the context otherwise required, "a State specified in Part A or B 
of the First Schedule". This Article was amended by the 
Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, which was 
passed in order to implement the scheme for reorganization of 
States. The amended Article 308 provides, "In this Part, unless 
the context otherwise requires, the expression 'State' does not 
include the State of Jammu and Kashmir." Article 309 provides 
for recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the 
Union or a State, Article 310 for the tenure of office of such 
persons, and Article 311 for the mode of dismissal, removal or 
reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under 
the Union or a State. Article 312 deals with all-India services 
and inter-alia provides that where the Council of State has 
declared by resolution supported by not less than two thirds of 
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the members present and voting that it is necessary or 
expedient in the national interest so to do, Parliament might by 
law provide for the creation of one or more all-India services 
common to the Union and the States and subject to the other 
provisions of Chapter I regulate the recruitment and conditions 
of service of persons appointed to any such service; and it 
further provides that the Indian Administrative Service and the 
Indian Police Service shall be deemed to be services created 
by Parliament under Article 312. Article 313 provides for the 
continuance in force, so far as consistent with the provisions of 
the Constitution, of all the laws in force immediately before the 
commencement of the Constitution and applicable to any public 
service or any post which continued to exist after the 
commencement of the Constitution as an all-India service or as 
service or post under the Union or a State until other provision 
was made in this behalf under the Constitution. Under clause 
(10) of Article 366 the expression "existing law" means "any 
law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or 
made before the commencement of this Constitution by any 
Legislature, authority or person having power to make such a 
law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation." Thus, all 
Acts, rules and regulations applicable to different services 
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution 
continue to apply to such services in so far as they were 
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution until amended, 
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varied, revoked or replaced by Acts, rules or regulations made 
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
 
From what has been stated above it will be seen that the 
provisions with respect to civil services in the Government of 
India Act, 1935, were taken as the basis for Chapter I of Part 
XIV of the Constitution. 
 
Articles 309, 310 and 311: 
Articles 309 and 310 were amended by the Constitution 
(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, to omit from these Articles 
the reference to the Rajpramukh. Articles 309 and 310, as so 
amended, read as follows: 
"309. Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving 
the Union or a State. Subject to the provisions of this 
Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate 
the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons appointed, 
to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the 
Union or of any State. 
Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such 
person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in 
connection with the affairs of the Union, and for the Governor of 
a State or such person as he may direct in the case of services 
and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to make 
rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of 
persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in 
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that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate 
Legislature under this article, and any rules so made shall have 
effect subject to the provisions of any such Act. 
 
"310: tenure of office of persons serving the Union or a State. 
(1) Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every 
person who is a member of a defence service or of a civil 
service of the Union or of an all-India service or holds any post 
connected with defence or any civil post under the Union holds 
office during the pleasure of the President, and every person 
who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil 
post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the 
Governor of the State. 
(2) Notwithstanding that a person holding a civil post under the 
Union or a State holds office during the pleasure of the 
President or, as the case may be, of the Governor of the State, 
any contract under which a person, not being a member of a 
defence service or of an all-India service or of a civil service of 
the Union or a State, is appointed under this Constitution to 
hold such a post may, if the President or the Governor, as the 
case may be, deems it necessary in order to secure the 
services of a person having special qualifications, provide for 
the payment to him of compensation, if before the expiration of 
an agreed period that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not 
connected with any misconduct on his part, required to vacate 
that post." 
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Article 311 as originally enacted was in the following terms: 
 
"311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons 
employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. 
(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union 
or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil 
post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed 
by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. 
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed 
or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable 
opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be 
taken in regard to him : 
Provided that this clause shall not apply - 
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank 
on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a 
criminal charge; 
(b) where an authority empowered to dismiss or remove a 
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some 
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not 
reasonably practicable to give to that person an opportunity of 
showing cause; or 
(c) where the President or Governor or Rajpramukh, as the 
case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of 
the State it is not expedient to give to that person such an 
opportunity. 
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(3) If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to 
give to any person an opportunity of showing cause under 
clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to 
dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank, as the 
case may be, shall be f inal." 
The words "or Rajpramukh" in clause (c) of the proviso to 
Article 311(2) were omitted by the Constitution (Seventh 
Amendment) Act, 1956. 
 
By the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, clauses 
(2) and (3) of Article 311 were substituted by the following 
clauses: 
"(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or 
removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he 
has been informed of the charges against him and given a 
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those 
charges and where it is proposed, after such inquiry, to impose 
on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable 
opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, 
but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such 
inquiry: 
Provided that this clause shall not apply - 
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank 
on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a 
criminal charge; or 
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(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a 
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some 
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not 
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or  
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is 
satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not 
expedient to hold such inquiry. 
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question 
arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry 
as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the 
authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to 
reduce him in rank shall be final." 
 
The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, made 
certain amendments in the substituted clause (2) of Article 311 
with effect from January 3, 1977. Article 311 as so amended 
reads as follows: 
"311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons 
employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. - (1) No 
person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-
India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post 
under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an 
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. 
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed 
or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been 
 67
informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:  
Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose 
upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on 
the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it 
shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of 
making representation on the penalty proposed: 
Provided further that this clause shall not apply –  
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in 
rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction 
on a criminal charge; or 
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a 
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some 
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not 
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or 
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, 
is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not 
expedient to hold such inquiry. 
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question 
arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry 
as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the 
authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to 
reduce him in rank shall be final." 
 
From the original and amended Article 311 set out above it will 
be noticed that of the original Article 311 only clause (1) 
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remains unaltered, while both the other clauses have become 
the subject of Constitutional amendments. No submission was 
founded by either party on the substitution of the present clause 
(3) for the original by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) 
Act, 1963, for the obvious reason that such substitution was 
made only in order to bring clause (3) in conformity with clause 
(2) as substituted by the said Amendment Act. 
 
A comparison of Article 311 of the Constitution with section 240 
of the Government of India Act, 1935, shows that the 
safeguards provided to civil servants by Article 311 are very 
much the same as those under section 240 with this difference 
that while Article 311 also affords safeguards against removal 
from service section 240 did not. Further, though the proviso to 
section 240(3) is reproduced in what originally was the only 
proviso and is now the second proviso to Article 311(2), an 
addition clause, namely, clause (c) has been added thereto. A 
provision similar to clause (3) of Article 311 was also absent 
from the Government of India Act, 1935. Thus, while on the one 
hand Article 311 enlarges the protection afforded to civil 
servants, on the other hand it increases by one the number of 
cases in which that protection can be withdrawn. 
 
The Pleasure Doctrine: 
The concept of civil service is not new or of recent origin. 
Governments - whether monarchical, dictatorial or republican - 
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have to function; and for carrying on the administration and the 
varied functions of the government a large number of persons 
are required and have always been required, whether they are 
constituted in the form of a civil service or not. Every kingdom 
and country of the world throughout history had a group of 
persons who helped the ruler to administer the land, whether 
according to modem notions we may call that group a civil 
service or not because it is not, possible for one man by himself 
to rule and govern the land and look after and supervise all the 
details of administration. As it was throughout history, so it has 
been in England and in India. 
 
In England, all public officers and servants of the Crown hold 
their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown and their 
services can be terminated at will without assigning any cause. 
By the expression "the pleasure doctrine" is conveyed this right 
of the Crown. This right is, however, subject to what may be 
provided otherwise by legislation passed by Parliament 
because in the United Kingdom, Parliament has legislative 
sovereignty. 
 
The foundations of modern European civil services were laid in 
Prussia in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and by 
Napoleon's development of a highly organized hierarchy (a 
model copied by many countries in the nineteenth century); and 
they are the basis of modern European civil services. In 
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England civil servants were originally the monarch's personal 
servants and members of the King's household. Clive's creation 
from 1765 of a civil service to govern such parts of India as 
were under the dominion of the East India Company and 
McCauley’s report on recruitment to the Indian Civil Service 
provided the inspiration for the report of 1854 on the 
organization of the permanent civil service in Britain which 
recommended recruitment by open competitive examination, 
the selection of higher civil servants on the basis of general 
intellectual attainment, and the establishment of a Civil Service 
Commission to ensure proper recruitment. 
 
In the United Kingdom, until about the middle of November 
1981, the Civil Service Department, which was set up in 1968 
with the Prime Minister, as Minister for the Civil Service, as its 
Head, looked after the management and personnel functions in 
connection with the Civil Service, which were until then being 
looked after by the treasury. These functions included the 
organization and conduct of the Civil Service and the 
remuneration, conditions of service, expenses and allowances 
of persons serving in it; mode of recruitment of persons to the 
Civil Service; the pay and allowances of, and the charges 
payable by, members of the armed forces; with certain 
exceptions, superannuation and, injury payments, 
compensation for loss of employment or loss or diminution of 
emoluments or pension rights applicable to civil servants and 
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others in the public sector and to members of the armed forces; 
the exercise by other persons and bodies of powers to 
determine, subject to the minister's sanction, the pay or 
conditions of service of members of public bodies (excluding 
judicial bodies), or the numbers, pay or conditions of service of 
staff employed by such bodies or by the holders of certain non-
judicial offices; and the appointment or employment and the 
remuneration, conditions of service, personal expenses or 
allowances of judges and judicial staff 40 
  
The Permanent Secretary to the Civil Service Department was 
the Head of the Home Civil Service and gave advice to the 
Prime Minister as to civil service appointments, decorations, 
etc. The Civil Service Department was abolished on November 
12, 1981, and its functions, instead of reverting to the Treasury, 
were divided between the Treasury and the newly created 
Management and Personnel Office. 
 
In India, the pleasure doctrine has received constitutional 
sanction by being enacted in Article 310(1). Unlike in the United 
Kingdom, in India it is not subject to any law made by 
Parliament but is subject only to what is expressly provided by 
the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
4o  Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 8. para 1162. 
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The pleasure doctrine relates to the tenure of a government 
servant. "Tenure" means "manner, conditions or term of holding 
something" according to Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, and "terms of holding; title; authority" according to 
the Oxford English Dictionary. It, therefore, means the period 
for which an incumbent of office holds it.  
 
The first time that a statute relating to the government of India 
provided that civil servants hold office during His Majesty's 
pleasure was the Government of India Act of 1919 in section 
96B of that Act. The marginal note to section 96B did not, 
however, refer to the tenure of civil servants but stated "The 
Civil Services in India". This was because, section 96B in 
addition to dealing with the tenure of civil servants also dealt 
with matters relating to their recruitment, conditions of service, 
pay, allowances, pensions, etc. The marginal note to section 
240 of the Government of India Act. 1935, however, was 
"Tenure of office of persons employed in civil capacities in 
India." The marginal note to Article 310 of the Constitution also 
refers to "tenure" and states "Tenure of office of persons 
serving the Union or a State". Thus, it is the tenure of 
government servants which Article 310(1) makes subject to the 
pleasure of the President or the Governor of a State, except as 
expressly provided by the Constitution. 
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As pointed out by Lord Hobhouse, the pleasure doctrine is 
founded upon the principle that the difficulty which would 
otherwise be experienced in dismissing those whose 
continuance in office is detrimental to the State would be such 
as seriously to impede the working of the public service41. 
Subsequently the Court of Appeal in England held that it was 
an implied term of every contract of service that servants of the 
Crown, civil as well as military, except in special cases where it 
is otherwise provided by law, hold their offices only during the 
pleasure of the Crown. In that case Lord Herschell observed: 
 
"It seems to me that it is the public interest which has led 'to the 
term which I have mentioned being imported into contracts for 
employment in the service of the Crown. The cases cited shew 
that, such employment being for the good of the public, it is 
essential for the public good that it should be capable of being 
determined at the pleasure of the Crown, except in certain 
exceptional cases where it has been deemed to be more for the 
public good that some restrictions should be imposed on the 
power of the Crown to dismiss its servants."  
 
In the same case Kay, L.J., said, “It seems to me that the 
continued employment of a civil servant might in many cases 
be as detrimental to the interests of the State as the continued 
employment of a military officer." In this case as reported in the 
                                                 
41 Shenton vs. Smith, 1895 AC 229 
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Law Times Reports series the judgments of the three learned 
judges who decided the case, though in substance the same, 
are given in very different language and the passages extracted 
above do not appear in that report. The report of the case in the 
All England Law Reports Reprint series is with very minor 
variations the same as the report in the Times Law Reports 
series but somewhat abridged. This is because the All England 
Law Reports Reprint series is a revised and annotated reprint 
of a selection from the Law Times Reports for the years 1843 to 
1935. The report from which the above extracts are given is the 
one in the Law Reports series published by the Incorporated 
Council of Law Reporting which was established in 1865 and 
which report is, therefore, more authoritative. 
 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council further held that 
where by regulations a civil service is established prescribing 
qualifications for its members and imposing some restriction on 
the power to dismiss them, such regulations should be deemed 
to be made for the public good42. 
 
The position that the pleasure doctrine is not based upon any 
special prerogative of the Crown but upon public policy has 
been accepted by the Supreme Court43. This Court has also 
accepted the principle that society has an interest in the due 
                                                 
42 Gould vs. Stuart 1896 AC 575, 578-9 JC 
43 State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Babu Ram Upadhya (1961) 2 SCR 679, 696: (AIR 1961 SC 
751 at P. 759) and Moti Ram Deka vs. General Manager, N.E.F. Railways, Maligaon, 
Pandu, (1964) 5 SCR 683,734-5: (AIR 1964 SC 600 at Pp. 620-21) 
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discharge of their duties by government servants44.  "It is true 
that the origin of Government service is contractual. There is an 
offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to his 
post or office the Government servant acquires a status and his 
rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of 
both parties, but by statute or statutory rules, which may be 
framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. In other 
words, the legal position of a Government servant is more one 
of status than of contract. The hallmark of status is the 
attachment to a legal relationship of nights and duties imposed 
by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. 
The emolument of the Government servant and his terms of 
service are governed by statute or statutory rules, which may 
be unilaterally altered by the Government without the consent 
of the employee. It is true that Art. 311 impose constitutional 
restrictions upon the power of removal granted to the President 
and the Governor under Art. 310. But it is obvious that the 
relationship between the Government and its servant is not like 
an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. 
The legal relationship is something entirely different, something 
in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual 
relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The 
duties of status are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of 
these duties society has an interest. In the language of 
jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of 
                                                 
44 Roshan Lal Tandon vs. Union of India (1968) 1 SCR 185: (AIR 1967 SC 1889) 
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which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and 
not by agreement between the parties concerned."   
 
Ministers frame policies and legislatures enact laws and lay 
down the mode in which such policies are to be carried out and 
the object of the legislation achieved. In many cases, in a 
Welfare State such as ours, such policies and statutes are 
intended to bring about socio-economic reforms and the uplift of 
the poor and disadvantaged classes. From the nature of things 
the task of efficiently and effectively implementing these 
policies and enactments, however, rests with the civil services. 
The public is, therefore, vitally interested in the efficiency and 
integrity of such services. Government servants are after all 
paid from the public exchequer to which everyone contributes 
either by way of direct or indirect taxes. Those who are paid by 
the public and are charged with public administration for public 
good must, therefore, in their turn bring to the discharge of their 
duties a sense of responsibility. The efficiency of public 
administration does not depend only upon the top echelons of 
these services. It depends as much upon all the other members 
of such services, even on those in the most subordinate posts. 
For instance, railways do not run because of the members of 
the Railway Board or the General Mangers of different railways 
or the heads of different departments of the railway 
administration. They run also because of engine drivers, 
firemen, signalmen, booking clerks and those holding hundred 
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other similar posts. Similarly, it is not the administrative heads 
who alone can see to the proper functioning of the post and 
telegraph service. For a service to run efficiently there must, 
therefore, be a collective sense of responsibility. But for a 
government servant to discharge his duties faithfully and 
conscientiously, he must have a feeling of security of tenure. 
Under our Constitution, this is provided for by the Acts and 
rules made under Article 309 as also by the safeguards in 
respect of the punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in 
rank provided in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311. It is, 
however, as much in public interest and for public good that 
government servants who are inefficient, dishonest or corrupt or 
have become a security risk should not continue in service and 
that the protection afforded to them by the Acts and rules made 
under Article 309 and by Article 311 be not abused by them to 
the detriment of public interest and public good. When a 
situation as envisaged in one of the three clauses of the second 
proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 arises and the relevant 
clause is properly applied and the disciplinary inquiry dispensed 
with, the concerned government servant cannot be heard to 
complain that he is deprived of his livelihood. The livelihood of 
an individual is a matter of great concern to him and his family 
but his livelihood is a matter of his private interest and where 
such livelihood is provided by the public exchequer and the 
taking away of such livelihood is in the public interest and for 
public good, the former must yield to the latter. These 
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consequences follow not because the pleasure doctrine is a 
special prerogative of the British Crown which has been 
inherited by India and transposed into our Constitution adapted 
to suit the Constitutional set up of our Republic but because 
public policy requires, public interest needs and public good 
demands that there should be such a doctrine. 
 
It is thus clear that the pleasure doctrine embodied in Article 
310(1), the protection afforded to civil servants by clauses (1) 
and (2) of Article 311 and the withdrawal of the protection under 
clause (2) of Article 311 by the second proviso thereto are all 
provided in the Constitution on the ground of public policy and 
in the public interest and are for public good. 
 
The Scope of the Pleasure Doctrine: 
While under section 96B (1) of the Government of India Act of 
1919 the holding of office in the civil service of the Crown in 
India "during His Majesty's pleasure" was "Subject to the 
provisions of this Act and the rules made there under", under 
section 240(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the 
holding of such office during His Majesty's pleasure was 
"Except as expressly provided by this Act." Similarly, the 
pleasure doctrine as enacted in Article 310(1) is not an absolute 
one and is not untrammelled or free of all fetters, but operates 
"Except as expressly provided by this Constitution". The 
constitutional restrictions on the exercise of pleasure under 
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Article 310(1) other than those contained in Article 311 will be 
considered later but what is immediately relevant is the group of 
Articles consisting of Articles 309, 310 and 311. These three 
Articles are interlinked and form an integrated whole. There is 
an organic and thematic unity running through them and it is 
now necessary to see the interplay of these three Articles. 
 
These Articles occur in Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution. 
Part XIV is entitled "Services under the Union and the States" 
and Chapter I thereof is entitled "Services". While Article 309 
deals with the recruitment and conditions of service of persons 
appointed to the public services and posts in connection with 
the affairs of the Union or a State, Article 310 deals with the 
tenure of office of members of the defence services and of civil 
services of the Union and the States and Article 311 provides 
certain safeguards to persons employed in civil capacities 
under the Union or a State but not to members of the defence 
services. The first thing which is required to be noticed about 
Article 309 is that it itself makes no provision for recruitment or 
conditions of service of government servants but confers power 
upon the appropriate Legislature to make laws and upon the 
President and the Governor of a State to make rules in respect 
of these matters. The passing of these Acts and the framing of 
these rules are, however, made "Subject to the provisions of 
this Constitution". This phrase which precedes and qualifies the 
power conferred by Article 309 is significantly different from the 
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qualifying phrase in Article 310(1) which is "Except as expressly 
provided by this Constitution". 
 
With reference to the words "conditions of service" occurring in 
section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, under which 
the conditions of service of the subordinate ranks of the various 
police forces in India were to be determined by or under Acts 
relating to those forces, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council held that this expression included provisions which 
prescribed the circumstances under which the employer would 
be entitled to terminate the service of an employee, whether 
such provisions were constitutional or statutory45. 
 
The Supreme Court held that the expression "conditions of 
service" means all those conditions which regulate the holding 
of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment until 
his retirement and even beyond it in matters like pension etc. 
and would include the right to dismiss such persons from 
service46. Thus, as pointed out a law can be made by the 
appropriate Legislature or a rule by the appropriate executive 
under Article 309 prescribing the procedure and the authority by 
whom disciplinary action can be taken against a government 
servant47. Thus the functions with respect to the civil service 
which in England until 1968 were being performed by the 
                                                 
45 North-West Frontier Province vs. Suraj Narain Anand (1948) 75 Ind App 343, 352-3: 
(AIR 1949 PC 112 at P. 114) 
46 State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shardul Singh (1970) 3 SCR 302, 305-6 
47 Sardari Lal vs. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 1547 at P. 1549 
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Treasury and thereafter by the Civil Service Department and 
from mid-November 1981 are being performed partly by the 
Treasury and partly by the Management & Personnel Office are 
in India under Article 309 of the Constitution to be performed 
with respect to not only persons, employed in civil capacities 
but with respect to all persons appointed to public services and 
posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State by 
authorities appointed under or specified in Acts made under 
Article 309 or rules made under such Acts or made under the 
proviso to that Article. 
 
As the making of such laws and the framing of such rules are 
subject to the provisions of the Constitution, if any such Act or 
rule violates any of the provisions of the Constitution, it would 
be void.  If any such Act or rule trespasses upon the rights 
guaranteed to government servants by Article 311, it would be 
void. Similarly, such Acts and rules cannot abridge or restrict 
the pleasure of the President or the Governor of a State 
exercisable under Article 310 (1) further than what the 
Constitution has expressly done. In the same way, such Act or 
rule would be void if it violates any Fundamental Right 
guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution48.  
 
Which would be the appropriate Legislature to enact laws or the 
appropriate authority to frame rules would depend upon the 
                                                 
48 Moti Ram Deka's case AIR 1964 SC 600,  
 82
provisions of the Constitution with respect to legislative 
competence and the division of legislative powers. Thus, for 
instance, under Entry 70 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the 
Constitution, Union Public Services, all-India Services and 
Union Public Service Commission are subjects which fall within 
the exclusive legislative field of Parliament, while under Entry 
41 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, State 
Public Services and State Public Service Commission fall within 
the exclusive legislative field of the State Legislatures. The 
rules framed, by the President or the Governor of a State must 
also, therefore, conform to these legislative powers. It is, 
however, not necessary that the Act of an appropriate 
Legislature should specifically deal with a particular service. It is 
sufficient if it is an Act as contemplated by Article 309 by which 
provision is made regulating the recruitment and conditions in a 
service49.   
 
It was at one time thought that the right of a government 
servant to recover arrears of salary fell within the ambit of the 
pleasure doctrine and a servant of the Crown, therefore, cannot 
sue for his salary, it being a bounty of the Crown and not a 
contractual debt50. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme 
Court pointed out that the attention of the Judicial Committee 
was not drawn to section 60 and the other relevant provisions 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and that the rule of 
                                                 
49 Ram Pal Chaturvedi vs. State of Rajasthan, (1970) 2 SCR 559, 564) 
50 Mulvenna vs. The Admiralty, 1926 SC (Sessions Cases) 842 
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English law that a Crown servant cannot maintain a suit against 
the Crown for recovery of arrears of salary did not prevail in 
India as it has been negatived by the provisions of statutory law 
in India51.  
 
As seen earlier, in India for the first time a fetter was imposed 
upon the pleasure of the Crown to terminate the service of any 
of its servants by section 96B of the Government of India Act, 
1919, but that was only with respect to the authority, which 
could dismiss him. In that section the holding of office "during 
His Majesty's pleasure" was made subject to both the 
provisions of that Act and the rules made there under. Under 
the Government of India Act, 1935, the reference to the rules to 
be made under the Act was omitted and the tenure of office of a 
civil servant was to be "during His Majesty's pleasure except as 
expressly provided" by that Act. Article 310(1) adopts the same 
phraseology as in section 240 of the 1935 Act. Under it also the 
holding of an office is during the pleasure of the President or 
The Governor "Except as specifically provided by this 
Constitution". Therefore, the only fetter which is placed on the 
exercise of such pleasure is when it is expressly so provided in 
the Constitution itself, that is, when there is an express 
provision in that behalf in the Constitution. Express provisions 
in that behalf are to be found in the case of certain 
Constitutional functionaries in respect of whose tenure special 
                                                 
51 State of Bihar vs. Abdul Majid AIR 1954 SC 245 
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provision is made in the Constitution as, for instance, in clauses 
(4) and (5) of Article 124 with respect to Judges of the Supreme 
Court, Article 218 with respect to Judges of the High Court, 
Article 148(1) with respect to the Comptroller and Auditor-
General of India, Article 324(1) with respect to the Chief 
Election Commissioner, and Article 324(5) with respect to the 
Election Commissioners and Regional Commissioners. 
 
Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 impose restrictions upon the 
exercise by the President or the Governor of a State of his 
pleasure under Article 310(1). These are express provisions 
with respect to termination of service by dismissal or removal 
as also with respect to reduction in rank of a civil servant and 
thus come within the ambit of the expression "Except as 
otherwise provided by this "Constitution" qualifying Article 
310(1). Article 311 is thus an exception to Article 310 and was 
described as operating as a proviso to Article 310(l) though set 
out in a separate Article52. Article 309 is, however, not such an 
exception. It does not lay down any express provision which 
would derogate from the amplitude of the exercise of pleasure 
under Article 310(l), It merely confers upon the appropriate 
Legislature or executive the power to make laws and frame 
rules but this power is made subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution. Thus, Article 309 is subject to Article 310(l) and 
any provision restricting the exercise of the pleasure of the 
                                                 
52 Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 at P. 41 
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President or Governor in an Act or rule made or framed under 
Article 309 not being an express provision of the Constitution, 
cannot fall within the expression "Except as expressly provided 
by this Constitution" occurring in Article 310(l) and would be in 
conflict with Article 310(l) and must be held to be 
unconstitutional. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 expressly 
restrict the manner in which a Government servant can be 
dismissed, removed or reduced in rank and unless an Act made 
or rule framed under Article 309, also conforms to these 
restrictions, it would be void The restrictions placed by clauses 
(1) and (2) of Article 311 are two: (1) with respect to the 
authority empowered to dismiss or remove a Government 
servant provided for in clause (1) of Article 311; and (2) with 
respect to the procedure for dismissal, removal or reduction in 
rank of a government servant provided for in clause (2). The 
second proviso to Article 311 (2), which is the central point of 
controversy in these Appeals and Writ Petitions, lifts the 
restriction imposed by Article 311 (2) in the cases specified in 
the three clauses of that proviso. 
 
None of these three Articles (namely, Articles 309, 310 and 
311) sets out the grounds for dismissal, removal or reduction in 
rank of a government servant or for imposition of any other 
penalty upon him or states what those other penalties are. 
These are matters which are left to be dealt with by Acts and 
rules made under Article 309. There are two classes of 
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penalties in service jurisprudence, namely, minor penalties and 
major penalties. Amongst minor penalties are censure, 
withholding of promotion and withholding of increments, of pay. 
Amongst major penalties is dismissal or removal from service, 
compulsory retirement and reduction in rank. Minor penalties do 
not affect the tenure of a government servant but the penalty of 
dismissal or removal does because these two penalties bring to 
an end the service of a government Servant. It is also now well 
established that compulsory retirement by way of penalty 
amounts to removal from service. So this penalty also affects 
the tenure of a government servant. Reduction in rank does not 
terminate the employment of a government servant and it 
would, therefore, be difficult to say that it affects the tenure of a 
government servant. It may, however, be argued that it does 
brink to an end the holding of office in a particular rank and 
from that point of view it affects the government servant's 
tenure in the rank from which he is reduced.   
 
Exercise of Pleasure: 
A question which arises in this connection is whether the 
pleasure of the President or the Governor under Article 310(1) 
is to be exercised by the President or the Governor personally 
or it can be exercised by a delegate or some other authority 
empowered under the Constitution or by an Act or Rules made 
under Article 309. This question came up for consideration 
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before a Constitution Bench of the apex court53. The majority of 
the Court (speaking through Subba Rao, J., as he then was) 
stated the conclusions it had reached in the form of seven 
propositions. These propositions are: 
(1)     In India every person who is a member of a public service 
described in Article 310 of the Constitution holds office 
during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as 
the case may be, subject to the express provisions 
therein. 
(2)   The power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure is 
outside the scope of Article 154 and, therefore, cannot be 
delegated by the Governor to a subordinate officer, and 
can be exercised by him only in the manner prescribed by 
the Constitution. 
(3)    This tenure is subject to the limitations or qualifications 
mentioned in Article 311, of the Constitution. 
(4)   The Parliament or the Legislatures of States cannot make 
a law abrogating or modifying this tenure so as to impinge 
upon the overriding power conferred upon the President 
or the Governor under Article 310, as qualified by Article 
311. 
(5)  The Parliament or the Legislatures of States can make a 
law regulating the conditions of service of such a member 
which includes proceedings by way of disciplinary action, 
without affecting the powers of the President or the 
                                                 
53 Babu Ram Upadhya's case AIR 1961 SC 751. 
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Governor under Article 310 of the Constitution read with 
Article 311 thereof. 
(6)   The Parliament and the Legislatures also can make a law 
laying down and regulating the scope and content of the 
doctrine of reasonable opportunity' embodied in Article. 
311 of the Constitution; but the said law would be subject 
to judicial review. 
(7)  If a statute could be made by Legislatures within the 
foregoing permissible limits, the rules made by an 
authority in exercise of the power conferred there under 
would likewise be efficacious within the said limits. 
 
The question came to be reconsidered by a larger Bench of 
seven Judges54. While referring to the judgment of the majority 
in Babu Ram Upadhya's case supra the Court observed "What 
the said Judgment has held is that while Art. 310 provides for 
tenure at pleasure of the President or the Governor, Art. 309 
enables the legislature or the executive, as the case may be, to 
make any law or rule in regard, inter alia, to conditions of 
service without impinging upon the overriding power recognised 
under Art 310. In other words, in exercising the power conferred 
by Art. 309 the extent of the pleasure recognised by Art. 310 
cannot be affected, or impaired. In fact, while stating the 
conclusions in the form of proposition the said judgment has 
observed that the Parliament or the Legislature can make a law 
                                                 
54 Moti Ram Deka's case  AIR 1964 SC 600 
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regulating the conditions of service without affecting the powers 
of the President or the Governor under Art. 310 read with Art. 
311. It has also been stated at the same place that the power to 
dismiss a public servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Art. 
154 and, therefore, cannot be delegated by the Governor to a 
subordinate officer and can be exercised by him only in the 
manner prescribed by the Constitution. In the context, it would 
be clear that this latter observation is not intended to lay down 
that a law cannot be made under Art 309 or a Rule cannot be 
framed under the proviso to the said Article prescribing the 
procedure by which, and the authority by whom, the said 
pleasure can be exercised. This observation which is 
mentioned as proposition number (2) must be read along with 
the subsequent propositions specified as (3), (4), (5) & (6). The 
only point made is that whatever is done under Art. 309 must 
be subject to the pleasure prescribed by Art. 310." 
 
The Supreme Court it was held that where the President or the 
Governor, as the case may be, if satisfied, makes an order 
under clause (c) of what is now the second proviso to Article 
311(2) that in the interest of the security of the State it is not 
expedient to hold an inquiry for dismissal or removal or 
reduction in rank of an officer, the satisfaction of the President 
or the Governor must be his personal satisfaction55. The 
correctness of this view was considered by a seven-Judge 
                                                 
55 Sardari Lal vs. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 1547 
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Bench of the Supreme Court.56 It was categorically stated in that 
case that the majority view in Babu Ram Upadhya's case was 
no longer good law after the decision in Moti Ram Deka's case. 
Referring to these two cases the Court observed "This Court in 
Babu Rarn Upadhya’s case held that the power of the Governor 
to dismiss at pleasure, subject to the provisions of Article 311, 
is not an executive power under Article 154 but a Constitutional 
power and is not capable of being delegated to officers 
subordinate to him. The effect of the judgment in Babu Ram 
Upadhya's case (supra) was that the Governor could not 
delegate his pleasure to any officer nor could any law provide 
for the exercise of that pleasure by an officer with the result that 
statutory rules governing dismissal are binding on every officer 
though they were subject to the overriding pleasure of the 
Governor. This would mean that the officer was bound by the 
Rules but the Governor was not. "In Babu Ram Upadhya's case 
(supra) the majority view stated seven propositions of the 
report. Proposition No. 2 is that the power to dismiss a public 
servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Article 154 and 
therefore cannot be delegated by the Governor to a subordinate 
officer and can be exercised by him only in the manner 
prescribed by the Constitution. Propositions Nos. 3 and 4 are 
these. The tenure of a public servant is subject to the limitations 
or qualifications mentioned in Article 311 of the Constitution. 
The Parliament or the Legislatures of States cannot make a law 
                                                 
56 Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab  AIR 1974 SC 2192 
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abrogating or modifying this tenure so as to impinge upon the 
overriding power  conferred upon the President or the Governor 
under Article 310 as qualified by Article 311. That the 
Parliament or the Legislatures of States can make a law 
regulating the conditions of service of such a member which 
includes proceedings by way of disciplinary action, without 
affecting the powers of the President or the Governor under 
Article 310 of the Constitution read with Article 311. Proposition 
No. 6 is that the Parliament and the Legislatures also can make 
a law laying down and regulating the scope and content of the 
doctrine of reasonable opportunity' embodied in Article 311, but 
the said law would be subject to judicial review. "As these 
propositions were reviewed by the majority opinion of this Court 
in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) and this Court restated that 
proposition No. 2 must be read along with the subsequent 
propositions specified as propositions Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6. The 
ruling in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) is that a law can be 
framed prescribing the procedure by which and the authority by 
whom the said pleasure can be exercised. The pleasure of the 
President or the Governor to dismiss can therefore not only be 
delegated but is also subject to Article 311. The true position as 
laid down in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra) is that Articles 310 
and 311 must no doubt be read together but once the true 
scope and effect of Article 311 is determined the scope of 
Article 310 (1) must be limited in the sense that in regard to 
cases falling under Article 311 (2) the: Pleasure mentioned in 
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Article 310(2) must be exercised in accordance with the 
requirements of Article 311. "The majority view in Babu Ram 
Upadhya's case (supra) is no longer good law after the decision 
in Moti Ram Deka's case (supra). The theory that only the 
President or the Governor is Personally to exercise pleasure of 
dismissing or removing a public servant is repelled by express 
words in Article 311 that no person who is a member of the civil 
service or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be 
dismissed or removed by authority subordinate to that by which 
he was appointed. The words dismissed or removed by an 
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed 
indicate that the pleasure of the President or the Governor is 
exercised by such officers on whom the President or the 
Governor confers or delegates power." The Court then stated 
its conclusion as follows "For the foregoing reasons we hold 
that the President or the Governor acts on the aid and advice of 
the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head in 
the case of the Union and the Chief Minister as the head in the 
case of State in all matters which vest in the executive whether 
those functions are executive or legislative in character. Neither 
the President nor the Governor is to exercise the executive 
functions personally." 
 
The position, therefore, is that the pleasure of the President or 
the Governor is not required to be exercised by either of them, 
personally, and that is indeed obvious from the language of 
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Article 311. Under clause (1) of that Article a government 
servant cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority 
subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The question of 
an authority equal or superior in rank to the appointing authority 
cannot arise if the power to dismiss or remove is to be 
exercised by the President or the Governor personally. Clause 
(b) of the second proviso to Article 311 equally makes this clear 
when the power to dispense with an inquiry is conferred by it 
upon the authority empowered to dismiss, remove or reduce in 
rank a government servant in a case where such authority is 
satisfied that for some reason, to recorded by that authority in 
writing it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry, 
because if it was the personal satisfaction of the President or 
the Governor, the question of the satisfaction of any authority 
empowered to dismiss or remove or reduce in rank a 
government servant would not arise. Thus, though under Article 
310 (1) the tenure of a government servant is at the pleasure of 
the President or the Governor, the exercise of such pleasure 
can be either by the President or the Governor acting with the 
aid and on the advice of the Council of Ministers or by the 
authority specified in Acts made under Article 309 or in rules 
made under such Acts or made under the proviso to Article 
309; and in the case of clause (c) of the second proviso to 
Article 311(2) the inquiry, is to be dispensed with not on the 
personal satisfaction of the President or the Governor but on 
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his satisfaction arrived at with the aid and on the advice of the 
Council of Ministers. 
 
The Second Proviso to Article 311 (2) 
Clause (2) of Article 311 gives a constitutional mandate to the 
principles of natural justice and the audi alteram partem rule by 
providing that a person employed in a civil capacity under the 
Union or a State shall not be dismissed or removed from 
service or reduced in rank until after an inquiry in which he has 
been informed of the charges against him and has been given a 
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those 
charges. To this extent, the pleasure doctrine enacted in Article 
310(l) is abridged because Article 311(2) is an express 
provision of the Constitution. This safeguard provided for a 
government servant by clause (2) of Article 311 is, however, 
taken away when the second proviso to that clause becomes 
applicable. The safeguard provided by clause (1) of Article 311, 
however, remains intact and continues to be available to the 
government servant, The second proviso to Article 311(2) 
becomes applicable in the three cases mentioned in clauses (a) 
to (c) of that proviso. These cases are: 
 
(a) where a person is dismissed or remove or reduced in 
rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his 
conviction on a criminal charge; or 
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(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a 
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some 
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not 
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; and 
 
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, 
is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it 
is not expedient to hold such inquiry. 
 
The construction to be placed upon the second proviso and the 
scope and effect of that proviso were much debated at the Bar 
in the Supreme Court57 as follows: "In construing a statutory 
provision, the first and the foremost rule of construction is the 
literary construction. All that we have to see at the very outset is 
what does that provision say? If the provision is unambiguous 
and if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, we need 
not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The 
other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid only 
when the legislative intention is not clear. Ordinarily a proviso to 
a section is intended to take out a part of the main section for 
special treatment. It is not expected to enlarge the scope of the 
main section. But cases have arisen in which this Court has 
held that despite the fact that a provision is called proviso, it is 
really a separate provision and the so called proviso has 
substantially altered the main section."  
                                                 
57 Hira Lal Rattan Lal vs. State of U. P. AIR 1973 SC 1034 
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The language of the second proviso is plain and unambiguous. 
The keywords in the second proviso are "this clause shall not 
apply" By "this clause" is meant clause (2). As clause (2) 
requires an inquiry to be held against a government servant, 
the only meaning attributable to these words is that this inquiry 
shall not be held. There is no scope for any ambiguity in these 
words and there is no reason to give them any meaning 
different from the plain and ordinary meaning, which they bear. 
The resultant effect of these words is that when a situation 
envisaged in any of the three clauses of the proviso arises and 
that clause becomes applicable, the safeguard provided to a 
government servant by clause (2) is taken away. As pointed out 
earlier, this provision is as much in public interest and for public 
good and a matter of public policy as the pleasure doctrine and 
the safeguards with respect to security of tenure contained in 
clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311. 
 
Before, however, any clause of the second proviso can come 
into play the condition laid down in it must be satisfied. The 
condition for the application of each of these clauses is 
different. In the case of clause (a) a government servant must 
be guilty of conduct deserving the penalty of dismissal; removal 
or reduction in rank, which conduct, has led to him being 
convicted on a criminal charge. In the case of clause (b) the 
disciplinary authority must be satisfied that it is not reasonably 
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practicable to hold an inquiry. In the case of clause (c) the 
President or the Governor of a State, as the case may be, must 
be satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is 
not expedient to hold an inquiry. The paramount thing, 
however, to bear in mind is that the second proviso will apply 
only where the conduct of a government servant is such as he 
deserves the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in 
rank. If the conduct is such as to deserve a punishment 
different from those mentioned above, the second proviso 
cannot come into play at all, because Article 311 (2) is itself 
confined only to these three penalties. Therefore, before 
denying a government servant his constitutional right to an 
inquiry, the first consideration would be whether the conduct of 
the concerned government servant is such as justifies the 
penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Once that 
conclusion is reached and the condition specified in the 
relevant clause of the second proviso is satisfied, that proviso 
becomes applicable and the government servant is not entitled 
to an inquiry. The extent to which a government servant can be 
denied his right to an inquiry formed the subject-matter of 
considerable debate at the Bar and we, therefore, now turn to 
the question whether under the second proviso to Article 311(2) 
even though the inquiry is dispensed with some opportunity at 
least should not be afforded to the government servant so that 
he is not left wholly without protection, As most of the 
arguments on this part of the case were common to all the 
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three clauses of the second proviso, it will be convenient at this 
stage to deal at one place with all the arguments on this part of 
the case, leaving aside to be separately dealt with the other 
arguments pertaining only to a particular clause of the second 
proviso. 
 
The Extent of Denial of Opportunity under the Second 
Proviso - 
That an inquiry consists of several stages and, therefore, even 
where by the application of the second proviso the full inquiry is 
dispensed with, there is nothing to prevent the disciplinary 
authority from holding at least a minimal inquiry because no 
prejudice can be caused by doing so. It was further submitted 
that even though the three clauses of the second proviso are 
different in their content, it was feasible in the case of each of 
the three clauses to give to the government servant an 
opportunity of showing cause against the penalty proposed to 
be imposed so as to enable him to convince the disciplinary 
authority that the nature of the misconduct attributed to him did 
not call for his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. For 
instance, in a case falling under clause (a) the government 
servant can point out that the offence of which he was 
convicted was a trivial or a technical one in respect of which the 
criminal court had taken a lenient view and had sentenced him 
to pay a nominal fine or had given him the benefit of probation. 
It was further submitted that apart from the opportunity to show 
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cause against the proposed penalty it was also feasible to give 
a further opportunity in the case of each of the three clauses 
though such opportunity in each case may not be identical. 
Thus, it was argued that the charge-sheet or at least a notice 
informing the government servant of the charges against him 
and calling for his explanation thereto was always feasible. It 
was further argued that though under clause (a) of the second 
proviso an inquiry into the conduct which led to the conviction of 
the government servant on a criminal charge would not be 
necessary, such a notice would enable him to point out that it 
was a case of mistaken identity and he was not the person who 
had been convicted but was an altogether different individual. It 
was urged that there could be no practical difficulty in serving 
such charge-sheet to the concerned government servant 
because even if he were sentenced to imprisonment, the 
charge sheet or notice with respect to the proposed penalty can 
always be sent to the jail in which he is serving his sentence. 
So far as clause (b) is concerned, it was argued that even 
though it may not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, 
the explanation of the government servant can at least be 
asked for with respect to the charges made against him so that 
he would have an opportunity of showing in his written reply 
that he was not guilty of any of those charges. It was also 
argued that assuming such government servant was 
absconding the notice could be sent by registered post to his 
last known address or pasted there. Similar arguments as in 
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case of clause (b) were advanced with respect to clause (c). It 
was submitted that the disciplinary authority could never make 
up its mind whether to dismiss or remove or reduce in rank a 
government servant unless such minimal opportunity at least 
was afforded to the government servant. Support for these 
contentions was sought to be derived from (1) the language of 
Article 311 (2) and the implications flowing there from, (2) the 
principles of natural justice including the audi alteram partem 
rule comprehended in Article 14, and (3) the language of 
certain rules made either under Acts referable to Article 309 or 
made under the proviso to that Article. We will consider the 
contentions with respect to each of these bases separately. 
 
So far as Article 311(2) was concerned, it was said that the 
language of the second proviso did not negative every single 
opportunity, which could be afforded to a government servant 
under different situations though the nature of such opportunity 
may be different depending upon the circumstances of the 
case. It was further submitted that the object of Article 311(2) 
was that no government servant should be condemned 
unheard and dismissed or removed or reduced in rank without 
affording him at least some chance of either showing his 
innocence or convincing the disciplinary authority that the 
proposed penalty was too drastic and was uncalled for in his 
case and a lesser penalty should therefore, be imposed upon 
him.   
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The language of the second proviso to Article 311(2) read in the 
light of the interpretation placed upon clause (2) of Article 311 
as originally enacted and the legislative history of that clause 
wholly rule out the giving of any opportunity. While construing 
Ruler 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and 
Appeal) Rules and the phrase "a reasonable opportunity of 
showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in 
regard to him" occurring  in sub-section (3) of section 240 of  
the Government of India Act, 1935.  
 
The very phrase "a reasonable opportunity of showing cause 
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him" in 
sub- section (3), of section 240 of the Government of India Act, 
1935, was repeated in clause (2) of Article 311 as originally 
enacted, that is, in the said clause prior to its amendment by 
the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963. Approving 
the construction placed by the Judicial Committee upon this 
phrase, the Supreme Court held as follows58: "It is true that the 
provision does not, in terms, refer to different stages at which 
opportunity is to be given to the officer concerned. All that it 
says is that the government servant must be given a 
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action 
proposed to be taken in regard to him. He must not only be 
given an opportunity but such opportunity must be a reasonable 
                                                 
58 Khem Chand vs. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 300 
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one: In order that the opportunity to show cause against the 
proposed action may be regarded as a reasonable one, it is 
quite obviously necessary that the government servant should 
have the opportunity, to say, if that be his case, that he  has not 
been guilty of any misconduct to merit any punishment at all 
and also that the particular punishment proposed to be given is 
much more drastic and severe than he deserves. If it is open to 
the government servant under this provision to contend, if that 
be the fact, that he is not guilty of any misconduct then how can 
he take that plea unless he is told what misconduct is alleged 
against him? If the opportunity to show cause is to be a 
reasonable one it is clear that he should be informed about the 
charge or charges levelled against him and the evidence by 
which it is sought to be established, for it is only then that he 
will be able to put forward his defence. If the purpose of this 
provision is to give the government servant an opportunity to 
exonerate himself from the charge and if this opportunity is to 
be a reasonable one he should be allowed to show that the 
evidence against, him is not worthy of credence or 
consideration and that he can only do if he is given a chance to 
cross-examine the witnesses called against him and to examine 
himself or any other witness in support of his defence. All this 
appears to us to be implicit in the language used in the clause, 
but this does not exhaust his rights, In addition to showing that 
he has not been guilty of any misconduct so as to merit any 
punishment, it is reasonable that he should also have an 
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opportunity to contend that the charges proved against him do 
not necessarily require the particular punishment proposed to 
be meted out to him. He may say, for instance, that although he 
has been guilty of some misconduct it is not of such a character 
as to merit the extreme punishment of dismissal or even of 
removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser" 
punishments ought to be sufficient in his case. 
 
 To summarize: the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the 
provision, under consideration includes:- 
 
(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, 
which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled 
against him are and the allegations on which such charges 
are based; 
 
(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the 
witnesses produced against him and by examining himself 
or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally 
 
(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the 
proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which 
he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is 
over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise 
of the charges proved against the government servant 
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tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments 
and communicates the same to the government servant.  
 
In short the substance of the protection provided by rules, like 
R. 55 referred to above, was bodily lifted out of the rules and 
together with an additional opportunity embodied in S. 240 (3) 
of the Government of India Act, 1935 so as to give a statutory 
protection to the government servants and has now been 
incorporated in Art. 311 (2) so as to convert the protection into 
a constitutional safeguard. 
 
As for the concern under clause (a) of the second proviso a 
government servant could be wrongly dismissed, removed or 
reduced in rank mistaking him for another with the same name 
unless, he is given an opportunity of bringing to the notice of 
the disciplinary authority that he is not the individual who has 
been convicted, it can only be described as being too fanciful 
and far-fetched for though such a case of mistaken identity may 
be hypothetically possible, it is highly improbable. As in all other 
organizations, there is in government service an extremely 
active grapevine, both departmental and interdepartmental, 
which is constantly active, humming and bumming with service 
news and office gossip, and it would indeed to strange if the 
news that a member of a department was facing prosecution or 
had been convicted were' to remain a secret for long. Assuming 
such a case occurs, the government servant is not without any 
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remedy. He can prove in a departmental appeal which service 
rules provide   for, save in exceptional cases, that he has been 
wrongly mistaken for another, Similarly, it not possible to accept 
the argument that unless a written explanation with respect to 
the charge is asked for from a government servant and his side 
of the case known, the penalty which would be imposed upon 
him, could be grossly out of proportion to his actual misconduct 
The disciplinary authorities are expected to act justly and fairly 
after taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the 
case and if they act arbitrarily and impose a penalty which is 
unduly excessive, capricious or vindictive, it can be set aside in 
a departmental appeal. In any event, the remedy by way of 
judicial review is always open to a government servant. 
 
The position which emerges from the above discussion is that 
the keywords of the second proviso govern each and every 
clause of that proviso and leave no scope for any kind of 
opportunity to be given to a government servant. The phrase 
"this clause shall not apply" is mandatory and not directory. It is 
in the nature of a Constitutional prohibitory injunction restraining 
the disciplinary authority from holding an inquiry under Article 
311 (2) or from giving any kind of opportunity to the concerned 
government servant. There is thus no scope for introducing into 
the second proviso sonic kind of inquiry or opportunity by a 
process of inference or implication. The maxim "expressum 
facit cessare tacitum" ("when there is express mention of 
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certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded")59 this 
well-known maxim is a principle of logic and common sense 
and not merely a technical rule of construction. The second 
proviso expressly mentions that clause (2) shall not apply 
where one of the clauses of that proviso becomes applicable. 
This express mention excludes everything that clause (2) 
contains and there can be no scope for once again introducing 
the opportunities provided by clause (2) or any one of them into 
the second proviso.  
 
 After all, it is not as if a government servant is without any 
remedy when the second proviso has been applied to him. 
There are two remedies open to him, namely, departmental 
appeal and judicial review.  
 
Article 14 and the Second Proviso: "Does Article 14 make any 
difference to the consequences which flow from the second 
proviso to Article 311(2)?" It was submitted very oftenly the 
government servants that Article 14 in which the principles of 
natural justice are comprehended permeates the entire 
Constitution and, therefore, Article 14 must be read into the 
second proviso to Article 311 (2) and accordingly, if not under 
that proviso read by itself, under it read with Article 14 a 
government servant is entitled to an opportunity both of 
showing cause against the charges made against him as also 
                                                 
59 B. Shankara Rao Badami vs. State of Mysore AIR 1969 SC 453   
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against. the penalty proposed to' be imposed upon him, though 
such opportunity may not extend to the holding of a complete 
and elaborate inquiry as would be the case where clause (2) of 
Article 311 applies; According to learned Counsel this is what is 
required by the audi alteram partem  rule which is one of the two 
main principles of natural justice. In the alternative it was 
submitted that though an order may be valid and supportable 
under the second proviso to Article 311(2), it could none the 
less be void under Article 14 on the ground that the principles of 
natural justice have been wholly disregarded. These arguments 
are based upon an imperfect understanding of the principles of 
natural justice in their application in courts of law to the 
adjudication of causes before them and the function of Article 
14 vis-a-vis the other provisions of the Constitution and 
particularly the second proviso to Article 311(2).  
 
The principles of natural justice are not the creation of Article 
14. Article 14 is not their begetter but their Constitutional 
guardian. Principles of natural justice trace their ancestry to 
ancient civilizations and centuries long past. Until about two 
centuries ago the term "natural justice" was often used 
interchangeably with "natural law" and at times it is still so used. 
The expression "natural law" has been variously defined. In. 
Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law60 it is defined as "rules 
derived from God, reason or nature, as distinct from man-made 
                                                 
60 (Second Edition, page 1221) 
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law." Black's Law   states: "This expression, 'natural law,' or jus 
naturale, was largely used in the philosophical speculations of 
the Roman jurists of the Antonine age, and was intended to 
denote a system of rules and principles for the guidance of 
human conduct which, independently of enacted law or of the 
systems peculiar to any one people, might be discovered by the 
rational intelligence of man, and would be found to grow out of 
and conform to his nature, meaning by that word his whole 
mental, moral, and physical constitution. The point of departure 
for this conception was the Stoic doctrine of a life ordered 
'according to nature, which in its turn rested upon the purely 
supposititious existence, in primitive. times, of a state of nature; 
that is, a condition of society in which men universally were 
governed, solely by a rational and consistent obedience to the 
needs, impulses, and promptings of their true nature, such 
nature being as yet undefaced by dishonesty, falsehood, or 
indulgence of the baser passions. In ethics, it consists in 
practical universal judgments which man himself elicits. These 
express necessary and obligatory rules of human conduct 
which have been established by the author of human nature as 
essential to the divine purposes in the universe and have been 
promulgated by God solely through human reason." 
 
There are certain basic values which man has cherished 
throughout the ages. But man looked about him and found the 
ways of men to be cruel and unjust and so also their laws and 
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customs. He saw men flogged, tortured, mutilated, made 
slaves, and sentenced to row the galleys or to toil in the 
darkness of the mines or to fight in an arena with wild and 
hungry beasts of the jungle or to die in other ways a cruel, 
horrible and lingering death. He found judges to be venal and 
servile to those in power and the laws they administered to be 
capricious, changing with the whims of the ruler to suit his 
propose. When, therefore, he found a system of law, which did 
not so change, he praised it. Thus, the Old Testament in the 
Book of Esther (I, 19) speaks admiringly of the legal system of 
the Achaemenid dynasty (the First Persian Empire) in which "a 
royal commandment" was, "written among the laws of the 
Persians and the Medes, that it be not altered." Man saw cities 
and towns sacked and pillaged, their populace dragged into 
captivity and condemned to slavery the men to labour, the 
women and the girls to concubinage, and the young boys to be 
castrated into eunuchs their only crime being that their ruler had 
the misfortune to be defeated in battle and to lose one of his 
cities or towns to the enemy. Thus, there was neither hope nor 
help in man-made laws or man-established customs for they 
were one-sided and oppressive, intended to benefit armed 
might and monied power and to subjugate the down-trodden 
poor and the helpless needy. If there was any help to be found 
or any hope to be discovered, it was only in a law based on 
justice and reason which transcended the laws and customs of 
men, a law made by someone greater and mightier than those 
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men who made these laws and established these customs. 
Such a person could only be a divine being and such a law 
could only be "natural law" or "the law of nature" meaning 
thereby "certain rules of conduct supposed to be so just that 
they are binding upon all mankind". It was not "the law of 
nature" in the sense of "the law of the Jungle" where the lion 
devours the lamb and the tiger feeds upon the antelope 
because the lion is hungry and the tiger famished but a higher 
law of nature or "the natural law" where the lion and the lamb lie 
down together and the tiger frisks with the antelope. 
 
Most, if not all, jurists are agreed that "reason" and "the nature 
of man" constitute the fountain-head of natural law but there is 
a considerable divergence of opinion amongst them as also 
amongst philosophers about the nature and meaning of that law 
and its relation to positive law. Among the ancient Greeks the 
Sophists, Aristotle in his treatises on "Logic" and "Ethics", and 
the Stoics developed different theories. The theory propounded 
by Aristotle in his "Logic" adhered substantially to the point of 
view of the Sophists, namely, that man is a natural creature but 
is also endowed with reason. Later, in his "Ethics", Aristotle 
came to distinguish between natural and legal or conventional 
justice and postulated that natural law had authority everywhere 
and was discoverable by the use of reason. The ancient 
Romans were not given to philosophical speculations or 
creative originality in art. They preferred to borrow these from 
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the Greeks. The Romans were a hard-headed, practical race of 
conquerors, administrators and legislators. Roman jurists, 
therefore, used the concept of natural law-, that is, jus naturale 
(or His naturale as the Romans wrote it because Roman 
alphabet had no letter "J" or "j" in it) to introduce into the body 
of law those parts of laws and customs of foreigners, that is, 
non-Roman people with whom they came in commercial 
contract or whom they subjugated. The rules which the Romans 
borrowed from these laws and customs were those which were 
capable of general application and they developed them into 
general legal principles, which came to form jus gentium  or the 
law of nations. In doing so they acted upon the principle that 
any rule of law which was common to the nations (gentes) they 
knew of must be basically in consonance with reason and, 
therefore, fundamentally just. They applied jus gentium to those 
to whom jus civil (civil law) did not apply, that is, in cases 
between foreigners or between a Roman citizen and a 
foreigner. On this basic formulation that what was common to 
all known nations must be in consonance with reason and 
justice, the Roman jurists and magistrates proceeded to the 
theory that any rule which instinctively commanded itself to the 
sense of justice and reason would be part of the jus gentium. 
The jus gentium of the Romans was different from what we call 
international law and should not be confused with it, for the 
scope of the jus gentium  was much wider than our international 
law. Because of the theory of its identity with justice and 
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reason, the term "jus gentium" came at times to be used for 
aequitas, that is, equity as understood by the Romans, which 
was the basis of praetorian law or the power of the praetors to 
grant remedies where none existed under the jus civile. In the 
Dark Ages the expression "natural law" acquired a theological 
base and the Fathers of the Church, particularly St. Ambrose, 
St. Augustine and St. Gregory, held the belief that it was the 
function of the Church to bring about the best possible 
approximation of human laws to Christian principles.  
 
As a result of the infusion of new ideas during the Renaissance 
and the Reformation, the intellectual authority of reason again 
came to be substituted for the spiritual authority of divine law as 
the basis of natural law. This new or rather resuscitated basis of 
natural law was laid by Grotius (Huigh de Groot) in his "De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis" the precursor of modern public international law. 
 
Reason as the theoretical basis for natural law, however, once 
again suffered a reversal at the hand of David Hume. According 
to Hume, only knowledge obtained by mathematical reasoning 
was certain; knowledge obtained from other sciences being 
only probable. His theory of justice was that it served both an 
ethical and a sociological function. He contended that public 
utility was the sole origin of legal justice and the sole foundation 
of its merit, and that for a legal system to be useful, it must 
adhere to its rules even though it may cause injustice in 
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particular cases. He did not make a formal analysis of law but 
distinguished equity or the general system of morality, the legal 
order, and law, as a body of precepts. According to him, the 
authority of civil law modified the rules of natural justice 
according to the particular convenience of each community. 
 
Blackstone, however, in his, "Commentaries on the Laws of 
England" had this to say about natural law:  
"This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and 
dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation 
to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all 
countries, and at all times : no human laws are of any 
validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid 
derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or 
immediately, from this original." 
 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was a reaction 
against natural law as the basis of law. The French Revolution 
had enthrowned reason as a goddess. The excesses of the 
French Revolution, however, led to a reaction against the 
theory that reason was the basis of law. The utilitarian view was 
that the basis for law was the practical inquiry as to what would 
most conduce to the general benefit (greatest happiness of 
gratest number). The spirit of scientific inquiry which pre-
dominated the nineteenth and twentieth centuries could not 
favour hypotheses which were vague and unprovable. In the 
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twentieth century, disillusionment with the theory that good 
could come out of the power of the State and positive law has, 
however, once again brought about a revival of interest in 
natural law. 
 
Apart from providing the subject-matter for philosophical 
dissertations and speculative theories on the origin and 
attributes of natural law, the concept of natural law has made 
invaluable contribution to the development of positive law. It 
helped to transform the rigidity of the jus civile of the Romans 
into a more equitable system based on the theory of the jus 
gentium . It provided arguments to both sides in the struggle 
during the Middle Ages between the Popes and the Emperors. 
It inspired in the eighteenth century the movement for 
codification of law in order to formulate ideas derived from the 
concept of natural law into detailed rules. In England, the idea 
of natural law and natural justice has influenced its law in 
several respects. The origin and development of equity in 
England owed much to natural law. It also served as the basis 
for the recognition or rejection of a custom. It was looked to for 
support in the struggle for supremacy, which took place 
between the judges and Parliament in the seventeenth century. 
The concept of natural law and natural rights influenced the 
drafting of the Constitution of the United States of America and 
many of the amendments made thereto as also the 
Constitutions of its various States, It has provided a basis for 
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much modem international law and International Conventions, 
Covenants and Declarations. Above all, it has enriched positive 
law by introducing into it the principles of natural justice, 
divested of all their philosophical, metaphysical and theological 
trappings and disassociated from their identification with, or 
supposed derivation from, natural law. 
 
How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted 
in the courts and within what limits are they to be confined? 
Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules 
have been evolved as representing' the principles of natural 
justice in judicial process including there in quasi-judicial and 
administrative processes. They constitute the basic elements of 
a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for 
fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular 
race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first 
rule is "nemo judex in causa sua" or "nemo debet esse judex in 
propria "causas" that is, "no man shall be a judge in his own 
cause", "aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa quia non 
potest esse judex et pars" that is, "no man ought to be a judge 
in his own cause, because he cannot act as judge and at the 
same time be a party". The form "nemo potest esse simul actor 
et judex", that is, "no one can be at once suitor and judge" is 
also at times used. The second rule and that is the rule, with 
which we are concerned in these Appeals and Writ Petitions is 
"audi alteram partem", that is, "hear the other side". At times 
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and particularly in continental countries the form "audietur et 
altera pars" is used, meaning very much the same thing. A 
corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and 
particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely, "qui aliquid 
statuerit parte inaudita altera, aequum licet dixerit, haud 
aequum fecerit", that is, "he who shall decide anything without 
the other side having been heard, although he may have said 
what is right, will not have done what is right" or, in other words, 
as it is now expressed, "justice should not only be done but 
should manifestly be seen to be done". 
 
The above two rules and their corollary are neither new nor 
were they the discovery of English Judges. They were 
recognized in many civilizations and over many centuries. 
Roman law recognized the need for a judge to be impartial and 
not to have a personal interest in the case before him and 
Tacitus in his "Dialogus" referred to this principle. Under Roman 
law a judge who heard a cause in which he had an interest was 
liable as on a quasi-delict to the party prejudiced thereby 
(Justinian's Institutes IV, 5 pr.; as also Justinians Codex III, 5, 
1). Even the Kiganda tribesmen of Buganda have an old 
proverb which literally translated means "a monkey does not 
decide an affair of the forest”. The requirement of he arriving 
both sides before at a decision was part of the judicial oath in 
Athens. It also formed the subject-matter of a proverb which 
was often referred to or quoted by Greek playwrights, as for 
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instance, by Aritophanes in his comedy "The Wasps" and 
Euripides in his tragedies "Heracleidae" and "Andromache", 
and by Greek orators, for instance, Demosthenes in his speech 
"De Corona". Among the Romans, Seneca in his tragedy 
"Medea" referred to the injustice of coming to a decision without 
a full hearing.  
 
The two rules "nemo judes in causa sua" and "audi alteram 
partem" and their corollary that justice should not only be done 
but should manifestly be seen to be done have been 
recognized from early days in English courts. References to 
them are to be found in the Year Books - a title preferred to the 
alternative one of "Books of Years and Terms" - which were a 
regular series, with a few gaps, of law reports in Anglo-Norman 
or Norman French or a mixture of English, Norman - French 
and French, which had then become the court language, from 
the 1270s to 1535 or, as printed after the invention of the 
printing press, from 1290 to 1535, that is, from the time of 
Edward II to Henry VIII. The above principles of natural justice 
came to be firmly established over the course of centuries and 
have become a part of the law of the land. Both in England and 
in India they apply to civil as well as to criminal cases and to the 
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative powers. 
The expression "natural, justice is now so well understood in 
England that it has been used without any definition in statutes 
of Parliament, for example, in section 3(10) of the Foreign 
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Compensation Act, 1969, and section 6(13) of the Trade Union 
and Labour Reforms Act, 1974, which was later repealed by the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976. 
These rules of natural justice have been recognized and given 
effect to in many countries and different system of law. They 
have now received international recognition by being enshrined 
in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations by Resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948. Article 
6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which came into force on 
September 3, 1953, and Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General 
Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966 which 
came into force on March 23, 1976. 
Article 14 does not set out in express terms either of the above 
two well-established rules of natural justice. The question which 
then arises is "Whether the rules of natural justice form part of 
Article 14 and, if so, how?" 
Article 14 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
 
"14 Equality before law: 
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law 
or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." 
Article 14 thus contains an express constitutional, injunction 
against the, State as defined in Article 12 prohibiting the State 
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from denying to any person (1) equality before the law, or (2) 
the equal protection of the laws. Neither of these two concepts 
are new. They are based upon similar provisions in other 
Constitutions. One instance is section 40(l) of the Constitution 
of Eire of 1937, which occurs in the Chapter entitled 
Fundamental Rights in that Constitution. The Constitution of 
Eire begins on a strong religious note. It starts by stating: 
 
"In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from whom is all authority 
and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and 
States must be referred. 
We, the people of Eire, 
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, 
Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of 
trial ......." 
 
Section 40(1) of that Constitution provides as follows: 
 
"All Citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the 
law.   
This shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its 
enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, physical 
and moral, and of social functions." 
Another instance is Article 3(1) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany of 1948 which states: 
"All persons shall be equal before the law." 
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Yet another instance is section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States of America which reads:  
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." 
 
Constitutions of some other countries also have similar 
provisions but as these Constitutions have suffered political 
vicissitudes, it is unnecessary to refer to them. Provisions 
similar to Article 14 are to be found in International Charters 
and Conventions. Thus, Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of  
 
Human Rights of 1948, provides as follows: 
"All are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law." 
 
Article 14 is divided into two parts.  "The first part of article 14, 
which was adopted from the Irish 'Constitution, is a declaration 
of equality of the civil rights of all persons within the territories 
of India. It enshrines a basic principle of republicanism. The 
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second part, which is a corollary of the first and is based on the 
last clause of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the American Constitution, enjoins that equal protection shall be 
secured to all such persons in the enjoyment of their rights and 
liberties without discrimination of favouritism. It is a pledge of 
the protection of equal laws, that is, laws that operate alike on 
all persons under like circumstances." 
 
Article 14 contains a guarantee of equality before the law to all 
persons and a protection to them against discrimination by any 
law. Sub-clause (a) of clause (3) of Article 13 defines law as 
follows:  “'law' includes any Ordinance, order, bye law, rule, 
regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory 
of India the force of law". What Article 14 forbids is 
discrimination by law, that is, treating persons similarly 
circumstance differently or treating those not similarly 
circumstance in the same way or, as has been pithily put, 
treating equals as unequals and unequals as equals. Article 14 
prohibits hostile classification by law and is directed against 
discriminatory class legislation. The propositions deducible from 
decisions of this Court on this point have been set out in the 
form of thirteen propositions in the judgment of Chandrachud, 
C.J61.  The first of these propositions which describes the nature 
of the two parts of Article 14 has been extracted earlier. We are 
not concerned in these Appeals and Writ Petitions with the 
                                                 
61 In re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (AIR 1979 SC 478) 
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other propositions set out in that judgment In early days, this 
Court was concerned with discriminatory and hostile class 
legislation and it was to this aspect of Article 14 that its 
attention was directed. As fresh thinking began to take place oh 
the scope and ambit of Article 14, new dimensions to this 
guarantee of equality before the law and of the equal protection 
of the laws emerged and were recognized by this Court. It was 
realized that to treat one person differently from another when 
there was no rational basis for doing so would be arbitrary and 
thus discriminatory. Arbitrariness can take many forms and 
shapes but whatever form or shape it takes; it is none the less 
discrimination. It also became apparent that to treat a person or 
a class of persons unfairly would be an arbitrary act amounting 
to discrimination forbidden by Article 14. Similarly, this Court 
recognized that to treat a person in violation of the principles of 
natural justice would amount to arbitrary and discriminatory 
treatment and would violate the guarantee given by Article 14. 
 
Subba Rao, C.J speaking for the Court, said "Official 
arbitrariness is more subversive of the doctrine of equality than 
statutory discrimination. In respect of a statutory discrimination 
one knows where he stands, but the wand of official 
arbitrariness can be waved in all directions indiscriminately62." 
 
                                                 
62 State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Nalla AIR 1967 SC 1458 
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While considering Article 14 and Article 16, Bhagwati, J., in a 
passage which has become a classic said “Art 14 is the genus 
while Art. 16 is a species Art. 16 gives effect to the doctrine of 
equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic 
principle which therefore, informs both Arts. 14 and 16 is 
equality and inhibition against discrimination.  Now, what is the 
content and reach of this great equalizing principle? It is a 
founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J., 'a way of life' and it 
must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic 
approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its 
all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to 
violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with 
in aspects and dimensions and it cannot be 'cribbed, cabined 
and confined' within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a 
positivistic point of view equality antithet to arbitrariness. In fact 
equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to 
the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and 
caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is 
implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic 
and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art. 14, and if 
it affects any matter relating to public employment' it is also 
violative of Art. 16. Arts. 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in 
State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. 
They require that State action must be based on, relevant 
principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not 
be guided by any- extraneous or irrelevant considerations 
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because that would be denial of equality Where the operative., 
reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing 
from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and 
relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible 
considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power 
and that is hit by Arts. 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power 
and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from 
the same vice, in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both 
are inhibited by Arts. 14 and 16."63   
 
The same learned Judge, speaking for the Court said,64 "The 
true scope and ambit of Article 14 has been the subject matter 
of numerous decisions and it is not necessary to make any 
detailed reference to them. It is sufficient to state that the 
content and reach of Article 14 must not be confused with the 
doctrine of classification. Unfortunately, in the early stages of 
the evolution of our constitutional law, Article 14 came to be 
identified with the doctrine of classification because the view 
taken was that the Article forbids discrimination and there would 
be no discrimination where the classification making the 
differentia fulfils two conditions, namely, (i) that the 
classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which 
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from 
others left out of the group; and (ii) that that differentia has a 
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rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the 
impugned legislative or executive action." 
 
The principles of natural justice have thus come to be 
recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 
14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this 
Court to the concept of equality, which is the subject matter of 
that Article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus: violation of a 
rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same 
as discrimination. Where discrimination is the result of State 
action, it is a violation of Article 14: therefore, a violation of a 
principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of 
Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the 
principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that 
any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The 
principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to 
legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, 
authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of 
"State" in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a 
matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require 
that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially. 
 
The rule of natural justice with which we are concerned in these 
Appeals and Writ Petitions, namely, the audi teram partem rule, 
in its fullest amplitude means that a person against whom an 
order to his prejudice may be passed should be informed of the 
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allegations and charges against him, be given an opportunity of 
submitting his explanation thereto, have, the right to know the 
evidence, both oral or documentary, by which the matter is 
proposed to be decided against him, and to inspect the 
documents which are relied upon for the purpose of being used 
against him, to have the witnesses who are to give evidence 
against him examined in his presence and have the right to 
cross-examine them, and to lead his own evidence; both oral 
and documentary, in his defence. The process of a fair hearing 
need not, however, conform to the judicial process in a court of 
law, because judicial adjudication of causes involves a number 
of technical rules of procedure and evidence which are 
unnecessary and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing 
within the meaning of audi alteram partem rule in a quasi 
judicial or administrative inquiry. If we look at clause (2) of 
Article 311 in the light of what is stated above, it will be 
apparent that that clause is merely an express statement of the 
audi alterarn partem rule which is implicitly made part of the 
guarantee contained in Article 14 as a result of the 
interpretation placed upon that Article by recent decisions of 
this Court Clause (2) of Article 311 requires that before a 
government servant is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, 
an inquiry must be held in which he is informed of the charges 
against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard 
in respect of those charges. The nature of the hearing to be 
given to a government servant under clause (2) of Article 311 
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has been elaborately set out by this Court in Khem Chand's 
case65 in the passages from the judgment extracted above. 
Though that case related to the original clause (2) of Article 
311, the same applies to the present clause (2) of Article 311 
except for the fact that now a government servant has no right 
to make any representation against the penalty proposed to be 
imposed upon him but, as pointed out earlier,66 such an 
opportunity is not the requirement of the principles of natural 
justice and neither the ordinary law of the land nor industrial law 
requires such an opportunity to be given. If, therefore, an 
inquiry held against a government servant under clause (2) of 
Article 311 is unfair or biased or has been conducted in such a 
manner as not to give him a fair or reasonable opportunity to 
defend himself, undoubtedly, the principles of natural justice 
would be violated, but in such a case the order of dismissal, 
removal or reduction in rank would be held to be bad as 
contravening the express provisions of clause (2) of Article 311 
and there will be no scope for having recourse to Article 14 for 
the purpose of invalidating it. 
 
Though the two rules of natural justice namely, nemo judex in 
causa sua and audi alteram partem , have now a definite 
meaning and connotation in law and their content and 
implications are well understood and firmly established, they 
are none the less not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields 
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to and changes with the exigencies of different situations They 
do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not 
alike these rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be 
put in a legal strait-jacket They are not immutable but flexible. 
These rules can be adapted and modified by statutes and 
statutory rules and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which 
has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such 
Tribunal is governed. There is no difference in this respect 
between the law in England and in India.  
 
Hegde, J., observed "What particular rule of natural justice 
should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on 
the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the 
law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the 
Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. 
Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some 
principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has 
to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary 
for a just decision on the facts of that case"67. 
 
Chinnappa Reddy, J., in his dissenting judgment68 summarized 
the position in law on this point as follows: "The principles of 
natural justice have taken deep root in the judicial conscience 
of our people, nurtured by the Apex Court69. They are now 
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68 Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 818 
69  Mohnider Singh Gill case, AIR 1978 SC851, Maneka Gandhi case-AIR 1978 SC 597   
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considered as fundamental as to be 'implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty' and, therefore, implicit in every decision making 
function, call it judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. Where 
authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for 
the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular 
manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner 
and in no other. No wider right than that provided by statute can 
be claimed nor can the right be narrowed. Where the statute is 
silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, 
such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the 
principles of natural justice. The implication of natural justice be 
presumptive it may be excluded by express words of statute or 
by necessary intendment. Where the conflict is between the 
public interest and the private interest, the presumption must 
necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced."  
 
In this connection, it must be remembered that a government 
servant is not wholly without any opportunity. Rules made 
under the proviso to Article 309 or under Acts referable to that 
Article generally provide for a right of appeal except in those 
cases where the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in 
rank is passed by the President or the Governor of a State 
because they being the, highest Constitutional functionaries, 
there can be no higher authority to which an appeal can lie from 
an order passed by one of them. Thus, where the second 
proviso applies, though there is no prior opportunity to a 
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government servant to defend himself against the charges 
made against him, he has the opportunity to show in an appeal 
filed by him that the charges made against him are not true. 
This would be a sufficient compliance with the requirements of 
natural justice.  
 
The Second Proviso - Clause (a): 
Not much remains to be said about clause (a) of the second 
proviso to Article 311(2). To recapitulate, briefly, where a 
disciplinary authority comes to know that a government servant 
has been convicted on a criminal charge, it must consider 
whether his conduct which has led to his conviction was such 
as warrants the imposition of a penalty and, if so, what that 
penalty should be. For, that purpose it will have to peruse the 
judgment of the criminal court and consider all the facts and 
circumstances of the case and the various factors set out in 
Challappan's case70. This, however, has to be done by it ex 
parte and by itself. Once the disciplinary authority reaches the 
conclusion that the government servant's conduct was such as 
to require his dismissal or removal from service or reduction in 
rank he must decide which of these three penalties should be 
imposed on him. This too it has to do by itself and without 
hearing the concerned government servant by reason of the 
exclusionary effect of the second proviso. The disciplinary 
authority must, however, bear in mind that a conviction on a 
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criminal charge does not automatically entail dismissal, removal 
or reduction in rank of the concerned government servant. 
Having decided which of these three penalties is required to be 
imposed, he has to pass the requisite order. A government 
servant who is aggrieved by the penalty imposed can agitate .in 
appeal, revision or review, as the case may be, that the penalty 
was too severe or excessive and not warranted by the facts and 
circumstances of the case. If it is his case that he is not the 
government servant who has been in fact convicted, he can 
also agitate this question in appeal, revision or review. If he fails 
in all the departmental remedies and still wants to pursue the 
matter, he can invoke the court's power of judicial review 
subject to the court permitting it. If the court finds that he was 
not in fact the person convicted, it will strike down the impugned 
order and order him to be reinstated in service. Where the court 
finds that the penalty imposed by the impugned order is 
arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the 
offence committed or not warranted by the facts and 
circumstances of the case or the requirements of that particular 
government service the court will also strike down the 
impugned order. Thus, the Apex Court71 set aside the impugned 
order of penalty on the ground that the penalty of dismissal 
from service imposed upon the appellant was whimsical and 
ordered his reinstatement in service with full back wages. It is, 
however, not necessary that the court should always order 
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reinstatement. The court can instead substitute a penalty which 
in its opinion would be just and proper in the circumstances of 
the case.  
 
The Second Proviso - Clause (b): 
As regards clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) 
was that whatever the situation may be a minimal inquiry or at 
least an opportunity to show cause against the proposed 
penalty is always feasible and is required by law. The 
arguments with-respect to a minimal inquiry were founded on 
the basis of the applicability of Article 14 and the principles of 
natural justice and the arguments with respect to an opportunity 
to show cause against the proposed penalty were in addition 
founded upon the decision in Challappan's Case (supra).  
 
The next contention was that even if it is not reasonably 
practicable to hold an inquiry, a government servant can be 
placed under suspension until the situation improves and it 
becomes possible to hold the inquiry. This contention also 
cannot be accepted. Very often a situation which makes it not 
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry is of the creation of 
the concerned government servant himself or of himself acting 
in concert with others or of his associates. It can even be that 
he himself is not a party to bringing about that situation. In all 
such cases neither public interest nor public good requires that 
salary or subsistence allowance should be continued to be paid 
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out of the public exchequer to the concerned government 
servant. It should also be borne in mind that in the case of a 
serious situation which renders the holding of an inquiry not 
reasonably practicable, it would be difficult to foresee how long 
the situation will last and when normalcy would return or be 
restored. It is impossible to draw the line as to the period of 
time for which the suspension should continue and on the 
expiry of that period action should be taken under clause (b) of 
the second proviso. Further, the exigencies of a situation may 
require that prompt action should be taken and suspending the 
government servant cannot serve the purpose. Sometimes not 
taking prompt action may result in the trouble spreading and the 
situation worsening and at times becoming uncontrollable. Not 
taking prompt action may also be construed by the trouble-
makers and agitators as a sign of weakness on the part of the 
authorities and thus encourage them to step up the tempo of 
their activities or agitation. It is true that when prompt action is 
taken in order to prevent this happening, there is an element of 
deterrence in it but that is an unavoidable and necessary 
concomitance of such an action resulting from a situation which 
is not of the creation of the authorities. After all, clause (b) is pot 
meant to be applied 'in ordinary, normal situations but in such 
situations where it is not reasonably practicable to hold an 
inquiry. 
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The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the 
satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is not reasonably 
practicable to hold" the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of 
Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are 
"not reasonably practicable" and not "impracticable". According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary "practicable" means "Capable 
of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, 
accomplished, or done; feasible". Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary defines the word "practicable" inter alia 
as meaning "possible to practice or perform capable of being 
put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible". Further, the 
words used are not, "not practicable" but "not reasonably 
practicable". Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner: to a 
fairly sufficient extent". Thus, whether it was practicable to hold 
the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it 
was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute 
impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is 
requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in 
the opinion of a reasonable man taking a. reasonable view of 
the prevailing situation. 'It is not possible to enumerate the 
cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold 
the inquiry, but some instances by way of illustration may, 
however, be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to 
hold an inquiry where the government servant, particularly 
through or together, with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens 
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or intimidate witnesses who are going to give evidence against 
him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or 
where the government servant by himself or together with or 
through others threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer 
who is the disciplinary authority or members of his family so 
that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It 
would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry 
where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and 
insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the 
concerned government servant is or is not a party to bringing 
about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in 
mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may 
not. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a 
matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. 
Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is 
happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best 
judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of 
the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary 
authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry 
lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely. in order 
to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's 
case against the government servant is weak and must fail. The 
finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by 
Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power 
of judicial review is concerned and in such a se the court will 
strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the 
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order imposing penalty. The case of Arjun Chaubey vs. Union 
of India72 is an instance in point. In that case the appellant was 
working as a senior clerk in the office of the Chief Commercial 
superintendent, Northern Railway, Varanasi. The Senior 
Commercial Officer wrote a letter o the appellant calling upon 
him to submit his explanation with regard to twelve charges of 
gross indiscipline mostly relating to the Deputy Chief 
Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted his 
explanation and on .the very next day the Deputy Chief 
Commercial Superintendent served a second notice on the 
appellant saying that his explanation was not convincing and 
that another chance was, being given to him to offer his 
explanation with respect to those charges. The appellant 
submitted his further explanation but on the very next day the 
Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an order 
dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to be retained 
in service. This Court struck down the order holding that seven 
out of twelve charges related to the conduct of the appellant 
with the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent who was the 
disciplinary authority and that if an inquiry were to be held, the 
principal witness for the Department would have been the 
Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent himself, resulting in 
the same person being the main accuser, the chief witness and 
also the judge of the matter. 
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It is not necessary that a situation which makes the holding of 
an inquiry not reasonably practicable should exist before the 
disciplinary inquiry is initiated against a government servant. 
Such a situation can also come into existence subsequently 
during the course of an inquiry, for instance, after the service of 
a charge-sheet upon the government servant or after he has 
filed his written statement thereto or even after evidence has 
been led in part. In such a case also the disciplinary authority 
would be entitled to apply clause (b) of the second proviso 
because the word "inquiry" in that clause includes part of an 
inquiry. It would also not be reasonably practicable to afford to 
the government servant and opportunity of hearing or further 
hearing, as the case may be, when at the commencement of 
the inquiry or pending it the government servant absconds and 
cannot be served or will not participate in the inquiry. In such 
cases, the matter must proceed ex-parte and on the materials 
before the disciplinary authority. Therefore, even where a part 
of an inquiry has been held and the rest is dispensed with 
under clause (b) or a provision in the service rules analogous 
thereto, the exclusionary words of the second proviso operate 
in their full vigour and the government servant cannot complain 
that he has been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank in 
violation of the safeguards provided by Article 311(2). 
 
The second condition necessary for the valid application of 
clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority 
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should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was 
not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by 
Article 311(2). This is a Constitutional obligation and if such 
reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the 
inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both 
be void and unconstitutional. 
 
It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason for 
dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order imposing 
the penalty. The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need 
not, therefore find a place in the final order. It would be usual, to 
record the reason separately and then considers the question 
of the penalty to be imposed and pass the order imposing the 
penalty. It would, however, be better to record the reason in the 
final order in order to avoid the allegation that the reason was 
not recorded in writing before passing the final order but was 
subsequently fabricated. The reason for dispensing with the 
inquiry need not contain detailed particulars, but the reason 
must not be vague or just a repetition of the language of clause 
(b) of the second proviso. For instance, it would be no 
compliance with the requirement of clause (b) for the 
disciplinary authority simply to state that he was satisfied that it 
was not reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry. Sometimes 
a situation may be such that it is not reasonably practicable to 
give detailed reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. This would 
not, however, per se invalidate the order. Each case must be 
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judged on its own merits and in the light of its own facts and 
circumstances. 
 
If reasons are not recorded in the final order, the need of 
communicating them to the concerned government servant to 
enable him to challenge the validity of the reasons in a 
departmental appeal or before a court of law does not arise. As 
the constitutional requirement in clause (b) is that the reason for 
dispensing with the inquiry should be recorded in writing. There 
is no obligation to communicate the reason to the government 
servant. At clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the 
disciplinary authority on this point final, the question cannot be 
agitated in a departmental appeal, revision or review., The 
obligation to record the reason in writing is provided in clause 
(b) so that the superiors of the disciplinary authority may be 
able to judge whether such authority had exercised its power 
under clause (b) properly or not with a view to judge the 
performance and capacity of that officer for the purposes of 
promotion etc. It would however, be better for the disciplinary 
authority to communicate to the government servant its reason 
for dispensing with the inquiry because such communication 
would eliminate the possibility of an allegation being made that 
the reasons have been subsequently fabricated. It would also 
enable the government servant to approach the High Court 
under Article 226 or, in a fit case, this Court under Article 32.  If 
the reasons are not communicated to the government servant 
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and the matter comes to the court, the court can direct the 
reasons to be produced and famished to the government 
servant and if still not produced, a presumption should be 
drawn that the reasons were not recorded in writing and the 
impugned order would then stand invalidated. Such 
presumption can, however, be rebutted by a satisfactory 
explanation for the non-production of the written reasons. 
 
The Second Proviso - Clause (c): 
We now turn to the last clause of the second proviso to Article 
311(2), namely, clause (c). Though it’s exclusionary operation 
on the safeguards provided in Article 311(2) is the same as 
those of the other two clauses, it is very different in content 
from them. While under clause (b) the satisfaction is to be of 
disciplinary authority, under clause (c) it is to be of the 
President or the Governor of a State, as the case may be. 
Further, while under clause (b) the satisfaction has to be with 
respect to whether it is not reasonably practicable to hold the 
inquiry, under clause (c) it is to be with respect to whether it will 
not be expedient in the interest of the security of the State to 
hold the inquiry. Thus, in one case the test is of reasonable 
practicability of holding the inquiry, in the other case it is of the 
expediency of holding the inquiry, while clause (b) expressly 
requires that the reason for dispensing with the inquiry should 
be recorded in writing, clause (c) does not so require it, either 
expressly or impliedly. 
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The expressions "law and order", "public order" and "security of 
the State" have been used in different Acts. Situations which 
affect "public order" are graver than those which affect "law and 
order" and situations which affect "security of the State,, are 
graver than those which affect "public order". Thus, of those 
situations those which affect "security of the State" are the 
gravest. Danger to the security of the State may arise from 
without or within the State. The expression "security of the 
State" does not mean security of the entire country or a whole 
State. It includes security of a part of the State. It also cannot 
be confined to an armed rebellion or revolt. There are various 
ways in which security of the State can be affected. It can be 
affected by State secrets or information relating to defence, 
production or similar matters being passed on to other 
countries, whether inimical or not to our country; or by secret 
links with terrorists. It is difficult to enumerate the various ways 
in which security of the State can be affected. The way in which 
security of the State is affected may be either open or 
clandestine.  Amongst the more obvious acts which affect the 
security of the State would be disaffection in the Armed Forces 
or para-military Forces. Disaffection in any of these Forces is 
likely to spread, for disaffected or dissatisfied members of these 
Forces spread such dissatisfaction and disaffection among 
other members of the Force and thus induce them not to 
discharge their duties properly and to commit acts of 
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indiscipline, insubordination and disobedience to the orders of 
their superiors. Such a situation cannot be a matter affecting 
only law and order or public order but, is a matter affecting 
vitally the security of the State. In this respect, the Police Force 
stands very much on the same footing as a military or a para-
military force for it is charged with the duty of ensuring and 
maintaining law and order and public order, and breaches of 
discipline and acts of disobedience and insubordination on the 
part of the members of the Police Force cannot be viewed with 
less gravity than similar acts on the part of the members of the 
military or para-military Forces. How important the proper 
discharge of their duties by members of these Forces and the 
maintenance of discipline among them is considered can be 
seen from Article 33 of the Constitution. Prior to the Constitution 
(Fiftieth Amendment) Act, 1984, Article 33 provided as follows: 
 
"33. Power to Parliament to modify the tights conferred by this 
Part in their application to forces Parliament may by law 
determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by this Part 
shall, in their application to the members of the Armed Forces 
or the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order, be 
restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of 
their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them."  
 
By the Constitution Fiftieth Amendment) Act, 1984, this Article 
was substituted. By the Substituted Article the scope of the 
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Parliament's power to so restrict or abrogate the application of 
any of the Fundamental Rights is made wider. The substituted 
Article 33 reads as follows: 
 
"33. Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this 
Part in their application to Forces, etc. Parliament may, by law, 
determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by this Part 
shall in their application to, -    
 
(a) the members of the Armed Forces; or 
 
(b) the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of 
public order; or 
 
(c) persons employed in any bureau or other organisation 
established by the State for purposes of intelligence or counter 
intelligence; or 
 
(d) persons employed in, or in connection with, the 
telecommunication systems set up for the purposes of any 
Force, bureau or organisation referred to in clauses (a) to (c),be 
restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of: 
their duties and the maintenance of disc line among them." 
 
Thus, the discharge of their duties by the members of these 
Forces, and the maintenance of discipline amongst them is 
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considered of such vital importance to the country that in order 
to ensure this the Constitution has conferred power upon 
Parliament to restrict or abrogate any of the Fundamental 
Rights in their application to them. 
 
The question under clause (c), however, is not whether the 
security of the State has been affected or not, for the 
expression used in clause (c) is "in the interest of the security of 
the State". The interest of the security of the State may be 
affected by actual acts or even the likelihood of such acts taking 
place. Further, what is required under clause (c) is not the 
satisfaction of the President or the Governor, as the case may 
be, that the interest of the security of the State is or will be 
affected but his satisfaction that in the interest of the security of 
the State, it is not expedient to hold an inquiry as contemplated 
by Article 311(2). The satisfaction of the President or Governor 
must, therefore, be with respect to the expediency or 
inexpediency of holding an inquiry in the interest of the security 
of the State. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third 
Edition, defines the word "inexpedient" as meaning "not 
expedient, disadvantageous in the circumstances, unadvisable 
impolitic" The same dictionary defines "expedient" as, meaning 
inter alia "advantageous; fit, proper, or suitable to the 
circumstances of the case" Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary also defines the term "expedient" as meaning inter 
alia "characterized by suitability, practicality, and efficiency in 
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achieving a particular end, fit, proper, or advantageous under 
the circumstances". It must be borne in mind that the 
satisfaction required by clause (c) is of the Constitutional Head 
of the whole country or of the State. Under Article 74(1) of the 
Constitution, the satisfaction of the President would be arrived 
at with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers with the 
Prime Minister as the Head and in the case of a State by 
reason of the provisions of Article 163(l) by the Governor acting 
with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers with the Chief 
Minister as the Head: Whenever, therefore, the President or the 
Governor in the constitutional sense is satisfied that it will not 
be advantageous or fit or proper or suitable or politic in the 
interest of the security of the State to hold an inquiry, he would 
be entitled to dispense with it under clause (c). The satisfaction 
so reached by the President or the' Governor must, necessarily 
be, a subjective satisfaction. Expediency involves matters of 
policy. Satisfaction may be arrived at, as a result of 'secret 
information received by the Government about the brewing 
danger to the security of the State and like matters. There may 
be other factors which may be required to be considered, 
weighed and balanced in order to reach the requisite 
satisfaction whether holding an inquiry would be expedient or 
not. If the requisite satisfaction has been reached as a result of 
secret information received by the Government, making known 
such information may very often result in disclosure of the 
source of such information. Once known, the particular source 
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from which the information was received would no more be 
available to the Government. The reasons for the satisfaction 
reached by the President or Governor under clause (c) cannot 
therefore, be required to be recorded in the order of dismissal, 
removal or reduction in rank nor can they be made public. 
 
In the case of clause (b) of the second proviso, clause (3) of 
Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority that 
it was hot reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry final. There 
is no such clause in Article 311 with respect to the satisfaction 
reached by the President or the Governor under clause (c) of 
the second proviso. There are two reasons for this. There can 
be no departmental appeal or other departmental remedy 
against the satisfaction reached by the President or the 
Governor; and so far as the Court's power of judicial review is 
concerned, the Court   cannot sit in judgment over State policy 
or the wisdom or otherwise of such policy The Court equally 
cannot be the Judge of expediency or inexpediency. Given a 
known situation, it is not for, the Court' to decide whether it was 
expedient or inexpedient in the circumstances of the case to 
dispense with the inquiry. The satisfaction reached by the 
President or Governor under clause (c) is subjective 
satisfaction and. therefore, would not be a fit matter for judicial 
review, Relying upon the observations of Bhagwati, J.73  it was 
submitted that the power of judicial review is not excluded 
                                                 
73 State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 1361,1414 and 1415 
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where the satisfaction of the President or the Governor has 
been reached mala  fide or is based on wholly extraneous or 
irrelevant grounds because in such a case, in law there would 
be no satisfaction of the President or the Governor at, all. It is 
unnecessary to decide this question because in the matters 
under clause (c) before us, all the materials, including the 
advice tendered by the Council of Ministers, have been 
produced and they clearly show that, in those cases the 
satisfaction of the Governor was neither reached malafide nor 
was it based on any extraneous or irrelevant ground. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148
 
Chapter 02: PURPOSE & SCOPE 
 
2.1 Purpose of Disciplinary Enquiry 
2.2 Scope of Disciplinary Enquiry 
2.3 Principles of Natural Justice and their application in 
the Disciplinary Enquiry. 
2.1 PURPOSE OF DISCILIANRY ENQUIRY: 
The necessity to have a proper disciplinary enquiry procedure 
is to maintain effective discipline in the organisation and to have 
effective control over the etiquette of the employees in an 
organization. The objective is not to punish somebody but is to 
improve his conduct & behaviour, if an employee has failed 
anywhere. It is mainly to "regulate" the behaviour of an 
employee other than to punish him.  In the case of Union of 
India and others, Appellants vs. J. Ahmed74, the Supreme Court 
has observed that  
“what would constitute misconduct for the purpose of 
disciplinary proceeding a look at the charges framed 
against the respondent would affirmatively show that the 
                                                 
74 AIR 1979 SC 1022 
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charge inter alia alleged failure to take any effective 
preventive measures meaning thereby error in judgment 
in evaluating developing situation. Similarly, failure to visit 
the scenes of disturbance is another failure to perform the 
duty in a certain manner. Charges Nos. 2 and 5 clearly 
indicate the shortcomings in the personal capacity or 
degree of efficiency of the respondent. It is alleged that 
respondent showed complete lack of leadership when 
disturbances broke out and he disclosed complete 
inaptitude, lack of foresight, lack of firmness and capacity 
to take firm decision. These are personal qualities which a 
man holding a post of Deputy Commissioner would be 
expected to possess. They may be relevant 
considerations on the question of retaining him in the post 
or for promotion, but such lack of personal quality cannot 
constitute misconduct for the purpose of disciplinary 
proceedings. In fact, charges 2, 5 and 6 are clear 
surmises on account of the failure of the respondent to 
take effective preventive measures to arrest or to nip in 
the bud the ensuring disturbances. We do not take any 
notice of charge No. 4 because even the Enquiry Officer 
has noted that there are number of extenuating 
circumstances which may exonerate the respondent in 
respect of that charge. What was styled as charge No. 6 
is the conclusion, viz., because of what transpired in the 
inquiry, the Enquiry Officer was of the view that the 
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respondent was unfit to hold any responsible position. 
Somehow or other, the Enquiry Officer completely failed 
to take note of what was alleged in charges 2, 5 and 6 
which was neither misconduct nor even negligence but 
conclusions about the absence or lack of personal 
qualities in the respondent. It would thus transpire that the 
allegations made against the respondent may indicate 
that he is not fit to hold the post of Deputy Commissioner 
and that if it was possible he may be reverted or he may 
be compulsorily retired, not by way of punishment. But 
when the respondent is sought to be removed as a 
disciplinary measure and by way of penalty, there should 
have been clear case of misconduct, viz., such acts and 
omissions which would render him liable for any of the 
punishments set out in Rule 3 of the Discipline and 
Appeal Rules, 1955. No such case has been made out”.   
In the case of Madan Gopal, vs. The State of Punjab and 
others75, the Supreme Court further observed that ------ 
“Where an enquiry made by the Officer is made with 
the object of ascertaining whether disciplinary action 
should be taken against the Govt. servant for his 
alleged misdemeanour, it is an enquiry for the 
purpose of taking punitive action including dismissal 
or removal from service if the servant is found to 
                                                 
75 AIR 1963 SC 531 
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have committed the misdemeanour charged against 
him”.  
 
As stated herein before, a very significant arena of service 
jurisprudence is the maintenance of discipline in the precincts 
of employment and the need for initiating disciplinary 
proceedings against an employee on the charges of 
misconduct and other lapses by adhering the rules of natural 
justice and providing reasonable opportunity to delinquent 
employee before any final order of penalty is passed by the 
disciplinary authority. The Supreme Court, in the case of Sur 
Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd., vs. The Workmen76, held that 
the mere form of an enquiry would not satisfy the requirements 
of complete adjudication to protect the disciplinary action 
against a workman. An enquiry cannot be said to have been 
properly held unless: 
 
(i) the employee proceeded against has been informed 
clearly of the charges levelled against him  
 
(ii)  the witnesses are examined - ordinarily in the presence 
of the employee-in respect of the charges  
 
(iii) the employee is given a fair opportunity to cross examine 
witnesses  
                                                 
76 AIR 1963 SC 1914 
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(iv) he is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses 
including himself in his defence if he so wishes on any 
relevant matter, and  
 
(v)  the enquiry officer records his findings with reasons for 
the same in his report. 
 
In the recent judgment the supreme court of India in the case of 
Union of India and others, vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan77, once 
again reiterated that Disciplinary inquiry is quasi-judicial in 
nature. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at 
which evidence is led and assessment of the material before 
conclusion is reached. These facets do make the matter quasi-
judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. With the 
Forty-Second Amendment, the delinquent officer is not 
associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of 
evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the 
material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. 
In case his conclusions are kept away from the delinquent 
officer and the Inquiry Officer submits his; conclusions with or 
without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent is 
precluded from knowing the contents thereof although such 
material is used against him by the disciplinary authority. The 
report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records a 
                                                 
77 AIR 1991 SC 471 
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finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as the 
delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the 
delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material 
against him though the same is made available to the punishing 
authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of 
natural justice would be affected. 
 
As discussed in chapter – 1, there exists no watertight definition 
for the terms “discipline”, “misconduct” in the Industrial 
Jurisprudence. According to Mr.K.P Chakravarti in his book 
“Domestic Enquiry and Punishment”78, it has been stated that 
three main points involved in the term discipline is (a) Positive 
aspect (b) negative aspect (c) it implies maintenance of control 
over the rank and file of the subordinates. And the basic idea of 
discipline linked with master and servant relationship, it is 
implied in the every master and servant relationship that a 
master has right to exercise his control lover his servant, not 
only control over his work, but also disciplinary control over his 
conduct. While exercise of that inherent right, the master can 
punish his servant by way of discharge, dismissal or stoppage 
of increment or promotion, etc for any misconduct justifying 
such punitive action in consonance with the applicable rules. 
 
Master and servant relationship has been reflected by way of 
contracts, appointment letter and by following certain work 
                                                 
78 3rd Edition -1998 at page 3 
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etiquette’s and express and implied disciplinary rules. 
Nonetheless, the basic obligation of the employee is to serve 
the employer faithfully and honestly. In the present Industrial 
Jurisprudence scenario too, the rights of the employer to 
terminate the services of the employee on the ground of “loss of 
confidence” have remained unfettered the apex court and the 
courts below have interfered79 in such kind of terminations very 
often terming that the same are falls under the category of 
“termination simplicitor” in other words summary termination 
sans enquiry process whatsoever.           
 
The Supreme Court has been succinctly laid down the 
touchstones of the principles of the relationship between the 
employer and the employee80 as follows: 
 
(a) Servant must be obedient to and amenable to the 
directions of the master; and 
(b) The master must have the power to discharge or 
dismiss him.  
 
In case, the above ingredients are absent in the relationship, 
there cannot be a master and servant relationship and master 
has no power and jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary action or 
such employee has no case to make against such employer. 
                                                 
79 AIR 1984 SC 229, AIR 1999 SC 983, AIR 1996 SC2618, AIR 1985 SC1128, AIR 1982 
SC 1062 
80 AIR 1951 SC 4 
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The common law right of the employer “to hire and fire” has 
been largely modified and changed by the concept of social 
justice as well as statutory provisions of the state (welfare state 
like India). The disciplinary action must have now the sanction 
of law and has to be conducted according to the established 
procedure and due process of law. In the wake of the changes 
brought in by the concept of welfare state and social justice in 
the relationship of the master and servant, discipline now 
largely depend upon the mutual co-operation between the 
employer and the employees and willing to obedience of the 
employees to the rules of the establishment. To ensure better 
discipline in the industry mutual efforts of the employers and the 
employees are very necessary. Accordingly, it is pertinent to 
mention here that the observations of V.R Krishna Iyer in his 
work Law and the People, as follows: 
“The doctrine of ‘laissez faire’ which held sway in the world 
since the time of Adam Smith has particularly given place to a 
doctrine which emphasizes the duty of the State to interfere in 
the affairs of the individuals in the interest of social well being of 
the entire community. As Julian Huxley remarks in his essay on 
Economic Man and Social Man, ‘many of our old ideas must be 
translated, so to speak, in to a new language. The democratic 
idea of   freedom, for instance must loose its nineteenth century 
meaning of individual liberty in the economic sphere, and 
become adjusted to new conception of social duties and 
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responsibilities. When a big employer talks about his 
democratic rights and individual freedom, meaning thereby a 
claim to socially irresponsible control over the lives of tens of 
thousands of human beings whom it happens to employ, he is 
talking in dying language”81        
 
In an approach to ensure the industrial peace and discipline in 
the industry, the following principles may serve as guidelines for 
both the employers and employees: 
 
ON THE SIDE OF THE EMLOYERS / MANAGEMENT: 
?? No undue change in the work procedures 
?? The disciplinary action and procedure thereof shall be 
clearly laid down and well publicized. 
?? Fair and just application of the rules and regulations. 
?? No vindictive attitude. 
?? Penalty to be imposed in proportionate to the misconduct. 
 
ON THE SIDE OF THE EMPLYEES: 
?? Employees should abide by the rules of the company, 
standing orders and other lawful orders of the 
management vogue in from time to time. 
?? Discharge duties to the utmost honest and faithfulness. 
?? Avoid absenteeism. 
                                                 
81  Law and the People – A collection of Essays – V.R. Krishna Iyer. J 
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?? Not to cause damage reputation and interest of the 
management. 
?? Strikes and other such activities to be avoided.   
?? Amicable settlement of disputes at floor / plant / Industry 
level.  
 
 In the public utility service, the workers responsibility is greater 
because their acts and omissions largely affect the public, in 
other words they are responsible to the public for their acts and 
omissions, and the same has been reiterated by the Supreme 
Court in the recent judgment82.  
 
It has been quoted very often that efficiency and discipline are 
essential factors among other factors for success of any 
organization. Meanwhile, it is very difficult to maintain these 
factors, especially the “discipline” in the work place as the 
workers have been protected by various social security and 
social welfare legislations. However, disciplinary action is 
resorted to enforce discipline in the work place. No organization 
can ever function without resorting to disciplinary action is being 
taken against errant employees. As the matter of maintenance 
of discipline in the Industry is of utmost relevant, as in the 
contemporary society, the “industry” whatever nature it may be 
called as temples of modern Society. One can easily predict 
and presume the impact of indiscipline; consequences of 
                                                 
82 T.K Rangarajan vs. Govt. of T.N & ors (2003) 6 SCC 581 
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haphazard and nontransparent disciplinary enquiry process will 
have negative impact on the society as a whole and colossal 
loss to the economy of any society.  In other words, it goes to 
suggest that a systematic, transparent and codified disciplinary 
enquiry process will serve long way to keep up better Industrial 
Relations.        
 
METHOD OF ENFORCEMENT OF DISCIPLINE:       
It is fact that maintenance of internal discipline in an 
organization is the responsibility of the management and the no 
outside agency can interfere with the way it should manage its 
internal affairs. As stated supra that the employer has inherent 
right to maintain efficiency of work and regulate the conduct of 
the workmen in the work place. However, while resorting to the 
said inherent right the employer should not be vindictive, unfair, 
and unjust and not be biased. Disciplinary action is nothing but 
a method of enforcement of discipline by punishing a delinquent 
employee and making thereof a mark of deterrent effect on the 
rest of employees, which will enable employer to maintain 
efficiency and discipline in the work place. 
 
Disciplinary action thus contemplates certain procedure to be 
followed by the management. The procedure is based mainly 
on the principles of natural justice and equity. The intention of 
following the principles of natural justice that there exist no 
codified law to regulate the procedure of disciplinary enquiry, 
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unlike procedural laws of criminal procedure code and the civil 
procedure code to regulate the criminal and civil disputes 
respectively. Therefore, full and fair opportunity will be provided 
to the delinquent to prove his side of the story and defend the 
charges leveled against him. The Disciplinary action broadly 
consists of several stages viz;  
 
(a)  Initiation of disciplinary enquiry by way of complaint /   
preliminary enquiry / suo-moto  action of the management; 
(b)    Charge-sheet; 
(c)    Suspension if circumstances necessitates; 
(d)    Appointment of Enquiry Officer; 
(e) proceedings before Enquiry Officer which includes; 
delinquent to be represented by the lawyer, enquiry 
proceedings vis-à-vis criminal proceedings, record of 
evidence, Enquiry Report, and action of the management 
on the finding of the enquiry officer. 
   
Thus the disciplinary proceedings are not an empty formality. It 
is a serious matter of concern not only with disciplining of the 
individual workman, but as stated supra it is intended to 
maintain probity of the administration of an Industry as a whole. 
2.2 SCOPE OF DISICPLINARY ENQUIRY:-  
The procedure should be strictly followed and the delinquent 
employee should be given enough opportunity to defend his 
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case.  The opportunity given should not only be fair but it should 
also appear to be fair. As per the conduct / disciplinary rules of 
the respective organization, whenever the disciplinary authority 
is of the opinion that there are grounds for enquiring to the truth 
thereof. The departmental enquiry should be conducted within 
the frame work of the established rules and by following 
principles of Natural Justice and conduct / disciplinary Rules, 
i.e.: 
?  One should not be judged on his own cause. 
?  A fair opportunity should be given to a delinquent and 
nothing shall be done behind his back. 
Normally, the High Court and the Supreme Court would not 
interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic 
enquiry but if the finding of 'guilt' is based on no evidence, it 
would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial 
scrutiny. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained 
between the decisions which are perverse and those which are 
not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which 
is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act 
upon it, the order would be perverse. But, if there is some 
evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be 
relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the 
conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings 
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would not be interfered with83. The Writ Court while exercising 
writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the enquiring 
authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is 
insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the 
conclusion of the enquiring authority, it is not the function of the 
Court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own 
independent finding. The enquiring authority is the sole Judge 
of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to 
substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the 
evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be 
canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings. 
The scope of the enquiry called for when the question which 
calls for determination in all such cases is whether the facts 
satisfy the criterion repeatedly laid down by this Court that an 
order is not passed by way of punishment, and is merely an 
order of termination simpliciter, if the material against the 
Government servant on which the superior authority has acted 
constitutes the motive and not the foundation for the order. The 
application of the test is not always easy. In each case it is 
necessary to examine the entire range of facts carefully and 
consider whether in the light of those facts the superior 
authority intended to punish the Government servant or, having 
regard to his character, conduct and suitability in relation to the 
post held by him it was intended simply to terminate his 
services. The function of the court is to discover the nature of 
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the order by attempting to ascertain what was the motivating 
consideration in the mind of the authority which prompted the 
order84.  
The expression ‘misconduct’ covers a large area of human 
conduct.  On the one hand, are the habitual late attendance, 
habitual negligence and neglect of work, on the other hand, are 
riotous or disorderly behaviour during working hours at the 
establishment or acts subversive of discipline, willful 
insubordination or disobedience. In the word of Shah, J., 
“misconduct spreads over a wide and hazy spectrum of 
industrial activity’; the most seriously subversive conducts 
rendering an employee wholly unfit for employment to mere 
technical default are covered thereby85”.        
Misconduct falling under any one or several of the heads of 
misconduct my not always involve direct loss or damage to the 
employer, but may render the functioning of the establishment 
impossible or extremely hazardous. For instance, assault on the 
manager of an establishment may not directly involve the 
employer in any loss or damage which could be equated in 
terms of money, but it would render the working of the 
establishment impossible. Several acts of misconduct may also 
be envisaged not directly involving the establishment in any 
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85 Delhi Cloth & Genl. Mills Ltd., vs. Workmen, 1969-II-LLJ, 755 (772) (SC)  
 163
loss, but which are destructive of discipline and cannot be 
tolerated86. 
For modulating the quantum of punishment, a distinction has to 
be made between mere technical misconduct which leaves no 
trial of indiscipline on one hand and a misconduct resulting in 
damage to the employer’s property or serious misconduct 
resulting in damage, may be conducive grave indiscipline for 
instance acts of violence against officers of the management or 
other employees or riotous behaviour, in or near the place of 
employment, on the other. But the scope of the misconduct for 
the purpose of industrial adjudication is wider than that of 
criminal offence such as theft. To some extent, misconduct is 
civil crime, which is visited with civil and pecuniary 
consequences87.   
Some conditions precedents and subsequent on the part of the 
management while resorting to the inherent power of discipline in 
the workplace:-       
As discussed in the part of purpose of disciplinary enquiry – it is 
will within the managerial powers to maintain internal discipline. 
In order to maintain discipline, punitive action against the erring 
employees has often been taken. But there are certain 
conditions like every punitive action cannot be taken in isolation 
without the enquiry. In other words before imposition of penalty 
                                                 
86 New victoria mills Co., Ltd., vs. L.C, 1970 Lab IC 428 (431) (All), per Beg.J 
87 Rama kant misra vs. State of U.P, 1982 Lab IC 1790 (SC).  
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(major) enquiry is must. We have already seen the history  and 
evolution of doctrine of pleasure and the protection available for 
civil servants under Article 311 of the Indian constitution in 
chapter – 1 herein before.   Accordingly, the concept of 
termination simpliciter (termination without due process of law / 
enquiry) is withering away from the text of the industrial 
jurisprudence. Law courts of the country, now very often held 
that such actions are not tenable at law.    
 
In the landmark judgement of the Supreme Court in Secretary, 
Haryana State Electricity Board vs. Suresh & ors.88 though this 
judgment is not exactly about the termination employees sans 
enquiry also known as termination simplicitor, but still, it is 
worth while to refer the observations of the apex court:    
 
 "Continuation of contract labour when the work is of perennial 
nature and the contractor does not obtain the licence under the 
Contract Labour (R&A) Act or the principal employer is not 
registered under the said Act.  The judgement clarifies about 
determination of relationship of 'employer and employee' when 
the contract labour is engaged through contractor and such 
workers have completed 240 days of their service. In that 
eventuality such workers will become the employees of the 
principal employer." 
 
                                                 
88 1999 LLR 433 
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However, in each and every case of cessation of relationship 
between the employer and employee, employers need not to 
hold the enquiry. Employment relationships like, fixed term 
contractual appointments will come to an end as per the 
stipulations mentioned thereof. In such type of relationships and 
discontinuation thereof neither disciplinary enquiry warrants nor 
the Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 attracts.    
By stating above, we are not saying that there is a statutory 
guard available to the entrepreneur to hire the services on fixed 
term contract basis. As we have already said, the basis for the 
relationship between the employer and employee is a contract. 
In this perceptive, in the year 1984 a new clause was added to 
the definition of retrenchment u/s 2(oo) namely sub sec. (bb) of 
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which reads as under: 
 
“Termination of service of the workman as a result of the 
non-renewal of the contract of employment between the 
employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of 
such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that 
behalf contained therein” ........does not amount to 
retrenchment. 
 
With the protection of the above amended clause, the employer 
segment bravely and enthusiastically started deploying labour 
on contract for a fixed term / through contractor.  However, over 
the period a large part of the employers particularly private 
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entrepreneurs used (mis-used) the said clause to the maximum 
extent at their convenience & advantage.  So at this point of 
anti-thesis, the judiciary particularly the Supreme Court and the 
various High Courts pitched-in and has been trying to build 
consensus / resolve the existing problems with regard to 
interpretation of the said amended clause under the Industrial 
Disputes Act.  
 
It is relevant to mention here that the views of the Supreme 
Court expressed in some of the recent land marked judgements 
passed by it with regard to termination of casual / temporary / 
fixed term contract employment.    
 
It depends upon the supervision, control and the nature of 
activities being carried out by the employees as engaged 
through the contractor. The most important factor is that the 
nature of work which is of temporary and / or perennial nature.  
It is pertinent to refer one case where the petitioner, a 
residential university having 14 hostels to accommodate 
students and cafeterias to provide food services to the resident 
of hostels and others.  There were about 175 employees in 
cafeterias and they claimed to be employees of the petitioner 
university with regular pay scales.  The two disputes were 
referred to Labour Court for adjudication and Labour Court held 
in their favour and High Court in writ petition confirmed the 
same. Hence, an appeal was filed in Supreme Court. While 
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rejecting the appeal it has been held that the hostel and 
cafeterias regulations framed under UP Agricultural University 
Act lead to unmistakable conclusion that the employees of the 
cafeterias cannot be but termed to be employees of the 
university in as much as the university has control over the 
running of the cafeterias. The concerned expressed by the 
Supreme Court89 on the deployment of contract labour against 
the perennial work is quoted hereunder: 
 
"There are questions remain unanswered:  The society shall 
have to thrive:  The society shall have to prosper and this 
prosperity can only come in the event of there being a wider 
vision for a total social good and benefit:  It is not bestowing 
any favour to any body to it is a mandatory obligation to see 
that the society thrives. The deprivation of the weaker section 
we had for long but time has now come to cry halt and it is for 
the law courts to rise up to the occasion and grant relief to a 
seeker of a just cause and just grievance. Economic justice is 
not a mere legal jargon but in the new millennium, it is the 
obligation for all to confer this economic justice to a seeker:  
society is to remind society justice is the order and economic 
justice is the rule of the day. Narrow pedantic approach to 
statutory documents no longer survives. The principle of 
corporate jurisprudence is now being imbibed in the industrial 
jurisprudence and there is a long catena of cases in regard 
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1189(SC) 
 168
thereto - the law thus is not a state of fluidity since the situation 
is more or less settled. As regards interpretation widest 
possible amplitude shall have to be offered in the matter of 
interpretation of statutory documents under industrial 
jurisprudence. The draconian concept is no longer available. 
Justice - social and economic as noticed above ought to be 
made available with utmost expedition so that the socialistic 
pattern of the society as dreamt of by the founding fathers can 
thrive and have its foundation so that the future generation do 
not live in the dark and cry social and economic justice. "    
 
The similar views were also held by the Supreme Court in the 
earlier cases namely Parimal Chandra Raha vs. LIC90   In this 
case, the contract labour engaged in the canteens of Life 
Insurance Corporation held the labour deployed in the canteens 
are the employees of the LIC.  
 
As we have stated above that the intervention of the Judiciary 
depends on the supervision and control and the nature of 
activities being carried out by the employees as engaged 
through contractor or for a fixed term contract. There are some 
instances wherein SC has intervened when the employees 
have been terminated on cessation of the contract.  In the case 
of Director, Institute of Management Development, UP vs. Smt. 
                                                 
90 1995 JT(3) SC 268. 
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Pushpa Srivastava91 in this case the Apex Court has held that 
where the appointment is purely on ad-hoc basis and is 
contractual and by efflux of time, the appointment comes to an 
end, the person holding such post can have no right to continue 
in the post.  This is so with the person is continued from time to 
time on ad hoc basis for more than a year.  He cannot claim 
regularisation in service on the basis that he was appointed on 
ad-hoc basis for more than a year.  
 
In one case the Allh. High Court92 held that workman appointed 
on 5.6.86 as an English Typist and continues to work till 29.2.92 
he was given an ad-hoc appointment with breaks. Last letter 
was given on 19.6.91 for fixed term employment till 1992. No 
doubt that the award of the Labour Court to reinstate him is 
illegal that the termination of the workmen appointed for fixed 
period amount to retrenchment but the termination amount to 
discrimination since two persons engaged subsequent to the 
appointment of the workman were working. The award is 
modified and the workman is to be reinstated.  In another case 
Pramod Kumar Tiwari vs. Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation Ltd93, 
the MP High Court held that the termination of a contractual 
appointment of a workman will not amount to retrenchment, 
since the same will be covered by Sec. 2(oo)(bb) of the 
Industrial Disputes Act which excludes certain terminations 
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from the definitions of retrenchment.  In the instant case an 
employee appointed for a project, which lasted for 8 years, on 
closure of the project termination of such employee will not 
amount to retrenchment.   
 
The recent judgement of Supreme Court in the case of Deepa 
Chandra vs. State of UP & ors.94. In this case a dispute was 
raised by the appellant on the ground that though he had put in 
more than 240 days in each year of service from 1982 - 1988 
he had been retrenched without following procedure prescribed 
under Sec. 25F of Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial 
Tribunal, therefore, on adjudication came to the conclusion that 
termination of service of the appellant is bad and in particular 
notice that persons have been employed subsequent to the 
appellant have been continuing in service, whereas the 
services of the appellant had been put to an end.  In the 
circumstances, the Labour Court made an award granting the 
reinstatement with back wages with other consequential 
benefits that may follow from it.  The High Court approached 
the matter; the High Court set aside the award of the Labour 
Court.   Subsequently, the Supreme Court approached the 
matter and held that the High Court lost the sight of the point in 
issue i.e. where an employee had put in service more than 240 
days in each year for several years whether his services can be 
put to an end without following procedure prescribed u/s 25 F of 
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Industrial Disputes Act.  If there has been violation that of such 
an employee will have to be reinstated in his original service on 
the same terms and conditions in which he was working earlier.  
Accordingly, the order passed by the Labour Court was 
restored by the Supreme Court.   
 
In another case Keshod Nagarpalika vs. Pankajgiri Jhavergiri95  
The Gujarat Hihg Court has held that Sec. 25F of the Industrial 
Disputes Act, conditions precedent for retrenchment of 
workman. A workman must have worked for 240 days. In the 
present case, the workman has pleaded that he has worked for 
16 months; the management did not contradict it, the award of 
the Labour Court granting him reinstatement with full back 
wages cannot be set aside. 
 
In view of the above explained settled position of law, if an 
employee works more than 240 days in a year even the guard 
stipulated under section 2(oo) (bb) is of no use. Because one of 
the condition precedents u/s 25F denotes that “no workman 
employed in an industry who has been in continuous service for 
not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched 
by that employer until ..........(condition precedents)”. Therefore, 
the word continuous service has to be understood as defined in 
Sec. 25B where the employee had completed service of 240 
days, the provisions of Sec. 25F would be attracted.  If a person 
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is a workman as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act and the 
employer is the same, he earns continuous service by working 
for 240 days within a period of 12 calendar months preceding 
the date of retrenchment the same view was held by the 
Hon’ble High Courts of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.  For 
the purpose of Sec. 25F a period of 240 days has to be counted 
from the day of the workman had joined the services even 
though on ad-hoc basis. This was held by Supreme Court in the 
case of Krishna Kumar vs. UP SFEC Corporation96. 
 
Further, the labour deployed who completes more than 240 
days they may be required to be paid retrenchment 
compensation on their termination under Sec.25 (F) of the 
Industrial Disputes Act. Even on their non-completion of their 
said period and to avoid the magic of calculation of 240 days it 
is advisable to pay the said compensation by way of an 
abundant caution. Thereby even if the employee makes claim 
for retrenchment compensation, the management would be in a 
better position to contend that it has been paid retrenchment 
compensation as an abundant caution and thereby it has 
followed the procedure prescribed under Sec.25 (F) of the 
Industrial Disputes Act.  
 
The above discussions witness that the approach and concept 
of social justice adopted by the judicial system has taken away 
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much of the common law right of the employer. The exercise of 
managerial power is now subject to statutes, awards, 
settlements, and regulations. The absolute power of hire and 
fire has been restricted largely because:- 
 
(a) Security of service of the Industrial worker no longer 
depends upon the sweet will of the employer. 
(b) No punitive action will be justified if the procedure 
followed is not in accordance with the provisions of 
the law / natural justice. 
 
Having said so, it is pertinent to reiterate again that as there 
exist no codified law in this regard, thus still lot of room left with 
employer to influence, coerce the enquiry proceedings and 
much less to say ultimately he may reverse the finding of the 
enquiry officer and much less to say that ultimately, employer 
may reverse the findings of the enquiry officer. All these 
aspects and their validity and judicial interference there to, is 
being dealt in the below mentioned chapters.  
 
Generally, the scope of initiation of disciplinary enquiry against 
such alleged misconducts committed within the premises of the 
establishment and in the course of the employment.  
 
Let us analyze views of the law courts on this complex and 
dynamic aspect of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against 
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delinquent employee for alleged misconduct committed within 
the premises of the work precincts and / or during the course of 
the employment and otherwise:     
 
M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I.) Ltd, vs. Presiding Officer, Labour 
Court, Meerut,97 The ratio held in this case “To enable an 
employer to peacefully carry on his industrial activity, the Act 
confers powers on him to prescribe conditions of service 
including enumerating acts of misconduct when committed 
within the premises of the establishment. The employer has 
hardly any extra-territorial jurisdiction. He is not the custodian of 
general law and order situation nor the Guru or mentor of his 
workmen for their well regulated cultural advancement. If the 
power to regulate the behaviour of the workmen outside the 
duty hours and at any place wherever they may be was 
conferred upon the employer, contract of service may be 
reduced to contract of slavery. The employer is entitled to 
prescribe conditions of service more or less specifying the acts 
of misconduct to be enforced within the premises where the 
workmen gather together for rendering service. The employer 
has both power and jurisdiction to regulate the, behaviour of 
workmen within the premises of the establishment, or for 
peacefully carrying the industrial activity in the vicinity of the 
establishment”. 
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When the broad purpose for conferring power on the employer 
to prescribe acts of misconduct that may be committed by his 
workmen is kept in view, it is not difficult to ascertain whether 
the expression 'Committed' within the premises of the 
establishment or in the vicinity thereof would qualify each and 
every act of misconduct collocated in clause 10 or the last two 
only, namely, 'any act subversive of discipline and efficiency 
and any act involving moral turpitude'. To buttress this 
conclusion, one illustration would suffice. Drunkenness even 
from the point of view of prohibitionist can at best be said to be 
an act involving moral turpitude. If the misconduct alleging 
drunkenness as an act involving moral turpitude is charged, it 
would have to be shown that it was committed within the 
premises of the establishment or vicinity thereof but if the 
misconduct charged would be drunkenness the limitation of its 
being committed within the premises of the establishment can 
be disregarded. 
 
Para 15 of the judgment: The misconduct prescribed in a 
Standing Order which would attract a penalty has a causal 
connection with the place of the work as well as the time at 
which it is committed which would ordinarily be within the 
establishment and during duty hours. The causal connection in 
order to provide linkage between the alleged act of misconduct 
and employment must be real and substantial, immediate and 
proximate and not remote or tenuous. 
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Para 23 of the judgment: Some misconduct neither defined nor 
enumerated and which may be believed by the employer to be 
misconduct ex-post facto would not expose the workmen to a 
penalty. It cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say 
ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission 
nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant Standing 
Order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the 
enumerated misconduct in the relevant Standing Order but yet 
a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. 
 
Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd., Appellant vs. 
The Workmen,98 Standing order no.24 (misconduct) was 
subjected judicial scrutiny, which reads as:- 
(1) Commission of any act subversive of discipline or good 
behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment: 
xx xx xx xx xx xx xx" 
 
Assault by operator on charge-man of same factory would be 
an act subversive of discipline. The fact that the assault was 
committed outside the factory (in a suburban train while the 
charge-man assaulted was going (home) would not take it out 
of the above standing order. The words "within the premises or 
precincts of the establishment" refer not to the place where the 
act which is subversive of discipline or good behavior is 
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committed but where the consequence of such an act manifests 
itself. In other words, an act, wherever committed, if it has the 
effect of subverting discipline or good behaviour within the 
premises or precincts of the establishment, will amount to 
misconduct under Standing Order 24 (1). 
 
Central India Coalfields Ltd., Calcutta, vs. Ram Bilas 
Shobnath,99 The Supreme Court held that “It is common ground 
that quarters are provided by the appellant to its employees and 
they are situated on the coal bearing area at a distance of 
about 200 feet from the pit-mouth according to the appellant 
and at a distance of 2000 feet according to the respondent. 
Standing Order No. 29(5) provides that drunkenness, fighting, 
riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour constitutes 
misconduct, which entails dismissal. Normally this Standing 
Order would apply to the behaviour on the premises where the 
workmen discharge their duties and during the hours of their 
work. It may also be conceded that if a quarrel takes place 
between workmen outside working hours and away from the 
coal premises that would be a private matter which may not fall 
within Standing Order No. 29(5); but in the special 
circumstances of this case it is clear that the incident took place 
in the quarters at a short distance from the coal bearing area 
and the conduct of the respondent which is proved clearly 
amounts both to drunkenness as well as riotous, disorderly and 
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indecent behaviour”. In the matter of Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., vs. 
The Workmen,100 Standing Order 22 (viii) of the Certified 
standing orders of the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., provided that 
without prejudice to the general meaning of the term 
"misconduct," it shall be deemed to mean and include, inter 
alia, drunkenness, fighting riotous or disorderly or indecent 
behaviour within or outside the factory.  
 
The Supreme Court held that: 
(i) it would be unreasonable to include within Standing Order 
22(vii) any riotous behaviour without the factory which was the 
result of purely private and individual dispute  and in course of 
which tempers of both the contestants became hot. In order 
that Standing Order 22(viii) may be attracted, it must be shown 
that the disorderly or riotous behaviour had some rational 
connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim. 
  
(ii) Where, what the occasion for the assault by the charge-
sheeted workman on another workman was and what motive 
actuated it, had been considered by the domestic tribunal, the 
findings of the domestic tribunal on these points must be 
accepted in proceedings before Industrial Tribunal, unless they 
were shown to be based on no evidence or were otherwise 
perverse.    
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(iii) If the charge-sheeted workman assaulted another workman 
solely for the reason that the latter was supporting the plea for 
more production, that could not be said to be outside the 
purview of Standing Order 22 (viii). 
 
Palghat BPL & PSP Thozhilali Union vs. BPL India Ltd.,101  The 
workers of BPL were on strike and threw stones on officers and 
also hit an officer with a stick near the BPL bus stop. According 
to the relevant standing Orders, “any act of subversive 
discipline committed either within or outside the premises of the 
company” was also misconduct. The workmen’s counsel 
contended that the action of the workmen did not amount to 
misconduct. The Supreme Court rejected the contention and 
held that: 
 
Any act subversive of discipline committed outside the 
premises is also misconduct. Any act unrelated to the service 
committed outside the factory would not amount to misconduct. 
But when a misconduct vis-à-vis the officers of the 
management is committed outside the factory, certainly, same 
would be an act subversive of discipline. 
 
Agnani vs. Badri Das102 The Supreme Court has held that 
though it is true that private quarrel between an employee and 
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a stranger with which the employer is not concerned as falls 
outside the categories of misconduct, it cannot be reasonably 
disputed that acts which are subversive of discipline amongst 
employees or misconduct or misbehaviour by an employee 
which is directed against another employee of the concern may 
in certain circumstances constitute misconduct so as to form 
the basis of an order of dismissal or discharge.  S. Govinda 
Menon vs. Union of India103 In para 6 of the judgment the apex 
court has observed that “In our opinion, it is not necessary that 
a member of the Service should have committed the alleged act 
or omission in the course of discharge of his duties as a servant 
of the Government in order that it may form the subject-matter 
of disciplinary proceedings. In other words, if the act or 
omission is such as to reflect on the reputation of the officer for 
his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty, there is no reason 
why disciplinary proceedings should not be taken against him 
for that act or omission even though the act or omission relates 
to an activity in regard to which there is no actual master and 
servant relationship. To put it differently, the test is not whether 
the act or omission was committed by the appellant in the 
course of the discharge of his duties as servant of the 
Government. The test is whether the act or omission has some 
reasonable connection with the nature and condition of his 
service or whether the act or omission has cast any reflection 
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upon the reputation of the member of the Service for integrity or 
devotion to duty as a public servant. We are of the opinion that 
even the appellant was not subject to the administrative control 
of the Government when he was functioning as Commissioner 
under the Act and was not the servant of the Government 
subject to its orders at the relevant time, his act or omission as 
Commissioner could form the subject-matter of disciplinary 
proceedings provided the act or omission would reflect upon his 
reputation for integrity or devotion to duty as a member of the 
Service”. The Court relied on the observations made by Lopes, 
L. J. in Pearce. vs. Foster, (1886) 17 QBD 536 at p. 542: 
"If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with 
the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is 
misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That 
misconduct, according to my view, need not be 
misconduct in the carrying on of the service or the 
business. It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial 
or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests or to the 
reputation of the master, and the master will be justified. 
not only if he discovers it at the time, but also if he 
discovers it afterwards, in dismissing that servant." 
Let us also see and analyze the scope of the disciplinary 
enquiry vis-à-vis when the delinquent admits / confess the 
charges and the views of the law courts and their limitation and 
parameter set thereof to the effect of admission of guilt: 
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Evidentiary Value of the expression of admission / 
confession of guilt: In the case of Sahoo vs. State of U.P,104 
the Supreme Court has observed “It is said that one cannot 
confess to himself; he can only confess to another. This raises 
an interesting point, which falls to be decided on a 
consideration of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act. 
Section 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act deal with the admissibility 
of confession by accused persons in criminal cases. But the 
expression "confession" is not defined. The Judicial Committee 
in Pakala Narayanaswami vs. Emperor105 has defined the said 
expression thus: 
 
"A confession is a statement made by an accused 
which must either admit in terms the offence or at 
any rate substantially all the facts which constitute 
the offence." 
 
A scrutiny of the provisions of Ss. 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act 
discloses, as one learned author puts it that statement is a 
genus, admission is the species and confession is the sub-
species. Shortly stated, a confession is a statement made by an 
accused admitting his guilt. What does the expression 
"statement" mean? The dictionary meaning of the word 
"statement" is "the act of stating, reciting or presenting verbally 
or on paper." The term "statement", therefore, includes both 
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oral and written statements. It is also a necessary ingredient of 
the term that it shall be communicated to another? The 
dictionary meaning of the term does not warrant any such 
extension; or the reason of the rule underlying the doctrine of 
admission or confession demands it. Admissions and 
confessions are exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Evidence 
Act places them in the category of relevant evidence 
presumably on the grounds that, as they are declarations 
against the interest of the person making them, they are 
probably true. The probative value of an admission or a 
confession does not depend upon its communication to 
another, though, just like any other piece of evidence, it can be 
admitted in evidence only on proof. This proof in the case of 
oral admission or confession can be offered only by witnesses 
who heard the admission or confession, as the case may be”. 
 
In the case of K.S Srinivasan vs. Union of India,106 the apex 
court has held that Admission - Probative value - - An 
admission is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted, 
though it may in certain circumstances operate as an estoppel.  
Relying on the ratio of the said judgment the court in the case 
of Allahabad Bank vs. Pronab Kumar Mukherjee107, has held 
that an admission may not in all cases do away with the 
requirement of holding an enquiry. Even if no enquiry is 
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required to be held in a particular case, the conditions laid down 
in the relevant rules should be strictly followed 
 
No enquiry necessary when guilt is admitted – In the case 
of Central Bank of India vs. Karunamoy Banerjee,108 the 
Supreme Court has observed that “We must, however, 
emphasize that the rules of natural justice, as laid down by this 
Court, will have to be observed, in the conduct of a domestic 
enquiry against a workman. If the allegations are denied by the 
workman, it is needless to state that the burden of proving the 
truth of those allegations will be on the management; and the 
witnesses called, by the management, must be allowed to be 
cross-examined, by the workman, and the latter must also be 
given an opportunity to examine himself and adduce any other 
evidence that he might choose, in support of his plea. But, if the 
workman admits his guilt, to insist upon the management to let 
in evidence about the allegations, will, in our opinion, only be an 
empty formality”. In nutshell, if a workman, against whom 
disciplinary proceedings are instituted, admits his guilt, there is 
no necessity for the management to hold any enquiry. 
 
The Apex Court in the case of Channabasappa Basappa 
Happali, vs. The State of Mysore,109 , has observed that – “it 
was contended on the basis of the ruling reported in R. vs. 
Durham Quarter Sessions; Ex parte Virgo, (1952 (2) QBD 1) 
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that on the facts admitted in the present case, a plea of guilty 
ought not to be entered upon the record and a plea of not guilty 
entered instead. Under the English law, a plea of guilty has to 
be unequivocal and the Court must ask the person and if the 
plea of guilty is qualified the Court must not enter a plea of 
guilty but one of not guilty. The Police constable here was not 
on his trial for a criminal offence. It was a departmental enquiry, 
on facts of which due notice was given to him. He admitted the 
facts. In fact his counsel argued before us that he admitted the 
facts but not his guilt. We do not see any distinction between 
admission of facts and admission of guilt. When he admitted 
the facts, he was guilty. The facts speak for themselves. It was 
a clear case of indiscipline and nothing less”.   
 
In case a workman admits the charge against him or makes an 
unconditional and unqualified confession then there is nothing 
more to be done away of enquiry and it cannot be argued that 
the procedure of departmental enquiry should have been 
applied notwithstanding such admission or confession held in 
J.L Toppo vs. Tata Locomotive & Engg. Co. Ltd.,110  
   
 Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Instrumentation Ltd., 
vs. P.O. Labour Court,111 has held that - Section 58 of the 
Evidence Act lays down that facts admitted need not be proved, 
and therefore, where the facts are admitted and those are 
                                                 
110 1964 ICR 586 (IC). 
111 1988 II LLJ 492 
 186
sufficient to make out a case of misconduct, any further 
departmental enquiry would be an empty formality.  
 
In the case of P.K Thankachan vs. Thalandu services Co-op 
Bank,112 the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala has held that - 
evidence is required to prove disputed facts and no admitted 
facts. Where an admission is made after knowing the charges, 
no evidence is required to be held.  It would be a different 
matter if the admission of guilt is by an employee who could not 
understand what the charges were or if he was induced or 
coerced into admitting his guilt. 
 
In the case of Manger Boisahabi tea Estate vs. P.O. Labour 
Court,113 the Hon’ble Guwahati High Court has held that -  a 
misconduct owned and admitted by the delinquent is antithesis 
of the violation of principles of natural justice or victimisation as 
understood in industrial relations, as the question of prejudice 
does not arise under such circumstances. 
 
In the case of Manjunatha Gowda vs. Director General of 
Central Reserve Police Force,114 held by the Karnataka High 
Court that, there is no infringement whatsoever of the rules of 
natural justice if no enquiry is conducted after the charge is 
admitted by the delinquent employee. The Andhra Pradesh 
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High Court has further clarified in the case of K. 
Venkateshwarlu vs. Nagarjuna Gramin Bank,115 , that even if the 
employer holds a departmental enquiry in-spite of such 
admission of guilt, and the Court finds some flaw or defect in 
such unnecessary enquiry conducted by the employer, the 
Court cannot set aside the order made by the employer 
imposing punishment.  It is so because even if a defective 
enquiry is conducted, no prejudice is caused to the delinquent 
because action could have been taken against him on the basis 
of admission.  
 
Do’s and Don’ts which administer the admission / 
confession: - The Apex Court in the case of Jagadish Prasad 
Saxena vs. Sate of M.P,116 held that, as the statements made by 
the appellant did not amount to a clear or unambiguous 
admission of his guilt, failure to hold a formal enquiry 
constituted a serious infirmity in the order of dismissal passed 
against him, as the appellant had no opportunity at all of 
showing cause against the charge framed against him and so 
the requirement of Art. 311(2) were not satisfied. - - Even if the 
appellant had made some statements which amounted to 
admission, it was open to doubt whether he could be removed 
from service on the strength of the said alleged admissions 
without holding a formal enquiry as required by the rules.  
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It is of the utmost importance that in taking disciplinary action 
against a public servant a proper departmental enquiry must be 
held against him after supplying him with a charge-sheet, and 
he must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to meet the 
allegations contained in the charge-sheet. The departmental 
enquiry is not an empty formality; it is a serious proceeding 
intended to give the officer concerned a chance to meet the 
charge and to prove his innocence. In the absence of any such 
enquiry it would not be fair to strain facts against the appellant 
and to hold that in view of the admissions made by him the 
enquiry would have served no useful purpose. That is a matter 
of speculation which is wholly out of place in dealing with cases 
of orders passed against public servants terminating their 
services.   
 
In Allahabad Bank vs. Pronab Kumar Mukherjee,117 it has been 
held that an admission has to be construed strictly because it 
deprives a delinquent employee of his right to show that the 
allegations against him have no basic at all and that he is 
innocent.  An admission of guilt is different from acceptance of 
moral obligation. If the employee denies the charges levelled 
against him but makes good the shortage considering that as in-
charge of the department it is his moral obligation, it cannot be 
taken to be an admission of his guilt.  The disciplinary authority 
should enquire as to whether it was an act of the employee as 
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in-charge or of the other employees under him which resulted in 
the shortage.  
 
In the case of ACC Babock Ltd., vs. Bhimsa,118 it has been held, 
if a person admits the allegation but gives reasons for the same, 
it does not amount to admission of guilt. It only amounts to 
accepting the fact of allegation but under extenuating 
circumstances which may be justified.  In such a case, an 
enquiry is to be held as the workman has a right to lead 
evidence to support the plea of extenuating circumstances 
which may lead the management to take a lenient view.  
 
Further it has been held in the case of P.Selvaraj vs. M.D 
Kattabamman Transport Corpn. Ltd.,119 it has been held that 
where the employee stated in his statement that whatever that 
had happened, had happened because of the problems which 
were created by the passengers and their quarrel with him and 
that he had not consciously committed any mistake, it was held 
that this observation could not be taken to be an admission. 
Merely picking out a single sentence from the entire 
explanation, and treating the statement of the employee as 
amounting to admission of guilt could not be sustained. 
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In Associated Cement Co. Ltd., vs. Abdul Gaffar,120 the 
workman had contended that his confession of guilt during the 
inquiry was given on an assurance by the inquiry office that the 
workman would not be dismissed from service.  This was 
denied by the inquiry officer. The Court felt on an examination 
of the relevant facts that the workman’s plea appeared to be an 
afterthought.  It was further observed by the Court that as a rule 
of prudence, whenever there is a conflict of versions, the 
version given by the inquiry officer should normally be 
accepted. 
 
Fall-out from the aforementioned the judicial decisions and 
which are required to be kept in mind, viz;  
 
Principles regarding admission must be complied with: 
 
(1) Confession statements should be scrutinized with utmost 
care & caution 
(2) Confession should be in terms of the misconduct / 
charges. 
(3) All the ingredients of the charge must be admitted in the 
confession. 
(4) Confession should be interpreted as whole and an 
admission along with explanations / reasons does not 
amount to confession. 
                                                 
120 1980 Lab IC 683 
 191
(5) Confession should be unconditional & unqualified. 
(6) Confession should be secured without threat or coercion. 
(7) Confession is also vitiated by inducement. 
(8) Admission or confession before issue of charge sheet can 
be used as evidence but does not obviate enquiry. 
      
When admission is withdrawn– When a confession / 
admission is retracted it becomes doubtful and therefore, the 
principles of natural justice mandates that it should be 
corroborated. In the case of Thotapalli Radhakrishnamurthy vs. 
Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co.,121 the court has 
observed that it is not safe to act upon the admission of the 
delinquent when it is denied and when it is alleged to have 
been extracted by coercion.  Further in the case of   Madikal 
Service Co-op. Bank ltd., vs. Labour Court 122 it has been held 
that where the charge-sheeted employee had made some 
inculcator statement before the audit part and also give a 
general statement in a letter that he had committed mistakes 
and was, therefore, guilty, but in his written statement of 
defence denied every one of the charges and also challenged 
the said inculpatory statement as being not voluntary, it was 
held that the Labour Court was justified in concluding that the 
employee did not pleas guilty to the charges. There should 
have been a proper enquiry examining the witnesses and the 
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employee being allowed to cross-examine the witnesses and 
adduce evidence. 
 
When fact of misconduct has to be established inspite of 
admission – In Natvarbhai S. Makwana vs. Union Bank of 
India123, it was held by a Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court 
(at p. 302) that even in case of admission, the factum of 
misconduct must be established.  Dealing with a case of theft or 
misappropriation of Bank money, the Court observed that it 
might happen that the bank authorities may bona fide believe 
that there is theft or misappropriation, and later on in audit, it 
might be discovered that there was accounting mistake and no 
theft or misappropriation whatsoever. To avoid such possibility, 
it is always necessary that the factum of misconduct be 
established.  The delinquent employee may be induced to 
confess the guilt for various reasons. It is submitted that, putting 
it in simple language, the Court held that it should first be 
proved that the misconduct has been committed, and the 
admission would be relevant only with regard to the question 
whether the employee concerned is guilty of the said 
misconduct.  It is submitted that such  a dictum may hold good 
only in respect of a limited class of cases like theft or 
misappropriation, and it would be safer in such cases for the 
employer to prove the occurrence of theft on misappropriation 
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and also consequent loss caused thereby even in case of 
admission. 
 
2.3 APPLICABILITY OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL 
JUSTICE: - 
It is universally understood that where there is no codified law, 
the principles of natural justice may be applicable. As well in the 
disciplinary / departmental enquiries there is no hard and fast 
written procedure as such, hence the principle of natural justice 
will acts as a variable to meet the ends of justice. In this 
direction there are catena of case laws, which decided by 
various courts of the land as to the degree of applicability, 
scope, purpose, objectivity etc., of the principles of natural 
justice in the process of Disciplinary Enquiry. Let us further 
analyze the evolution and applicability of the “principles of 
natural justice” under Indian context, though some extent, we 
have covered in chapter – 1 above.  
  
The concept of hire and fire has been abandoned. Since the 
rights of the employees in Private as well as Public sectors 
employment, almost been recognized either through Statutes or 
through the pronouncements / precedents of law courts. Even 
the doctrine of ‘pleasure’ which still finds a place in our 
democratic constitution has been restricted by the provisions 
contained in Articles 309 and 311 of Constitution. 
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An employer expects loyalty, honesty and hard work from his 
employees and if an employee fails to fulfill his expectations the 
employer by virtue of master-servant relationship has a right to 
punish the defaulting employee. The employer or the master 
has not been given absolute authority to inflict any punishment 
on his employees. He has to be just even in awarding the 
punishment. An employer should not be actuated by any motive 
of victimization and his action of awarding punishment should 
be fair, bonafide and just. He cannot punish an employee 
unless he has given an opportunity to him to prove his 
innocence. This opportunity is afforded to an employee in 
domestic enquiries. 
 
The principles of natural justice mean the principles relating to 
the procedure required to be followed by authorities entrusted 
with the task of deciding disputes between the parties when no 
procedure is laid down by rules. The principles of natural justice 
only lay down the procedure and they have nothing to do with 
the merits of the case. The can as well be called the principles 
of procedural justice. 
 
The principles to ensure fair procedure are generally called “the 
principles of natural justice” on account of historic reasons. 
Previously it was believed that such principles had got the 
divine origin and they were imbedded in the heart of man by the 
nature itself i.e. “Justice”, “equity” and “good conscience”. Thus, 
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the principles acquired the nomenclature of “principles of 
natural justice”. The name is however, a misnomer. The 
principles arose out of crystallization of the judicial thinking 
regarding necessity to evolve minimum norms of fair procedure 
and they do not owe their origin to either nature or any divine 
agency.  
 
Natural Justice in Enquiry:  
The principles of ‘natural justice’ and reasonable opportunity 
have a special significance in domestic proceedings. English 
courts have been applying the principles of ‘natural justice’ 
without defining the term or fixing its connotation. Lord 
Evershed felt that the principles of natural justice were easy to 
proclaim but their precise extent was far less easy to define. 
The principle of natural justice is contained in the maxim ‘audi 
alteram partam’ which means ‘hear the other side’. This phrase 
is, of course, used only in a popular sense and must not be 
taken to mean that there is any natural justice among men. 
Under the English law the following elements are considered 
essential for natural justice:- 
 
1. Memo debet esse judex in propria cause i.e., no man can 
be a judge in his own case; and 
2. Audi alteram partam i.e., both sides are to be heard. 
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The first principle requires that a judge should be free from 
bias. The judge can have withered pecuniary or legal interest in 
the matter before him. 
 
In the industrial jurisprudence, discipline on the part of the 
employee in an establishment is accepted as natural 
phenomenon and indiscipline as unnatural behaviour. 
Indiscipline is something which is against the interest of the 
society. Punishing a delinquent employee for his acts of 
omissions or commissions in a day-to-day working or any other 
misbehaviour is, therefore, fulfillment of social obligation. 
Enforcement of discipline, so long as the methods and manners 
adopted are in conformity with the accepted principles of social 
and natural justice, can never be discarded. 
 
As stated above, the principles of natural justice require than no 
man should be condemned unheard to consequences resulting 
from alleged misconduct without having an opportunity of 
making his defense. The Supreme Court has laid down the 
following principles inter-alia stating that an enquiry cannot be 
said to be held in conformity with the principles of “natural 
justice” unless:124  
 
(i) The employee proceeded against has been informed 
clearly of the charges leveled against him; 
                                                 
124 Sur Emmanel and Stamping works Ltd., vs. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1914 ; AK 
Kraipak vs. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC150, 
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(ii) The witnesses are examined – ordinarily in the presence 
of the employee – in respect of the charges. 
(iii) The employee is given a fair opportunity to cross-examine 
witness 
(iv) He is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses 
including himself in his defence if he so wishes on any 
relevant matter; and 
(v) The enquiry officer records his findings with reasons for 
the same in his report.  
 
Bias in an Enquiry: 
The first principle of natural justice consists of the rule against 
bias or interest and is based on three maxims: 
 
 i) No man shall be a judge on his own cause. 
ii) Justice should not be done, but manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seemed to be done 
iii) Judges like Caesar’s wife should be above 
suspicion. 
 
The first requirement of natural justice is that the judge should 
be impartial and neutral and must be free from bias. He is 
supposed to be indifferent to the parties to the controversy. He 
cannot act as judge of a cause in which he himself has some 
interest either pecuniary or otherwise as it affords the strongest 
proof against neutrality. He must be in a position to act judicially 
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and to decide the matter objectively. This principle applies not 
only to judicial proceedings but also to quasi-judicial as well as 
administrative proceedings125. There are variety of bias among 
those these three are the basic types of bias viz; 
 I) pecuniary bias 
 ii) personal bias 
 iii) official bias or bias as to subject matter. 
 
In this regard there are catena of cases which decided by the 
different courts of the land. Let us browse through some such 
matters referred to and adjudication by the Law Courts:- 
 
A complaint was lodged by an officer and thereafter he 
appeared as a witness in the enquiry. The proceedings are said 
to be biased126.  
 
It is obvious that pecuniary interest, however small it may be in 
a subject matter of the proceedings, would wholly disqualify a 
member from acting as a judge127. One of the Committee 
members of a departmental enquiry was biased. Entire exercise 
of conducting enquiry by such committee would be futile. It 
would be violative of principles of natural justice.128   
  
                                                 
125 AIR 1984 SC 1572 
126 1990 II LLJ 23 (AP). 
127 AIR 1957 SC 425 (429) 
128 FLR 1988 (57) (Kar HC) 496 
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Bias - tests to determine: 
A predisposition to decide for or against one party without 
proper regard to the merits of the list is bias. Personal bias is 
one of the three major limits of bias, viz. pecuniary, personal 
and official bias. The test is not whether in fact a bias has 
affected the judgement, the test is always is and must be 
whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias 
attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated 
against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. It is in this 
sense that justice must not only be done must also appear to 
be done.129  
Constitution of enquiry committee of three members - Appellant 
alleging bias against one of the members of the committee on 
ground of enemity - rejected, said member appeared as witness 
in the enquiry deposed against him to prove charge no.12 also 
participated in the enquiry proceedings as its member - whether 
enquiry proceedings are vitiated - Held YES130. Bias of 
Disciplinary authority will vitiate enquiry131. 
 
Reasonable apprehension..... Petitioner was an active member 
of Union had earlier filed a complaint against the enquiry officer 
---- raised objection against the appointment of EO to conduct 
                                                 
129 1993  LLR 6557(SC) - See Also : AIR 1961 SC 705, AIR 1978 SC 597, AIR 1957 SC 
227, 1988 SC 651 
130 1993 LLR 657. Also See : AIR 1961 SC 705, 1970 SCR 457, 1968 SCR 186, AIR 
1957 SC 227 
131 1968 SLR 470 (Raj.HC). 1993 CLR 1 (SC) 
 200
enquiry against him...... request denied...... whether justified?  
held No132 . 
 
There are various aspects, which are to be taken in to 
consideration so that an enquiry ordered to be held against 
employee should not appear as an empty formality. The 
cardinal rule is for domestic enquiry that the principles of 
natural justice should be followed and the concerned employee 
is to be given an opportunity to defend himself and to cross-
examine the witnesses of the management. Also the enquiry 
officer should be an impartial person.  An enquiry by an officer, 
who participated in the proceedings against an employee 
resulting in his suspension, will be certainly biased and not 
impartial. 133      
The authority, who issued show cause notice, initiated 
disciplinary proceedings and acted as appellate authority. Bias 
likely to arise, Possibility of predisposition hovering over the 
mind of adjudicator could not be ruled out.    
 
Pecuniary Interest:  
It is now well settled that a pecuniary interest, howsoever slight 
will disqualify even though it is not proved that the decision was 
in any way affected by it. In jeejeebhoy vs. Asst. Collector of 
                                                 
132 1994 LLR 677 (Delhi) also see: 1987(4) SCC 611, AIR 1983 SC 109, AIR 1991 SC 
1221, 1969 (1) QB 125, 1970 AC 403., AIR 1972 SC 217., 1986 LAB IC 613 
133 B. Harischandra vs. Academy of General Education, 1995 LLR 420 (Kar. HC) 
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thane134, Chief Justice Gajendragadker reconstituted the bench 
on objection being taken on behalf of the interveners in the 
court on the ground that the Chief Justice who was the member 
of the Bench was also a member of the Cooperative Society of 
which the disputed land had been acquired.  
 
Personal Interest: 
Personal interest is the inclination of the adjudicator in favour or 
against one of the parties and may be reflected by word or 
deed so the judge which could be the result of -  
(a) Close personal relationship; 
(b) Professional, business or other vocational relationship; 
(c) The relation of employer or employee; 
(d) Strong personal animosity; 
(e) Close personal friendship. 
 
General Interest / Legal Interest:  
A judge may have a bias in the subject matter, which means 
that he is himself a party or has one direct connection with the 
litigation so as to constitute a legal interest. A legal interest 
mean that the judge is in such a position that bias must be 
assumed. There may not be any personal ill-will, yet the judge 
may be imbued with the desire to promote the departmental 
policy or may have an interest in the subject matter of litigation. 
The smallest legal interest may disqualify the judge. The 
                                                 
134 AIR 1965 SC 1065 
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interest has to be specific. General interest will not disqualify. 
For instance when in a disciplinary case, the inquiry officer got 
himself examined as prosecution witness, he was held to have 
legal interest in the case, and, therefore, disqualified from 
functioning as inquiry officer135. 
 
It is of the utmost importance that the officer selected to make 
an inquiry should be a person with an open mind and not one 
who is either biased against the person against whom action is 
sought to be taken or has pr-judged the issue. Bias is relevant 
not only in the punishing authority but also in the inquiry officer 
even where the inquiry officer is a different person from the 
punishing authority.    
 
The Supreme Court has also held that judges should be able to 
act impartially, objectively and without any bias and the 
authority empowered to decide the dispute between opposite 
parties bust be without bias towards one side or the other. The 
principle of natural justice properly extended to all cases where 
an independent mind as to be applied to arrive at fair decision 
between the rival claims of the parties. The strict standards 
applied to courts justice are now coming to be applied 
increasingly to administrative bodies. The result is that area of 
operation of the principles is expanding day by day and several 
                                                 
135 State of U.P vs. Moh. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 
 203
administrative decisions are also now required, to be taken in 
accordance with these principles.  
 
These principles are now considered almost to be so 
fundamental as to be implicit in every decision making function, 
may it be quasi-judicial or administrative. It is now well settled 
where civil consequences follow o r the authority has the scope 
for discretion to the disadvantage of a party, its decision must 
be taken in accordance with the principles of natural justice. In 
other words, a statutory body which is entrusted by statute with 
discretion must act fairly and afford hearing to other party 
before taking a final decision. This principle has been fully 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr Binapani 
Devi136, wherein justice J.C Shah, speaking of the court 
observed: 
 
“It is true that the order is administrative in character but 
even an administrative order which involves civil 
consequence …..must be made consistently with the 
rules of natural justice….”    
 
It may, however, be added that where the statute is silent about 
the observance of the principles of natural justice such statutory 
silence is taken to imply compliance with these principles. The 
implication of natural justice being presumptive, it may be 
                                                 
136 AIR 1967 SC 1269 
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included by the expressed words of statute, or by necessary 
intendment.  
 
Rules of Natural Justice do not supplant the law but 
supplement it: 
 
Rules of natural justice, are not embodies rules nor can they be 
elevated to the position of fundamental rights. The aim of rules 
of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to 
prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in 
areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they 
do not supplant the law but supplement it.  These are the 
observations the Supreme Court in the case mentioned supra137  
 
Area of applicability of the principles of natural justice:  
If a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary 
implication excludes application of any or all the rules of  
principles of natural justice, then the court cannot ignore the 
mandate of the legislature and read in to the concerned 
provision the principles of natural justice138.  
 
Where a particular situation is covered by the express 
provisions of the law or the rules, the applicability of the 
principles of natural justice to that extent is excluded. For 
instance, where a statutory rule provides that a disciplinary 
                                                 
137 AIR 1970 SC 150 
138 Union of India vs. JN Sinha & Ors, AIR 1971 SC 40 
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authority may either himself hold an enquiry in to the charges or 
appoint an inquiring authority for the purpose, the holding of the 
inquiry by the disciplinary authority himself shall not be barred 
by the rule of natural justice that no person shall be judged in 
his own cause. But, where the rules are silent on a point, the 
gap can be filled by the rules of natural justice.  
 
Other principles, which have evolved in course of time:  
In addition to afore mentioned two principles, which are basic, 
the following two principles are natural and logical consequence 
of the said principles:     
 
(1) The decision must be made in good faith without bias and 
not arbitrarily or unreasonably. 
(2) An order must be a speaking order.  
 
Requirement of Good faith: 
The principle that decision must be made in good faith implies 
that the judge has bestowed due consideration to the facts and 
evidence adduced during the trial or inquiry and has not taken 
in to account any extraneous matter not adduced during inquiry 
and that he arrived at the decision without favour to any of the 
parties. 
Speaking Orders: 
Whether the judge has considered all the aspects of a matter 
before him can only be ascertained if the order which he makes 
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is a speaking order. A speaking order means that it should 
contain the reasons for the conclusions reached. In the case of 
Bhagat raja vs. Union of India139 , it has been held that if an 
order does not give any reasons it does not fulfill elementary 
requirements of a quasi-judicial process.  
 
The Supreme Court in Siemens Engineering Vs. Union of 
India140  it has been held that the rule requiring reasons to be 
recorded by qusi-judcial authorities in support of the order 
passed by them is a basic principle of natural justice. This is 
one of the most valuable safe guards against any arbitrary 
exercise of power by authorities. 
 
A serious study of certain decision of Indian courts on 
reasonable opportunity goes to establish that the following 
ingredients constitute reasonable opportunity:       
 
(i) The person proceeded against should be clearly and 
specifically told of the charges standing against him; 
(ii)      He should be given full and adequate opportunity to 
explain; 
(iii) He should be allowed show cause against the 
punishment; and  
(iv) The whole thing must be an honest fair deal done with a 
sense of responsibility 
                                                 
139 1967 SCR 302 
140 AIR 1976 SC 1785 
 207
 
However, if an employee fails to appear before the enquiry 
officer although the enquiry was adjourned several times  in 
order to enable him to appear and finally he wrote back to the 
enquiry officer that he would not participate in the enquiry, 
cannot complain that no opportunity of hearing in respect of the 
charges was given at the enquiry. 
 
The Madras High Court in the case of Gabrial vs. State of 
Madras, has succinctly set out the requirements of an enquiry 
in the following terms: 
“All the enquiries in to the conduct of the individuals must 
conform to certain standards. One is that the person 
proceeded against must be given a fair and reasonable 
opportunity to defend himself. Another is that the person 
charged with the duty to hold the enquiry must discharge 
that duty without bias and certainly without vindictiveness. 
He must conduct himself objectively and dispassionately not 
merely during the procedural stages of enquiry, but also in 
dealing with the evidence and the material on record when 
drawing up the final order / report. A further requirement is 
that the conclusion must be rested on the evidence and not 
matters out side the record. And when it is said that the 
conclusion must be rested on the evidence, it goes without 
saying that it must not be based on a misreading of the 
evidence. These requirements are basic and cannot be 
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whittled down, whatever be the nature of enquiry, whether it 
be judicial, departmental or other”     
 
To conclude, the extent and application of the doctrine of 
natural justice cannot imprison within the straight jacket of a 
rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the 
nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative 
authority; upon the character of the rights of the persons 
affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other 
relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case.     
  
Let us further peruse, as to how the law courts have reacted to 
the situation and applicability of the natural justice in the 
proceedings of the disciplinary enquiry:  
 
If a delinquent employee wants certain documents and if they 
are not supplied to him on the ground that the copies are not 
available the inability would violate principles of natural justice if 
sufficient explanation is not forthcoming justifying their 
unavailability.141 Documents on which reliance is placed, copies 
thereof must be supplied for provisions of reasonable 
opportunity.142  
 
                                                 
141 1989 (I) LLJ 106 
142 1986 II LLJ 468 (SC) 
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A copy of the enquiry report has not given to the applicant. Held 
this deprived him to file an effective appeal and ordered to 
supply copy of enquiry report and give chance to file appeal.143  
Natural justice not violated on account of change in personnel 
of the enquiry committee by transfer of some members.144  
Rules violated if witnesses are examined in absence of a 
charged person or previously recorded statements are taken on 
record.145  
 
Neither charge of serious misconduct in spite of written request 
- nor copy of relevant documents supplied - nor request to 
engage advocate considered - enquiry conducted and 
concluded. Held, enquiry was neither fair nor proper and was 
not conducted in accordance with law.146  Neither copy of the 
enquiry report supplied nor petitioner was given opportunity to 
explain the material contained in the enquiry report - 
Termination of services based on enquiry report, held is clearly 
contrary to the principles of natural justice and statutory rules.147  
 
Disciplinary proceedings - non supply of copy of enquiry report - 
effect of - In this case the court viewed as the supply of enquiry 
report along with the recommendations, if any, in the matter of 
proposed punishment to be inflicted could be in composed by 
                                                 
143 CAT (Cal.) 1988 (I) 594 
144 (1970) II LLJ 279 
145 1961 LLJ 372 
146 LLR 1993 P.968 (Bombay HC) 
147 LLR 1993 P.881 (P&H HC);  Union of India vs. Moh. Ramsan 1990 (61) FLR 736 (SC) 
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the rules of natural justice and the delinquent therefore be 
entitled to supply of copy thereof. In one case148, held that even 
if there is no recommendation relating punishment, furnishing 
copy of the enquiry report is mandated before imposing 
punishment by the rules of natural justice. The object of supply 
of enquiry report is not merely to show cause against the 
proposed punishment but also become aware of factors, which 
may influence the mind of the disciplinary authority.   
   
Not giving an opportunity to the delinquent to explain why 
enquiry be not conducted against him. Held does not vitiate the 
enquiry on this sole ground.149  
 
Whether general provisions of principles of natural justice, as 
prevailing under common law would be applicable before 
imposing the penalty or damages. Held - YES the rules of ‘Audi 
Alterm Partem’ is applicable to the each and every case - i.e. 
No man shall condemned unheard.150  
  
Necessity of second opportunity against proposed punishment - 
Principles of natural justice does not warrant.  In this case151 the 
court observed that no doubt principles of natural justice are 
                                                 
148 AIR 1969 SC 1294 
149 LLR 1993 P.425 (AP HC). Also See : 1973-1-LLJ 278, 1975-II LLJ 379, 1983-II-LLJ-
425, 1982-I-LLN 332, 1984-I-LLJ-386, 1991-II-LLJ-412, 1988-I-LLJ-341 
150 1993 LLR 247 (Alhd. HC). See Also AIR 1976 SC 676, AIR 1979 Lab. I.C.27, AIR 
1981 SC 818, AIR 1986 SC 180, 1986(4) SC 876 
151 1993 LLR 9 (Ker. HC) 
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facts of Art.14 of the constitution and one opportunity generally 
necessary before imposition of punishment, a second 
opportunity by way of furnishing enquiry report is not 
imperative. In certain cases falling under reasonable 
classifications, if principles of natural justice are excluded, Art-
14 cannot be said to be violated. 
 
Application of principles of natural justice - Non-supply of 
enquiry report - consequences thereof: - The proposition of law 
laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India 
vs. Mah. Ramzan152 has been held that the delinquent workman 
be supplied with a copy of the enquiry report to enable him to 
make a representation to the disciplinary authority before 
passing the final order of punishment. However, the Bombay 
High Court has held contrary to the views of the Apex Court 
inter-alia stating that this principle would not apply to domestic 
enquiry where there are no such provisions of service rules or 
standing orders of that establishment153.  
 
Non-supply of complaint - effect on disciplinary proceedings - 
The complaint, which is the basis of entire proceedings against 
the petitioner, when not supplied to the petitioner, vitiated the 
                                                 
152 AIR 1991 SC 471 
153 1993 LLR 588 (Bom.HC) 
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proceedings by a failure to observe the principles of natural 
justice.154  
  
Non supply of copy of documents relied upon to the delinquent 
- effect:  It is well settled that if prejudice has been caused on 
account of non-supply of certain documents then prejudice 
would be deemed to have been caused and there would be 
violation of principles of natural justice. In the instant case, the 
entire case of the respondent corporation is based on the 
documents. The documentary evidence was material evidence 
and was used against the petitioner. Thus a conclusion can be 
legitimately drawn that the prejudice was caused to the 
petitioner. The fact that such a finding was recorded by the 
Labour Court cannot be ignored.155   
 
Applicability of rule of Audi Altern parten: It is well known latin 
maxim, mandates that no person should be condemned 
unheard - no decision must be taken which will affect the right 
of the concerned person without his/her first being informed of 
the case and giving him/her as opportunity of putting forward 
his/her case.  An order of entailing civil consequences must be 
made in accordance with the principles of natural justice. There 
                                                 
154 1993  LLR 304 
155 AIR 1961 SC 1623; 1994 LLR 980 (MP) 
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are any number of judicial pronouncements of the appeal court 
and this court reiterating this proposition of law.156  
 
The Supreme Court held that the finding of the High Court that 
punishment of removal from service is vitiated for non-supply of 
enquiry report / documents relied in the enquiry in view of the 
recent decision of the constitution Bench of the Supreme Court 
in Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad vs. B. Karunakar & 
Others 157  
 
Request of workman on 5.7.82 to the Enquiry Officer to adjourn 
the proceedings till 2 p.m as their representative would come by 
that time – Enquiry Officer waited up to 12.30 p.m refused to 
adjourn upto 2.30 pm closed the case and fixed the same for 
his report. Whether refusal to adjourn amounts to violation of 
principles of natural justice - Held ‘NO’.158  
 
Enquiry Officer found charges are not proved - Disciplinary 
authority disagreeing with the findings of Enquiry Officer - Held 
charges proved imposed minor penalty without any notice - 
single judge of Gujarat High Court held principles of natural 
justice have been violated as no fresh opportunity was given 
                                                 
156 1994 LLR 589  
157 1994 LLR 391; 1994 LLR 563 (SC) Also see : 1982 (3) ALL.E.R. 141, 1992 Suppl. (2) 
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before recording a finding that charges are proved. Divisional 
Bench of the same court upheld the view of single judge159.  
Deprivation of employee’s right for appeal and review - Higher 
authority than the disciplinary authority exercised his power and 
imposed punishment, thereby delinquent deprived the right of 
appeal and review160. 
  
Non-supply of copy of statements of witnesses recorded during 
preliminary inquiry - despite of demands - whether workman 
has been prejudiced in his defence and inquiry is illegal? Held 
YES.161  
 
Request made by the petitioner for summoning records in the 
custody of management, rejected by the Enquiry Officer saying 
that he has no power to do so - Whether petitioner (delinquent 
employee) has been denied right to defend. HELD YES.162   
 
Non supply of relevant documents with charge-sheet can vitiate 
enquiry - Held Yes, Non-supply of enquiry report before passing 
the order of dismissal violates the principles of natural justice. It 
causes serious prejudice to the aggrieved person.163 
 
                                                 
1591994  LLR 728 (Guj.) 
1601995 LLR 593 (SC) 
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Non-supply of the copies of the statements of witnesses 
examined in the preliminary enquiry and   in raising plea of 
violation of the Principles of Natural Justice is wholly 
unreasonable and in-fact nowhere the appellant has mentioned 
what prejudice she has suffered. There was no prejudice 
caused to the appellant on account of non supply of the 
statements in the preliminary enquiry164 . 
  
The principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard 
and fast formulas. They cannot also be put in to a straight 
jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and facts 
and circumstances of each case. The objective is to ensure fair 
hearing, a fair deal to the person whose rights are affected. A 
complaint of violation of facet of natural justice has to be 
examined on the touch – stone of prejudice165.  
 The requirements of principles of natural justice, which are 
required to be observed, are: 
 (1) workman should know the nature of the complaint or 
accusation;  
(2) an opportunity to state his case; and  
                                                 
164 Ms.Gupra vs. CMD Engineering India Ltd., 1997 LLR 372   
165 State Bank of Patiala vs. SK Sharma, 1997 LLR 269 SC 
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(3) the management should act in good faith which means 
that the action of the management should be fair, 
reasonable and just.  
It is no point laying stress on the principles of natural justice 
without understanding their scope or real meaning. As stated 
herein before, there are two essential elements of natural 
justice which are: (a) no man shall be judge in his own cause; 
and (b) no man shall be condemned, either civilly or criminally, 
without being afforded an opportunity of being heard in answer 
to the charge made against him. In course of time by various 
judicial pronouncements these two principles of natural justice 
have been expanded, e.g., a party must have due notice when 
the Tribunal will proceed; Tribunal should not act on irrelevant 
evidence or shut out relevant evidence; if the Tribunal consists 
of several members they all must sit together at all times; 
Tribunal should act independently and should not be biased 
against any party; its action should be based on good faith and 
order and should act in just, fair and reasonable manner. These 
in fact are the extensions or refinements of the main principles 
of natural justice stated above.166   
In Mclean vs. workers’ union167 Ch. Maugham J., observed “all 
that is meant by compliance with rules of natural justice by a 
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domestic tribunal is that the tribunal must act honestly and in 
good faith and must give the delinquent a chance of 
explanation and defence. If the rules postulate an inquiry, the 
delinquent must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard 
and, of correcting and contradicting a relevant statement 
prejudicial to his view”.   
In Byrne vs. kinemetograph renters’ society168, it was observed 
that “Firstly, I think the person accused should know the nature 
of accusation made; secondly, that he should be given an 
opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the 
tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really 
anything more”  
Union of India vs. T.R Varma169, the Supreme Court has 
observed that  “stating it broadly and without intending to be 
exhaustive it may be observed that rules of natural justice 
require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all 
relevant evidence on which he relies, the evidence of the 
opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should 
be given an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses 
examined; the Supreme Court has held that party and that no 
materials should be relied on against him without his being 
given an opportunity of explaining them”.     
  
                                                 
168 (1958) 2 All ER 579 
169 1957 SC 882 
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Applicability of principles of natural justice - charge-sheet:  
The issuance of charge-sheet is an essential requirement. The 
employee must be told what are the charges leveled against 
him and the allegations on which they are based170. He must 
also be informed of the evidence on which the charges are 
sought to be established so that he can put forward his 
defence. 
The charge-sheet should be issued in writing. A hasty verbal 
reading of the charge-sheet does not constitute service of 
charge171.  The charge must not be vague. The allegations 
should be concrete and specific with full particularity and should 
not leave out anything which the charged employee should 
know to make out his defence172.  
However, the charge-sheet is a matter of substance and not of 
form. Where full particulars were communicated through the 
memos, the Supreme Court did not accept the contention that 
no formal charge-sheet had been issued.  There is no magic in 
the word charge-sheet – the court observed173. The charge 
sheet cannot be issued by any higher authority. It can be issued 
only either the disciplinary authority itself or any authority so 
authorized by the statutory rules174.  
                                                 
170 Khme Chand vs. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 300  
171 K.S Tewari vs. G.M. High Explosives Factory, GB CB (1988) ATC 984 
172 Surath Chandra Chakravarty vs. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 752 
173 Kirshna Chandra Tandon vs. Union of India AIR 1974 SC 1589  
174 State of M.P vs. Shardul Singh (1970) 1 SCC 108  
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Even the disciplinary authority cannot take the proceedings, if 
the matter concerns himself or when he is a witness in the 
case175. This requirement is based on the principle that no 
person shall be judged on his own cause. The reason is 
beautifully stated by Lord Hewart CJ., in R.V Susses JJ. 
Exparte McCarthy (1924) I KB 256):  
“It is not merely of some importance, but is of 
fundamental importance that justice should not be done 
but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seem to be 
done” 
Communication of the charges to the employee concerned is 
also an essential requirement. No ex-parte proceedings can be 
taken unless the charges have been communicated.      
Applicability of principles of natural justice - appointment 
of Enquiry Officer:  
An enquiry held by a biased officer is bad in law. While 
pecuniary interest, howsoever small, shall disqualify the inquiry 
officer from deciding the matter, the test applied in the case 
personal interest is that there must be real likelihood of bias; 
whether the subject was really prejudiced or not, not being the 
relevant question. In Manak Lal vs. Dr. Singhvi176  the Supreme 
Court has stated the principles in the following words:  
                                                 
175 Arjun Chaubey vs. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 1356, State of U.P vs. Moh. Nooh, AIR 
1958 SC 86 
176 supra 
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“it is well settled that every member of the tribunal that is called 
upon to try the issue in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings 
must be able to act judicially; and it is of essence of judicial 
decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able 
to act impartially, objectively and without bias, In such cases, 
the test is not whether in fact bias has affected the judgment, 
the test always is and must be whether a litigant could 
reasonable apprehend that a bias attributable to the member of 
the tribunal  might have operated against him in the final 
decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it often said that 
justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done” 
If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing 
circumstances that he is likely to be prejudices that is sufficient 
to quash the decision177. However, there must be a real likely-
hood of bias. Surmises and conjunctures would not be enough. 
Right to defence assistance from a fellow employee / 
outside – applicability of principles: 
Though there is right to defence assistance from a fellow 
employee, there is no right of defence assistance from a 
particular employee if his services cannot be spared in the 
interest of the public service178 
 
                                                 
177 S. Parthasarthi vs. State of A.P, AIR 1973 SC 2701 
178 H.C. Sarin vs . Union of India AIR 1976 SC 1686 
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Defence assistance from a legal practitioner:  
Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay Vs. PR Nadkarni179  
The Supreme Court has held that in appropriate cases, having 
legal overtones or involving legal or factual complexities or 
where the status of the presenting officer so warrants, denial of 
permission to engage legal practitioner shall result in breach of 
natural justice. 
Rule 14(8) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control 
& Appeal) Rules, 1965, provides that an employee has been 
given the choice of being represented in the disciplinary 
proceedings through a co-employee.  
 
In Kalindi vs. Tata Locomotive & Engineering Company Ltd.180,  
a Three-Judge Bench observed as under (Paras 3 to 5 of AIR) 
"Accustomed as we are to the practice in the Courts of law to 
skilful handling of witnesses by lawyers specially trained in the 
art of examination and cross-examination of witnesses, our first 
inclination is to think that a fair enquiry demands that the 
person accused of an act should have the assistance of some 
person, who even if not a lawyer may be expected to examine 
and cross-examine witnesses with a fair amount of skill. We 
have to remember however in the first place that these are not 
enquiries in a Court of law. It is necessary to remember also 
                                                 
179 AIR 1983 SC 109 
180 AIR 1960 SC 914 
 222
that in these enquiries, fairly simple questions of fact as to 
whether certain acts of misconduct were committed by a 
workman or not only fall to be considered, and straightforward 
questioning which a person of fair intelligence and knowledge 
of conditions prevailing in the industry will be able to do will 
ordinarily help to elicit the truth. It may often happen that the 
accused workman will be best suited, and fully able to cross-
examine the witnesses who have spoken against him and to 
examine witnesses in his favour”. 
  
 In the above premise, in the case of Bharat Petroleum 
Corporation Ltd., vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and 
others181, the Apex court arrived at conclusion that a workman 
against whom an enquiry is being held by the management has 
no right to be represented at such enquiry by a representative 
of his Union; though of course an employer in his discretion can 
and may allow his employee to avail himself of such 
assistance." 
   
In another decision, namely, Dunlop Rubber Company vs. 
Workmen182 it was laid down that there was no right to 
representation in the disciplinary proceedings by another 
person unless the Service Rules specifically provided for the 
same. 
 
                                                 
181 AIR 1999 SC 401 
182 AIR 1965 SC 1392     
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The matter again came to be considered by a Three Judge 
Bench of this Court in Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd., vs. 
Ram Naresh Tripathi183, and Ahmadi, J. (as he then was) in the 
context of Section 22(ii) of the Maharashtra Recognition of 
Trade Unions and Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, as also in 
the context of domestic enquiry, upheld the statutory 
restrictions imposed on delinquent's choice of representation in 
the domestic enquiry through an agent. It was laid down as 
under:- 
 
"11. A delinquent appearing before a Tribunal may feel that the 
right to representation is implied in the larger entitlement of a 
fair hearing based on the rule of natural justice. He may, 
therefore, feel that refusal to be represented by an agent of his 
choice would tantamount to denial of natural Justice. Ordinarily 
it is considered desirable not to restrict this right of 
representation by counsel or an agent of one's choice but it is a 
different thing to say that such a right is an element of the 
principles of natural Justice and denial thereof would invalidate 
the enquiry. Representation through counsel can be restricted 
by law as for example, Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 
1947, and so also by certified Standing Orders. In the present 
case the Standing Orders permitted an employee to be 
represented by a clerk or workman working in the same 
                                                 
183 (1993) 2 SCC 115   
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department as the delinquent. So also the right to 
representation can be regulated or restricted by statute." 
 
In para 12 of the judgment the Apex court has concluded “it is 
therefore, clear from the above case law that the right to be 
represented through counsel or agent can be restricted, 
regulated by statute, rules, regulations or standing orders. A 
delinquent has no right to be represented through counsel or 
agent unless the law specifically confers such right. The 
requirement of rule of natural justice in so far as the 
delinquent’s right of hearing is concerned, cannot and does not 
extend to a right to be represented through counsel or agent…”           
 
 The earlier decisions in Kalindi vs. Tata Locomotive & 
Engineering Co. Ltd Dunlop Rubber Co. vs. Workmen and 
Brooke Bond India (P) Ltd. vs. Subba Raman184, were followed 
and it was held that the law in this country does not concede an 
absolute right of representation to an employee as part of his 
right to be heard. It was further specified that there is no right to 
representation as such unless the Company, by its Standing 
Orders, recognizes such a right. In this case, it was also laid 
down that a delinquent employee has no right to be 
represented in the departmental proceedings by a lawyer 
unless the facts involved in the disciplinary proceedings were of 
                                                 
184 Supra 
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a complex nature in which case the assistance of a lawyer 
could be permitted. 
The age-old concept “a man not only has right to speak from 
his own voice, but also has right to speak from his 
representative voice when his life, liberty and lively-hood is at 
stake” – this concept seems to be withering away day by day. 
The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of K.C Mani vs. 
Central Warehousing Corporation185.,  has laid down illustrative 
tests to determine such request for soliciting an assistance of 
legally trained mind / co-employee :  
 
?? Whether it is really a fight between two unequals? 
 
?? Whether the nature of charge is simple or complex? 
 
?? Whether the charge is such that some documents are 
required to be proved or disproved either because they 
are false or fabricated? 
 
?? Is it a case where there are number of witnesses to be 
examined and re-examined? 
 
 
?? Whether any expert witness is to be cross examined? 
                                                 
185 1994 LLR 312 
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?? What is the intellectual capacity, status and experience of 
the delinquent facing the departmental proceedings? 
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Chapter 03: JUDICIAL  STRUCTURE &  
       PERSPECTIVE - I 
3.1 Initiation of Disciplinary Enquiry 
3.2 Charge-Sheet 
3.3 Appointment of Enquiry Officer & Presenting Officer. 
3.4 Stay of Enquiry proceedings by the Law Courts. 
 
Prelude: This chapter – 3 and next two chapters are being 
dealt with demand of delinquent to be represented by the 
lawyer, disciplinary proceedings vis-à-vis criminal trial, 
communications and notice in the enquiry, witnesses, evidence 
and admission in the enquiry, element of bias in the enquiry 
(chapter-4). Enquiry report by the Enquiry Officer, Supply of 
enquiry report and second show cause notice, act of imposition 
of penalty and remedies (chapter-5). The said topics are being 
discussed with the help of judicial pronouncements of various 
Indian law courts including the Supreme Court, New Delhi, 
India.   
 
3.1 Initiation of Disciplinary Enquiry: 
 It is a general understanding that every legal action is 
espoused by one or the other cause. In the same way 
disciplinary proceedings also is not an exception to that general 
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understanding. The object of preliminary enquiry on the spot is 
made by the concerned department to satisfy the genuiness of 
the complaint against the delinquent employee. If it is found that 
the complaint is justified, the concerned departmental head 
contacts the Personnel department and seek their advice. He 
may be required to give written complaint and also obtain the 
statements of the complainant and defendants and witnesses if 
any. In the realm of initiation of disciplinary enquiry, its legality 
or otherwise has been referred to the wisdom of the court of 
law. The Law Courts have developed mass of case law in this 
area of initiation of enquiry. Some of the case laws in this 
regard has been discussed / mentioned in the relevant 
headings of this chapter:     
BASIC STEPS ideally to be resorted in THE DOMESTIC / 
DISCIPLINARY ENQUIRIES: 
1. Preliminary (if necessary to be held) after the report of the 
complaint 
2. Issue of show-cause notice / charge-sheet 
3. Explanation of workman complained against the issue of 
charge-sheet 
4. In case explanation is not satisfactory. Management may 
appoint an enquiry officer. 
5. Enquiry Notice 
 229
6. Oral enquiry if required. 
7. Reports of the findings and conclusions 
8. Disciplinary authority to issue second show cause notice 
with a copy of the Enquiry Report as to why proposed penalty 
should not be imposed and accept the findings of the Enquiry 
Officer. 
9. Communication of disciplinary orders to employee 
concerned 
ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS IN EACH STEP: 
REPORT OR COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DELINQUENT : 
(i) The report must contain specific date and time.  
??Specific acts or omission of the employee against whom 
complaint has reported 
??Effect of such act or omission on the organization 
??Names of the persons who were eyewitnesses 
(ii) The report must be made immediately after the occurrence 
of the act or omission. 
(iii) The report must be made by the supervisor/reporting officer 
concerned or affected with the matter of complaint 
(iv) It should be addressed to the head of the Department. 
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(v) It must be noted through proper channel. 
(vi) It must be forwarded in original with his remark to the 
appointing authority / Disciplinary Authority. 
ACTION ON THE REPORT / COMPLAINT BY THE 
MANAGEMENT : 
(a) The officer concerned should give his opinion in brief about 
the reported acts or omission. And record if disciplinary action is 
necessary with reasons. 
(b) The forwarding officer / complainant should send all the 
papers and documents connected with or throwing light on the 
acts or omissions and the behaviour in the department / section 
/ plant of the employee concerned. 
PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY : 
(i) If the employee is to be corrected in the department itself, it 
may serve the purpose; the workman may apologize. 
(ii) It can be useful where the facts are complicated or the 
employer for his satisfaction wants to ascertain the truth of the 
complaint or take action if desired. 
(iii) Nature of preliminary enquiry:- 
 
A preliminary enquiry is of very informal character and the 
methods are likely to vary in accordance with the requirements 
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of each case. The delinquent employees have no vested right 
in any form or procedure of holding preliminary enquiry.  The 
procedure is wholly at the discretion of the officer holding the 
enquiry.  After the preliminary enquiry, the disciplinary authority 
need not record its satisfaction in writing nor is it required to 
give reasons for initiating the regular departmental enquiry.  Ex 
- parte subjective satisfaction can be reached regarding prima 
facie case.  The authority need not give any opportunity to the 
delinquent to have his say in the preliminary enquiry.  Principles 
of rationality and fairness in action cannot be read into such 
enquiry.  The doctrine of principles of natural justice is not 
applicable to preliminary enquiries. 
 
Preliminary inquiry is only for the purpose of satisfaction of the 
disciplinary authority as to the existence of a prima facie case 
against the concerned employee for instituting a regular 
departmental inquiry. The disciplinary authority can get a fresh 
preliminary inquiry conducted by another officer and institute a 
regular departmental inquiry on its basis if it was not satisfied 
with the investigation and report of an earlier preliminary 
inquiry. 
Wherein and whenever conducted it must be - 
a) under oral instructions or written orders. 
b) conducted on the same day or as early as possible 
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c) statements need not be recorded. 
d) only some explanatory questions to the employee 
complained against and one or two or three eye witnesses if 
any may be asked. 
Who should conduct the preliminary enquiry:- 
There cannot be a broad and unqualified proposition that an 
officer who conducted a preliminary enquiry is disqualified from 
acting as a disciplinary authority on the ground of bias.  Also, 
there is no proposition that official bias can never be attributed 
to the authority who conducted a preliminary enquiry and later 
on held the disciplinary enquiry as well.  It depends on the facts 
and circumstances of each case. In a given case there may be 
circumstances to show that a disciplinary authority who was a 
party to the preliminary enquiry report was so overwhelmed by 
his findings in the preliminary report that had approached the 
entire issue with a closed mind.  The manner of conducting the 
disciplinary enquiry and process of decision making may be 
suggestive of an inference that the disciplinary authority 
considered the domestic enquiry as a mere formality to fortify 
his own view point.  In such cases, bias can be a ground for 
invalidating the decision of the disciplinary authority. But where 
the order passed by the disciplinary authority indicates that he 
scanned and made an independent appraisal of the entire 
evidence and gave additional reasons in support of its 
conclusions and was not mechanically led away by what was 
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said in the preliminary enquiry report, an inference of strong 
likelihood of bias may not be drawn.  However, it would be 
prudent for the disciplinary enquiry not to conduct the 
preliminary enquiry himself. The same view was held in the 
case of Rajendra Prasad Singh vs. Union of India186  
Generally, either the head of the department or under his 
instructions someone else of the department who is possibly 
should not be junior to the complainant. 
a) Someone other than the complaining officer. 
b) Not by one who is to be appointed as Enquiry Officer in the 
matter. 
Submission of report of the Preliminary enquiry:- 
a) The officer conducting preliminary enquiry should as far as 
possible submit a written report to the Head of the Department 
who had ordered the Preliminary enquiry. 
b) The Head of the Department should forward preliminary 
report along with the report of the complainant to the 
disciplinary authority. 
c) Even if the employee has apologized, the head of the 
department should always send his report to the disciplinary 
authority. 
 
                                                 
186 1996 I LLJ 1003 (Cal. H.C ) 
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An employee cannot complain that the preliminary enquiry was 
not properly conducted and, therefore, the enquiry is vitiated by 
the principles of natural justice. The preliminary enquiry has 
nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after the issue of the 
charge sheet. After full-fledged enquiry is held, the preliminary 
enquiry loses its importance and no judicial interference with 
preliminary enquiry. 
1. ISSUE OF SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE OR CHARGE-SHEET 
TO THE DELINQUENT:  
1) If any action whether it is punishing or pardoning, the 
employee complained against, is contemplated by the 
management, show cause notice or charge-sheet should be 
issued.  It may however be issued in those cases also if the 
objective is to drop the enquiry or if the delinquent realizes his 
lapses or defaults and tenders apology.  
2) The show cause notice or charge-sheet is the very basis of 
any disciplinary action. The scope of charges mentioned in the 
show cause notice or charge-sheet will never be widened at 
any time after issuance of show cause notice or charge-sheet. 
3) If the disciplinary enquiry has to be carried to its conclusions 
a charge-sheet should be issued and not a show-cause notice. 
If the object is merely reprimand the delinquent or enquiry is not 
intended in any reason, a show-cause notice may be issued. 
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2. DRAFTING OF CHARGE-SHEET OR SHOW CAUSE 
NOTICE: 
As per the staff rules / Conduct Rules of the organization where 
it is proposed to hold an enquiry, the disciplinary authority shall 
frame the definite charges on the basis of the allegations 
against an employee. The charges together with a statement of 
the allegations, on which they are based, a list of documents by 
which and a list of witnesses by whom the articles of charges 
are proposed to be sustained, shall be communicated in writing 
to the employee who shall be required to submit within such 
time as may be specified by the disciplinary authority (not 
exceeding 15 days), a written statement whether he admits or 
denies of or all the articles of charges. 
Explanation 
It will not be necessary to show the documents listed with the 
charge-sheet or any other document to the employee at this 
stage. 
There is no standard or prescribed form, for drafting charge-
sheet or show cause notice, it may be in a form of a letter or a 
notice.  However the following essentials ought to mention: 
It should be signed by the Disciplinary authority/appointing 
authority. 
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3. SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE/CHARGE-SHEET MUST BE 
SERVED ON THE DELINQUENT : 
(a) If not served on the delinquent no enquiry could be 
proceeded with. 
(b) The service must be on the delinquent employee himself 
unless otherwise provided by the service rules or standing 
orders. 
(c) The service may be - 
i) By hand delivery 
ii) By displaying on the Notice Board 
If the Service Rules provide and authorise the same. 
iii) By Registered AD Post Acknowledgement Due. 
iv) Through newspaper as a last resort. 
Refusal to accept the notice or charge-sheet by the workman 
when delivered in persons or by Registered post with 
acknowledgement due. 
If the workman refuses to take delivery of the letter, there 
should be record of this fact with signatures of the persons 
effecting the delivery and the witnesses to the (minimum 2). 
Whereas service under Postal Certificate is not a conclusive 
proof of service. 
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4. WORKMAN'S EXPLANATION AND HOW TO DEAL 
WITH IT : 
The workman complained against may or may not submit his 
explanation. 
The explanation when received - 
(i) Must be received by putting thereof the date and time of 
its receipt. 
(ii) Must be immediately forwarded to appointing 
authority/disciplinary authority through Administration 
Division. 
(iii) Must be minutely examined vis-à-vis the show cause 
notice or the charge sheet. 
(iv) Should be from and be signed by the workman 
concerned and not by any person or representative on his 
behalf unless it is accompanied by written authority or unless 
the representative is a legal practitioner. 
(v) Its contents should be brought to the notice of the 
complaining Head of the Department. 
5. ADMISSION OF CHARGES AND ACTION THEREOF: 
(a) If the workman complained against accepts the charges 
levelled in the Show Cause Notice or Charge-sheet the 
management may take the matter in view of the gravity of the 
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offences from the nature of an apology tendered by him in 
explanation.  If in any case of absolute apologies, a warning for 
the sake of record must be issued to the workmen concerned 
though this time he is being excused or let off with minor 
punishments, he would be dealt with seriously if he indulges 
often again in similar or other misconduct. 
(b) Admission should be unconditional. 
(c) If the explanation is not satisfactory, the case should be 
fixed for enquiry and the delinquent should be informed 
accordingly. 
6. ENQUIRY NOTICE: 
 A. (i) Drafting of notice 
The Enquiry Officer should clearly inform the delinquent about - 
(a) Place, date and time of the enquiry; 
(b) Name or names of officer(s) who would conduct the 
enquiry; 
(ii) The enquiry notice should mention - 
(a) The delinquent would be allowed to be assisted by another 
workman of the same department. As per the Staff Rules of the 
organization the employee may take the assistance of any other 
employee of the organization but may not engage a legal 
practitioner for the purpose. 
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(b) That in case the delinquent workman fails to attend the 
enquiry, the same would be held ex-parte and that whatever the 
decision would be binding on him. 
(c) It should be signed by the management in case of first 
notice and later on by the Enquiry Officer. 
B. Copy of notice to Enquiry Officer:  
Copy of enquiry notice or separate letter must also be 
addressed to the Enquiry Officer authorizing him to hold the 
enquiry at the stipulated time and submit his report of finding 
after satisfactory completion of the enquiry. 
C. Nomination of Presenting Officer: 
The management should nominate any of its officers to present 
its side in the enquiry proceedings. 
7. COMMENCEMENT OF ORAL ENQUIRY :  
Oral enquiry     :  Name of: 
(a) Object: The very purpose of holding the enquiry is to give a 
chance of hearing to the workman so that he is not punished 
without getting a reasonable and proper opportunity to explain 
the charges made against him. 
(b) Distinguished with the court trials: 
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The domestic or departmental enquiry differs from the ordinary 
court trial in as much as the court trials are held and according 
to well laid and codified laws of the land, the domestic enquiries 
are guided and regulated by principles of natural justice. 
(c)    A domestic enquiry should be started as soon as possible, 
should not be un-necessarily prolonged. 
8. WHO SHOULD BE THE ENQUIRY OFFICER? 
(I) The Enquiry Officer could be an outsider and also an 
advocate but as far as possible the EO should be from within 
the organization. 
(II) He should act independently of his other duties towards the 
parties. 
(III) The EO should not have before hand personal knowledge 
of misconduct or its facts - he should not be witness. 
(IV) He should be impartial man with an open mind and not 
biased against the delinquent. 
(V) As per the existing Staff Rules of the organization, where 
the disciplinary authority itself enquiries or appointing an 
enquiry officer for holding an enquiry, it may by an order appoint 
a person to known as the presenting officer on its behalf the 
case in support of the articles of charge. 
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9.        INQUIRY PROCEEDINGS: 
(I) It is desirable that the EO maintains written records 
of the inquiry proceedings. 
(II) Enquiry Officer should - 
a) Record the adjournment of the proceeding. 
b) Sign the proceedings himself, besides taking signatures of 
management representative as well as the delinquent workman 
in duplicate. 
c) Every page of the proceedings should also be marginally 
signed or initiated by both the parties as well as the EO. 
d) On the first date, the EO read over the charges to the 
delinquent workman and ask him whether he wants to add in 
his explanation and this should be recorded. 
(I) As per the Staff Rules of the organization on the date fixed 
by the EO, the employee shall appear before the EO at the 
time, place and date specified in the notice. The Enquiry Officer 
shall ask the employee whether he pleads guilty or has any 
defence to make and if he pleads guilty to anyone of the 
charges levelled against him, the Enquiry Officer shall record 
the plea, sign the record and obtain the signatures of the 
charge-sheeted employee thereon. The EO shall return a 
finding of guilt in respect of those charges to which the 
employee concerned pleads guilty. 
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If the employee does not plead guilty, the inquiry officer shall 
adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding 30 days, after 
recording an order that the employee may, for the purpose of 
preparing his defence: 
(i) Inspect the document listed with the charge-sheet; 
(ii) Submit a list of additional documents and witness that he 
wants to examine, and 
(iii) Be supplied with the copies of the statements of witnesses 
if any, listed in the charge-sheet. 
10.  WHETHER CONDUCTING ENQUIRY EX-PARTE IS 
LEGAL: 
(a) If the delinquent workman does not appear at the scheduled 
enquiry and has not applied for adjournment or if applied it has 
been refused, the EO may proceed to complete the inquiry ex-
parte. 
(b) If the inquiry is conducted ex-parte the EO should mention 
in the proceedings before recording the statements whether or 
not the inquiry notice has been served on the workman 
complained against. 
(c) The EO should allow some grace time for the delinquent 
workman and should record the same mentioning the specific 
time allowed by him. This is, however, essential every time and 
is under the discretion of the EO. 
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(d) If the workman comes to participate thereafter, he may be 
read over the proceedings so far recorded and be allowed to 
join thereafter. 
(e) Even in case of ex-parte enquiry, the EO has to be satisfied 
that the mis-conducts are proved by the reliable evidence. 
11. DELINQUENT WORKMAN'S REPRESENTAION AT 
THE ENQUIRY: 
(a) As an offshoot of one, principles of natural justice it is now 
well established that the workman should be allowed to be 
assisted or represented by another workman from the same 
department and if not available from the same department, the 
same establishment.  
(b) The workman's representative is only to watch the 
proceedings and assist the workman but not to interfere in the 
conduct of inquiry. 
(c) The EO has discretion to permit representation of 
delinquent workman by an outsider like a lawyer or trade union 
representative. If the facts of the enquiry or the charges are 
completed or the management is represented by a lawyer 
through in employment of the employer or in the interest of 
justice he thinks if necessary. 
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12. RULES OF EVIDENCE:  
Although the Indian Evidence Act is not applicable to the 
departmental proceedings yet, the fundamental principles of 
evidence and their appreciation are no doubt applicable. Before 
a worker is held guilty there must be reliable and legal evidence 
from which an inference of guilt can be drawn. 
13.   HOW TO RECORD STATEMENT / ORAL EVIDENCE IN 
AN INQUIRY: 
(a) Statement is the oral evidence given by witness before the 
EO. 
(b) Every statement comprises of three parts and should be 
recorded in the following order: 
i) First:  Chief of direct examination conducted, the party 
calling the witness.  
ii) Second: Cross-examination conducted by the opposite 
party. 
iii) Third: Re-examination conducted by the party conducting 
the direct Examination. 
(a) In the above the Enquiry Officer, may if he thinks fit 
essential and not otherwise put any questions to the witnesses.  
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14. CLOSING PROCEEDINGS: 
As soon as the workman closes his evidence, the Enquiry 
Officer should write in the end that "workman concerned has no 
more witnesses to examine and the proceedings closed" and 
sign the statement himself and should also get the same signed 
by the management representative or the complainant workman 
- complained against and his representative. 
15. REPORT OF FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS IS 
NECESSARY: 
After the completion of the enquiry the Enquiry Officer should 
immediately start preparing his report of the enquiry conducted, 
however, he should examine very minutely not orally the 
proceedings recorded by him, but also the show cause 
notice/charge-sheet and the reply received from the employee 
concerned. 
As per the staff rules of the organization once the enquiry 
officer concludes enquiry, the report shall prepared, which shall 
contain: 
(a) a gist of the articles of charge and the statement of the 
imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour; 
(b) a gist of the defense of the employee in respect of each 
articles of charge. 
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(c) As assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of 
charge. 
(d) The finding on each article of charge and the reasons 
thereof. 
The report of the finding should be submitted by the Enquiry 
Officer to the appointing authority/disciplinary authority. 
As per the staff rules, the disciplinary authority, if it is not itself 
the enquiry authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in 
writing remit the case to the enquiry officer for fresh or further 
enquiry and report, and the enquiry officer shall thereupon 
proceed to hold the further enquiry according to the provisions 
of the Staff Rules. 
16. PASSING ORDERS OF PUNISHMENT ON REPORT : 
The Disciplinary authority while passing the order should 
mention that - 
(i). He/she has gone through the report of the findings as well 
as, 
(ii). The entire record of the enquiry and 
(iii). Confirms of disagree with the views of the Inquiry Officer 
(iv). Thereafter the Disciplinary authority should mention that 
he/she has considered the circumstances of the case, 
gravity of misconduct and past record of the workman and 
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propose appropriate punishment in his/her opinion would 
meet the ends of justice. 
As per Staff Rules of the organization orders made by the 
disciplinary authority shall be communicated to the employee 
concerned, who shall also be supplied with a copy of the report 
of the enquiry. 
(v). The order must also reveal that decision taken by him/her 
is necessary for the sake of discipline in the Board. 
(vi). Should be given minimum 15 days time to delinquent to 
explain himself against the proposed punishment. 
17. IMPOSING OF PUNISHMENT : 
On receiving the explanation from the delinquent, the 
appointing/disciplinary authority may pass order of the 
proposed punishment or may reduce depending on any 
extenuating circumstances which might have been brought out 
by the workman in his explanation and if disciplinary authority 
things it necessary to do so. 
18. APPEALS: 
As per the Staff Rules of the organization the appeal over the 
decision of the appointing authority will be with CEO/BOD. 
An appeal shall be preferred within the stipulated period from 
the date of the communication of the order appealed against.  
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The appeal shall be addressed tot he appellate authority as 
aforesaid and submitted to the authority whose order is 
appealed against. The authority whose order is appealed 
against shall forward the appeal together with its comments and 
the records of the case to the appellate authority within 
stipulated period.  The appellate shall consider whether the 
findings are justified or whether the penalty is excessive or in 
adequate and pass appropriate order. The appellate authority 
may pass order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting 
aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which 
impose the penalty or to any other authority within such 
direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. 
 
A very significant arena of service jurisprudence is the 
maintenance of discipline in the precincts of employment and 
the need for initiating disciplinary proceedings against an 
employee on the charges of misconduct and other lapses by 
adhering the rules of natural justice and providing reasonable 
opportunity to delinquent employee before any final order of 
penalty is passed by the disciplinary authority. The Supreme 
Court in the case of Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd., vs. 
The Workmen187, held that the mere form of an enquiry would 
not satisfy the requirements of complete adjudication to protect 
the disciplinary action against a workman. An enquiry cannot be 
said to have been properly held unless: 
                                                 
187 AIR 1963 SC 1914 
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(i) the employee proceeded against has been informed 
clearly of the charges levelled against him  
 
(ii) the witnesses are examined - ordinarily in the presence of 
the employee-in respect of the charges  
 
(iii)   the employee is given a fair opportunity to cross examine 
witnesses  
 
(iv) he is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses 
including himself in his defence if he so wishes on any 
relevant matter, and  
 
(iv) the enquiry officer records his findings with reasons for 
the same in his report. 
 
In the recent judgment the supreme court of India in the case of 
Union of India and others, vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan188, once 
again reiterated that Disciplinary inquiry is quasi-judicial in 
nature. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at 
which evidence is led and assessment of the material before 
conclusion is reached. These facets do make the matter quasi-
judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. With the 
Forty-Second Amendment, the delinquent officer is not 
                                                 
188 AIR 1991 SC 471 
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associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of 
evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the 
material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. 
In case his conclusions are kept away from the delinquent 
officer and the Inquiry Officer submits his; conclusions with or 
without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent is 
precluded from knowing the contents thereof although such 
material is used against him by the disciplinary authority. The 
report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records a 
finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as the 
delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the 
delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material 
against him though the same is made available to the punishing 
authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of 
natural justice would be affected. 
  
Every aspect of disciplinary enquiry beginning from initiation of 
disciplinary enquiry, issuing of charge-sheet, Initiation of 
Disciplinary Proceedings, Enquiry Officer, Representation by 
Lawyer, Disciplinary Proceedings vis-a-vis Criminal Trial, Notice 
of Enquiry Proceedings, applicability of Principles of Natural 
Justice, Bias in Enquiry, Ex-parte Enquiry, Witness in Enquiry,  
Evidence in Enquiry,  Suspension Allowance, Enquiry Report,  
Validity of an Enquiry, Appeal,   
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Initiation of Enquiry (Charge sheet served) after retirement-   
The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of T. Narsiah vs. 
State Bank of India189, has observed that it might happen that 
the irregularities of misfeasance of an employee could not be 
detected well before his retirement so as to initiate and 
complete disciplinary enquiry in the matter and again there 
might be a case where disciplinary enquiry was initiated but 
could not be completed before the delinquent employee 
attained the age of superannuation. The Court noted that there 
was no provision in the Service Rules of the Bank providing for 
extension of service of an employee to enable the authorities to 
complete the disciplinary enquiry against him which power was 
available under the Government Service Rules. The Court said 
even if an enquiry was pending against an employee there was 
nothing to stop him from retiring on his attaining the age of 
superannuation. The enquiry could not continue after his 
retirement. The Court was, therefore, of the opinion that it was 
for that reason that the Bank had reserved to itself the power to 
sanction the pensionary benefits under Rule 11 and if there was 
nothing wrong with the service of an employee throughout, the 
Bank would naturally sanction the pension, but if there was 
sufficient material disclosing grave irregularities on the part of 
the employee, the Bank might be well within its power in 
refusing to sanction the pensionary benefits, or in sanctioning 
                                                 
189 (1978) 2 Lab LJ 173 
 252
them only partly. The learned single Judge of the Andhra 
Pradesh High Court then went on to hold as under: 
 
"Of course, such a decision has to be arrived at fairly, which 
necessarily means after holding an enquiry, giving a fair 
opportunity to the concerned officer to defend himself against 
the accusation. Such an enquiry would not be a 'disciplinary 
enquiry' within the ordinary meaning of the term, but an enquiry 
confined to the purposes of the rules, viz., whether the 
employee should be granted any pensionary benefits; and if so, 
to what extent? Such an enquiry can also be made after the 
retirement (of an employee; and particularly in cases of 
retirement) on attaining the age of superannuation; probably 
such enquiries will have to be conducted only after retirement." 
 
The Court, therefore, gave direction as to how the enquiry was 
to be conducted against the officer so as to entitle him the 
pensionary benefits if he was exonerated.  
 
However the Supreme Court differs from the said observations 
of Andhra Pradesh High Court and held that “We are afraid that 
this view of the Andhra High Court does not commend to us. By 
giving such an interpretation to Rule 11 the Andhra Pradesh 
High Court has, in effect, lent validity to disciplinary proceeding 
against an employee even after his superannuation for which 
no provision existed either in Pension Rules or in the Service 
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Rules and when the High Court had itself observed that an 
enquiry even if initiated during the service period of the 
employee could not be continued after his retirement on 
superannuation. Further held that Inquiry initiated for purposes 
of determining pension and not for penalty and therefore held 
invalid, held in The State Bank of India, vs. A. N. Gupta190.  
 
Holding of enquiry after retirement held, not permissible. This 
issue was come up before Kerala High Court, the Court 
observed that, the position is well settled by various decisions 
of the Supreme Court & High Court that disciplinary 
proceedings intended to visit the employees with punishment 
for misconduct cannot be initiated or continued after the relation 
of the employer-employee has ceased to exist by retirement or 
otherwise.191 The Lordships of the Patna High Court held that 
the power of disciplinary control is a necessary concomitant of 
employer and employee or master and servant relationship.  
Once the relationship ceases to exist, the power of disciplinary 
control also comes to an end unless there are rules to the 
contrary. In this case the Superannuation had taken place and 
no rule was shown which permitted continuation of disciplinary 
proceedings after superannuation.192  
 
                                                 
190 AIR 1998 SC 159 
191 (FLR 1988 (57) 883 Ker.) 
192 1993 II LLJ 1162 (Pat. D.B) 
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Can an Enquiry be continued against an employee after 
retirement? 
 
Where the question before the Supreme Court was whether the 
departmental enquiry entrusted to and conducted by a bank 
officer stood vitiated if the said officer proceeded with the 
enquiry and concluded the same after his superannuation 
during the pendency of the enquiry. It was held that in the facts 
and circumstance of the case, the defacto doctrine can have no 
application. The defacto doctrine can be invoked in cases 
where there is an appointment to the office is defective, but not 
withstanding the defect to the title of this office, the decision 
made by such a defacto officer allotted with powers and 
functions of the office would be as efficacious as those made by 
de-jure officer. Instant is a case more or less akin to a case 
tried by a court lacking in inherent jurisdiction193.  
 
Order of dismissal issued to employee two days after his 
attaining age of 58 years i.e. date of superannuation as per 
R.29 of M.P. State Municipal Service (Executive) Rules (1973)  
- Order of dismissal sought to be justified on ground that 
superannuation would be effective on the last day of the month 
in which employee completes his 58 years in view of notification 
issued by State Govt. i.e. administrative instructions - Dismissal 
                                                 
193 Central of India vs. C. Bernard 1991 LLR 1 (SC) 
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invalid, as statutory rule would prevail over notification it being 
in nature of administrative instruction.194   
Initiation of Domestic Enquiries - Procedure: - The Patna 
High Court in the case of Laxman Shastri vs. State195, and 
Calcutta High Court in the case of Bibhuti Bhusan Poul vs. 
State of West Bengal196, the following, theme has been laid 
down: 
 
“At the very outset it is made clear that an enquiry has to be 
held in accordance with the principles of natural justice since 
there is no legislation to this effect. On the first date of enquiry, 
the EO should first of all bring home to the workman concerned 
in clear and precise language the charge-sheet levelled against 
him by reading out to him the contents of the charge-sheet and 
then asked him if he admits or denies. In case he denies, the 
charges, then the management should be called upon to put 
forward the case against him with all evidence that it wants to 
rely upon the workman concerned to state what he wants to 
submit in his defence. This procedure for initiating the enquiry is 
based on the analogy of Sec.255 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code which requires that the charges should be read out and 
explained to the accused person and he should be asked 
whether he is guilty or has any defence to make and in case he 
does not admit the charges then the prosecutor is asked to 
                                                 
194 C.L. Verma, vs. State of M.P. and another, AIR 1990 SC 463 
195 AIR 1957 Patna 160 
196 AIR 1967 Cal. 29 
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state the enquiry. But in case the workman has already 
submitted a detailed explanation in reply to the charge-sheet 
then asking him again to admit or deny is mere superfluity.  
Thereafter the EO is required to decide as to which procedure 
he would adopt in conducting the domestic enquiry”. When, 
however, two different procedures are provided for major 
penalty and minor penalty then a tentative decision has to be 
made before the enquiry is started. The EO should be very 
sympathetic and he should extend helping hands to the 
delinquent in explaining the procedure and giving him due 
facilities and assistance to participate in the enquiry consistent 
with his understanding and ability because a mere knowledge 
of principles of  natural justice may not be wholly sufficient to 
affectively discharge the role of EO.   
 
The decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings cannot be 
subsequent to the issuance of the charge-sheet, since issue of 
the charge sheet is a consequence of the decision to initiate 
disciplinary proceedings. Framing the charge-sheet, is the first 
step taken for holding the enquiry into the allegations, on the 
decision taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The charge-
sheet is framed on the basis of the allegations made against 
the   Government servant; the charges-sheet is then served on 
him to enable him to give his explanation; if the explanation is 
satisfactory, the proceedings are closed, otherwise, an enquiry 
is held into the charges; if the charges are not proved, the 
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proceedings are closed and the Government servant 
exonerated; but if the charges are proved, the penalty follows. 
Thus, the service of the charge-sheet on the Government 
servant follows the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings; 
and it does not precede or coincide with that decision. The 
delay, if any, in service of the charge-sheet to the Government 
servant, after it has been framed and dispatched, does not 
have the effect of delaying initiation of the disciplinary 
proceedings, inasmuch as information to the Government 
servant of the charges framed against him, by service of 
charge-sheet, is not a part of the decision-making process of 
the authorities for initiating the disciplinary proceedings. 
 
'Issue' of the charge-sheet in the context of a decision taken to 
initiate the disciplinary proceedings must mean, as it does, the 
framing of the charge-sheet and taking of the necessary action 
to dispatch the charge-sheet to the employee to inform him of 
the charges framed against him requiring his explanation; and 
not also the further fact of service of the charge-sheet on the 
employee. It is so, because knowledge to the employee of the 
charges framed against him, on the basis of the decision taken 
to initiate disciplinary proceedings, does not form a part of the 
decision making process of the authorities to initiate the 
disciplinary proceedings, even if framing the charges forms a 
part of that process in certain situations. The meaning of the 
word 'issued' has to be gathered from the context in which it is 
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used. The issue of a charge-sheet, therefore, means its 
dispatch to the Government servant, and this act is complete 
the moment steps are taken for the purpose, by framing the 
charge-sheet and dispatching it to the Government servant, the 
further fact of its actual service on the Government servant not 
being a necessary part of its requirement197.  
 
Whether first show cause notice prior to issuance of charge sheet is 
mandatory?  
 
This question has been answered by the supreme court in the 
case of Employers of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. (Private) 
Ltd., vs. The Workmen198 that - - Although in a domestic 
enquiry, it may be desirable to call for an explanation before 
serving a charge-sheet on a delinquent workman, there is no 
principle which compels such a course. The calling for an 
explanation can only be with a view to making an enquiry 
unnecessary, where the explanation is good but in many cases 
it would be open to the criticism that the defence of the 
workman was being fished out. If after a preliminary enquiry 
there is prima facie reason to think that the workman was at 
fault, a charge-sheet setting out the details of the allegations 
and the likely evidence may be issued without offending against 
any principle of justice and fair play.   
                                                 
197 Delhi Development Authority, Appellant vs. H.C. Khurana, Respondent AIR 1993 SC 
1488 
198 AIR 1968 SC 236 
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Fresh or de novo enquiry - When can be ordered by 
Disciplinary Authority - Enquiry Officer taking letters as 
oral statements - It is in violation of Rules and results in 
miscarriage of Justice - Fresh enquiry can be ordered by 
Disciplinary Authority. 
 
The Enquiry Officer conducted an enquiry on the aforesaid 
charges and made a report to the Disciplinary Authority. The 
Disciplinary Authority noticed certain irregularities in the 
conduct of the enquiry which were of vital nature, in particular, 
that the Enquiry Officer acted on the letters of one U.N. Chaini, 
who was a witness on behalf of the department and K.M. 
Verghese, who was a witness on behalf of the respondent on 
the basis of a representation made by them stating that they 
are not in a position to attend the enquiry proceedings but 
indicating the facts within their knowledge. The concerned 
authority was of the view that the witnesses should have been 
examined in person and the procedure adopted by the Enquiry 
Officer was contrary to the relevant rules in taking their letters 
as statements. The Enquiry Officer did not ascertain the facts 
necessary for the conclusion of the case. Therefore, he set 
aside the findings recorded by him and directed de novo 
enquiry by an order made on May 19, 1995 which was 
communicated to the respondent on June 7, 1995. Challenging 
this order, the respondent preferred a writ petition in the High 
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Court of Guwahati. The learned single Judge directed issue of 
rule but did not grant any interim order on the basis that Rule 
15 of the Disciplinary Rules enables the authority to remit the 
matter to the Enquiry Officer for further enquiry and that the 
power has been exercised by the authority under Rule 15 and 
mere use of expression "de novo" will not change the tenor of 
the order. A writ appeal was preferred against the said order 
and the Division Bench of the High Court granted initially an 
interim order staying further proceedings in the enquiry and 
thereafter by an order made on December 15, 1997 allowed the 
appeal by taking the view that in an appeal arising out of an 
order of punishment made by the Disciplinary Authority 
accepting or rejecting the conclusion reached by the enquiry 
authority, the appellate authority could direct a fresh or de novo 
enquiry and such power is not available to the Disciplinary 
Authority. Whereas the Supreme Court held: In the present 
case the basis upon which the Disciplinary Authority set aside 
the enquiry is that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer 
was contrary to the relevant rules and affects the rights of the 
parties and not that the report does not appeal to him. When 
important evidence, either to be relied upon by the department 
or by the delinquent official, is shut out, this would not result in 
any advancement of any justice but on the other hand result in 
a miscarriage thereof. Therefore we are of the view that Rule 
27(c) enables the Disciplinary Authority to record his findings on 
the report and to pass an appropriate order including ordering a 
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de novo enquiry in a case of present nature.  Held in Union of 
India and others, vs. P. Thyagarajan199. 
In the case of   K. R. Deb, vs. The Collector of Central Excise, 
Shillong200, the supreme court has held that, If there is some 
defect in the inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer, the 
Disciplinary Authority can direct the inquiry Officer to conduct 
farther inquiries in respect of that matter but it cannot direct a 
fresh inquiry to he conducted by some other Officer. 
Disciplinary proceedings - Delay and laches - Department 
aware of involvement of officer in alleged irregularities - No 
satisfactory explanation for inordinate delay in issuing the 
charge memo - Disciplinary proceedings initiated against 
delinquent after more than 12 years - Liable to be quashed. 
Held in State of M.P., vs. Bani Singh and another201. 
 
Delay in initiation of Disciplinary Enquiry / proceedings - 
proceedings related to the allegation of year 1972 - 
Departmental proceedings initiated after lapse of 8 years. Held 
proceedings should not allow to continue.202   Delay in initiating 
enquiry against the employees for procuring jobs on bogus 
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200 AIR 1971 SC 1447   
201 AIR 1990 SC 1308 
 
202 Binay Kumar Singh vs. State of Bihar & ors 1994 LLR 280 (Patna H.C) 
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certificates will not vitiate the enquiry as held in the case of R. 
Fakruddin & ors vs. APSEB,203  
 
Initiation of disciplinary action after acquittal from criminal 
court: 
 
Article 226 of the Indian Constitution - After acquittal of an 
offence from the criminal court, continuation of departmental 
enquiry - no bar against management. Held in K.V Dinshan vs. 
Vijaya Bank & Ors204 relied and referred to the case of G. 
Chandra Shekar vs. Madras Port Trust.205  However it is further 
held that ordering fresh enquiry after conclusion of enquiry not 
permissible206.  
 
Initiation of disciplinary proceedings after acquittal of the 
petitioner of the charges of rash and negligent driving - on 
technical grounds as material witness turned hostile - Held 
initiation of disciplinary proceedings in respect of the same is 
not barred207.  
 
The petitioner was contended that once criminal court disposed 
of the matter, the employer shall not initiate enquiry on same 
                                                 
203 1999 LLR 149 
 
204 19993 LLR 1993 382 (Mad.HC) 
205 1990 LLN- II 839  
206 1993 LLR 304 
207 G. Simhachalam vs. The Depot Manger, APSRTC., 1994 LLR 817 (AP. H.C). 
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cause. Held that the degree of proof in domestic enquiries is 
different than that of the criminal proceedings208.  
 
Acquittal of employee by the Criminal Court - whether acquittal 
bars the jurisdiction of the authorities to initiate proceedings on 
the same charges Held: No - The ordinary rule is that normally 
where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely 
exonerated of the charges, it is not expedient to continue a 
departmental enquiry on the very same charges or grounds or 
evidence. This is a rule of prudence and thus it does not take 
away the power of the authority concerned to continue the 
departmental / domestic enquiry. It also does not fetter the 
discretion of the authority concerned. It is, however, importance 
to note that before deciding to continue the enquiry, after 
acquittal by a criminal court and exoneration of charges by 
criminal court, is it proper to punish an employee 
departmentally or by the management by holding against the 
employee and accepting as proved all the charges or evidence, 
which ahs been rejected by the criminal court. There can be a 
reason, which could invite the challenge to any action by the 
employer in case where, for no apparent reason, a domestic 
enquiry is held in to the very same charges and on the basis of 
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the same evidence, which is not accepted by the court of law. 
Such an act of employer is taken as violative of article 14 of the 
Constitution of India209.  
An employer is within its right to hold an enquiry against an 
employee who has been acquitted by the Criminal Court.210  
 
Other general instances of initiation of enquiry:  
Disciplinary proceedings can be taken even in cases where the 
act complained of, is done by an officer in a quasi-
judicial\judicial proceeding211 
 
Disciplinary action can be initiated for action/misconduct 
outside working hours provided it has relation with the 
employment and whether it is committed within the precincts of 
the concern212  
 
Article 226. Petitioner was placed under suspension on 
24.4.1992 in contemplation of enquiry. More than nine months 
expired. Neither enquiry initiated nor charge-sheet served, held 
that the order is not sustainable.213  Impracticability to hold 
enquiry - Art.226 - on the ground that it was not reasonably 
practicable to hold enquiry - Action based on solitary act of 
abusing, assaulting an officer of the company. Held, that resort 
                                                 
209 Special; Office, Salem, NGO’s co-operative Stores, Salem & anr., 1995 LLR 648 [Mad. 
HC] Also see. Corporation of Nagpur Vs. Ramchandra G. Medak, 1982-1-LLN 227 (SC). 
210 Babulal V/s. State of Haryana & Ors. 1991 (78) FLR 489 SC 
211 1992 FLR 1059 (SC) 
212 (1970) II LLJ 478 
213 LLR 1993 P.976 (Allh HC) also see AIR 1984 SC 153 
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to dispense with the enquiry can be had in exceptional and 
glaring cases and not in routine. Held order is malafide and 
liable to be quashed.214  
 
Holding of enquiry when the workman admits the charges, but 
pleads leniency – Holding of the enquiry is imperative215. 
Misconduct once condoned by the employer - cannot be 
reopened in future216.   
 
Action against  absence of an employee - Enquiry will be 
imperative - if an employee remain absent more than 8 
consecutive days, in accordance with the certified standing 
orders, has abandoned the job and when his name is struck off 
from the muster rolls - such certified standing orders has struck 
down by the Supreme Court in D.K. Yadav vs. J.M. Industries 
Ltd.,217. 
 
It is not imperative that an enquiry must be held at a place 
where the incident pertaining to misconduct has taken place218.   
When the guilt is admitted by the delinquent employee, the 
enquiry is not necessary219.  
 
                                                 
214 LLR 1993 P.678. (Delhi HC) - Also see - AIR 1986 SC 1416 
215 ACC Babcock Ltd. vs. Bimsha & Ors. 1987 FJR (71) 384 (Karn HC). 
216 MP State Road Transport Corp. vs. Om Prakash Joshi & Ors. 1990 (60) FLR 15 (MP) 
217 1993 (67) FLR 111 (SC), 1993 LLR 584 
218 1987 FLR (54) Del. HC. 
219 Krishndev Puri vs. UOI 1984 LIC. 532 Delhi HC 
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The enquiry may be initiated at the instance of the Courts’ 
order. In one case Rajastan High Court took serious note of 
inaction on the part of official of the department and observed 
that the present case is fit where enquiry should be made and 
erring official held responsible for negligence220.  
 
When an employee is absent more than 15 days amounts to 
misconduct, wherein initiation of the disciplinary action is 
imperative. Whereas automatic abandonment of services on 
remaining absent for 15 consecutive days is unconstitutional 
held by the Allahabad H.C. M/s U.P State Textile Corporation 
Spinning Mills Jhansi  vs. State of U.P & ors 221:  
 
The Supreme Court has defined “Sexual Harassment” and has 
further directed that where such conduct amounts to 
misconduct in employment as defined by the different Service 
Regulations appropriate disciplinary action should be imitated 
by the Employer222.  With regard to initiation  of disciplinary 
proceedings, it is now well settled law that it is necessary that 
the competent authority who imposes the penalty must alone  
initiate domestic enquiry proceedings and that the proceedings 
                                                 
220 State of Rajasthan vs. Smt. Lassi 1997 LLR 368 
221 1997 LLR 391, also see National Engineering Industries Ltd., Jaipur vs. Hanuman, 
AIR 1968 SC 33; Backingam & Carnatic Co., Ltd., vs. Venkataish & ors, AIR 1964 SC 
1272; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. vs. Ludhbudh Singh, AIR 1972 SC 65; Union f 
India & ors, vs. M/s Jalyan Udyog & anr (1994) 1 SCC 318; D.K Yadav vs. JMA 
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can be initiated by any superior authority who may be an officer 
subordinate to the appointing authority223.  
 
It is well settled by the Supreme Court that initiating the 
domestic enquiry proceedings for and passing orders of 
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a Govt., Servant who 
has been convicted by a criminal court is not barred merely 
because of the sentence or order is suspended by the appellate 
Court or on the ground that the Dy. Director of Collegiate 
Education224.  
 
 Assault on a co-worker for a matter connected with the 
establishment committed outside the premises of the 
establishment is a misconduct and is covered by the clause 
“Commission of any act subversive of discipline of good 
behaviour” - Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. vs. S.A. Patil & Ors225.  
 
A disciplinary action was initiated against the acts that the 
delinquent has written letter to Governor stating bad 
administration, corruption, nepotism and alleging appointment 
of several persons not properly qualified but recruited at the 
instance of the Ministers and Political leaders. Also issued a 
press statement published in Newspaper welcoming the 
dismissal of the Chairman Congress Committee. Management 
                                                 
223 Inspector General of Police vs. Thavasiappan 1996 (2)SLR 470 
224 1995 (3) SCC 377,  K. Sampath Kumar vs.FCI 1996 (3) SLR 666 
225 1993 I LLN 770 (Bom.HC) 
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initiated disciplinary action, meanwhile he filed civil suit - 
injunction refused, and he failed to participate in the enquiry. 
Enquiry concluded and TWO charges proved. Held Art.19 is not 
free and as per the Service regulations of the Corporation the 
management has entitle to take action226.  
           
The Supreme Court in the catena of judgments held that no 
disciplinary action against delinquent can be initiated or taken in 
respect of an act / misconduct not defined in the Standing 
Orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Act, 1946 or the Service Regulations or even in case 
where such acts are vaguely defined227.  The Madras High 
Court has held that refund of misappropriated money does not 
absolve from initiation of action228. Abandonment of an 
employment by an employee enquiry will be imperative229.   
 
Misconduct – moral turpitude – the observation of the Supreme 
Court in the case of Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana & anr, 
(1996) 4 SCC 17, that whatever may be the meaning which 
may be given to the term “moral turpitude” it appears that one 
of the most serous offences involving ‘moral turpitude’ would be 
where a person employed in a Banking company dealing with 
                                                 
226 MH Devendrappa vs. Karnataka Small Industries Dev. Corpn. 1998 LLR 356 SC 
227 Glaxo Industries Ltd., vs. P O Labour Court Meerut AIR 1984 SC 505; AL Karla Vs. 
Project & Equipment Corpn of India 1984 LIC 961 (SC);  RV Patel vs. Ahmedabad 
Municipal Corpn 1985 LLR –8 (SC); Phalghat BPL & PSP ThoZilali Union vs. BPL 
India 195 LLR 1019 (SC) 
228 Chief GM, SBI vs. P O, I.T & anr, 1996 (74) FLR 15 (Mad – HC) 
229 DK Yadav vs. JMA Industries 1993 LLR 584 (SC), Uptron India Ltd., vs. Shammi Ban, 
1998 LLR 385 (SC) 
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money of the general public, commits forgery and wrongfully 
with draws money which he is not entitled to withdraw230.  
  
Misconduct in a departmental enquiry is never considered to be 
a crime. It is quite often described as a civil wrong or civil 
offence. Therefore, the proof of the charge is required to be 
grounded on preponderance of probabilities and not on the 
basis of mens-rea or guilty mind231.  Disciplinary enquiry - 
Initiation of - Rules does not require that charge memo has to 
be issued only by appointing authority - Charge memo issued 
by Dy. Supdtt. of Police who was not appointing authority of 
Police Constable concerned - Not invalid232.  
 
Disciplinary proceedings, initiated by one of competent 
disciplinary authorities - Need not be completed by that 
authority alone - Proceedings initiated by one disciplinary 
authority - Dismissal order passed by another competent 
disciplinary authority - Not void233.  Charges related to holding of 
assets disproportionate to known sources of income and for 
having acquired assets without permission of Dept. in violation 
of A.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 - Criminal case 
pending against delinquent officer for possessing 
disproportionate assets - Subsequent acquittal in criminal case 
- Disciplinary proceedings for very same charge, cannot be held 
                                                 
230 Allahabad Bank vs. D.K. Bhola  1997 LLR 608 SC 
231 T.Sudharshan vs. Labour Court & ors, 1997 LLR 124 
232 Govt. of T.N. and others,  vs. S. Vel Raj, AIR 1997. SC 1900 
233 Allahabad Bank, Appellant vs.  Prem Narain Pande and others, AIR 1996 SC 492 
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- It is, however, open to Disciplinary Authority to proceed with 
other charge relating to acquisition of assets without permission 
of Dept. Govt. of A.P. and another, vs. C. Muralidhar234.  
 
Proceedings - Initiated by one of competent disciplinary 
authorities - Need not be completed by that authority alone - 
Proceedings initiated by one disciplinary authority - Dismissal 
order passed by another competent disciplinary authority - Not 
void. Under the Regulations it is not necessary that the entire 
gamut of the departmental enquiry against the officer must be 
conducted from beginning to end by only one disciplinary 
authority and one competent disciplinary authority, which 
initiated the proceedings cannot get changed in midstream by 
another equally competent disciplinary authority.    
 
The delinquent officer was serving in the bank in junior 
management scale-I. Under the regulations both the Dy.  
General Manager as well as the Asstt. General Manager is 
disciplinary authorities who can initiate proceedings against the 
officer in Scale 1 and who can also pass the final penalty order.  
In the instant case the Dy. General Manager, Lucknow Division, 
initiated the disciplinary proceedings as Disciplinary Authority 
under Regulation 6 (3) by framing charges and appointing the 
Enquiry Officer.  The enquiry was completed by him, but before 
the stage of Regulation 7 was reached, the Enquiry Officer's 
                                                 
234 AIR 1997 SC 3005 
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report as per Regulation 6 sub-regulation 21 (ii) came to be 
sent to another equally competent Disciplinary Authority, 
namely, Asstt.  General Manager, Patna Branch.  The dismissal 
order was passed by Asst. General Manager. Held, the order of 
dismissal passed by Asst. General Manager could not be said 
to be void. There is nothing in the Regulations to suggest that 
once a competent disciplinary authority, namely, Dy.  General 
Manager has initiated disciplinary proceedings by framing 
charges and appointing enquiry officer as per Regulation 6 sub-
regulation (3), it is only that Disciplinary Authority, namely, the 
Dy. General Manager who must necessarily complete the 
proceedings till they are terminated and final orders are passed 
under Regulation 7.  It could not be said that the transfer of 
disciplinary proceedings from one authority to other was likely 
to result in two conflicting orders of two equally competent 
authorities. Such a situation would never arise for the simple 
reason that for one disciplinary enquiry against a concerned 
officer at a given point of time there would be only one 
disciplinary authority.  After transfer of proceedings to Asst.  
General Manager it was only the Asst. General Manage who 
remained the sole disciplinary authority in the field.  It could not 
also be said that the change of disciplinary authority before 
completion of the enquiry would whittle down the right of appeal 
available to the concerned delinquent235.   
       
                                                 
235 Allahabad Bank, vs. Prem Narain Pande and others, AIR 1996 SC 492 
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3.2   CHARGE SHEET: 
The charge sheet is the charter of disciplinary enquiry. It should 
always specific and consonance with the standing orders / rules 
of the institution. In the charge sheet the charges leveled 
against the delinquent employee should be phrased in a clear 
specific terms. The date, time and the place of the incident 
should be mentioned in the charge sheet. The charges should 
be leveled quoting the appropriate clauses of the Standing 
Orders / conduct rules as the case may be. It is imperative that 
the competent authority should issue the charge sheet and he 
should not the accuser. The language of the charge-sheet shall 
merely indicate that the workman what he supposed to or 
alleged to have done.  In case the delinquent employee refuses 
to accept the charge sheet, the refusal be recorded in writing in 
the presence of two witnesses. A copy of the charge sheet  can 
also be sent by registered pos with acknowledgement due to 
his last known address. When the employee does not 
understand English, the contents of charge sheet should be 
explained to him in Hindi or other language known to him in the 
presence of two witnesses and they should be made to sign on 
the charge sheet as token of having explained the contents in 
the language understood by the delinquent employee. Under 
this chapter too, there are catena of cases which are decided 
by the court of law, viz:- 
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If a charge-sheet is vague, not precisely setting out the 
allegations of misconduct, then enquiry held on the basis of 
such charge-sheet is bad236.  
Petitioner was given charge-sheet with several counts of 
misconducturing the enquiry one of the charges withdrawn by 
the employer whether amounts to victimization of the 
petitioner? The court held that this act cannot be construed 
against the management. It is a demonstration of balance 
attitude on the part of the employer. The said act of dropping of 
one charge does not amount to victimization on the ground the 
management was anxious to victimize the workman237.  
 
Failure to issue a specific charge-sheet - Enquiry is vitiated - 
especially when charges are such that involve consequences of 
termination. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the 
allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are 
founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, 
discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the 
contemplation of the authorities to be established against him. 
The whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to 
give all the necessary particulars and details, which would 
satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put 
up defence. So, in spite of the, Government servant repeatedly 
objecting to the vagueness of charges and non-furnishing of 
                                                 
236 Miraj Tluka Gimi Kamgar vs. The Manager Shree Gajanan Mills Sangli & Ors, 1992 
LLR 105 [Bom. HC] 
237 C.B Bidkar vs. Mather & Platt (India) Ltd., 1992 LLR 113 [Bom. HC] 
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statement of allegations, the failure to supply him the facts, 
circumstances and particulars relevant to the charges even at 
the stage of second show cause notice would amount to denial 
of proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself in 
complete disregard of principles of natural justice238.  
 
Where the charges framed against the delinquent officer were 
vague and no allegations regarding it have been made by him 
before the enquiry officer or before the High Court, the fact that 
he has participated in the enquiry would not exonerate the 
department to bring home the charges. The enquiry based on 
such charges would stand vitiated being not fair. Held, that the 
report of the enquiry officer finding the delinquent officer guilty 
could not be sustained as the charges were vague and it was 
difficult to meet the charges fairly by the delinquent officer. The 
evidence adduced was perfunctory and did not at all bring 
home the guilt of the delinquent officer. Consequently the order 
of termination of service of delinquent officer would be liable to 
be set aside239. Charge-sheet not issued in a language known 
by the charged official - violation of principles of natural 
justice240.  
 
No prescribed format for a charge-sheet, a statement of 
commission of certain irregularities was held to be a charge 
                                                 
238 Surath Chandra Chakravarty vs. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 752 
239 Sawai Singh, vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 995 
240 1992 (1) SLJ 161 (CAT) 
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sheet based on which a warning was issued. The Deptt. issued 
a second charge sheet on the ground that the first was just 
‘letter’, contention negatived241.  
 
A charge-sheet if issued by a subordinate authority does not 
vitiate disciplinary enquiry. When such a charge-sheet is issued 
with the implicit approval of the superior / appointing authority242. 
A charge memo can be issued to an officer, for his conduct in 
his capacity as a judicial officer. No defence can be taken that 
such act is done by him not in discharge of his duty as a govt. 
servant243.  
 
Applicant served with a vague charge sheet, such charge sheet 
was defective, as it did not enable him to prepare defence. Held 
that Departmental Enquiry was defective and has not been 
done properly244.  The charge must not contain any expression, 
which gives rise to an apprehension that the management has 
made up its mind regarding guilt245.  
Petitioner was called upon by a simple notice to explain his 
absence satisfactorily and if he fails, his name will be struck 
from rolls - whether giving of notice can be equated to an 
enquiry - Held No.246 
 
                                                 
241 1992 (3) SLJ 20 
242 Gramophone (India) Co. vs. west Bengal, 1991 (1) LLJ 536 (Cal. H.C) 
243 1990 (1) LLJ 243 (Ker.) 
244 CAT (Gaw) 1988 I 442 
245 1965 II LLJ 101 
246 1993 LLR P.600 
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Charge sheet - who can issue.  The general law is that any 
person who has got power to appoint the employees has also 
the power to take disciplinary action. It is well settled that an 
authority competent to impose penalty or dismiss the employee 
can issue or frame charge sheet.247   
 
Non-issuance of charge-sheet – consequences: Although no 
procedure is prescribed for initiating disciplinary action against 
an employee either under Industrial Disputes Act or the 
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, but it is 
always advisable to issue a charge sheet to the delinquent 
employee as a first step to initiate disciplinary action against 
him. Notwithstanding that in one case the Kerala High Court 
has held that absence of specific charge-sheet issued by the 
management itself before domestic enquiry commenced is 
immaterial. It was further held that when the entire matter is 
before the Labour Court, there will be pleading before him, that 
is, statement on behalf of the management and reply there to. 
Specific issues can be framed, and the parties will be able to 
know what exactly is the case they have to meet. The issue of 
determination remains as to whether the employee is guilty of 
the misconduct alleged against him. This is to be examined by 
the Lab. Court on the basis of pleadings and issues raised on 
evidence as adduced before it. No doubt, the management can 
take shelter of the decision of the Kerala High Court in case a 
                                                 
247 AIR 1959 SC 512, 1986 (68) FJR 349 (P&H, HC) 
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charge sheet has not been issued but the law is otherwise well 
settled that charge-sheet must be issued as a preliminary step 
for initiating disciplinary proceedings against an employee248.  
 
Misconduct of bribery against the petitioner – charge-sheet 
alleging that the petitioner planned to deliver unaccounted stock 
of scrap to the contractor in expectation of bribe - no specific 
charges when the delinquent demanded or received bribe. Held 
charge sheet is invalid, enquiry report and the final order are 
liable to be quashed. Further the High court has observed 
about the requirement and object of valid and proper charge-
sheet as – Fair hearing pre-supposes a precise and definite 
catalogue of charges so as that the person charged may 
understand and effectively meet it. If the charges are imprecise 
and indefinite, the person charged could not be able to 
understand them and defend himself effectively and the 
resulting enquiry would not be fair and just enquiry. If a vague 
charge is given to delinquent, it is a fatal defect, which vitiates 
entire proceedings. Vagueness in the charge is not excused on 
the plea that the employee concerned should be deemed to 
have known the facts correctly. It should not be left to the 
delinquent official to find out or imagine what the charges 
against him are and it is for the employer to frame specific 
charges with full particulars249.   
 
                                                 
248 1992 1 LLJ 777 (Ker.HC) 
249 G. Chandrakant vs. Guntur Dist. Milk Producers Union Ltd., 1994 LR 984 (AP. HC) 
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Language of charge-sheet - while drafting charge sheet steps 
should be taken that it is in a language which the delinquent 
worker can easily understand250. The language of the charge-
sheet assumes importance because if the delinquent is not in a 
position to understand, then he would not have reasonable 
opportunity to defend himself. In order that the worker must 
know correctly the charges levelled against them251.  Mentioning 
particular clause of standing order in the charge sheet not 
imperative - Held by their Lordships of Karnataka High Court.252  
 
Vague charge-sheet - effect of it: - It has been repeatedly 
held by the Supreme Court and the courts below that if the 
charge-sheet is vague, and then there has been no proper 
enquiry. Since the delinquent has to meet the charge, he must 
know in certain, and intelligible language, what he is accused 
of? The absence of a reasonably certain and particularized 
charge, robs the enquiry of its substance. Such enquiry with the 
charge is bound to be vitiated.253  
 
Vague charge-sheet - whole disciplinary proceedings will be 
quashed.  The particulars of the misconduct not incorporated in 
the charge-sheet that is not the charge sheet at all. The barest 
requirement of the charge-sheet must contain particulars and 
                                                 
250 AIR 1953 SC 241 
251 Harikisan, vs. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1962 SC 911 
 
252 1990 (61) FLR 8 
253 1981 Lab IC 1110 and 1993 LLN 798 (Kerala HC) 
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special instances of misconduct, so as to enable the delinquent 
employee to defend himself.254    
 
Petitioner - storekeeper was served with charge-sheet for 
misconduct - petitioner demanded detail particulars - not 
supplied - dismissed after enquiry, the order of dismissal was 
quashed in lieu of violation of principles of natural justice.  The 
court further held that the charges leveled are vague and no 
reasonable person could have effectively replied to them or 
effectively defended against them255.  
 
Charge-sheet its essentials and authority competent to 
issue: The general law is that any person who has got power to 
appoint the employees has also power to take disciplinary 
action. In other words, the appointing authority has got power to 
frame and issue the charge-sheet. It is well settled that the 
authority competent to impose penalty or to dismiss the 
employee can issue the charge-sheet. Thus if the charge sheet 
is not issued by the competent authority / person, the whole 
disciplinary proceedings would be vitiated. This was observed 
in the case of Amulya Ratan Mukharjee vs. Dy., Chief 
Mechanical Engineer.256  
 
                                                 
254 Miraj Tluka Gimi Kamgar  vs. The Manager Shree Gajanan Mills Sangli & Ors, 1992 
LLR 236 (Bom. H.C.) 
255 Sundar Lal Dhanraj  Kasliwal vs. Karmaveer Kakasaheb Wagh Skhar Ltd.,  1995 LLR  
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256 AIR 1961 Cal.40 and in State of U.P & ors. vs. C.H Pathak 1995(71) FLR 434. 
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 A charge-sheet is a charter of disciplinary action which 
specifically sets out all charges which the workman is called 
upon to show cause and also should state all relevant 
particulars without which he cannot defend himself. The object 
of this requirement is that the delinquent employee must know 
that he is charged with and have the amplest opportunity to 
meet the charge. It ahs been held that if the charges are 
imprecise or indefinite, the person charged would not be able to 
understand them and defend himself effectively and the 
resulting enquiry would not be fair and just. It has also been 
held that if the charges are vague and the workman has no 
opportunity to reply to them and the particulars of such charges 
are not disclosed t the workman, the enquiry will not be in 
conformity with rules of natural justice. This view has held in 
catena of case to mention a few which are : Sisir Kumar Das 
vs. Sate of West Bengal, AIR 1995 Cal.183; J.K Cotton 
Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., vs. Jagan Nath (1963) I – 
LLJ 475; Northern Railway Coop. Credit Society vs. Industrial 
Tribunal (1967) II LLJ 46 (SC); Miraj Taluka Girini Kamgar 
Sangh (supra).             
 
Charge sheet - when not vague: - It depends on the facts of 
each case. Normally charge-sheet be specific and must contain 
in all the allegations. But these can be exceptions under 
specific circumstances. For instance, in one case, the petitioner 
employee was charge-sheeted for misconduct for using filthy 
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and vulgar language. Filthy and vulgar language is not stated in 
the charge-sheet. Even the concerned witness did not depose 
of the said words but wrote the same on a piece of paper and 
gave the same to EO which is put on exhibit. The words were 
so horrible that etiquette and decency impelled them not to 
resort to verbal utterance regarding the same.  In the 
circumstances, the pleas that charge sheet is vague is 
rejected.257  
 
Defective charge-sheet - consequences thereof - A charge 
sheet is the charter of disciplinary action which specifically sets 
out all charges which the workman is called upon to show 
cause against and also should state all relevant particulars 
without which he cannot defend himself. The object of this 
requirement is that the delinquent employee must know that he 
is charged with and have the ample opportunity to meet the 
charges. It has been held by the Calcutta High Court that if the 
charges are either imprecise or indefinite or vague, the person 
charged would not be able to understand them and defend 
himself effectively and the resulting enquiry would not be fair 
and just. In another case also, it has been held that for initiating 
disciplinary action the department should have issued specific 
charge-sheet containing such allegations or any other 
allegation intended to be proved in the disciplinary proceedings. 
It is not permissible to allege a fact not intended to be proved. 
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Disciplinary proceedings should succeed or fail on the basis of 
the charge-sheet. In view of setting aside of the order of 
dismissal on the basis of a charge-sheet, the delinquent 
employee must be deemed to be in service and as such the 
department will be free to take steps to proceed with the other 
disciplinary proceeding258.  
 
The charges should contain particulars of the alleged offences - 
which should be specific and not vogue. When a worker given a 
reply then he cannot later on say that the charge is vague the 
other contentions decided by the Court that a charge of 
indiscipline cannot be viewed with same strictness as a charge 
for an offence triable under Criminal Law. Delay in passing the 
order coupled with reasonable reasons shall be fatal to the 
enquiry.259  
 
When an allegation of misconduct is made against a workman 
he should be given a charge-sheet and a domestic enquiry 
should be held against him giving him full opportunity of 
hearing. This is the basic principle of industrial law. In dealing 
with industrial disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act and 
other similar legislation, Industrial Tribunals, Labour Courts, 
Appellate Tribunals and finally the Supreme Court have by a 
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series of decisions laid down the law that, even though under 
contract law, pure and simple, an employee may be liable to 
dismissal, without anything more, industrial adjudication would 
set aside the order of dismissal and direct reinstatement of the 
workmen where dismissal was made without proper and fair 
enquiry by the management or where, even if such enquiry had 
been held the decision of the Enquiring Officer was perverse or 
the action of the management was malafide or amounted to 
unfair labour practice or victimization, subject to this that even 
where no enquiry had been held or the enquiry had not been 
properly held the employer would have an opportunity of 
establishing its case for the dismissal of the workman by 
adducing evidence before an industrial Tribunal. It is 
reasonable to think that all this body of law was well known to 
those who where responsible for enacting the C. P. and Berar 
Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 and that when they 
used the words "in accordance with law" in Cl.3 of Sch. 2 of the 
Act they did not intend to exclude the law as settled by the 
Industrial Courts and the Supreme Court as regards where a 
dismissal would be set aside and reinstatement of the 
dismissed workmen ordered. If the word "law" in Sch.2 includes 
not only enacted or statutory law but also common law, there is 
no reason why it would not include industrial law as it has been 
evolved by industrial decision. Therefore, even where under the 
terms of an employment, an employee is liable to dismissal 
without any enquiry, the management is bound in law to hold an 
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enquiry before dismissing such an employee, held in Provincial 
Transport Services vs. State Industrial Court,260  
 
When the charge-sheet is defective, the whole disciplinary 
action as initiated by the employer will be vitiated held in Steel 
Authority of India Ltd. vs. Ujjal Kumar Bhowmik261. It is well 
settled that a charge-sheet contains the details of the charges 
including date and time when the delinquent employee has 
committed the same. However, in one case it has been held 
that a charge-sheet of disciplinary proceedings is different than 
that under Criminal Law and no rigid principles of law of 
confidence will be applicable. It has also been held that a 
charge-sheet will be deemed as vague when an employee has 
submitted detailed reply to the same.262  
 
The purpose of a charge-sheet is to know as to what exactly is 
the case the workman alleged to be guilty of misconduct(s) as 
to answer. Though different situation will require different 
charge-sheet, one requisite feature of every charge-sheet is 
that it should be specific in all possible details. Besides being 
accurate so that the acts of misconduct on the part of the 
delinquent employee must be brought home, because 
otherwise the entire disciplinary proceeding will come to 
naught. The whole object of furnishing a charge-sheet is to give 
                                                 
260 AIR, 1963 SC 114; Sur Enemel & Stamping Works vs. their workmen 1963 (7) FLR 
236 SC 
261 1990 LLR 77 
262 D. Anantkumar vs. India Air Lines. 1997 LLR 395 (Kar. HC) 
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an opportunity to the person who is charged with misconduct 
and the principles of natural justice also require that a person 
charged with an offence should know preciously the nature of 
the offence so that he may be able to explain what he has to 
say about it and prove his innocence in the matter. So, the 
purpose of the charge-sheet being to acquaint fully the 
employee about the nature of the charges levelled against him, 
it must contain full details and must be in writing and must be 
signed by the disciplinary authority and should not be vague as 
held by Mad. High Court in A. Narayan vs. Southern 
Railways263.  A charge-sheet for gross negligence without 
alleging or giving particulars pertaining to negligence will be 
vague and will result in perversity of the enquiry held against 
the delinquent employee who established by evidence 
produced in the enquiry to the effect that he was diligent264.  
 
The charge-memo was issued by the director of the appellant 
whereas their appointing / disciplinary authority being the 
Managing Director of the Appellant. The Supreme Court held 
that the judgment of the High Court could not be sustained as 
the authority who issued the charge-sheet was the controlling 
authority and therefore it was invalid265.  
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Serving of charge-sheet – charge-sheet sent by Regd. Post 
returned with postal remarks “not found” - does not amount to 
tendering to the addressee - cannot be treated to have been 
served. Delinquent was an employee of the appellant. His 
personal file and the entire service record were available in 
which his home address also had been mentioned. The charge 
sheet which was sent to the respondent was returned with the 
postal endorsement "not found." This indicates that the charge 
sheet was not tendered to him even by the postal authorities. A 
document sent by registered post can be treated to have been 
served only when it is established that it was tendered to the 
addressee. Where the addressee   was not available even to 
the postal authorities, and the registered cover was returned to 
the sender with the endorsement "not found," it cannot be 
legally treated to have been served. The appellant should have 
made further efforts to serve the charge sheet on the 
respondent. Single effort, in the circumstances of the case, 
cannot be treated as sufficient. That being so, the very initiation 
of the departmental proceedings were bad. It was ex-parte 
even from the stage of charge sheet, which, at no stage, was 
served upon the respondent. 
 
So far as the service of show cause notice is concerned, it also 
cannot be treated to have been served. Service of this notice 
was sought to be effected on the respondent by publication in a 
newspaper without making any earlier effort to serve him 
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personally by tendering the show-cause notice either through 
the office peon or by registered post. There is nothing on record 
to indicate that the newspaper in which the show-cause notice 
was published was a popular newspaper which was expected 
to be read by the public in general or that it had wide circulation 
in the area or locality where the respondent lived. The show-
cause notice cannot, therefore, in these circum-stances, be 
held to have been served on the respondent. In any case, since 
the very initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was bad for 
the reason that the charge sheet was not served, all 
subsequent steps and stages, including the issuance of the 
show-cause notice would be bad. Where the disciplinary 
proceedings are intended to be initiated by issuing a charge-
sheet, its actual service is essential as the person to whom the 
charge-sheet is issued is required to submit his reply and, 
thereafter, to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. So 
also, when the show-cause notice is issued, the employee is 
called upon to submit his reply to the action proposed to be 
taken against him. Since in both the situations, the employee is 
given an opportunity to submit his reply, the theory of 
"Communication" cannot be invoked and "Actual Service" must 
be proved and established266.  
In the case of State of Punjab, vs. Khemi Ram267, the Supreme 
Court has discussed the words ‘communication’ & ‘effective 
                                                 
266 Union of India & Ors, vs. Dinanath Shantaram Karekar & Ors, AIR 1998 SC 2722 
267 AIR 1970 SC 214 
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communication. The ordinary meaning of the word 
'communicate' is to impart, confer or transmit information. It is 
the communication of the order which is essential and not its 
actual receipt by the officer concerned and such communication 
is necessary because till the order is issued and actually sent 
out to the person concerned the authority making such order 
would be in a position to change its mind and modify it if it 
thought fit. But once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the 
control of such authority, and therefore, there would be no 
chance whatsoever of its changing its mind or modifying it. The 
word "communicate" cannot be interpreted to mean that the 
order would become effective only on its receipt by the 
concerned servant unless the provision in question expressly 
so provides. Actually knowledge by him of an order where it is 
one of dismissal, may, perhaps, become necessary because of 
certain consequences. But such consequences would not occur 
in the case of an officer who has proceeded on leave and 
against whom an order of suspension is passed because in his 
case there is no question of his doing any act or passing any 
order and such act or order being challenged as invalid.  
Like-wise, mere passing of an order of dismissal is not effective 
unless it is published and communicated to the officer 
concerned. An order of dismissal passed by an appropriate 
authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the 
officer concerned or otherwise publishing it does not take effect 
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as from the date on which the order is actually written out by 
the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is 
communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise 
published. This view was held by the Supreme Court in the 
case of State of Punjab, vs. Amar Singh Harika,268  
 
Service of charge-sheet - Proper procedure: The Standing 
Orders of the employer company provided that the workmen 
charged with an offence should receive a copy of such charge 
and that a workman who refused to accept the charge-sheet 
should be deemed to have admitted the charge made against 
him. The charge-sheets in the case were sent to eleven 
workmen by registered post and returned un-served, because 
they were not found in their villages. On the same day on which 
the charge-sheets were sent by registered post notices were 
issued in certain newspapers informing the workmen, without 
mentioning their names, that charge sheets were sent 
individually to the workers who had taken part in the illegal 
strike and had also been displayed on the notice boards both 
inside and outside the office gates of the factory and the 
workers concerned were required to submit their explanations 
by certain date. There was no provision in the Standing Orders 
for affixing charge-sheets on the notice board; Held that it could 
not be said that the workmen would have notice that they were 
among those to whom charge-sheets had been sent or about 
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whom charge-sheets had been displayed on the notice boards. 
The proper course was when the registered notices came back 
un-served in the case of these workmen to publish notices in 
their names in some newspaper in the regional language with a 
wide circulation in the State along with the charges framed 
against them269.  
The Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills Vs. 
Nand Kishore Singh270, held that - - the charge sheet, however, 
only complained about the speech which he had made on 10-6-
1952, wherein, among other defamatory remarks, he, the 
respondent, had instigated the workers to take steps for the 
removal of the General Manager.  The acts of insubordination 
calculated to undermine the discipline, in the factory which we 
have adverted to above were neither the subject matters of the 
charge nor were they relied upon by the General Manager in 
his report as the grounds of misconduct entitling the 
management to dismiss the respondent from its employ. The 
charge-sheet which was furnished by the appellant to the 
respondent formed the basis of the enquiry which was held by 
the General Manager and the appellant could not be allowed to 
justify its action on any other grounds than those contained in 
the charge sheet. The respondent not having been charged 
with the acts of insubordination which would have really justified 
the appellant in dismissing him from its employ, the appellant 
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could not take advantage of the same even though these acts 
could be brought home to him. 
It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to 
answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also 
the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be 
given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the 
charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-
examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to 
rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest 
requirement of an enquiry of this character and this requirement 
must be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry 
can be accepted. A departure from this requirement in effect 
throws the burden upon the person charged to repel the charge 
without first making it out against him. In an enquiry into 
charges against certain workmen, of participation in an assault 
by many workmen on the manager and assistant managers of a 
tea estate, conducted by the assaulted officers themselves, 
only certain questions were put to each workman in turn. 
Neither was any witness examined in support of the charge nor 
was any statement made by any witness tendered in evidence. 
There was no opportunity to the persons charged to cross-
examine the officers assaulted who were not only in the 
position of judges but also of prosecutors and witnesses and 
they drew upon their own knowledge of the incident and instead 
cross-examined the persons charged: It was held that the 
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enquiry was vitiated because it was not held in accordance with 
the principles of natural justice. There was such a travesty of 
those principles that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the 
findings and asking the company to prove the allegations 
against each workman de novo before it. Meenanglas Tea 
Estate vs. Its Workmen271   
Enquiry - Mere fact that employee did not appear on date fixed 
for enquiry will not satisfy requirement of principles of natural 
justice that he should be told about details of charges and that 
material available in support of charges be disclosed to him. In 
one case, The Supreme Court has held that - That 
circumstance however will not make the enquiry valid, unless it 
be held that an adequate opportunity was given to Kanraj to 
meet the charges framed against him. The charges, as we have 
indicated above which were served on Kanraj were very vague 
and he had no opportunity to give a reply to them. The material 
which was available in support of these charges was also never 
disclosed to him. The mere fact that Kanraj did not appear on 
the date fixed for the enquiry will not, in these circumstances, 
satisfy the requirement of the principles of natural justice that 
he should have been told of the details of the charges and the 
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material available in support of these charges should have 
been disclosed to him272. 
Mr.Ziakh vs. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Limited,273 where it 
was held that there cold be go-slow even where wages are 
being paid on piece-rate basis. Assuming that to be so, we are 
of opinion that that does not affect the validity of the conclusion 
as to base or standard in the present scheme at which we have 
arrived: It may be possible to punish for go-slow even where 
wages are paid on a piece-rate system because the employee 
deliberately does not produce what he had been normally 
producing. 
The delinquent bank employee absented himself from work for 
a period of 90 or more consecutive days. The Bank sent show 
cause notice to delinquent for his continued absence and to 
report back for work before mentioned date failing which he 
would be deemed to have been voluntarily retired from the 
services of the Bank for his continued absence. The said notice 
was sent by registered post but it was returned with the report 
of the postal authority that he refused to receive the same. The 
Bank by virtue of Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement treated 
the delinquent as having voluntarily abandoned his services. 
This order of the Bank was similarly sent to delinquent under 
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registered cover but was returned with the endorsement of the 
postal authority "not found during delivery time". Industrial 
dispute was raised by the union, which led the reference by 
Government to the Tribunal for adjudication. The Tribunal was 
of the view that since the Bank did not examine the postman 
that delinquent in fact refused to receive the notice, it could not 
be said that there was service of notice to him274. 
The charge-sheet issued by subordinate authority, which is 
later supported by the disciplinary authority, whether it can be 
said that domestic enquiry is vitiated and the consequent order 
of dismissal liable to be set aside.  This issue was settled by the 
High Court of Calcutta in the case of Gramophone Co. of India 
Ltd., vs. State of West Bengal & ors,275. The court has held that 
there is no proposition of law that under no circumstances any 
person or authority subordinate to the disciplinary authority 
cannot issue charge-sheet or initiate departmental proceedings. 
If it can be established that such subordinate authority has 
either express or implied approval to the same by the 
disciplinary / appointing authority, then the departmental 
proceedings initiated at the instance of such subordinate 
authority cannot be vitiated. The Court has relied on the earlier 
judgments viz; Mahananda Bhaduri vs. Astt. Commercial 
Superintendent, Khargpur276, M C. Vasudevan vs. SNDP 
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Yogan277, Workmen of Indian Overseas Bank vs. Indian 
Overseas Bank & anr278, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Surdal 
Singh279  
Non acceptance of charge-sheet – legal implications: 
While the delinquent employee refuses / avoids accepting the 
charge-sheet – the following steps among the other are 
resorted to: 
In case the employee refuses to accept charge-sheet, the 
guidelines have to be taken from the Civil Procedure Code vide 
Order 5 Rule 1. In one case it has been held by Tribunal that if 
a worker avoids receiving a notice on the plea that it does not 
contain his full name, then the management is not bound to 
adopt other mode of affective service, such as publication of the 
charge in the Newspaper. It has been held by the Supreme 
Court that charge-sheet sent by Registered post, if received 
back un-served then it should be published in news paper280.  
However, when a worker refuse to accept the charge-sheet 
when sent by Registered Post, then the management can 
proceed with further action presuming that the service of charge 
sheet on the employee has been effected. It has also been held 
by Supreme Court that when a registered envelop is tendered 
by the Postman to the addressee, but he refuses it to accept it, 
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there is due service effected upon the addressee by the refusal. 
The addressee must therefore be imputed with knowledge of 
the complaint thereof and this flow upon presumption, which 
are raised under Sec.2 of the General Clause Act, 1897 and 
Sec.114 of the Evidence Act. 
If the delinquent does not accept personally or is already placed 
under suspension then the same may be sent by Registered 
Post with Acknowledgement Due. If such notice comes back 
with postal endorsement ‘refused’, a presumption is drawn that 
the addressee has refused to accept the same. It has been held 
that more denial of the service of the charge-sheet by post 
unaccompanied by any other evidence is not sufficient to rebut 
the presumption relating to services of registered cover. The 
burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party challenging 
the  service. The respondent failed to discharge this burden as 
he failed to place material before court to show that the 
endorsement made by the postal authorities was wrong and 
incorrect. It was further held that mere denial by respondent in 
the circumstances of the case will not be justified281.  
Whether law laid down in the Mahomad Ramzan’s case will 
apply to all establishment - public, private, government or non-
governmental undertaking ? Held YES. Electronic Corporation 
of  India Ltd., vs. B. Karunakar282    
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Application of Mahhomad Ramzan’s case to those other than 
govt. servants - in the Year 1993 this issue was came up before 
their Lordship of Kerala HC. In Mahomad Ramzan vs. UOI,283 
the Supreme Court held that the supply of Enquiry Report 
before inflicting the proposed punishment is must, otherwise the 
same may vitiate enquiry. But the Kerala High Court observed 
in the year 1976 itself i.e. the Constitution 42nd Amendment, 
dispensing with the second opportunity under Art.311 at the 
stage of imposing penalty. And the court viewed that giving 
second opportunity before imposing punishment proposed is 
part and parcel of the principles of natural justice. It is 
applicable to all employees irrespective of govt. and non-
government servants.  
 
3.3. APPOINTMENT OF ENQUIRY OFFICER (EO): 
Appointment of Enquiry Officer (EO) is a vital stage in the 
disciplinary proceedings. Each and every Organization may 
prescribe the qualification and essentials regarding 
appointment of Enquiry Officer (EO). Generally, Organizations 
prefer outsiders to conduct enquiry proceedings. But as 
mentioned above since the procedure to be followed by the 
Enquiry Officer to hold enquiry is not codified and the 
proposition in this regard is based on the judge made law. 
Therefore, there are series of case laws decided by the law 
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courts from time to time witnesses the development of 
precedents in this particular area of subject. 
Merely because EO is an advocate, proceedings are not 
vitiated. No bar that an advocate cannot be appointed as E.O. 
In the case of M/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd., vs. Murari Lal 
Bikaneria284, the Supreme Court has observed that “we find 
ourselves unable to accept the conclusions arrived at by the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal seems to have been greatly impressed 
by the fact that instead of appointing someone in the appellant's 
factory itself as the Enquiry Officer the Works Manager had 
brought in an outsider who was no other than a junior advocate 
occasionally assisting Anand Prakash, their counsel in some 
matters. The Tribunal's view that this was wholly unwarranted 
and done with the purpose of loading the dice against the 
workmen appears to be unreasonable. Merely because the 
Enquiry Officer was a junior advocate and that he had on 
occasions been engaged by the appellant, it is not possible to 
take the view that he would necessarily be biased against the 
workmen. Evidently some of the workmen had behaved rudely 
to some members in the managerial cadre and it would not 
have been at all difficult for the Works Manager to appoint as 
Enquiry Officer some person of the factory itself over whom he 
was likely to have greater influence than on an outsider. As he 
himself was going to be a witness in the enquiry he entrusted 
the appointment of the Enquiry Officer to the Director of the 
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Company. We find nothing unfair in this and are unable to take 
any exception to the course adopted.  The same view was 
adopted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Raja Reddy 
vs. Labour Court , Hyderabad285. The Bombay High Court in the 
case of K.K Bhogade vs. Kalyani Steel Ltd., & ors286  held that it 
is by now well settled law that, as long as no bias can be 
imputed to the Enquiry Officer, the fact whether he was paid 
professional or a whole time employee of the employer, does 
not affect the validity of the enquiry held by him.     
 
When EO himself cross-examines the delinquent employee, 
whose conduct is subject to of enquiry he acts both as 
prosecutor / judge, this violates principles of natural justice. 
That is no man shall judge on his own cause (Nemo Judice 
Cause Sua). No bar to put questions on witness, by the EO, the 
enquiry not vitiated merely because the EO examines 
witness287.  
 
There may be no absolute prohibition to a presenting officer, 
also being witness. However it should be avoided as a 
prosecutor would become a witness288. Enquiry officer not to be 
lower rank than fact finding officer. Held EO was not a 
competent person289. Domestic enquiry must be presided over 
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by a person not disqualified by bias/prejudice/personal interest. 
If so, then it is bad in law290.  
 
Enquiry unfair if the victim of assault for which enquiry is held 
against a worker is EO.  It is an elementary principle that a 
person who is required to answer a charge must know not only 
the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation 
is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the 
evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant 
questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he 
must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. 
This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character 
and this requirement must be substantially fulfilled before the 
result of the enquiry can be accepted. A departure from this 
requirement in effect throws the burden upon the person 
charged to repel the charge without first making it out against 
him.   In an enquiry into charges against certain workmen, of 
participation in an assault by many workmen on the manager 
and assistant managers of a tea estate, conducted by the 
assaulted officers themselves, only certain questions were put 
to each workman in turn. Neither was any witness examined in 
support of the charge nor was any statement made by any 
witness tendered in evidence. There was no opportunity to the 
persons charged to cross-examine the officers assaulted who 
were not only in the position of judges but also of prosecutors 
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and witnesses and they drew upon their own knowledge of the 
incident and instead cross-examined the persons charged: Held 
that the enquiry was vitiated because it was not held in 
accordance with the principles of natural justice. There was 
such a travesty of those principles that the Tribunal was 
justified in rejecting the findings and asking the company to 
prove the allegations against each workman de novo before 
it291.   
 
Duty of Enquiry Officer to explain procedure of Enquiry: 
Enquiry Officer’s (EO) function and duties in the conduct of 
domestic enquiry … it is not the function of the EO to propose 
only punishment even after EO records findings of guilt against 
the delinquent employees. Much less can the EO do so at the 
stage of serving the charges on the employee? It is for the 
disciplinary authority to propose the punishment after receipt of 
the report of the EO which suggests that before the authority 
proposes the punishment, it must have applied its mind to 
evidence and the findings recorded by the EO292.   
 
Questions by EO not prohibited - 
There is no such law prohibiting the EO to put any question to 
delinquent employee in the enquiry. In order to bring out the 
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truth, the EO is always within his right to put some questions to 
the delinquent employee293.  
 
Refusal to participate in the enquiry when justified:  Right of 
representation of an employee through an office bearer of a 
trade union in an enquiry cannot be claimed by him as a matter 
of right since it depends upon the circumstances of each case 
including the service rules of standing orders. In one case, the 
employee declined to participate in the enquiry because of 
refusal of permission to be represented by office bearer of a 
trade union of which he was a member, which right has been 
conferred on him by model standing orders. It has been held 
that employee’s refusal to participate in the enquiry 
proceedings cannot be faulted since it is amounted to the 
violation of principles of natural justice294.  Whereas the SC in 
this case held that if the delinquent refused to participate in 
enquiry without valid reasons, he cannot be permitted to 
complain later295.  
 
In case EO is paid professional whether enquiry is bad! - 
Legality of the above hypothetical issue has been discussed by 
Bombay High Court in the case of K.K Bhogade vs. Kalyani 
Steel Ltd296., and held it is by now well settled law that, as long 
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as no bias can be imported to the EO, the fact whether he was 
paid professional or a whole time employee of the employer, 
does not affect the validity of the enquiry held by him.   
 
 
Enquiry Officer junior to the delinquent validity of - Such an 
enquiry will be liable to be vitiated on the ground of bias of the 
enquiry officer. It is pertinent to refer to one case decided by the 
Divisional Bench of Kerala High Court in holding that the 
learned Single Judge was wrong in coming into conclusion that 
the writ petitioner would not be permitted to raise the question 
of real likelihood of bias, as he did not raise the same during 
the course of the enquiry proceedings. Admittedly, the 
inspector, who conducted the enquiry, was immediate 
subordinate to the delinquent. The entire enquiry was thus held 
to be vitiated297.  
 
Enquiry Officer cannot impose punishment - The scope of 
an enquiry to be held by an EO is restricted to give his findings 
on the basis of evidence as produced by the parties in an 
enquiry as held by him. He has no right even to recommend the 
punishment much less imposing the penalty upon a workman. 
In one case before the Karnataka High Court in clarifying that 
the power to frame charges and to initiate or dispense with the 
holding of enquiry in to the same vests in the disciplinary 
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authority and not the EO. Also the disciplinary authority may 
either hold the enquiry itself or appoint an EO. Even if the EO 
absolves the delinquent of the charges, the disciplinary 
authority is entitled to take a different view upon independent 
evaluation of the material available against the employee. The 
decision to accept those findings or to arrive at a conclusion 
different than the one arrived at by the EO is discretion of the 
disciplinary authority298.  
 
In order to inspire the confidence in the charge-sheeted 
employee, it is necessary that the enquiry officer should be a 
person who is known for his open mindedness and unbiased 
attitude. He should not nurse any pre-conceived notions and he 
must be independent in his approach to his task. That a person 
who is in any way whatsoever personally involved in an enquiry 
as an eye witness to the incident form in the cause of action, or 
else he is a person due to whose behaviour the workman has 
to face a charge of misconduct, if he is involved in the cause of 
enquiry in any other way, in such circumstances a person 
cannot be an EO. In the case of Nageshwar Rao vs. APSRTC299, 
the Supreme Court observed that it is a fundamental principle 
of natural justice that in the case of quasi judicial proceedings, 
the authority empowered to decide the dispute between 
opposing parties must be one without bias towards one side or 
other in the dispute. It is also a matter of fundamental 
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importance that a person interested in one party or the other 
should not, even formally, take part in the proceedings though 
in fact he does not influence the mind of the person, who finally 
decides the case. This is on the principle that justice should not 
only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen 
to be done.  
 
Enquiry Officer - who has held preliminary enquiry -  
Violation of Natural Justice - 
 
The enquiry will be against the principles of natural Justice if 
the Enquiry Officer as appointed by the disciplinary authority or 
management happens to be the same person who has held the 
preliminary enquiry against the delinquent employee.  It is, 
therefore, essential that the person holding the regular enquiry 
should be totally unbiased. A person holding the preliminary 
enquiry is bound to have been influenced during the course of 
factual investigation which he has made in the preliminary 
enquiry300.  
 
The appointment of EO shall be as stipulated in the certified 
standing orders. They will have binding force and must be 
followed meticulously.  If the certified standing orders provide 
that only an officer of the establishment can be appointed as 
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EO, then appointment of an outsider as EO will be violative in 
law301.  
 
It has been held by the Supreme Court that merely because the 
enquiry officer is an associate of legal advisor of the 
management and that he had on occasions been engaged by 
the management, it is not possible to take he would be 
necessarily be biased against the workman302.  
 
An enquiry officer should be impartial and not a witness to the 
misconduct alleged against the delinquent workmen. In one 
case it had been held that enquiry should not be entrusted to a 
person who is witness to the misconduct. When enquiry officer 
holding the enquiry has been held as not proper thus vitiated. A 
person who is associated himself with certain proceedings 
culminating in the suspension of the workmen cannot be 
expected act as an independent enquiry officer303  
 
Advocate, a person outside company appointed as an Enquiry 
Officer by Management - He can give findings as to misconduct 
of the employee. Where an advocate not being an employee of 
company could be appointed as an enquiry officer, the 
advocate would, have all the normal powers of an enquiry 
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officer including the power to give findings as to misconduct of 
the employees. No distinction can be made between the 
powers of an enquiry officer who is an employee of the 
Company and an outsider. If the Manager was entitled to 
appoint an enquiry officer in either case the appointee, in his 
capacity as an enquiry officer, would have the same powers. 
The advocate, being an outsider has the power to give findings 
as to misconduct of the employees304.  
 
Enquiry officer being junior advocate and at times appearing on 
behalf of management - No bias to be inferred. Merely because 
the Enquiry Officer was a junior advocate and that he had on 
occasions, been engaged by the Management he would not 
necessarily be biased against the workmen. So also as the 
Works Manager was going to be a witness in the enquiry there 
was nothing unfair in entrusting the appointment of the Enquiry 
Officer to the Director of the Company305.     
 
The enquiry was held by the Enquiry Officer and pursuant to 
the report of the Enquiry Officer the ad hoc disciplinary authority 
has imposed the punishment of removal from service. This was 
challenged by the respondent before the Central Administrative 
Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench. The Tribunal has set aside the 
proceedings and the order of the disciplinary authority only on 
the ground that the Enquiry Officer was appointed by the 
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original disciplinary authority and not by the ad hoc disciplinary 
authority appointed in respect of the present case.  There is no 
material to indicate that any prejudice was caused to the 
respondent as a result of the appointment of an Enquiry Officer 
and a presenting officer by the original disciplinary authority. It 
is not even alleged that any such prejudice was caused to the 
respondent. No allegation of any kind whether of bias or mala 
fides has been made against the Enquiry Officer or the 
presenting Officer so appointed in the conduct of the enquiry? 
The actual order against the respondent has been passed by 
the ad hoc disciplinary authority after taking into account the 
report of the Enquiry Officer and the evidence led in the case. 
In the absence of any prejudice or any allegations of mala fides, 
the enquiry should not have been set aside and the action of 
the disciplinary authority should not have been quashed only on 
a technical ground that instead of the ad hoc disciplinary 
authority, the actual disciplinary authority had appointed the 
Enquiry Officer in respect of the present case306.  
 
In Tilak Chand Magatram Obhan vs. Kamala Prasad Shukla307, 
the Principal of a school who was a member of the Inquiry 
Committee "was deeply biased against the delinquent. He had 
given notice to the delinquent for initiating defamation 
proceedings against him." It was held that the presence of the 
Principal on the Committee had vitiated the atmosphere for a 
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free and fair inquiry. It was also observed that the entire inquiry 
was bad and the fact that there was an appeal did not cure the 
defect. It was stated: 
    "Where the lapse is of the enquiry being conducted by an 
officer deeply biased against the delinquent or one of them 
being so biased that the entire enquiry proceedings are 
rendered void, the appellate authority cannot repair the 
damage done to the enquiry. Where one of the members of 
the Enquiry Committee has a strong hatred or bias against 
the delinquent of which the other members know not or the 
said member is in a position to influence the decision 
making, the entire record of the enquiry will be slanted and 
any independent decision taken by the appellate authority on 
such tainted record cannot undo the damage done. Besides 
where a delinquent is asked to appear before a Committee 
of which one member is deeply hostile towards him, the 
delinquent would be greatly handicapped in conducting his 
defence as he would be inhibited by the atmosphere 
prevailing in the enquiry room. Justice must not only be done 
but must also appear to be done. Would it so appear to the 
delinquent if one of the members of the Enquiry Committee 
has a strong bias against him." 
The leading case on the question of reasonable likelihood of 
bias is the one of Rattan Lal Sharma vs. Managing Committee, 
Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School308, The 
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Supreme Court held in that case that the test was one of 'real 
likelihood' of bias even if such bias was not in fact the direct 
cause. It was held there a real likelihood of bias means at least 
substantial possibility of bias. The question depends not upon 
what actually was done but upon what might appear to be 
done. The test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, 
fully apprised of all circumstances, would feel a serious 
apprehension of bias.  
 
"The test is not whether in fact, a bias has affected the 
judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant 
could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a 
member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the 
final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often 
said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to 
be done." 
Where the inquiry officer examined witnesses, recorded their 
statements and gave a clear finding of the appellant accepting 
a bribe and even recommended his termination. All these were 
done behind the back of the appellant. The Managing Director 
passed the termination order the very next day. It cannot in the 
above circumstances be stated, by any stretch of inspection 
that the report is a preliminary inquiry report. Its findings are 
definitive. It is not a preliminary report where some facts are 
gathered and a recommendation is made for a regular 
departmental inquiry. It is an obvious case where the report and 
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its findings are the foundation of the termination order and not 
merely the motive. Termination order passed is punitive and is 
violative of principles of natural justice309.  
 
Advocate, a person outside company appointed as an Enquiry 
Officer by Management - He can give findings as to misconduct 
of the employee.  Where an advocate not being an employee of 
company could be appointed as an enquiry officer, the 
advocate would, have all the normal powers of an enquiry 
officer including the power to give findings as to misconduct of 
the employees. No distinction can be made between the 
powers of an enquiry officer who is an employee of the 
Company and an outsider. If the Manager was entitled to 
appoint an enquiry officer in either case the appointee, in his 
capacity as an enquiry officer, would have the same powers. 
The advocate, being an outsider has the power to give findings 
as to misconduct of the employees310.  
 
Bye-law no.27 of the Guntur Dist. Milk Union Ltd., denotes 
about the initiation of the disciplinary action against its 
employees. Further the said bye-law does not permit the 
disciplinary authority to appoint an outsider as enquiry officer. It 
is also settled position in law is that if an enquiry is held by the 
incompetent and unauthorized person under the relevant 
                                                 
309 Radhey Shyam Gupta, vs. U. P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another, 
AIR 1999 SC 609 
310 AIR 1999 SC 1290 
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conduct regulations or rules, then it invalidates the entire 
proceedings and such a defect cannot be considered as mere 
irregularity and consequently it cannot be regularized by 
showing that the competent authority itself had applied its mind 
reviewed the enquiry records. Even if such a competent officer 
went through the enquiry records and recorded his agreement 
with the findings by the incompetent enquiry officer it is not 
sufficient when the rules do not permit the disciplinary authority 
to appoint an outsider as enquiry officer311.  
3.4 STAY OF ENQUIRY PROCEEDINGS BY LAW 
COURTS: 
Stay of Enquiry Proceeding by Civil Court - not permissible. The 
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to stay the Enquiry Proceedings 
against an employee is barred by the provisions of Industrial 
Disputes Act, 1947. Also the Civil Court cannot interfere at the 
stage of show-cause notice after the conclusion of domestic 
enquiry against the employee as any relief prayed for by the 
employee at the stage would fall within the domain of the 
forums as created under the Inudtrial Disputes Act only. The 
same issue was discussed by the Madras High Court in the 
case of Indian Oxygen Ltd., Madras vs. Ganga Prasad312.  
Criminal prosecution initiated on the same facts during 
pendency of domestic enquiry, Domestic inquiry not necessarily 
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to be stayed.313  Also see Kushwashwer Dube vs. M/s. Barat 
Cooking Coal Ltd314.  
Whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant stay?  Held No. It is 
settled position of law that the civil court has no jurisdiction to 
enforce a personal contract. The right to continue in service is a 
right conferred on the Industrial worker by the Industrial 
Disputes Act. De hors, the statute a termination of the service 
may give rise to a cause of action to claim damages and not 
reinstatement. Granting of the letter relief will amount to 
enforcement of personal contract, which is not the province of 
civil court.315  
 
At a time three proceedings initiated a disciplinary proceedings, 
a criminal proceeding, and a civil suit on the same set of facts - 
Disciplinary proceedings should normally be stayed pending 
disposal of the criminal case - even if it has been proceeded 
with - And even if the trial in the Criminal case has not yet 
commenced316. Here in the instant case the High Court 
distinguished the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in 
Dube’s case317 and to the present case and allowed the Writ 
Petition. and ordered to stay the disciplinary proceedings till the 
disposal of criminal charges. 
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Whether departmental proceedings against the petitioner 
should remain in abeyance once as criminal case has been 
registered against him on the same facts318. Held that the 
question as to whether departmental proceedings are required 
to be stayed merely because a criminal case stands registered 
against the delinquent or because cognizance has been taken 
by a criminal court has been subject matter of several 
decisions. Thus, the view discernable from the aforesaid 
judgments of the Supreme Court and other judgments is that 
the question as to whether departmental enquiry requires to be 
stayed or not is a question of fact to be decided by the taking 
into consideration as to how much complicate the case is. Also 
see319.   
 
Departmental Proceedings vis-à-vis criminal action on the same 
charges – stay of departmental proceedings. It is for the charge 
sheeted  employee that the materials for proving that the 
charges in the criminal trial are similar to  materials required to 
prove the charges in the departmental proceedings in abeyance 
until criminal court finally decides the issue. Held that both 
criminal and departmental action may go along. This was held 
in the case of Samudrapu Somalappudu & ors Vs. Nellimarala 
Jute Mills Co., Ltd.320.  
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Staying of departmental proceedings on pendency of criminal 
proceedings is purely based on facts and circumstances of the 
each and every case321. Naseen Ishaque vs. Indian Trade 
Promotion Organization322. However, Disciplinary enquiry need 
not be stayed when criminal proceedings are on323. It is 
pertinent to state that this aspect of the enquiry has been delat 
at length in the forthcoming chapter(s).  
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Chapter 04: JUDICIAL STRUCTURES &    
PERSPECTIVE – II 
 
4.1 Demand of delinquent to be represented by a 
Lawyer 
 4.2 Disciplinary Proceedings vis-à-vis Criminal Trail 
 4.3 Communications and Notices in the enquiry 
 4.4 Witnesses, evidence and admission in the enquiry 
 4.5 Element of Bias in the enquiry 
  
4.1 DEMAND OF DELINQUENT TO BE REPRESENTED     
BY A LAWYER 
At the cost of the repetition, it has been reiterated that as there 
exists no codified laws or rules, all the differences, doubts 
raised in this particular aspects of Disciplinary proceedings are 
frequently referred to the law courts for adjudication.  
Accordingly, there are catenas of cases decided by various 
courts of law.  The outcome of the case depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of the each and every case. 
 
Proposition of law and limitations on the choice of delinquent 
employee while opting for assistance in the matters of disciplinary 
enquiry.  The basic principle is that an employee has no right to 
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representation in the departmental proceedings of another 
person or a lawyer unless the Service Rules specifically provide 
for the same.  The right to representation is available only to the 
extent specifically provided for in the Rules.  For example, Rule 
of the Railway Establishment Code provides as under: 
“The accused railway servant may present his case with the 
assistance of any other railway servant employed on the same 
railway (including a railway servant on leave preparatory to 
retirement) on which he is working. 
The right to representation, therefore, has been made available 
in a restricted way to a delinquent employee.  He has a choice 
to be represented by another railway employee, but the choice 
is restricted to the Railway on which he himself is working, that 
is, if he is an employee of the Western Railway, his choice 
would be restricted to the employees working on the Western 
Railway.  The choice cannot be allowed to travel to other 
Railways. 
Similarly, a provision has been made in Rule 14(18) of the 
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 
1965, where too, an employee has been given the choice of 
being represented in the disciplinary proceedings through a co-
employee. In Kalindi vs. Tata Locomotive & Engineering 
Company Ltd324. a Three-Judge Bench observed as under 
(Paras 3 to 5 of AIR) “Accustomed as we are to the practice in 
the Courts of law to skilful handling of witnesses by lawyers 
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specially trained in the art of examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, our first inclination is to think that a 
fair enquiry demands that the person accused of an act should 
have the assistance of some person, who even if not a lawyer 
may be expected to examine and cross-examine witnesses with 
a fair amount of skill.  We have to remember however in the 
first place that these are not enquiries in a Court of Law.  It is 
necessary to remember also that in these enquiries, fairly 
simple questions of fact as to whether certain acts of 
misconduct were committed by a workman or not only fall to be 
considered, and straightforward questioning which a person of 
fair intelligence and knowledge of conditions prevailing in the 
industry will be able to do will ordinarily help to elicit the truth.  It 
may often happen that the accused workman will be best 
suited, and fully able to cross-examine the witnesses who have 
spoken against him and to examine witnesses in his favour.” 
(emphasis added) 
It is helpful to consider in this connection the fact that ordinarily 
in enquiries before domestic tribunals the person accused of 
any misconduct conducts his own case.  Rules have been 
framed by Government as regards the procedure to be followed 
in regards the procedure to be followed in enquiries against 
their own employees.   No provision is made in these Rules that 
the person against whom an enquiry is held may be 
represented by anybody else.  When the general practice 
adopted by domestic tribunals is that the person accused 
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conducts his own case, we are unable to accept an argument 
that natural justice demands that in the case of enquiries into a 
charge-sheet of misconduct against a workman he should be 
represented by a member of his Union.  Besides, it is 
necessary to remember that if any enquiry is not otherwise fair, 
the workman concerned can challenge its validity in an 
industrial dispute. 
In the above premises, in the case of Bharat Petroleum 
Corporation Ltd. vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and 
others325, the Apex Court arrived at a conclusion that a workman 
against whom an enquiry is being held by the management has 
no right to be represented at such enquiry by a representative 
of his Union; though of course an employer in his discretion can 
and may allow his employee to avail himself of such 
assistance.” 
In another decision, Dunlop Rubber Company vs. Workmen326 it 
was laid down that there was no right to representation in the 
disciplinary proceedings, by another person unless the Service 
Rules specifically provided for the same. 
The matter again came to be considered by a Three Judge 
Bench of the Supreme Court in Crescent Dyes and Chemicals 
Ltd. vs. Ram Naresh Tripathi,327  and Ahmadi, J. (as he then 
was) in the context of Section 22(ii) of the Maharashtra 
Recognition of Trade Unions and Unfair Labour Practices Act, 
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1971, as also in the context of domestic enquiry, upheld the 
statutory restrictions imposed on delinquent’s choice of 
representation in the domestic enquiry through an agent.  It was 
laid down as under: 
“11. A delinquent appearing before a Tribunal may feel that 
the right to representation is implied in the larger 
entitlement of a fair hearing based on the rule of natural 
justice.  He may, therefore, feel that refusal to be 
represented by an agent of his choice would tantamount to 
denial of natural Justice. Ordinarily it is considered 
desirable not to restrict this right of representation by 
counsel or an agent of one’s choice but it is a different thing 
to say that such a right is an element of the principles of 
natural Justice and denial thereof would invalidate the 
enquiry.  Representation through counsel can be restricted 
by law as for example, Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes 
Act, 1947, and so also by certified Standing Orders.  In the 
present case the Standing Orders permitted an employee 
to be represented by a clerk or workman working in the 
same department as the delinquent.  So also the right to 
representation can be regulated or restricted by statute”. 
In para 12 of the judgement the Apex Court has concluded that 
“it is therefore, clear from the above case law that the right to 
be represented through counsel or agent can be restricted, 
regulated by statute, rules, regulations or standing orders.  A 
delinquent has no right to be represented through counsel or 
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agent unless the law specifically confers such right.  The 
requirement of rule of natural justice in so far as the 
delinquent’s right of hearing is concerned, cannot and does not 
extend to a right to be represented through counsel or 
agent…..” The said proposition of law has been reiterated in the 
case of M/s. CIPLA Ltd. And others, vs. Ripu Daman Bhanot 
and another328. 
The earlier decisions in Kalindi vs. Tata Locomotive & 
Engineering Co. Ltd, Dunlop Rubber Co., vs. Workmen and 
Brooke Bond India (P) Ltd., vs. Subba Raman329, were followed 
and it was held that the law in this country does not concede an 
absolute right of representation to an employee as part of his 
right to be heard.  It was further specified that there is no right 
to representation as such unless the Company, by its Standing 
Orders, recognizes such a right.  In this case, it was also laid 
down that a delinquent employee has no right to be 
represented in the departmental proceedings by a lawyer 
unless the facts involved in the disciplinary proceedings were of 
a complex nature in which case the assistance of a lawyer 
could be permitted. 
 
The age old judicial concept “a man not only has right to 
speak from his voice, but also has right to speak from his 
representative voice when his life, liberty, and lively-hood 
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is at stake” – this concept seems to be withering away day by 
day.  The Hono’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of K.C. Mani 
vs. Central Warehousing Corporation330 has laid down 
illustrative tests to determine such request for soliciting an 
assistance of legally trained mind / co-employee: 
?? Whether it is really a fight between two unequals? 
?? Whether the nature of charge is simplex or complex? 
?? Whether the charge is such that some documents are 
required to be proved or disproved either 
?? Because they are false or fabricated 
?? Is it a case where there are number of witnesses to be 
examined and re-examined? 
?? Whether any expert witness is to be cross-examined? 
?? What is the intellectual capacity, status and experience of 
the delinquent facing the departmental proceedings? 
If the enquiry officer is a ‘trained personnel’ that by itself does 
not mechanically vest any right in the delinquent to have a legal 
assistance irrespective of facts and circumstances. The answer 
rests on facts and circumstances and on the answer to the 
following two questions. 
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?? Whether the case presents any legal and factual 
complexity making the delinquent totally handicapped to 
defend his case. 
?? Whether the delinquent is academically and 
psychologically fit and competent enough to defend 
himself in absence of outside legal assistance. 
To conclude, right to be represented by a counsel or an agent 
of one’s own choice under the decision of the English Courts is 
not absolute right and cannot be controlled, restricted or 
regulated by law, rules or regulations.   However, if the charges 
are of serious nature, the delinquent request to be considered.  
So far as the law applicable in India is concerned, there is no 
right to representation as such unless the company by its 
Standing Orders recognizes such right.  It was held that right to 
be represented through counsel or agent can be restricted, 
controlled or regulated by Statutes, rules, regulations or 
Standing Orders. 
Let us also look at other decisions of the law courts on this 
aspect of disciplinary enquiry. 
When the presenting officer is a man with legal background, 
rules of natural justice require that a delinquent be allowed to 
engage a counsel.  This becomes even more important when 
the charges are grave held in J.K. Agarwal vs. Haryana Seeds 
Development Corpn. Ltd., & ors331. 
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Whether there is violation of service rules in refusing 
permission to engage an advocate can be adjudicated upon 
ultimately.  High Court will not interfere in enquiry stage with the 
management prerogative332. 
Representation by lawyer not a right and denial would not 
violate natural justice.  However, if E.O. acts as a prosecutor 
and a judge or E.O acts as a prosecutor and a Judge or E.O 
acts with haste or is biased in the facts of this case, it was held 
since serious consequences would be suffered legal assistance 
ought to be provided333. If Department is represented by a 
legally trained mind, delinquent must be allowed a legal 
practitioner even if it is contrary to the rules. 
Even when the presenting officer is not a lawyer, but is trained 
in technique of disciplinary proceedings, the delinquent officer 
should be permitted to engage legally trained person - 
dissenting ruling. Merely because the presenting officer 
possesses a degree in law, it does not entitle the delinquent 
employee to ask for the services of a legal practitioner. 
The petitioner not allowed to engage a lawyer, but, however 
permitted to be represented by an employee of the Corporation 
principles of natural justice violated334. If the management in the 
enquiry is not being represented by a law graduate, the 
employee cannot be represented by an advocate335. 
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The certified standing orders provided that an employee can be 
represented in an enquiry by any of his employees.  Hence 
refusal to allow an outsider office bearer of trade union leader 
will not violate the principle of natural justice.  This has been 
held by the High Court of Rajasthan in the case of M/s. Derby 
Textiles Ltd., Jodhpur vs. Mahamantri Derby Textiles 
Karmachari & Shramik Union, Jodhpur336.  However, it has been 
held that engagement of a junior advocate who is a total 
outsider does not vitiate enquiry. 
Workman cannot as of right claim to be represented by Union 
representatives.  Employer has discretion337, representation by 
a lawyer in enquiry may not be permissible.  There is no 
absolute rule by which the services of lawyer are necessarily to 
be made available to an officer who is charged with 
misconduct.  There s not duty cast upon the respondent 
authorities to tell the workman as to various aspects of law of 
natural justice or as to what work of representation he might 
have in law in case he so chooses to ask for the same. 
Discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution of India – 
contention that workman being allowed to be represented by 
president and vice president of Trade Union who are practicing 
lawyers.  Applicant not being allowed to represent the 
management on the ground that he is a lawyer – The court held 
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that for deciding whether an advocate can be taken to be an 
officer, he is to be regular officer of the association, or an officer 
bearer of the association, or in the employment of the 
association.  In the instant case the applicant does not satisfy 
any of the conditions, as he has merely been co-opted to the 
executive committee and nominated as an officer to give legal 
advice to conduct cases on behalf of the association.  Law does 
not permit to treat the applicant as an officer of the association.  
Indeed any other review could have circumvented the 
provisions of section 36(4), such denial does not amounts to 
discrimination21. Request for gant of legal assistance – Denial of 
such request – Enquiry conducted by a legally trained officer – 
held right of delinquent to have legal assistance depends upon 
the facts and circumstances of the case and facts338. 
Advocate as an E.O – A practicing lawyer accepting from the 
management can be appointed as an EO.  There cannot be a 
ground that the advocate holding enquiry was biased339. 
 
Request of petitioner to engage lawyer to defend his side was 
denied – Circumstances under when such request can be 
considered explained – The denial of permission to engage an 
advocate to assist delinquent the foregoing judgements placed 
before the court; J.K. Agarwal vs. Haryana Seeds Development 
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Corpn., Ltd.340,  in this decision it is noted that the presiding 
officer of the employer corporation was a “man of Law” in that 
context and taking into account the Supreme Court stated thus: 
“on a consideration of the matter, we are persuaded to the view 
that the refusal to sanction the service of a lawyer in the enquiry 
was not a proper exercise of the decision under the rue 
resulting in a failure of natural justice; particularly, in view of the 
fact the Presenting Officer was a person with legal attainment 
and experience.  It was said that appellant was no less adept 
having been in the position of senior executive and could have 
defended, and did defend, himself competently; but was 
observed by the learned Master of Rolls in Pett vs. Greyhound 
Racing Association, 1968 (2) All ER 549 (CA) that in defending 
himself one may tend to become “nervous” or “tongue-tied”.  
Moreover, appellant, it is claimed, has had no legal 
background.  The refusal of the service of the lawyer, in the 
facts of this case, results in denial of natural justice.”  In fact in 
the preceding paragraph, the Hon’ble Supreme Court indicates 
the fact of granting of permission to engage services of a 
lawyer is in fact a matter of discretion.  This is what stated in 
para – 8 of the judgment:” ….The rule itself recognizes that 
where the charges are as serious as to entail a dismissal from 
service the enquiry authority may permit the services of lawyer.  
This rule vests in discretion.  In the matter of exercise of this 
discretion one of the relevant factors are whether there is 
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likelihood of the combat of being unequal entailing a 
miscarriage of failure of justice and denial of real and 
reasonable opportunity for defence by reasons of the appellant 
being petted against a Presenting Officer who is trained in law.  
A legal advisor and lawyer are for this purpose somewhat 
liberally construed and must include “Whoever assists or 
advises on facts and in law must be deemed to e in the position 
of a legal advisor.” 
This question again came up for consideration by larger bench 
of the Supreme Court in Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd., vs. 
Ram Naresh Tripathi341.  In para – 10, their Lordships stated as 
follows:  “….a delinquent appearing before a Tribunal may feel 
that the right to representation is implied in the large entitlement 
of a fair hearing based on other rule of natural justice.  He may, 
therefore, feel that refusal to be represented by an agent of his 
choice would tantamount to denial of natural justice.  Ordinarily 
it is considered desirable not to restrict this right of 
representation by Counsel or agent of one’s choice, but it is a 
different thing to say that such a right is an element of the 
principles of natural justice and denial thereof would invalidate 
the enquiry…” 
Later in the same paragraph, after analyzing various English 
Authorities, their Lordships stated as “….from the above 
decisions of the English Courts, it seems clear to us that the 
right to be represented by a Counsel or agent of one’s own 
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choice is not an absolute right and can be controlled, restricted 
or regulated by law, rules or regulations.  However, if the 
charge is of a serious and complex nature, the delinquent’s 
request to be represented through a counsel or agent could be 
conceded.”  As regards law India, after a detailed survey of 
leading decisions, their Lordships concluded as follows: “….12.  
It is therefore, clear from the above case law that the right to be 
represented through counsel or agent can be restricted, 
regulated by statute, rules, regulations or Standing Orders.  A 
delinquent has no right to be represented through Counsel or 
agent unless the law specifically confers such a right.  The 
requirement of the rule of natural justice in so far as the 
delinquent’s right of hearing is concerned, cannot and does not 
extend to a right to be represented through counsel or 
agent342…” 
Representation by lawyer by the delinquent employee-Not as a 
matter of right unless the rule so permit or the employer is 
being represented by legally trained person or that the social or 
financial status of the delinquent employee is likely to be ruined 
or where several complicated questions are raised which the 
delinquent employee is likely to be ruined or where several 
complicated questions are raised which the delinquent 
employee is unable to comprehend.  It is further held that 
seeking relief for representation through an advocate by a 
delinquent employee and agitating of his right is not a common 
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law right but a right acquired by the worker under Industrial 
Law.  In other words, what he really intends is to safeguard his 
interest to further the rights conferred on him under the 
industrial law. 
Advocate as an Enquiry Officer:- 
There is no bar in appointing as an Enquiry Officer for holding 
of an enquiry.  So much so, the Supreme Court has held that 
even an associate of the legal adviser of the Company can be 
appointed as an Enquiry Officer.  The Andhra Pradesh High 
Court has also held that there is nothing to indicate that there 
was any reasonable apprehension in the mind of the employee 
concerned that the advocate who was appointed as an enquiry 
officer was biased against the employee.  However, if the 
byelaws standing orders or service rules of an establishment 
prohibit an outsider including an advocate then appointment of 
an advocate as an Enquiry Officer will not be valid.  In one case 
the enquiry officer as appointed has been an advocate.  
Submission as been made by the delinquent employee that an 
outsider cannot be appointed as Enquiry Officer as there is 
prohibition to do so by be-law 27 applicable to the parties.  The 
said bye-law provides that the Disciplinary Authority may itself 
hold an enquiry or to appoint any other authority superior in 
rank to the employee charged.  Thus there is prohibition   to 
appoint any outsider.  The appointment of an advocate as 
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Enquiry Officer will be illegal. Enquiry held by such incompetent 
and unauthorized person invalidates entire proceedings343.  
Where the regulations are silent would be difficult to hold that a 
court must read into the Regulation either way and conclude 
that the denial of legal assistance would initiate the Enquiry.  
There is an undergoing requirement of fair conduct of 
proceedings, which is the essence behind the courts having 
repeatedly taken the view that legal assistance must be 
permitted in several situations.  Those principles can and be 
called out to read that where the allegations are extremely 
grave and where the status and condition of the concerned is 
such that the person is completely incompetent, ignorant, 
inexperienced and unable to get the assistance of any qualified 
persons and would therefore be rendered completely 
handicapped so much so that no valid defence can be pleaded 
or put up nor can the presenting authority’s evidence be tested 
or rejected, that in such situation alone if demonstrated to a 
court can a party contend that the enquiry stands vitiated344. 
Non appointment of presenting officer denying the enquiry 
whether the enquiry is valid – It was not necessary to appoint a 
Presenting Officer (PO) since the provisions of the Act of the 
Rules did not oblige the Municipal Commissioner or the 
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disciplinary authority to appoint the PO and as such an 
appointment of PO did not effect the validity of enquiry345. 
The delinquent’s request for permission to present through a 
lawyer was rejected by the EO on the ground that Presenting 
Officer (PO) is law graduate and not practicing, the charges 
imposed are simple in nature, and issues involved in the case 
are simple in nature.  Under the said circumstances no 
prejudice caused to the delinquent346. 
Generally the delinquent is entitled to an opportunity to defend 
himself either in person or co-employee – assistance of retired 
employee, though he was not legal practitioner prohibited to 
appear and assist delinquent, in reality amounted to permitting 
him to have regular practice – High Court commited error in 
giving such direction347. 
Where the model standing orders permit representation of the 
workman by an office bearer of the trade upon of which he is a 
member, the EO must grant permission to the workman. In one 
case the workman made request that he should be represented 
by a Trade Unionist but EO rejected his request. The enquiry 
was thus held to be unfair and vitiated348. However, a contrary 
view has been expressed where the standing orders of the 
company provided that an employee can be represented in an 
enquiry by any office co-employee hence refusal to allow an 
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outsider office bearer of Trade Union leader will not violate the 
principles of natural justice349. In another case the workman 
requested to be represented by the President of Mercantile 
Employees Association which was rejected on the ground that 
nominated person was an outsider and not the member of the 
Union. The workman boycotted the enquiry which was then 
held ex-parte and fair enquiry - a dismissal order was passed. 
The court rule that it was against the principles of natural 
justice350. 
 
Representation of delinquent by another workman – disallowed 
by the Enquiry Officer on the grounds of his being an active 
member of Union. The action of Enquiry Officer held valid 
based on that to maintain congenial atmosphere during the 
enquiry. The delinquent never participated after that in the 
enquiry.  It was held that it was presumed that he was given full 
and fair opportunity. Proportionate penalty of dismissal was 
passed based on the charges proved. Further held that the 
proved charges are commensurate to the proportionate penalty. 
This view was expressed in  Motir Rehman vs. Presiding 
Officer, LC, Patna351. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay 
vs. PR Nadkarni352. 
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Representation by an official of the Trade Union, a practicing 
lawyer certified standing orders as applicable permit 
representation in enquiry by an official of a Trade Union of 
which the delinquent employee is member. The court has held 
that an office bearer of the Trade Union advocate entitled to 
represent the employee in the enquiry353.  
 
Validity of an enquiry was challenged on the ground that legal 
assistance was denied. He has participated in the enquiry and 
cross examined the management witness, co-worker was 
allowed to denial of legal assistance, hence enquiry is valid. 
Further held that a copy of one document was not given, 
however that document was gone through by the delinquent 
and witnesses were cross examined on the basis of it – no 
prejudice was caused to him. This view was held in S Ravindra 
Kamath vs. P.O, Labour Court Ernakulam 354, and Jitendra Singh 
Rathore vs. Shree Baidhyantha Ayurvedha Ashram 355. 
 
There was no request what so ever by workman to the Enquiry 
Officer to provide him the assistance of lawyer. In the absence 
of any such request it is not necessary to the management to 
volunteer the services of an advocate to the delinquent 
employee. However this objection was raised, when the order 
of dismissal was passed. The workman cannot have any 
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grievance at all in this regard. An employee has no right to 
representation by an advocate in departmental enquiry unless 
service rules so provided. Held in Bharat Petroleum vs. 
Maharashtra general kamgar union & ors356.  Representation by 
a lawyer once granted cannot be withdrawn – held in N. 
Balasubramaniam vs. Can Bank financial Services357.  
 
It was held that a delinquent employee has no right to be 
represented by an advocate in the departmental proceedings 
and that if a right to be represented by co-workmen is given to 
him, the departmental proceedings would be bad only for the 
reasons that the assistance of an advocate was not provided to 
him358.  
 
4.2 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS VIS-A-VIS CRIMINAL 
TRIAL: 
There is no legal yardstick to allow or not to allow the 
Disciplinary Proceedings at par with the criminal trial on the 
same set of facts simultaneously. However, there are series of 
judicial pronouncements about as to when can be allowed or 
not to be allowed such parallel proceedings.  
 
When a delinquent has been acquitted in a criminal trial, it is 
not open for   the management to ignore the judgment of the 
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Criminal Court. The Disciplinary authority is bound to give 
weight-age to the judgment359.  
There is no hard and fast rule that disciplinary proceedings 
have to be withheld when there is a criminal proceedings360. 
Departmental Enquiry can be proceeded with when the 
Criminal Proceedings are in progress for the same charge. 
However, it would only be fair that the employer should stay 
their hands. There is however no bar for such enquiry.  
Applicability of Rules of evidence is separate361.   
 If enquiry is concluded before Criminal proceedings 
conclusions in the enquiry not vitiated even if the court acquits 
the worker on technical grounds or on merits. If criminal Court 
finds a worker guilty and so also does the enquiry on 
independently assessed evidence. Subsequent acquittal on 
appeal does not vitiate findings of enquiry.  If there is a 
judgment of the court earlier, EO must apply his mind to the 
judgment362. 
At a time three proceedings initiated a disciplinary proceedings, 
a criminal proceeding, and a civil suit on the same set of facts - 
Disciplinary proceedings should normally be stayed pending 
disposal of the criminal case - even if it has been proceeded 
with - and even if the trial in the Criminal case has not yet 
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commenced363.  Here in the instant case the High Court 
distinguished the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in 
Dube’s case364 and to the present case and allowed the Writ 
Petition and ordered to stay the disciplinary proceedings till the 
disposal of criminal charges. 
 
Whether criminal court order is binding on domestic enquiry - 
Disciplinary enquiry and criminal trial initiated against the 
petitioner based on the same misconduct of having assaulted a 
worker - Acquitted by criminal court - findings of the criminal 
court are not binding on the disciplinary enquiry365.   
 
After acquittal of petitioner by criminal court - plea of estoppel is 
applicable and department is barred from initiating the 
departmental proceedings after acquittal - Difference between 
departmental enquiry and criminal trial and their purpose 
explained. - There is no constitutional bar on the basis of which 
it can be held that departmental enquiry is bad in view of the 
order of acquittal recorded by a criminal court. Once the 
cardinal difference between a criminal proceeding and 
disciplinary proceedings are kept in mind there would be no 
scope for any confusion on this account. The dominant purpose 
of criminal proceedings is to achieve the protection of the 
society at large and the public while that of the disciplinary 
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proceedings is parity and efficacy of public service. Obviously 
therefore, the fields of operation of the two proceedings are 
quite different and independent to the principle of issue 
estoppel has nor application to departmental proceedings and 
applies to criminal proceedings only - neither Art. 20(3) of the 
constitution nor the principles of issue estoppel can absolutely 
bar disciplinary proceedings after acquittal366.  
Petitioner a bus conductor - found carrying 37 passengers 
without tickets by checking staff - initiation of departmental 
proceedings - in respect of said misconduct criminal case also 
registered against him and chalan filed - whether departmental 
proceedings against the petitioner should remain in abeyance 
once as criminal case has been registered against him on the 
same facts367 - Held that the question as to whether 
departmental proceedings are required to be stayed merely 
because a criminal case stands registered against the 
delinquent or because cognizance has been taken by a criminal 
court has been subject matter of several decisions. Thus, the 
view discernable from the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme 
Court and other judgments is that the question as to whether 
departmental enquiry requires to be stayed or not is a question 
of fact to be decided by the taking into consideration as to how 
much has been complicated the case is368. 
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Domestic enquiry vis - a - vis criminal proceedings / trial – effect 
of acquittal – Enquiry neither to be vitiated nor the punishment 
of dismissal to be set aside. It is held that the legal position is 
well settled with parallel proceedings, one by way of disciplinary 
proceedings and the other in the criminal court can be taken to 
with regard to the same allegation. Once the employer found 
guilty of misconduct for the serious charge of theft by taking 
employers property from the factory, no lesser punishment than 
the dismissal from service is a proper punishment in such 
cases. The above principles of rationality were laid down by the 
law courts in the following cases:  
 
(1)  Suraj Prakash vs. The judge Labour Court, Kota, 1996 
LLR 29,  
(2)  Jung Bahdur Singh vs. Brij Nath Tiwari, AIR 1969 SC 30,  
(3) Kushweshwar Dubey vs. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd.,AIR 
1988 SC 2118,  
(4)  Moh. Uman vs. Rajsthatn State Electricity Board & 
ors.,1993 (1)WLC 253,  
(5)  Nelson Motis vs. Union of India, 1992 (2) LLJ 744 SC 
 
Whether an employee can be dismissed on his conviction 
without holding an enquiry against him – No Enquiry is 
imperative and essential. It was held in Ramsuk vs. RSRTC369. 
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Departmental Proceedings vis-à-vis criminal action on the same 
charges – stay of departmental proceedings. It is for the charge 
sheeted employee that the materials for proving that the 
charges in the criminal trial are similar to materials required to 
prove the charges in the departmental proceedings in abeyance 
until criminal court finally decides the issue. Held that both 
criminal action and departmental action may go along. This was 
held in the case of Samudrapu Somalappudu & ors vs. 
Nellimarala Jute Mills Co., Ltd370. 
 
The Supreme Court held that acquittal from the criminal court 
does not automatically gives delinquent the right to be 
reinstated in to the service. It would still open to competent 
authority to take decision whether the delinquent can be taken 
in to the services or disciplinary action should be initiated371.  
 
There would be no bar to proceed simultaneous with 
departmental enquiry and trial of criminal case unless charges 
in criminal case were of grave in nature involving complicated 
question of facts and law. What is required to be seen was 
whether departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice 
delinquent in his defense at trial in criminal case. Departmental 
charges against delinquent for failure to anticipate accident and 
prevention thereof and nothing to do with culpability of an 
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offence under section 304A and 338 of Indian Penal Code. 
Accordingly, held that the High Court was not right to stay 
departmental enquiry proceedings372.  
 
Mere acquittal of an employee will not debar the employer to 
initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. In one case Delhi 
High Court held that it is well settled that nature and scope of 
criminal case is different from that of disciplinary proceedings 
held in Antony Aria vs. Indian School of Certificate Examination 
& ors373. In the criminal matters mens rea and in the civil / 
departmental enquiries the requird element is the 
propondernace of probabilities.  
 
Staying of departmental proceedings on pendency of criminal 
proceedings is purely based on facts and circumstances of the 
each and every case held in Naseen Ishaque vs. Indian Trade 
Promotion Organization374. 
 
Disciplinary proceedings vis-à-vis criminal trail standard of proof 
in criminal trial and departmental enquiry is different. Technical 
rules of evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt not 
applicable in departmental enquiry. In departmental enquiry  
preponderance of probabilities are sufficient.  Burden of proof 
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lies on delinquent to prove that he has not committed the 
misconduct375.  
 
The disciplinary proceedings were delayed due to pendency of 
criminal proceedings. The employee remained under 
suspension for 10 years. Enquiry commenced after about 13 
years, contended that there is undue delay in completing the 
enquiry would cause prejudice to the concerned employee. The 
court agreed with the contention of the concerned employee 
and quashed the enquiry proceedings376. 
 
Stay of enquiry proceedings during pendency of criminal trial – 
temporary injunction restraining employer from proceeding with 
departmental enquiry not justified. Criminal proceedings arising 
out of the same conduct are to be dealt with by different 
authorities under different law, standards and by adopting 
different procedure. More over employer cannot be restrained 
from taking disciplinary action till disposal of criminal case377.  
 
4.3  COMMUNICATION AND NOTICES IN THE ENQUIRY: 
In absence of material to show that enquiry was conducted in a 
language which the delinquent did not understand and more 
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over when an office bearer representing them was present. 
Principles of natural justice not violated378.  
 
In absence of evidence, if a finding is based on mere surmises 
and conjectures, inferences by writs court may be justified379. 
Delay in holding departmental proceedings would amount to 
denial of reasonable opportunity and would amount to vitiating 
enquiry380.  
 
A notice of the enquiry must be sent to the accused employee. 
The enquiry officer cannot be absolved of this duty even if reply 
has been given of the charge sheet381. Not strictly the evidence 
as in civil and criminal proceedings standard of proof is required 
not beyond reasonable doubt. The enquiry proceedings stand 
only on preponderance of probabilities held in Singaneri 
Collieries Co. vs. Industrial tribunal Hyderabad382. 
 
A notice of enquiry must be sent to the delinquent employee. 
The enquiry officer cannot be absolved of this duty even if reply 
has been given of the charge sheet. Not strictly the evidence as 
in civil and criminal proceedings standard of proof is required 
not beyond reasonable doubt.  The enquiry proceedings stand 
only on preponderance of probabilities. 
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 Applicant served with a chargesheet. He did not submit his 
defence. He did not appear in the enquiry and he was given 
opportunity at all stages but he did not avail. Held enquiry is 
valid383. Holding of exparte enquiry without notice in one sitting 
unnatural, when delinquent participated in many other sittings 
for which notice has given384.  
 
 Exparte enquiry:  When the delinquent has been arrested 
by the police, in one case, before the Patna High Court, the 
workers who was arrested by the police not at the instance of 
the management and as such they could not attend the enquiry 
because they were in jail, it has been held that the exparte 
enquiry did not vitiate the rules of natural justice385.  In another 
case the petitioner who was suspended had gone to his village 
home. He was given a reply to show cause notice. However, he 
was not given notice of enquiry about the next date even 
though it was within the knowledge of the enquiry office held 
exparte enquiry. It was held that the exparte enquiry shall be 
quashed386. However, the Calcutta High Court held that if 
despite opportunities to participate an employee remains 
absent in an enquiry he can be proceeded exparte387.  
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Non-appearance of an employee in an enquiry can be 
proceeded exparte: 
If the delinquent employee does not appear in the enquiry 
despite notices sent to him for his appearance the EO can 
proceed against him by holding enquiry exparte. In the instant 
case notices were issued to the employee intimating the time, 
date and venue of the enquiry by registered post with 
acknowledgment due which have returned back with the 
endorsement that the addressee refused to accept on four 
occasions. Thereafter the enquiry was held exparte and 
ultimately the report was submitted by the enquiry authority. It 
has been held that adequate opportunity was afforded to the 
delinquent employee to participate in enquiry and as such there 
was no violation of the principles of natural justice in holding the 
ex-parte enquiry against the delinquent employee388. 
In a case before Patna High Court, it has been held that the 
workers who were arrested by Police not at the instance of the 
management and as such they could not attend the enquiry 
because they were in the jail. It has been held that the ex-parte 
enquiry did not violate the rules of natural justice389.  
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The delinquent present in the enquiry and cross-examined the 
witness of the management, thereafter he disappeared. The 
enquiry concluded. It cannot be said as expate enquiry. Further 
it has held that in the middle stage of the enquiry denial of 
request to change enquiry officer will not amount to violation of 
the principles of natural justice390.   
 
4.4 WITNESSES, EVIDENCE AND ADMISSION IN THE 
ENQUIRY:  
Enquiry adjourned on a number of times - all documents asked 
for, either supplied or opportunity given to examine them. It was 
held that no irregularities were done. A witness produced and 
examined in the enquiry. No chance given to the delinquent to 
cross-examine him. Held this could not be done and was 
against rules391.  
When presenting officer appearing as a witness in the enquiry - 
If enquiry vitiated for violation of principles of natural justice. 
Held, there is nothing wrong in allowing presenting officer to 
appear as a witness392. 
Presenting Officer (P.O) as witness - Yes, Presenting Officer 
can appear as witness. In one case i.e. Management of Glaxo 
India Ltd., Madras vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court, Guntur & 
                                                 
390 J.K Industries vs. Dy. Commissioner of Labour, 1997 LLR 173 
391 CAT (Cal.) 1988 (I) 477 
392 LLR 1993 P.425 [AP. HC] 
 347
Anr393 the question arose as to whether P.O. can examine 
himself as a witness in the enquiry? It has been held by A.P. 
High Court that an enquiry will not be vitiated merely because 
the P.O. also appeared as a witness. 
Summoning of witnesses by the EO - An EO has no power to 
summon the witness like a court hence the objection of the 
delinquent employee that the EO did not summons the witness 
will be on sustainable394. However, in one case395; the Delhi High 
Court has held that an EO can send a letter of request to a 
particular witness if the management or the employee makes 
such a request to him. 
The EO officer merely asked clarificatory questions to the 
witnesses examined on behalf of the Corporation. Mere 
erroneous use of the word “cross examination” at the foot of the 
proceedings while recording the evidence of this witness does 
not mean that the EO had in fact cross examined the 
Corporation witnesses as such. In this view of the matter, the 
ratio of the judgement of the Supreme Court396 in the above 
referred case is clearly applicable. This view has been held by 
the Supreme Court in the following cases: 
(a) Pravin Ratilal Dudhana vs. Municiple Corp. of Greater 
Bombay 1996 LLR 350 (Bom. HC) 
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(b) Mulchandhari Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd., vs. The 
workmen AIR 1975 SC 2125. 
(c) Somnath Sahu vs. The State of Orissa & Ors. 1969(3) SC 
384 
The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P., vs. Om 
Prakash Gupta397, held that - - It is true that an enquiry under 
Section 311 (2) of the Constitution must be conducted in 
accordance with the principles of natural justice. Those 
principles are not embodied principles. What principle of natural 
justice should be applied in a particular case depends on the 
facts and circumstances of that case. All that the courts have to 
see is whether the non-observance of any of those principles in 
a given case is likely to have resulted in deflecting the course of 
justice. This Court has repeatedly laid down that the fact that 
the statements of the witnesses taken at the preliminary stage 
of the enquiry were used at the time of the formal enquiry does 
not vitiate the enquiry if those statements were made available 
to the delinquent officer and he was given opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses in respect of those statements. 
Evidence in Enquiry: Examining the delinquent before the 
examination of departmental witness is against the statutory 
provision398. 
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During the enquiry the main witness, who had detected the 
delinquent committing misconduct not called, though other 
much relevant ones called. Held enquiry was bad in law399. 
If the delinquent employee is not supplied with a copy of 
handwriting expert and refusal by the enquiry officer to permit 
him to engage the services of another expert for cross 
examination, the enquiry will be violative of principles of natural 
justice400. 
No evidence is imperative if charges are admitted - Leading of 
evidence in support of charges as levelled in a charge sheet is 
required to prove disputed facts and not admitted facts. Where 
on admission is made by the delinquent employee after 
knowing the charges, no evidence needs to be led by the 
management. It would, however, be a different matter if the 
admission of quilt is by an employee. Who could not 
understand what the changes were or if he was induced or 
coerced into admitting his guilt401.  
Applicability of Evidence Act - It is by now well settled that in a 
domestic enquiry strict rules of evidence do not apply and all 
materials which are logically probative are permissible. Even 
hearsay evidence can be taken note of provided it has 
reasonable nexus and credibility though the departmental 
                                                 
399 CAT (Hyd.) 1988 (I) 458 
400 1990 LLR 336 MP HC 
401 1994 LLR 364, 1991-II-LLN-412 
 
 350
authorities and Tribunals have to be careful in evaluating such 
evidence. A domestic tribunal whose procedure is not regulated 
by a statute is free to adopt a procedure of its own so long as it 
conforms to the Principles of Natural justice. They can, unlike 
courts obtain all formation and material for the points under 
enquiry from all sources without being hampered by rules of 
procedure which governs court proceedings. The only 
requirement is that whatever material they collect cannot be 
used by them unless it is put to the party against whom it is to 
be used402. 
Evidence of female employee in the enquiry will be necessary  - 
Denying to a delinquent employee the right to cross examine a 
witness who has deposed against him - strikes at the root of the 
enquiry process. In one case the J&K High Court held that 
when the charge-sheet against an employee pertains to his 
misbehaviour with a female employee, the delinquent cannot be 
denied a right to cross examine the complainant employee and 
the ground that if she is subject to cross examination by the 
delinquent with regard to the allegations levelled by the female 
complainant against him, she will subject to mental harassment 
or that her reputation and honour would be jeopardized or put 
at stake 403.  Enquiry to be vitiated when opportunity for cross 
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examination is not given404.  Evidence in an enquiry can be 
recorded in a narrative form of a statement.  But it is advisable 
to record it in Question and answer thereto and for the proper 
analysis of the evidence.  
The procedure relating to holding enquiry, as given above is 
lengthy and complicated for a layman but it has to be followed 
as closely as possible if the management intends to exercise its 
rights of punishment on delinquent employee without fear of its 
being upset later on by an Industrial Tribunal or should it be 
made by a subject matter of an industrial dispute. However, it 
has not meant that unless the above procedure followed strictly, 
the decision of the management, punishing an employee is 
bound to be upset. The rules and procedures are not only 
handmaids of justice and unless it could be shown that the 
employee was misled in his defence and subsequently there 
has been a failure of justice on account of some error or 
omission on the part of the EO, in the observations of correct 
rules of procedure for holding an enquiry, such error or 
omission would not be deemed to be material enough to vitiate 
the enquiry proceedings, and becomes case for upsetting of the 
decision of the management based thereon. Moreover it is 
generally realized by the Tribunals that the persons holding 
domestic enquiry are usually not well versed in law and as such 
rigid observations of the rules and procedure prescribed by the 
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Criminal Procedure Code 1973 or Evidence Act, 1872 cannot 
be expected from them. As a matter of fact, as long as s it can 
be shown that a fair opportunity was given to the accused 
workman  
(a) to remain present at the enquiry  
(b) to examine his own witnesses  
(c)  to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer;  
minor irregularities will not vitiate the enquiry proceedings, 
which nevertheless should be avoided405.  
The few questions which were disallowed by the EO were of 
trivial nature and were not really germane to the main 
controversy. It is therefore not possible to agree with the view 
taken by the Labour Court that this entire enquiry has been 
vitiated on account of the ....... of the EO disallowing certain 
questions during the cross examination of management’s 
witness. No satisfactory explanation given as to how the 
workman was prejudiced in any manner by disallowing such 
questions denying the course of cross-examination. On the 
other hand, on perusal of the enquiry proceedings it is revealed 
that the EO has given maximum latitude to the representative of 
the workman in the cross examination of the management 
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witness. The enquiry has thus been conducted in full 
compliance with the principle of natural justice406. 
The EO questioning / cross-examining the delinquent in the 
beginning of the enquiry regarding the admitted factual aspects 
of the case - whether procedure adopted by the EO if violative 
of principles of natural justice and the proceedings are vitiated. 
The Kerala High Court, held no407.  
Documents taken on file during the course of an enquiry giving 
opportunity to delinquent to peruse the same, but serial nos., 
were given after conclusion o the enquiry. Held, not violation of 
the principles of natural justice. Enquiry Officer acted 
impartially, High Court cannot correct the holding of the enquiry. 
Action of the departmental enquiry sustained408.  
It is well settled that technical rules of Evidence Act are not 
applicable in a domestic enquiry, since enquiry proceedings 
being quasi-judicial in nature are governed by the principles of 
natural justice409.   
Mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof 
even in domestic enquiries. It may be that the technical rules 
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which govern criminal trials in courts may not necessarily apply 
to disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless, the principle that 
in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see 
that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular 
criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the 
statutory rules410.  
It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and 
sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act 
may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a 
prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay 
evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is 
true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals 
must be careful in evaluating such material and should not 
glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the 
Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to 
cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken 
through case law and other authorities by counsel on both 
sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, 
exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and 
observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the 
basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender or 
independence of judgment vitiates the conclusions reached, 
such finding, even though of a domestic tribunals cannot be 
held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, 
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perhaps in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone 
out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a 
valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which 
counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain 
passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that 
extent nor does the passage from Halbsbury insist on such rigid 
requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or 
was there no evidence - not in the sense of the technical rules 
governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense 
way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept411.   
In the case of  K. L. Shinde,  vs. State of Mysore412,  the 
Supreme Court has observed that - - It is well settled that 
whether a delinquent had a reasonable opportunity of 
effectively defending himself is a question of fact depending 
upon the circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule 
can be laid in that behalf. In the instant case, the order 
restricting the movement of the appellant on which strong 
reliance has been placed on him behalf for assailing the 
impugned order of his dismissal was not such as can be said to 
have deprived his of the reasonable opportunity of making his 
defence. The order, it would be noted, did not place any 
embargo on the appellant's going to Belgaum for the purpose of 
and in connection with the departmental enquiry. In fact the 
appellant fully participated in the enquiry held at that place. He 
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also made full use of the assistance of a policeman (called 
police friend) provided to him to conduct the defence on his 
behalf. The police friend appeared on his behalf before the 
Enquiry Officer and cross-examined all the witnesses whom the 
prosecution examined or tendered for cross-examination. He 
was also furnished with copies of the statements of the three 
police constables recorded by the Cantonment P. S. I, and 
allowed an adequate opportunity of cross-examining them. 
There is also nothing to indicate that the appellant's request for 
an opportunity to examine any witness in his defence was 
refused. In fact he did examine some witnesses in his defence. 
In view of all this, it cannot be held that a reasonable 
opportunity of defending himself as contemplated by Article 311 
of the Constitution was denied to the appellant. 
Regarding the appellant's contention that there was no 
evidence to substantiate the charge against him, it may be 
observed that neither the High Court nor this Court can re-
examine and re-assess the evidence in writ proceedings. 
Whether or not there is sufficient evidence against a delinquent 
to justify his dismissal from service is a matter on which this 
Court cannot embark. It may also be observed that 
departmental proceedings do not stand on the same footing as 
criminal prosecutions in which high degree of proof is required. 
The present case is, in our opinion, covered by a decision of 
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this Court in State of Mysore vs. Shivabasappa413, where it was 
held as follows:- 
"Domestic tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not 
courts and therefore, they are not bound to follow the procedure 
prescribed for trial of actions in courts nor are they bound by 
strict rules of evidence. They can, unlike courts, obtain all 
information material for the points under enquiry from all 
sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by 
rules and procedure which govern proceedings in court. The 
only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should 
not act on any information which they may receive unless they 
put it to the party against who it is to be used and give him a fair 
opportunity to explain it. What is a fair opportunity must depend 
on the facts and circumstances of each case, but where such 
an opportunity has been given, the proceedings are not open to 
attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in 
accordance with the procedure followed in courts”. 
In respect of taking the evidence in an enquiry before such 
tribunal, the person against whom a charge is made should 
know the evidence which is given against him, so that he might 
be in a position to give his explanation. When the evidence is 
oral, normally the explanation of the witness will be in its 
entirety, take place before the party charged who will have full 
opportunity of cross-examining him. The position is the same 
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when a witness is called, the statement given previously by him 
behind the back of the party is put to him, and admitted in 
evidence, a copy thereof is given to the party and he is given an 
opportunity to cross-examine him. To require in that case that 
the contents of the previous statement should be repeated by 
the witness word-by-word and sentence-by-sentence, is to 
insist on bare technicalities and rules of natural justice are 
matters not of form but of substance. They are sufficiently 
complied with when previous statements given by witnesses 
are read over to them, marked on their admission, copies 
thereof given to the person charged and he is given an 
opportunity to cross-examine them." 
In the case of Khardah Co. Ltd. vs. Their Workmen414, this 
aspect was noted by this Court as follows:- 
"Normally, evidence on which the charges are sought to be 
proved must be led at such an enquiry in the presence of the 
workman himself. It is true that in the case of departmental 
enquiries held against public servants, this Court has observed 
in the State of Mysore vs. Sivabasappa415, as, if the deposition 
of a witness has been recorded by the enquiry officer in the 
absence of the public servant and a copy thereof is given to 
him, and an opportunity is given to him to cross-examine the 
witness after he affirms in a general way the truth of his 
statement already recorded, that would conform to the 
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requirements of natural justice; but as has been emphasized by 
this Court in M/s. Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. Gangadhar416, 
these observations must be applied with caution to enquiries 
held by domestic Tribunals against the industrial employees. In 
such enquiries, it is desirable that all witnesses on whose 
testimony the management relies in support of its charge 
against the workman should be examined in his presence. 
Recording evidence in the presence of the workman concerned 
serves a very important purpose. The witness knows that he is 
giving evidence against a particular individual who is present 
before him, and therefore, he is cautious in making his 
statement. Besides, when evidence is recorded in the presence 
of the accused person, there is no room for persuading the 
witness to make convenient statements, and it is always easier 
for an accused person to cross-examine the witness if his 
evidence is recorded in his presence. Therefore, we would 
discourage the idea of recording statements of witnesses ex 
parte and then producing the witnesses before the employee 
concerned for cross-examination after serving him with such 
previously recorded statements, even though the witnesses 
concerned make a general statement on the latter occasion that 
their statements already recorded correctly represent what they 
stated." 
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In one case417 the Supreme Court has held:-  "The minimum 
that we shall expect where witnesses are  not examined from 
the very beginning at the inquiry in the presence of the person 
charged, is that the person charged should be given a copy of 
the statements made by the witnesses which are to be used at 
the inquiry well in advance before the inquiry begins and when 
we say that the copy of the statements should be given well in 
advance, we mean that it should be given at least two days 
before the inquiry is to begin. If this is not done and yet the 
witnesses are not examined-in-chief fully at the inquiry, we do 
not think that it can be said that principles of natural justice 
which provide that the person charged should have an 
adequate opportunity of defending himself are complied with in 
the case of a domestic inquiry in an industrial matter." 
The Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd., 
vs. Prakash Chand Jain418, held that - - It is true that, in 
numerous cases, it has been held that domestic tribunals, like 
an Enquiry Officer, are not bound by the technical rules about 
evidence contained in the Evidence Act, but it has nowhere 
been laid down that even substantive rules, which would form 
part of principles of natural justice, also can be ignored by the 
domestic tribunals. The principle that a fact sought to be proved 
must be supported by statements made in the presence of the 
person against whom the enquiry is held and that statements 
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made behind the back of the person charged are not to be 
treated as substantive evidence, is one of the basic principles 
which cannot be ignored on the mere ground that domestic 
tribunals are not bound by the technical rules of procedure 
contained in the Evidence Act. 
Non-supply of document - Copies of certain documents which 
delinquent wanted to pursue was not relevant to charge   - Non-
supply of it by Enquiry Officer-Delinquent cannot be said to be 
deprived of reasonable opportunity of defending himself419.  
When more than one delinquent officers are involved, then with 
a view to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings, needless delay 
resulting from conducting the same and overlapping adducing 
of evidence or omission thereof and conflict of decision in that 
behalf, it is always necessary and salutary that common 
enquiry should be conducted against all the delinquent officers. 
The competent authority would objectively consider their cases 
according to Rules and decide the matter expeditiously after 
considering the evidence to record findings on proof of 
misconduct and proper penalty on proved charge and impose 
appropriate punishment on the delinquent. If one charged 
officer cites another charged officers as a witness, in proof of 
his defence, the enquiry need not per se be split up even when 
the charged officers would like to claim an independent enquiry 
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in that behalf. If that procedure is adopted, normally all the 
delinquents would be prone to seek split up of proceedings in 
their/his bid to delay the proceedings, and to see that there is 
conflict of decisions taken at different levels. Obviously, 
disciplinary enquiry should not be equated as a prosecution for 
an offence in a Criminal Court where the delinquents are 
arrayed as co-accused. In disciplinary proceedings, the concept 
of co-accused does not an. Therefore, each of the delinquents 
would be entitled to summon the other person and examine on 
his behalf as a defence witness in the enquiry or summon to 
cross-examine any other delinquent officer if he finds him to be 
hostile and have his version placed on record for consideration 
by the disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the 
need to split up the cases is obviously redundant, time 
consuming and dilatory. It should not be encouraged420.   
4.5 ELEMENT OF BIAS IN AN ENQUIRY: 
The first principle of natural justice consists of the rule against 
bias or interest and is based on the three maxims: 
i) No man shall be judged on his own cause 
ii) Justice should not be done, but manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seemed to be done. 
iii) Judges like Caesar’s wife should be above suspicion. 
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The first requirement of natural justice is that the judge should 
be impartial and neutral and must be free from bias. He is 
supposed to be indifferent to the parties to the controversy. He 
cannot act as judge of a cause in which he himself has some 
interest either pecuniary or otherwise as it affords the strongest 
proof against neutrality. He must be in position to act judicially 
and to decide the matter objectively. This principle applies not 
only to judicial proceedings but also to quasi-judicial as well as 
administrative proceedings421. There are variety of bias among 
those these three are the basic types of bias viz; 
 
I) Pecuniary bias 
 
ii) Personal bias 
 
iii) Official bias or bias as to subject matter. 
With regard to the principles of natural justice, we have already 
dealt exhaustively under chapter 03 hereinabove.  Nonetheless, 
we shall be now discussing the catena of judicial 
pronouncements passed by different law courts in this regard. 
 
A complaint was lodged by an officer and thereafter he 
appeared as a witness in the enquiry. The proceedings are said 
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to be biased422. It is obvious that pecuniary interest, however 
small it may be in a subject matter of the proceedings, would 
wholly disqualify a member from acting as a judge423.  
One of the Committee members of a departmental enquiry was 
biased. Entire exercise of conducting enquiry by such 
committee would be futile. It would be violative of principles of 
natural justice424. 
A predisposition to decide for or against one party without 
proper regard to the merits of the lis is bias. Personal bias is 
one of the three major limits of bias, viz. pecuniary, personal 
and official bias. The test is not whether in fact a bias has 
affected the judgement, the test is always is and must be 
whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias 
attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated 
against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. It is in this 
sense that justice must not only be done must also appear to 
be done425.  
Constitution of enquiry committee of three members - Appellant 
alleging bias against one of the members of the committee on 
ground of enemity - rejected, said member appeared as witness 
in the enquiry deposed against him to prove charge no.12 also 
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participated in the enquiry proceedings as its member - whether 
enquiry proceedings are vitiated - held yes426. Bias of 
Disciplinary authority will vitiate enquiry427.    
Reasonable apprehension...... Petitioner was an active member 
of Union had earlier filed a complaint against the enquiry officer 
--------- raised objection against the appointment of EO to 
conduct enquiry against him....... request denied....... whether 
justified?  held no428.   
There are various aspects, which are to be taken in to 
consideration so that an enquiry ordered to be held against 
employee should not appear as an empty formality. The 
cardinal rule is for domestic enquiry that the principles of 
natural justice should be followed and the concerned employee 
is to be given an opportunity to defend himself and to cross-
examine the witnesses of the management. Also the enquiry 
officer should be an impartial person.  An enquiry by an officer, 
who participated in the proceedings against an employee 
resulting in his suspension, will be certainly biased and not 
impartial429. The authority, who issued show cause notice, 
initiated disciplinary proceedings and acted as appellate 
authority - bias likely to arise. Possibility of predisposition 
hovering over the mind of adjudicator could not be ruled out.    
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The Madhya Pradesh High Court held vide its decision in 
Mahesh Kumar Kanskar vs. Mandla Balaghat Kshetriya Gramin 
Bank & anr430 that “in administrative law, rules of natural justice 
are foundational and fundamental concepts and law is now well 
settled that the principles of natural justice are part of the legal 
and judicial procedures. There should not only be fairness in 
action, but fairness should be writ large. There may not be 
direct proof of bias required in the case where a witness is 
required to adjudge while sitting as a disciplinary authority”.  
And consequently held that the orders passed by the 
disciplinary authority are liable to be quashed only on the 
ground that he himself acted as disciplinary authority while he 
was a crucial witness in the instant case. 
In Moh. Mia vs. State of West Bengal & ors431 held that the 
participation of the presenting officer as a witness in the instant 
case rendered the enquiry and the entire proceedings 
inoperative and without jurisdiction on the basis that  “criterion 
should be that the prosecutor cannot be witness applies in a 
departmental proceedings. The act of the Presenting Officer in 
having his own testimony recorded in the case beyond any 
shadow of doubt evidences a state of mind, which clearly 
demonstrates a considerable bias existed. It is completely 
foreign to the fundamentals of the Service Rules and Service 
jurisprudence that a Presenting Officer should be allowed to 
participate as witness. Whatever could not be said otherwise 
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before the Enquiry Officer was sought to be filled up by the 
deposition of the Presenting Officer as a supplemental to the 
case of fee prosecution” However, relying on the decision of the 
Bombay High Court rendered in N.N Rao vs. Greaves Cotton & 
Co, the Andhra Pradesh High court has held in Management of 
Glaxo India Ltd., Madras vs. Presiding Officer, LC, Guntur432 took 
a dissenting view to hold that he participation of the presenting 
officer as witness does not vitiate the proceedings. 
Whether enquiry offcer can reach a finding on the basis of 
his personal knowledge? 
In Associated Cement Companies Ltd., vs. its workmen433 the 
apex court clarified that where, without order intimating about 
the holding of the enquiry, the concerned workman was called 
upon the participate in the domestic enquiry and the enquiry 
officer having personal knowledge cone to the conclusion 
against he concerned workman. It was held that the cross 
examination at the beginning of the domestic enquiry of the 
concerned workman was not proper. 
How the bias is be proved by the delinquent against the 
enquiry officer?  
In the case of International Airport Authority of India vs. K.D 
Bali434 it was held that the onus of proving bias is on the person 
who alleges it. The allegation must be clearly proved, of the 
                                                 
432 1993 LLR 425 
433 1963-II LLJ 396 (SC) 
434 AIR 1988 SC 1049 
 368
proceedings sought to be set aside. It is not very suspicion held 
by a party must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing 
the proceedings is based. The apprehension must judged from 
healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not on mere 
apprehension o any whimsical person. The reasonable 
apprehension, it may be noted must be based on cogent 
materials. In Rattan Lal Sharma vs. Managing Committee435 it 
was held that the court can entertain the plea of bias even if it 
was not raised before the appellate authority who decided the 
appeal.   
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Chapter 05: JUDICIAL STRUCTURE  &   
PERSPECTIVE - III 
  
 
5.1 Enquiry Report by an Enquiry Officer 
5.2 Supply of Enquiry Report and second show cause 
notice 
5.3 Act of imposition of penalty 
5.4 Remedies available to delinquent employee. 
 
5.1 ENQUIRY REPORT BY AN ENQUIRY OFFICER:  
Essential ingredients of an enquiry report: - It is well settled 
legal proposition that a domestic enquiry is a quasi-judicial 
proceedings and Enquiry Officer has to act judicially. The 
Supreme Court has held that the report of the Enquiry Officer 
(EO) must be speaking order in the sense that the conclusions 
drawn by the Enquiry Officer are to be supported by the 
reasons. When the EO could not apply his mind to the evidence 
and merely reproduces in his report the stages through which 
the enquiry had passed, there would be no enquiry worth the 
name. The order of the termination of the services based on 
such report will be unsustainable436.   
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In another case, the High Court of Karnataka has held that 
failure to give reasons in the Enquiry report for the finding of 
guilt arrived at by the EO amounts to violation of principles of 
natural justice. An unreasonable enquiry report will vitiate the 
enquiry437.  
Dismissal of an employee on his conviction without enquiry 
cannot be held to be illegal. In one case, an employee 
employed with RSRTC was convicted by criminal court for a 
period of 3 years. The corporation dismissed the employee 
from service without holding an enquiry. When the employer 
challenged the dismissal the High Court held the no enquiry 
was imperative. It has been further held that if the RSRTC 
consider the conviction of an employee who has been 
convicted u/s. 376 IPC and decided that dismissal would meet 
the ends of justice, no fault can be found with such decision. 
Moreover when the employee is convicted and sentenced for 3 
years imprisonment, he is unable to serve the employer for 3 
years and asking the employer not to dismiss such an 
employee 3 years leave to enable him to serve his sentence. A 
fair and reasonable opportunity in the matter of employment 
would not mean a right to continue in employment even if the 
employee has not been able to serve the employer for 
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particular period during which he is incarcerated on being 
convicted by the criminal court438.  
Validity of an Enquiry: Voluntary withdrawal of workman from 
enquiry does not absolve EO from holding an Enquiry. If he 
closes the enquiry and dismisses the workman; dismissal held 
illegal439.  
No enquiry at all had been conducted by Enquiry Officer - no 
opportunity afforded to repel the charges levelled - opposite 
parties even not called for to adduce evidence. Once no 
enquiry was held, the enquiry report itself is vitiated. It is non-
est and no meaning in the eyes of law440.  
Essentials of enquiry: - The first and the foremost requirement 
is that in domestic enquiries, the principles of natural justice be 
complied with. In private employment domestic enquiry is that 
of mistrust which arises essentially because the charge sheet is 
given by the employer and the enquiry is also held by an officer 
or an outsider appointed by the employer. The employer, as 
such, represents the both, the prosecutor and the judge. A 
suspicion of bias is inevitable in such a situation. This is the 
main reason that the delinquent employee does not have faith 
in the enquiry officer. They participate reluctantly and take 
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every possible step to frustrate the enquiries. In one case441, it 
has been held that there are 3 essential ingredients of a 
departmental enquiry viz:  
1. that there are definite charges, 
2. that evidence is adduced during the enquiry 
3. that a reasonable opportunity, of being heard in respect of 
those charges is given to the person concerned. 
The enquiry is to be held into the charges which have been 
communicated to the delinquent and the penalty is to be 
inflicted on the basis of the result of the enquiry. The evidence 
adduced during the enquiry, serves the dual purpose of 
establishing the charges and determining the penalty. If no 
evidence is adduced, during the enquiry, the right to reasonable 
opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges will be 
illusory. It is only on the basis of evidence adduced during the 
enquiry that the person facing the enquiry may effectively 
exercise his right to being heard in respect of the charges 
against him. 
It will not out of place to state here that introduction of Sec.11 A 
to the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court or the Industrial 
Tribunal is vested with the power to decide the jurisdiction of 
the decision of the employers. Thus when it is found that the 
                                                 
441 Dilip Singh Rana vs. State of UP 1994 LIC 491 (Allahabad HC DB) 
 
 373
domestic enquiry is not held proprly, it will stand vitiated and the 
Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal would set aside the Order of 
punishment by giving appropriate relief including that of lesser 
punishment or even no punishment resulting in reinstatement to 
the concerned workman. This is entirely a new dimension given 
to the adjudication of industrial disputes concerning discharge 
or dismissal of a workman. 
Essential ingredients of valid enquiry: The law relating to 
holding of enquiry is based on the principles of natural justice 
and there is no proper laid down / prescribed procedure either 
in Industrial Disputes Act or other statutes for holding of an 
enquiry. In fact law relating to holding of enquiries has 
developed by precedents decided by the Supreme Court and 
various High Courts. In order to stall the possibility of getting 
the enquiry vitiated or to be held as perverse, the reference is 
made to the case decided by Calcutta High Court442 wherein 
their Lordships held that the findings of enquiry officer will be 
treated as perverse if - 
?? the EO has come to the finding of no evidence. 
?? the EO has based on the findings of materials not 
admissible and has excluded the relevant materials and 
as excluded relevant materials. 
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?? The EO has not applied his mind to all the relevant 
materials and has not considered the same in coming to 
the conclusion. 
?? The EO has come to the conclusion by considering 
materials, which is irrelevant, or by considering material 
which is partly relevant and which is partly irrelevant. 
?? The EO has disabled himself in reaching a fair decision 
by some consideration extraneous to the evidence and 
the merits of the case. 
?? The EO has based his findings upon conjunctures, 
surmises and suspicion. 
?? The EO has based the findings upon a view of the facts 
which cannot reasonably be entertained or the facts 
grounds are such that no persons acting judicially / quasi-
judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law 
could have found and,  
?? If the EO in conducting the enquiry, as acted in flagrant 
disregard the rules or procedures or has violated the 
principles of natural justice where no particular procedure 
is prescribed. 
Against the petitioner for same misconduct and same witness in 
both proceedings petitioner acquitted in criminal case, factum of 
acquittal ignored in the department proceedings had no 
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weightage was given to the judgment of the criminal court by 
the EO and petitioner was dismissed ..... held enquiry vitiated443.  
In absence of valid evidence, if findings are based on surmises, 
the enquiry will be vitiated - the same is against the principles of 
natural justice444.  
Enquiry Officer junior to the delinquent validity of - Such an 
enquiry will be liable to be vitiated on the ground of bias of the 
EO. It is pertinent to refer to one case decided by the Divisional 
Bench of Kerala High Court in holding that the learned single 
judge was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the writ 
petitioner could not be permitted to raise the question of real 
likelihood of bias, as he did not raise the same during the 
course of the enquiry proceedings. Admittedly, the Inspector, 
who conducted the enquiry was immediately subordinate to the 
complainant in the case, the real likelihood of bias is writ large 
on the face of the enquiry. The entire enquiry was thus held to 
be vitiated and accordingly entire proceedings including the 
penalty were quashed445.  
Termination of services by the authority subordinate to the 
appointing authority will be legal? 
No such a termination will be illegal, void and untenable. In one 
case petitioner was dismissed by Deputy General Manager re-
designated as General Manager. He was inferior to appointing 
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authority. Termination or dismissal of the petitioner could not be 
sustained as it was passed by authority inferior to that which he 
was appointed446.  
Earlier, the Punjab & Haryana High Court while following the 
Supreme Court judgments has also held that with the efflux of 
time and by age old recognized relationship of master and 
servant, it has become an integral part of service jurisprudence, 
that the authority subordinate to the appointing authority cannot 
terminate the service of an employee447.   
The Labour Court (L.C) set aside the enquiry on the sole 
ground that in the charge sheet wrong numbers of standing 
orders were mentioned. The award of the LC was set aside 
after serving that charge sheet and there are no other certified 
standing orders subsequent to the earlier ones. LC directed to 
hear the parties afresh on other points also448. It is well settled 
that the civil court cannot sit on judgment over the findings 
arrived in a departmental enquiry or domestic enquiry. The 
appropriate remedy in challenging the validity of an enquiry is 
provided under the Industrial Disputes Act449. The Karnataka 
High Court has also held that the civil court has no jurisdiction 
to grant stay of domestic enquiry since the courts under Civil 
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Procedure Code have no jurisdiction to enforce a personal 
contract450.  
None of the witnesses or cross-examined in the enquiry, 
Enquiry Officer gave corroborate reasons – no infirmity – 
charges of dereliction of duty of petitioner a Branch manager, 
Gramin Bank found established during enquiry – imposition of 
penalty was challenged on the ground that for proof charges, 
none of the witnesses examined nor opportunity was given to  
cross-examine them – charges were that petitioner failed to 
safe guard the interest of Bank by securing adequate security 
and not ensured supply of goods to loans – It were based on 
documents, part of record. No manifest error apparent on fact 
of warranting interference. Enquiry Officer elaborately 
discussed each charge and gave reasons – Enquiry Officer and 
appellate authority were not like civil court thus no infirmity in 
the enquiry451.   
Procedural steps followed and the dismissal order passed 
thereof become final High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot re-
appreciate the evidence and also cannot reverse the findings452.  
That no prejudice has resulted to the respondent on account of 
not furnishing the copies of the statement of witness, that 
cannot be said that the respondent did not have a fair hearing 
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or the disciplinary enquiry against him was not fair453.  
Questions by the Enquiry Officer – the Supreme Court took the 
view that the enquiry authority is entitled to question the 
witness, so long as the delinquent employee is permitted to 
cross-examine the witness. This will not violate the enquiry or 
make it unfair454.  
Enquiry will be vitiated if the appeal by the employee is heard 
by the same officer who had issued show cause notice and 
rejected the explanation455.  Non-payment of subsistence 
allowance to a suspended employee by the employer during 
pendency of enquiry will vitiate the enquiry456.   
5.2   SUPPLY OF ENQUIRY REPORT AND SECOND SHOW 
CAUSE NOTICE:  
Enquiry report – non-supply to an employee - - unable to 
show prejudice caused to him due to non-supply of the enquiry 
report. High Court declined to interfere with the major 
punishment or removal; from service – held no illegality457.  
Mere non-furnishing of enquiry proceedings will not violate 
enquiry since enquiry report was furnished to the employee and 
after considering his explanation the punishment has been 
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inflicted. It is necessary to plead and prove prejudice on 
account of non-furnishing of enquiry proceedings by employer 
to the delinquent458.  
A copy of the enquiry report was not furnished to the employee. 
Labour Court held that employee has been deprived of 
reasonable opportunity. Set aside the orders of dismissal, the 
award of labour court was challenged contending that the 
Tribunal / labour court is not mechanically set aside orders of 
punishment on the ground of non-supply of copy of the enquiry 
report by the employer and has to give reasons and therefore 
and should set aside the orders if it finds the furnishing of report 
would have made difference to the result459.  
Consequence of non-supply of enquiry report – when no 
prejudice is caused – Officer of the Bank suspended for 
misconduct prior to his promotion from clerk, served with four 
charge-sheets for embezzlement, mis-appropriation and other 
acts of unbecoming of a Bank officer. Enquiry initiated, 
delinquent officer attended few dates of enquiry, thereafter 
proceeded with ex-parte. Charges proved in the enquiry, 
dismissed from service. Aggrieved by the same the dismissal 
order was challenged in the High Court. High Court directed 
reinstatement, directed disciplinary authority to furnish the 
enquiry report. Management of the Bank preferred an appeal to 
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the Supreme Court, appeal admitted, order of the High Court 
set aside, dismissal confirmed. Held that the High Court 
erroneously assumed that the enquiry report was not furnished 
to the respondent or any prejudice was caused. In fact a copy 
of the enquiry report appears to be served when he filed 
statutory appeal / representation before the appellate authority. 
The high Court has failed to apply its judicial mind to the facts 
and circumstances of the case460.  
The enquiry report was served on delinquent only along with 
main show cause notice – amounts to denial f reasonable 
opportunity and violative of the principles of natural justice. Held 
the delinquent is entitled to have a copy of the report of the 
enquiry before disciplinary authority takes its decision on the 
charges461.  A copy of the enquiry report was not given to the 
applicant.  Held this deprived him to file effective appeal and 
ordered to supply copy of enquiry report and give chance to file 
appeal again462.  
In the absence of specific provision for furnishing a copy of 
enquiry report to workman, the enquiry will not be vitiated of 
report is not furnished463. But the Supreme Court in the case of 
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Electronic Corporation of India vs. B. Karunalkara over rules 
this view464. 
It has been held that delinquent employee is entitled to be 
furnished copy of the enquiry report to enable him to make 
representation to the disciplinary authority to prove his 
innocence465.   
A report is required to be furnished even when the punishment 
imposed is other than the major punishment of dismissal, 
removal or reduction in rank. A report should be furnished even 
when the statutory rules laying down procedure for holding an 
enquiry are silent or against it466. 
Entitlement of workman from the date of termination till the date 
of award rendered by the Labour Court when charges are 
proved - It is settled law that if guilt of the workman is 
established before the Labour Court for the first time, he is 
entitled to wages for the period when he was terminated till 
such time the award was rendered by the court. While remitting 
this case to the Labour court for determining the controversy as 
indicated above, a direction is given to the respondent 
management to pay the petitioner his wages from when his 
services were terminated till the date of award467.  Findings 
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cannot be challenged unless shown that the findings are 
perverse or based on no evidence at all. 
Non furnishing of list of witnesses to the employees along with 
the chargesheet and furnishing of day to day proceedings to the 
workman - whether amounts to violation of principles of natural 
justice - Held No468.  After acquittal of petitioner by Criminal 
Court - is plea of estoppel applicable and department is 
debarred from initiating the departmental proceedings after 
acquittal. Difference between departmental enquiry and criminal 
trial and their purpose has been touchedupon in the matter469.   
Second Show Cause Notice:  The enquiry report was served 
on delinquent only along with main show cause notice – 
amounts to denial f reasonable opportunity and violative of the 
principles of natural justice. Held the delinquent is entitled to 
have a copy of the report of the enquiry before disciplinary 
authority takes its decision on the charges470. Second show 
cause for inflicting punishment - not absolute rule471. 
The Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that the 
requirement of giving second show cause notice cannot be 
extended to disciplinary enquiries in private employment in the 
absence of binding rule. Neither the ordinary rule of law nor 
industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice and 
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the only class of cases in which a notice held necessary are 
those arising under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. It has 
been pointed out by the Supreme Court that to import such a 
requirement from Article 311 (2) of the Constitution in industrial 
matters does not appear either necessary or proper and would 
be equating industrial employees with civil servants for which 
there is no justification and besides such requirement would 
necessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest 
of the industrial peace, should be disposed of in a short time as 
possible472.   
Whereas in the 42nd amendment to the constitution provision of 
issuing show cause notice has been deleted in article 311(2); 
there is no obligation to issue second show cause notice before 
awarding punishment. So far as Standing Orders framed under 
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are 
concerned there is no provision for issuing a second show 
cause notice. It is also well settled that issue of second show 
cause notice before awarding punishment is not part of 
requirement of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, 
Allahabad High Court has held that if a person is found guilty of 
such charges for which only punishment is dismissal from 
service, then no second show cause notice is necessary and 
there is no principle of natural justice that such a notice should 
be given473.   
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5.3 ACT OF IMPOSITION OF PENALTY:  
Guidelines to be followed by the employer prior to inflicting 
punishment: - The punishing authority would do well to follow 
the following principles474 before passing final order of 
punishment:   
(i) The punishing authority should not pass order 
mechanically 
(ii) The punishing authority not to refer past record of the 
employee 
(iii) The punishing authority should apply its mind on each 
and every charge 
(iv) The punishing authority should not be discriminate and 
prejudiced. 
(v) The punishing authority should not be pass order with 
retrospective effect. 
(vi) The punishing authority should not be too vindictive and 
or too lenient. 
Duties of the competent authority after Enquiry / criteria for 
inflicting punishment:- 
In a fair exercise of discretion the punishment should not be 
ridiculously low nor unduly harsh. For an instance, punishment 
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of a dismissal for isolated absence on part of workman will not 
be justified but if the absence of the workman is habitual than 
such a severe punishment of dismissal will be proportionate to 
the misconduct. In one case it has been held by the Allahabad 
High Court also that for a single act of misconduct the 
punishment may be lighter. For repeated act of misconduct a 
punishment may be harsh. Even on the regular criminal side 
there is Probation of First Offenders Act where under an 
accused committing an offence of the specified nature cannot 
be sent to jail. The first offence is a mitigating circumstance. 
Again an accused may be dealt with leniently if he shows 
remorse and the punishing authority get assurance that the 
remorse is a genuine and accused with not commit offence 
again475.  
The matter of misconduct as proves as to be kept in mind while 
imposing punishment and the punishment to be inflicted must 
necessarily be commensurate with the gravity of misconduct. 
Even if the workman has put in unblemished lengthy service 
with the employer, but the charges proved against him like that 
of misappropriation of money, making false entry in the balance 
books, continuous absenteeism are serious. Then sheer 
seriousness of the charges brings a total cloud on the previous 
good record of the workman only in such type of cases, the 
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punishment of dismissal will be commensurate with the charges 
proved476.  
Can employer held fresh enquiry? Held No. On acceptance of 
the Enquiry report a disciplinary authority took final decision in 
the matter. It is not open to the disciplinary authority to order a 
fresh enquiry or an additional enquiry477.  
Disciplinary enquiry ordering second enquiry not justified - 
Once the EO has arrived at a finding and made his report, it is 
open to accept it or to come to finding upon the record other 
than that of the EO. It is however not open to him to scrap the 
finding / report and to subject the delinquent to the hazard and 
travail of a second enquiry. To do so will be violative of principle 
of natural justice and fair play as held by the Bombay High 
Court in Murali Ramchand Joshi vs. LIC of India and Ors478.  
Necessity of giving reasons by disciplinary authority while 
imposing punishment - In case the disciplinary authority does 
not agree with the findings of the EO then the reasons must be 
given by the disciplinary authority while imposing punishment 
upon the delinquent employee479. However, where the 
disciplinary authority agrees with the findings of the EO then it 
is not imperative to give reasons. In one case Div. Bench of 
Bombay High Court held that submission of respondent is that 
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the disciplinary authority while passing an order of his dismissal 
failed to give reasons and thus the principles of natural justice 
(PNJ) is violated. This submission is rejected following the 
decision of the Supreme Court480 in holding that when the 
punishment authority accepting the findings and the reasons 
given by the EO, the disciplinary authority is not required once 
again to give reasoned order and in the circumstances 
dismissal order is not vitiated.   
Bus conductor charge sheeted and dismissed from the services 
after domestic enquiry - challenged - Labour Court held that the 
misconduct not proved - directed reinstatement of the 
respondent with 50% back wages. In appeal, Industrial Tribunal 
moulded the relief to reinstatement with full back wages - The 
High Court held that the discretion   exercised by the Labour 
Court was fair and just and it should not have been highly 
interfered with by the Inudstrial Tribunal in the absence of good 
cause for interference481. 
Report of the findings of the enquiry officer - copy of the report 
has to be furnished to the employee. Affording him opportunity 
to comment upon or explain the findings of the enquiry officer 
before a decision on his guilt or otherwise is taken then only to 
issue second show cause notice to show cause against the 
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proposed punishment482. In the whole of the writ petition the 
petitioner did not specify as to what subsistence allowance 
would be payable and what has not been paid actually, mere 
fact that some amount has not been paid in making some 
calculation regarding the subsistence allowances would not 
mean that the petitioner was justified in boycotting the Enquiry 
proceedings. The petitioner has not pointed out any letter 
written by the petitioner with regard to the rules. The petitioner 
was suspended in October 1989 and the subsistence allowance 
was being deposited in his own account in the bank every 
month. It is not understood if there was any miscalculation in 
deposit of subsistence allowance in any month why the 
petitioner remained silent for such a long period. We do not find 
any merit in this contention as well483.  
Bus conductor alleged to have collected fare from passengers 
amounting to Rs.6 without issuing tickets - amount 
misappropriated being meager one - punishment of dismissal 
was disproportionate and that too when employee is aged 55 
years and also harsh to remove him from service at the fag end 
of his life. Employee is directed to be reinstated with continuity 
of service but without back wages484.  
Failure to give proper weightage by the disciplinary authority 
while imposing punishment order of acquittal of an employee 
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will vitiate enquiry. In one case the Bombay High Court has 
held that when witnesses were the same both in criminal trial as 
well as in the domestic enquiry and when the learned 
magistrate has given honourable acquittal to the accused, the 
EO is bound to consider the reasoning of Magistrate while 
giving hon’ble acquittal485.  
Dismissal for theft will be justified? - Once the delinquent of 
found guilty of misconduct for a serious charge of committing 
theft by employers property from the factory, no lesser 
punishment than dismissal from service is proper punishment in 
such case486.  Disciplinary authority may differ with the findings 
of the EO normally non-disclosure of reasons for disagreement 
by the Disciplinary authority can be fatal487.  
Where the charge memo was served on the delinquent and 
enquiry was conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, 
the order of compulsory retirement cannot be said to be illegal 
on the ground that only that penalty could have been lawfully 
imposed upon the delinquent which was within the powers of 
the Deputy Superintendent of Police and that as the Deputy 
Superintendent of Police was not competent to award the 
penalty of compulsory retirement, imposition of that penalty 
even by Deputy Inspector General of Police should be regarded 
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as illegal. Generally speaking, it is not necessary that the 
charges should be framed by the authority competent to award 
the proposed penalty or that the enquiry should be conducted 
by such authority. Moreover there is nothing in the relevant 
rules which would induce one to read in Rule 3(b) (i) such a 
requirement. Consequently the view taken by the Tribunal that 
in a case falling under Rule 3(b) the charge memo should be 
issued by the disciplinary authority empowered to impose the 
penalties referred to therein and if the charge memo is issued 
by any lower authority then only that penalty can be imposed 
which that lower authority is competent to award is clearly 
erroneous488.      
In disciplinary proceedings punishment imposed to seek 
retribution as to give vent to the feeling of wrath. It is well 
recognized that the object of punishment is to deter. In any 
case, the quantum of punishment is a matter within the 
discretion of the management489.  Security watchman sleeping 
during night duty - He was holding responsible job requiring 
continuous alertness on his part. Sleeping during night duty 
hours could have disastrous effect on safety and security of the 
installation, punishment of dismissal for such misconduct held 
appropriate490.  
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Ordinarily the High Court does not interfere with the quantum of 
punishment awarded by the Labour Court. In view of section 11 
A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is for the Tribunal / Labour 
Court to decide the quantum of punishment. However in the 
instant case the facts are so shocking that no other punishment 
except dismissal was called for491.  
Consideration of past conduct, while imposing punishment – It 
is desirable that past conduct of the employee should be taken 
in to consideration, but at the same time long service with 
unblemished record will not mean that the employer should 
award milder punishment when the charges are of grave and 
serious nature. It is pertinent to refer one case wherein it has 
been held by the court that the number of years of service 
cannot be relevant in the matter of imposition of punishment for 
proved misconduct, if a worker has put in a longer service, he 
cannot be taken to be licensed to commit misconduct492.  
Claiming reimbursement of money against false medical bills is 
a serous misconduct and can be a good cause for dismissal of 
an employee493. The disciplinary authority has to consider the 
evidence on record and give reasons in case it disagrees with 
the findings of the enquiry officer. Such findings cannot be 
distributed unless it is shown that such findings cannot be 
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distributed unless it is shown that such findings are pervasive or 
not based on the evidence on record or it is non-consideration 
of any material fact. The disciplinary authority may disagree 
with the findings of the enquiry officer494.   
Disobedience by an employee dismissal will be justified. As 
employee is appointed and paid essentially for performance of 
certain set of duties. Nonobservance of duties entrusted to him 
is therefore, the first and foremost misconduct495.   
For loss of confidence it is well settled law that objective, set of 
facts and motivation are to be proved by the employer before 
inflicting punishment of dismissal496. Guilty of an offence 
involving moral turpitude – employee convicted for allowing 
passenger to travel without ticket – Dismissal of an employee 
not justified, since it did not constitute major misconduct. 
Dismissal of workman for guilty of instigating the workers resort 
to strike will be justified497 Punishment of dismissal of an 
employee guilty of theft will be proportionate to the 
misconduct498.  
Nature of penalty that can be imposed - Not limited to penalties 
which authority is using charge memo could impose - Charge 
                                                 
494 JP.Sinha vs. Indian Telephone Industries Ltd., 1992 (80) FJR 267 (Kar. H.C) 
495 Textile Corporation of Marathwada vs. PB.Deshpande, 1997 (2) LLJ 466 (Bom H.C); 
496 Hindmazdoor Sabha & anr., vs. State of UP, LLR 1999, P 47. 
497 M/s Eicher Good earth Ltd. vs. P.O Labour Court 1999 LLR 1156 
498 Surajprakash vs. Judge LC, 1996 LLR 29 (Raj, H.C)     
 
 393
memo served by Deputy Superintendent of Police on Inspector 
- Imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement - Not illegal on 
ground that Deputy Superintendent of Police who issued 
charge memo was not competent to award such penalty. 
Where the charge memo was served on the delinquent and 
enquiry was conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, 
the order of compulsory retirement cannot be said to be illegal 
on the ground that only that penalty could have been lawfully 
imposed upon the delinquent which was within the powers of 
the Deputy Superintendent of Police and that as the Deputy 
Superintendent of Police was not competent to award the 
penalty of compulsory retirement, imposition of that penalty 
even by Deputy Inspector General of Police should be regarded 
as illegal. Generally speaking, it is not necessary that the 
charges should be framed by the authority competent to award 
the proposed penalty or that the enquiry should be conducted 
by such authority. Moreover there is nothing in the relevant 
rules which would induce one to read in Rule 3(b)(i) such a 
requirement. Consequently the view taken by the Tribunal that 
in a case falling under Rule 3(b) the charge memo should be 
issued by the disciplinary authority empowered to impose the 
penalties referred to therein and if the charge memo is issued 
by any lower authority then only that penalty can be imposed 
which that lower authority is competent to award is clearly 
erroneous499.   
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It is a general rule as laid sown by the Supreme Court in 
Bhagat Ram vs.  State of Himachal Pradesh500 that the penalty 
imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the 
misconduct and punishment which is disproportionate to the 
gravity of misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the 
constitution. In this particular case a junior officer of the Forest 
Department was removed from the service on the ground of 
negligence, arising out of his performance in the matter of 
felling trees in the forest. 
The workman cannot be visited with penalty not provided in the 
Standing Orders or Rules. When the rules provide that no 
workman shall be demoted to any post lower than which he 
was initially appointed, it is held that demotion is contrary to 
rules501.  
Communication of the punishment order and effective 
date: The law on this point is that the order of dismissal or 
removal must be communicated to the delinquent employee 
concerned. Until the order is communicated and the person 
concerned knows about it, the order does not become 
operative. In this connection the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
State of Punjab vs. Amar Singh Harike502 hold good in every 
case of removal or dismissal irrespective of whether the 
employee belongs to private or public undertakings.  Where in a 
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case, as laid down by the Supreme Court, the order of 
dismissal passed against govt., official, but kept on his file 
without communication to the concerned or publication. The 
order cannot said to be taken effect unless the officer 
concerned knows about it or otherwise communicated to him. 
The order of punishment cannot be retrospective. In the case of 
Jeevaratnam vs. State of Madras503 the Supreme Court has 
held that when a retrospective order is made it will be valid from 
the date of the order and not from the earlier date that is, the 
date on which the employee placed on suspension, that the two 
parts of the order being severable one part being invalid, that is, 
it is effective from retrospective date, there is no reason why 
the other part that is order of dismissal should not be given 
effect. 
Let us briefly touch upon the issues of under what 
circumstances, retrospective law can be made and put in 
to force:   
RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF LAW:  In Maxwell on the 
Interpretation of Statutes504, the statement of law in this regard 
is stated thus: 
 
"Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly 
established than thus - that a retrospective operation is 
not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing 
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right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of 
procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without 
doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the 
enactment is expressed in language, which is fairly 
capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed 
as prospective only. The rule has, in fact, two aspects, for 
it, "involves another and subordinate rule, to the effect 
that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a 
greater retrospective operation than its language renders 
necessary." 
 
In Francis Bennion's Statutory Interpretation505, the statement of 
law is stated as follows: 
"The essential idea of legal system is that current law should 
govern current activities. Elsewhere in this work a particular Act 
is likened to a floodlight switched on or off, and the general 
body of law to the circumambient air. Clumsy though these 
images are, they show the inappropriateness of retrospective 
laws. If we do something today, we feel that the law applying to 
it should be the law in force today, not tomorrow's backward 
adjustment of it. Such, we believe, is the nature of law. Dislike 
of ex-post facto law is enshrined in the United States 
Constitution and in the Constitution of many American States, 
which forbid it. The true principle is that lex prospicit non 
respicit (law looks forward not back). As Willes, J. said 
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retrospective legislation is 'contrary to the general principle that 
legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated 
ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future 
acts, and ought not to change the character of past transaction 
carried on upon the faith of the then existing law." 
 
In Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry506, the Supreme 
Court observed as thus: "The golden rule of construction is that, 
in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to 
have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to 
have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in 
litigation at the time when the Act was passed." 
In Smt. Dayawati vs. Inderjit507, in Para 10, it is held thus:  
"Now as a general proposition, it, may be admitted that 
ordinarily a Court of appeal cannot take into account a new law, 
brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has 
been rendered, because the rights of the litigants in an appeal 
are determined under the law in force at the date of the suit. 
Even before the days of Coke whose maxim - a new law ought 
to be prospective, not retrospective in its operation - is off-
quoted, Courts have looked with dis-favour upon laws which 
take away vested rights or affect pending cases. Matters of 
procedure are, however, different and the law affecting 
procedure is always retrospective. But it does not mean that 
                                                 
506 AIR 1957 SC 540   
507 AIR 1966 SC 1423 
 398
there is an absolute rule of inviolability of substantive rights. If 
the new law speaks in language, which, expressly or by clear 
intendment, takes in even pending matters, the Court of trial as 
well as the Court of appeal must have regard to an intention so 
expressed, and the Court of appeal may give effect to such a 
law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance." 
In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra508 this Court 
laid down the ambit and scope of an amending Act and its 
retrospective operation as follows: 
"(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be 
prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either 
expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which 
merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is 
textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its 
application, should not be given an extended meaning and 
should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits. 
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, 
whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even 
though remedial is substantive in nature. 
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no 
such right exists in procedural law. 
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be 
applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new 
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disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of 
transactions already accomplished: 
(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also 
creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be 
prospective in Operation unless otherwise provided, either 
expressly or by necessary implication." 
In K. S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala509, this Court while 
considering the effect of amendment in the Land Acquisition Act 
in pending proceedings held thus in Para 47 thereof as:  
‘‘...In the instant case we are concerned with the application of 
the provisions of Sub-sec. (1-A) of S.23 as introduced by the 
Amending Act to acquisition proceedings which were pending 
on the date of commencement of the Amending Act. In relation 
pending proceedings, the approach of the Courts in England is 
that the same are unaffected by the changes in the law so far 
as they relate to the determination of the substantive rights and 
in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary intention in an 
amending enactment, the substantive rights of the parties to an 
action fall to be determined by the law as it existed when the 
fiction was commenced and this is so whether the law is 
change before the hearing of the case at the first instance or 
while an appeal is pending”.    
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In State of M.P. and another, vs. G.S. Dall & Flour Mills510, the 
Apex Court in Para 21 of the judgment the Apex Court has 
observed that 
 
“the notification of 3/71187 amending the 1981 notification with 
retrospective effect so as to exclude what may be described in 
brief as 'traditional industries' though, like Rule 14 of the 
deferment rules, the exclusion extends' even to certain other 
non-traditional units operating in certain situations. Though this 
notification purports to be retrospective, it cannot be given such 
effect for a simple reason. We have held that the 1981 
notification clearly envisages no exclusion of any industry which 
fulfils the terms of the notification from availing of the exemption 
granted under it. In view of this interpretation, the 1987 
amendment has the effect of rescinding the exemption granted 
by the 1981 notification in respect of the industries mentioned 
by it. Section 12 is clear that, while a notification under it can be 
prospective or retrospective, only prospective operation can be 
given to a notification rescinding an exemption granted earlier. 
In the interpretation we have placed on the notification, the 31, 
7, 87 notification cannot be treated as one merely clarifying an 
ambiguity in the earlier one and hence capable of being 
retrospective; it enacts the rescission of the earlier exemption 
and, hence, can operate only prospectively. It cannot take away 
the exemption conferred by the earlier notification”. 
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In the case of Mithilesh Kumari and another, vs. Prem Behari 
Khare511, the Apex Court in Para 21 of its judgment as: 
 “A retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as 
to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards 
matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided 
without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before 
applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied 
that the statute is in fact retrospective.  The presumption 
against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the 
statute, if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect 
vested rights or the illegality of past transaction, or impair 
contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in 
respect of past transactions or considerations already passed, 
However, a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute 
because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a 
time antecedent to its passing. The general scope and purview 
of the statute and the remedy sought to be applied must be 
looked into and what was the former state of law and what the 
legislation contemplated has to be considered. Every law that 
impairs or takes away rights vested agreeably to existing laws 
is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. 
But laws made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the 
community as a whole may relate to a time antecedent to their 
commencement. The presumption against retrospectivity may 
in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the 
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language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an 
invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless 
so expressed in the very terms of the section, which had to be 
construed. The question is whether on a proper construction 
the legislature may be said to have so expressed its intention”.  
 
In the case of Hukam Chand etc. vs. Union of India and 
others512, the Apex court had occasion to deal with the following 
aspects of the subject under context and held: 
 
In the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) 
Act (44 of 1954), S.40 & 49 - there is nothing in Sec. 40 from 
which power of the Central Government to make retrospective 
rules may be inferred. In the absence of any such power, the 
Central Government acted in excess of its power in so far as it 
gave retrospective effect to the Explanation to Rule 49. The 
Explanation could not operate retrospectively and would be 
effective for the future from the date it was added.   
 
The fact that the rules framed under the Act have to be laid 
before each House of Parliament would not confer validity on a 
rule if it is made not in conformity with Sec. 40 of the Act. The 
laying referred to in Sec. 40 (3) is of the category of 'laying 
subject to negative resolution' because the above sub-section 
contemplates that the rule would have effect unless modified or 
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annulled by the House of Parliament. The act of the Central 
Government in laying the rules before each House of 
Parliament would not, however, prevent the courts from 
scrutinizing the validity of the rules and holding them to be ultra 
vires if on such scrutiny the rules are found to be beyond the 
rule making power of the Central Government.  
 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISO: 
Constitution of India, Art.245 - Subordinate legislation - Extent 
of power - Rule making authority has to act within limits of 
power delegated to it. Unlike Sovereign Legislature, which has 
power to enact laws with retrospective operation, authority 
vested with the power of making subordinate legislation has to 
act within the limits of its power and cannot transgress the 
same. The initial difference between subordinate legislation and 
the statute laws lies in the fact that a subordinate law making 
body is bound by the terms of its delegated or derived authority 
and that court of law, as a general rule, will not give effect to the 
rules, thus made, unless satisfied that all the conditions 
precedent to the validity of the rules have been fulfilled. Further, 
retrospective effect cannot be given to a subordinate legislation 
unless it is authorized by the parent statute or a validating 
statute. 
 
THE CONCEPT OF ULTRA VIRES:  In India, when the 
Legislature delegates legislative power to an administrative 
 404
authority without offering any guide lines, the validity of the 
relevant statute may be attacked on  following  grounds, viz; 
 
(a) The statute offends against Arts. 14 & 19 of the 
Constitution on the ground of unreasonable or arbitrary on 
the part of the legislature to confer uncontrolled 
discretionary power upon an administrative authority. 
(b)  That the statute is invalid because of excessive 
delegation of abdication of legislative power by the 
legislature. 
(c)  retrospective effect cannot be given to a subordinate 
legislation unless it is authorized by the parent statute or 
a validating statute 
  
It is crystal clear that the Statutes dealing with substantive 
rights - is prim facie / generally prospective unless it is 
expressly or by necessary implications made to have 
retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable 
where the object of the statute is to affect the vested rights or 
impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Statutes 
dealing with procedure  - In contrast to statutes dealing with 
substantive rights, statutes dealing with merely matters of 
procedure are presumed to retrospective unless such a 
construction is textually inadmissible. According to Lord Dennig: 
“The rule that an Act of Parliament is not be given 
retrospective effect applies only to statutes which affect 
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vested rights. It does not apply to statutes which only alter 
the form of procedure or the admissibility of evidence, or 
the effect which the courts give to evidence”   
In the light of the above judgments, and the principles laid down 
therein that the new Act / Rule affecting, existing rights or 
creating new obligations, is presumed to be prospective only.   
 
5.4 REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO DELINQUENT 
EMPLOYEE:  
Right of Appeal: When the Standing Orders provide that the 
order passed by the appointing authority would be appealed to 
the appellate authority of the management, however there is no 
appeal for an order of suspension pending enquiry513 when 
there is inbuilt enabling proviso of appeal is provided in the 
service rules / Standing Orders, then the principles of natural 
justice demand the aggrieved employee should be granted 
hearing.  However delinquent employee cannot claim oral 
hearing as right in every case514. Workman dismissed after 
enquiry challenged without availing remedy of reference under 
the Industrial Disputes Act – writ petition is not maintainable515. 
Whether the appellate authority can impose higher penalty 
that the Disciplinary Authority: Held No. In one case the 
petitioners was imposed the punishment of stoppage of four 
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increments with cumulative effect, after holding domestic 
enquiry. The petitioner carried the matter by way of appeal 
before the second respondent; Appellate authority instead of 
passing appropriate orders on the appeal filed by the petitioner, 
choose to issue further show-cause notice contemplating 
punishment of dismissal from service. Although the petitioner 
submitted his reply to the said show cause notice that the 
appellate authority i.e. the second respondent issued impugned 
proceedings dismissing the petitioner from the service. It has 
been held that an appeal preferred against the order of the 
disciplinary authority has to necessarily either reject or accept 
the appeal but cannot impose higher punishment than what 
was imposed by the disciplinary authority516.     
Imposition of penalty by the appellate authority will not be 
justified since such an action will deprive the delinquent right to 
the appeal to the appellate authority. It  has been held by the 
Supreme Court that when an appeal is provided to the higher 
authority against the order of the disciplinary authority / lower 
authority and the higher authority passed a punishment order, 
the employee concerned will be deprived of the remedy of 
appeal which there is a provision of appeal against the order of 
the disciplinary authority and when the appellate / higher 
authority against whose order there is no appeal, exercise the 
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power of the disciplinary authority in a given case, it rebutted in 
discrimination against the employee concerned517. 
Remedy with Labour Courts :   Section 11 A of the Industrial 
disputes Act, 1947 provides an unique remedy for the cases of 
discharge and dismissal. This particular section was inserted in 
the year 1972. Sec. 11 A reads as under:  
“11A. Powers of Labour Court Tribunal, and National 
Tribunal to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or 
dismissal of workmen 
- - Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or 
dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, 
Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course 
of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or 
National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order 
of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, 
set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct 
reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if 
any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman 
including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of 
discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may 
require: 
 
PROVIDED that in any proceeding under this section the 
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may 
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be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take 
any fresh evidence in relation to the matter”. 
In the case of Indian Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., vs. Workmen518  the 
apex court has observed that only under the following 
circumstances the Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal can 
interfere:  
(a) When there is want of good faith 
(b) When there is victimization or unfair labour practice 
(c) When the management is guilty of basic error or violation 
of principles of natural justice 
(d) When on the material of the findings are completely 
baseless or perverse.  
The said four principles were reiterated by the Supreme Court 
in G. Mckenzie & Co., Ltd., vs. Workmen519. Even after holding 
the enquiry fair and proper, the Labour Court  / Industrial 
Tribunal can modify / alter the punishment as awarded by an 
employer to workman520. 
High Courts power to decide on the adequacy / inadequacy 
of punishment: Generally High courts have no jurisdiction to 
modify the punishment. As stated above, Section 11 A of the 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 empowers Labour Courts and 
Industrial Tribunals to give such relief. Imposition of punishment 
obviously the discretion of the disciplinary authority. It is open to 
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the appellate authority to interfere with and not high court at the 
first instance. In case the said authorities act in a perverse 
manner, against such action one can invoke writ jurisdiction of 
the High Courts521.   
In a case decided by the Supreme Court522 it has been 
observed that the High Court could, in its appellate jurisdiction, 
exercise such powers as are exercisable by the Industrial 
Tribunal under section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 
1947. Therefore, it would open to the High Court to consider 
what would be the adequate punishment for the misconduct 
found to have been committed by the delinquent employee. 
Termination without enquiry - legality: 
a)  Termination of employee sans notice:- 
Based upon the constitutional guarantee of every citizen of 
India and the principles of natural justice as propounded by the 
judicial decisions, it is not permissible to employer to dispense 
with the services of a confirmed employee at his whims and 
fancies. However , unwarranted  and indiscipline employee may 
be,  an employer has to follow a meticulous procedure while 
dispensing with his  services e.g. giving him show cause notice 
and holding an enquiry when such employee denies the 
charges as enumerated in the charge sheet. In one case the 
petitioner was confirmed employee and his services was 
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terminated by the employer. The petitioner had not been 
afforded reasonable opportunity to show cause. He was served 
with the notice and not given hearing. The allegation was never 
rebutted by the employer. The Court cannot keep its eyes shut 
where a confirmed employee taken on the rolls for an 
unspecified period is robbed by his bread, butter and dignity by 
not even following the principles of natural justice and 
notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee enshrined in 
Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution523.   
b) Termination sans Enquiry:- 
Even when appointment is illegal - Such a termination of an 
employee will be violative of the principles of natural justice. 
First rule of natural justice is “no man shall be judged in his own 
cause” and second rule is “hear the other side” and corollary 
has been deduced from the above two rules and that is “justice 
should not only be done but should manifestly be seem to be 
done”. The audi alterm partem rule made in its full amplitude 
means that a person be informed of the allegations against him, 
he be given an opportunity to submit his explanation. The 
respondents had sufficient time to serve a show cause and for 
giving an opportunity of being heard before terminating the 
services of the petitioners. The question whether the 
appointment was in breach of the procedure provided in the 
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Rules and was void, could be decided in an inquiry after giving 
an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners524.  
The Supreme Court in the case of Workmen of Hindustan Steel 
Ltd. and another, vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd., and others525, 
observed that “in our opinion, when the decision of the 
employer to dispense with enquiry is questioned, the employer 
must be in a position to satisfy the Court that holding of the 
enquiry will be either be counter-productive or may cause such 
irreparable and irreversible damage which in the facts and 
circumstances of the case need not be suffered. This minimum 
requirement cannot and should not be dispensed with to control 
wide discretionary power and to guard against the drastic 
power to inflict such a heavy punishment as denial of livelihood 
and casting a stigma without giving the slightest opportunity to 
the employee to controvert the allegation and even without 
letting him know what his misconduct is”. 
Termination of Probationer’s service - Order terminating his 
services on ground of unsatisfactory work is stigmatic - Regular 
enquiry and opportunity of hearing is a must. A probationer, or 
a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and 
his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those 
services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying 
with the principles of a natural justice. The termination order 
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founded on the ground that the probationer had failed in the 
performance of his duties administratively and technically. Ex 
facie, is stigmatic. Such an order which, on the face of it, is 
stigmatic, could not have been passed without holding a regular 
enquiry and giving an opportunity of hearing to the probationer. 
Plea that, probationer cannot claim any right on post as his 
services could be terminated at any time during the period of 
probation without any notice, as set out in the appointment 
letter, cannot be countenanced526. 
Termination of service - Temparary employee or probationer - 
Order if simple or punitive - Determination - "Motive" or 
foundation theory – Explained by the Supreme Court in the 
case of Chandra Prakash Shahi, vs. State of U.P. and others527, 
as under :- 
The important principles which are deducible on the concept of 
"motive" and "foundation", concerning a probationer, are that a 
probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can 
be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of 
probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in 
question. If for the determination of suitability of the probationer 
for the post in question or for his further retention in service or 
for confirmation, an enquiry is held and it is on the basis of that 
enquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his service, the 
order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are allegations 
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of misconduct and an enquiry is held to find out the truth of that 
misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed on 
the basis of that enquiry, the order would be punitive in nature 
as the enquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability 
of the employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth 
of allegations of misconduct against that employee. In this 
situation, the order would be founded on misconduct and it will 
not be a mere matter of "motive". "Motive" is the moving power 
which   impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, 
"motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an 
act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act 
done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the 
employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general 
unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action 
would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of 
serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary 
enquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those 
allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the 
order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded 
on the allegations of misconduct which were found to be true in 
the preliminary enquiry. 
Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satvendra Nath Bose National 
Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others528, the Supreme 
Court has observed as under: - 
                                                 
528 AIR 1999 SC 983 
 414
Termination of probationer - Allegations whether punitive or 
simpliciter - Depends on whether allegations form foundation 
for motive of order. As to in what circumstances an order of 
termination of a probationer can be said to be punitive or not 
depends upon whether certain allegations which are the cause 
of the termination are the motive or foundation. If findings were 
arrived at in inquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the 
officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple 
order of termination is to be treated as 'founded' on the 
allegations and will be bad. But if the inquiry was not held, no 
finding were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to 
conduct an inquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to 
continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it 
would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. 
Similar is the position if the employer did not want to inquire into 
the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular 
departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing 
adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations 
would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order 
of termination would be valid. Use of words his conduct, 
performance, ability and capacity during whole period was not 
satisfactory in termination order - Whether amount to stigma or 
not - Depends upon facts and circumstances of each case.   
Stigmatic words - Need not be contained in order of termination 
itself - Documents referred to in order may also contain material 
which may amounts to stigma and would vitiate order.   
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Order stating that conduct, performance, during whole period 
not satisfactory - Letter issued earlier to probationer from 
management stated that he had prepared "false bills" and 
"misbehaved with women academic staff members" - Contents 
of letter form foundation of termination order and not a case of 
mere motive - Other three letters referred to in termination order 
contained not only certain allegations but clear adverse findings 
by Director as well as by informal Inquiry Committee - Said 
findings arrived at in non-departmental inquiry are 'foundation' 
for termination - Order vitiated on ground of stigma - 
Probationer not gainfully employed elsewhere - Entitled to 
reinstatement and back wages. 
U.P. Co-operative Societies Act (11 of 1966), S.122 - U.P. Co-
operative Societies Employees' Service Regulations (1975), 
Regn.19, Regn.84 - Termination of services - Disciplinary 
proceedings - Regulations prescribed detailed procedure for 
conduct of - No charge-sheet served - No enquiry officer 
appointed - No enquiry conducted against delinquent officer on 
alleged ground of abandoning his services - There is violation 
of Regulations to the prejudice of delinquent officer - 
Termination order set aside - Delinquent officer reinstated - Co-
operative Society not precluded from holding proper enquiry - 
Delinquent officer, however, admitted his remaining absent for 
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particular period - He is not entitled to pay and allowances for 
that particular period529.  
Temporary Servant - Termination of service without holding 
inquiry - Valid -when it is for unfitness and unsatisfactory work. 
It is settled law that the court can lift the veil of the innocuous 
order to find whether it is the foundation or motive to pass the 
offending order. If misconduct is the foundation to pass the 
order then an enquiry into misconduct should be conducted and 
an action according to law should follow. But if it is not the 
motive it is not incumbent upon the competent officer to have 
the enquiry conducted and the service of a temporary employee 
could be terminated, in terms of the order of appointment or 
rules giving one month's notice or pay salary in lieu thereof. 
Even if an enquiry was initiated, it could be dropped midway 
and action could be taken in terms of the rules or order of 
appointment. Where a person was appointed to a post 
temporarily by direct recruitment by selection committee 
constituted by the Government in this behalf; the appointment 
order mentioned that the appointee could be terminated from 
service on one month's notice or one month's pay; the 
appointee's work was supervised by the higher officers and two 
officers had submitted their reports concerning the performance 
of the duties by the appointee; she was regularly irregular in her 
duties, insubordination and left the office during office hours 
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without permission etc. and on consideration thereof, the 
competent authority found that she was not fit to be continued 
in service as her work and conduct were unsatisfactory, and 
therefore terminated her service in exercise of powers under 
U.P. Termination of Services of U. P. Govt.  Temporary Govt. 
Services of Rules (1975), the termination was for her 
unsuitability or unfitness but not by way of punishment as a 
punitive measure and was one in terms of the order of 
appointment and also the Rules. Consequently, the order 
terminating her service could not be set aside on ground that 
departmental enquiry was not held530.  
If an employee who is on probation or holding an appointment 
on temporary basis is removed from the service with stigma 
because of some specific charge, then a plea cannot be taken 
that as his service was temporary or his appointment was on 
probation, there was no requirement of holding any enquiry, 
affording such an employee an opportunity to show that the 
charge levelled against him is either not true or it is without any 
basis. But whenever the service of an employee is terminated 
during the period of probation or while his appointment is on 
temporary basis, by an order of termination simpliciter after 
some preliminary enquiry it cannot be held that as some 
enquiry had been made against him before issuance of order of 
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termination it really amounted to his removal from service on a 
charge, as such penal in nature.    
The principle of tearing of veil for finding out real nature of the 
order shall be applicable only in a case where the Court is 
satisfied that there is a direct nexus between the charge so 
levelled and action taken. If decision is taken, to terminate the 
service of an employee during period of probation, after taking 
into consideration overall performance and some action or 
inaction on the part of such employee then it cannot be said 
that it amounts to his removal from service as punishment. It 
need not be said that the appointing authority at stage of 
confirmation or while examining the question as to whether the 
service of such employee be terminated during the continuance 
of the period of probation, is entitled to look into any complaint 
made in respect of such employee while discharging his duties 
for purpose of making assessment of the performance of such 
employee. 
Thus in the present case the Governing Council examined 
different reports in respect of the probationer during period of 
probation and considered the question as to whether he should 
be allowed to continue in the service of the Institute. The 
decision was taken by the Governing Council on the total and 
overall assessment of the performance of the probationer in 
terms of the condition of the appointment. It cannot therefore be 
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said that the order of termination amounts to removal from 
service as punishment531.  
Plea for loss of confidence for termination: - This is too well 
settled that the belief or suspension of the employer upon an 
employee should not be a mere whim or fancy532. It should be 
bonafide reasonable and it must rest on some tangible basis 
and the power has to be exercised by an employer. Objectively, 
in good faith, which means honestly and with due care and 
prudence. If the exercise of such power is challenged on the 
ground of being colourable or malafide or an act of victimisation 
of unfair labour practice, the employer must disclose to the 
court the grounds of his impugned action so that the same may 
be tested judiciously533  
The Supreme Court in L. Michael vs. M/s. Johnson Pumps 
India Ltd534, observed that discharge simpliciter on the ground of 
loss of confidence when questioned before a court of law on the 
ground that it was a colourable exercise of power or it is a 
malafide action, the employer must disclose that he has acted 
in good faith and for good and objective reasons. Mere ipse 
dixit of the employer in such a situation is of no significance. 
Where a disciplinary enquiry is dispensed with on the specious 
plea that it was not reasonably practicable to hold one and a 
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penalty of dismissal or removal from service is 'imposed, if the 
same is challenged on the ground that it was a colourable 
exercise of power or malafide action, the same situation would 
emerge and, the employer must satisfy the court the good and 
objective reasons showing both proof of misconduct and valid 
and objective reasons for dispensing with the enquiry. 
Sudhir Vishnu Panvalkar vs. Bank of India535, in this case the 
Supreme Court observed with regard to plea of loss of 
confidence as “only ground that survives for our consideration 
is as to whether the Bank was justified in terminating the 
services of the appellant on the ground of loss of confidence 
and in the facts and circumstances of the case, whether any 
such inquiry was necessitated. From the material placed on 
record before us, it is quite clear that the appellant was involved 
in misappropriation of Society's funds. The proceedings initiated 
under Section 88 of the Act went up to the Maharashtra Co-
operative Tribunal and after contest by the parties, the Tribunal 
held the appellant guilty of certain charges involving moral 
turpitude relating to misappropriation of Society's funds. Mr. 
Singhvi, however, urged that some of these documents were 
not the subject-matter of proceedings before the High Court 
and, therefore, they cannot be relied upon by the Bank in this 
appeal. He also urged that these documents/papers are from 
the proceedings before the registrar and that they have no 
bearing upon the issue involved in this case. He also urged that 
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the Bank had not produced the entire correspondence before 
this Court for its appreciation and proper decision. Ordinarily, 
this plea could have been sustained but no statable reasons 
could be given on behalf of the appellant nor the correctness 
thereof could be challenged. All these documents were filed by 
the Bank along with its counter-affidavit of which the copy and 
the documents were furnished to the appellant long time back. 
Although, the rejoinder was filed by the appellant but he could 
not dispute the correctness of all these documents. It is in these 
circumstances, we are of the view that these documents could 
be relied upon by the Bank to justify the order of termination on 
the ground of loss of confidence. On perusal of the material 
produced before us, we are of the opinion that the order of 
termination passed by the Bank does not suffer from any vice 
and the Division Bench of the High Court was right in upholding 
the termination order”.    
The Plea of loss of confidence was discussed at length by the 
Supreme Court in the case of Chandu Lal, vs. The 
Management of M/s. Pan American World Airways Inc536.  
Termination of services on ground of loss of confidence - Does 
not amount to retrenchment - Holding of domestic enquiry is a 
condition precedent. Where the services of a workman were 
terminated on grounds that the workman was being involved in 
an act of smuggling, on basis of loss of confidence, without 
holding any domestic enquiry, the order of termination was 
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vitiated as it did amount to be one with stigma and warranted a 
proceeding contemplated by law preceding termination. Want of 
confidence in an employee does point out to an adverse facet 
in his character as true meaning of allegation is that the 
employee has failed to behave up to expected standard of 
conduct which has given rise to a situation involving loss of 
confidence. In such circumstances termination would not 
amount to retrenchment and disciplinary proceedings were 
necessary as condition precedent to infliction of termination as 
measure of punishment. In this respect termination of workman 
held illegal.  However, it being on ground of loss of confidence, 
workman held, not entitled to reinstatement but to 
compensation - Tenability of stand of loss of confidence as a 
defence to reinstatement not decided.  
Compensation in lieu of reinstatement - Periods of past 
unemployment and future term taken into consideration - A 
workman working in Airlines was removed from service on 
ground of loss of confidence and was out of employment for a 
little more than eleven years, keeping in view the fact that 
workman if restored to service would have been assured of 
employment for further term of years and the fact that he would 
have been entitled to back wages for period of unemployment, 
he was directed to be paid Rs. 2 lacs by way of compensation.    
Plea of - Loss of confidence - Amounts to stigma: Loss of 
confidence by the employer in the employee is a feature which 
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certainly affects the character or reputation of the employee 
and, therefore, the plea of loss of confidence in the employee 
indeed casts a stigma.  Whether termination is grounded upon 
stigma would not vary from case to case depending upon 
whether it involves a government servant or a workman.  But 
the procedural safeguards are different when termination is 
sought to be founded upon stigma.  If disciplinary inquiry has 
not preceded the prejudicial order in the case of a Government 
servant the action would be bad while in the case of a workman 
the order could be justified even in the course of adjudication 
before the appropriate Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes 
Act even though no inquiry had been undertaken earlier537.  
Permanent employee - Termination of service without holding 
enquiry - validity.  This issue was deliberated at length  by the 
Supreme Court in the following manner in the case of Delhi 
Transport Corporation vs. DT.C Mazdoor Sangh Congress & 
ors538. 
Regulation 9(b) which confers powers on the authority to 
terminate the services of a permanent and confirmed  
employee by issuing a notice without assigning any reasons in 
the order and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the 
employee before passing the impugned order is wholly 
arbitrary, uncanalised and unrestricted violating principles of 
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natural justice as well as Art. 14 of the Constitution. 
Government Company or Public Corporation being State 
instrumentalities are State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the 
Constitution and as such they are subject to the observance of 
fundamental right embodied in Part III as well as to conform to 
the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution. The 
Service Regulations or Rules framed by them are to be tested 
by the touchstone of Art. 14. Furthermore, the procedure 
prescribed by their Rules or Regulations must be reasonable, 
fair and just and not arbitrary, fanciful and unjust. Regulation 
9(b), therefore, confers unbridled, uncanalised and arbitrary 
power on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent 
employee without recording any reasons and without 
conforming to the principles of natural justice. There is no 
guideline in the Regulations or in the Act, as to when or in 
which cases and circumstances this power of termination by 
giving notice or pay in lieu of notice can be exercised. It is now 
well settled that the 'audi alteram partem' rule which in essence, 
enforces the equality clause in Art. 14 of the Constitution is 
applicable not only to quasi-judicial orders but to administrative 
orders affecting prejudicially the party-in-question unless the 
application of the rule has been expressly excluded by the Act 
or Regulation or Rule. Rules. of natural justice do not supplant 
but supplement the Rules and Regulations. Moreover, the Rule 
of Law which permeates our Constitution demands that it has to 
be observed both substantially and procedurally. Considering 
 425
from all aspects Regulation 9(b) is illegal and void as it is 
arbitrary, discriminatory and without any guidelines for exercise 
of the power. Rule of law posits that the power to be exercised 
in a manner which is just, fair and reasonable and not in an 
unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room for 
discrimination. Regulation 9(b) does not expressly exclude the 
application of the 'audi alteram partem' rule and as such the 
order of termination of service of a permanent employee cannot 
by passed by simply issuing a month's notice under Regulation 
9(b) or pay in lieu thereof without recording any reason in the 
order and without giving any hearing to the employee to 
controvert the allegation on the basis of which the purported 
order is made. Regulation 9(b) is also void under S. 23 of the 
Contract Act as being opposed to public policy.  
Per Sharma, J. 
The rights of the Government Companies and Public 
Corporations, which are State instrumentalities, be within 
meaning of Art. 14 and their employees cannot be governed by 
the general principle of master and servant, and the 
management cannot have unrestricted and unqualified power of 
terminating the services of the employees. In the interest of 
efficiency of the public bodies, however, they should have the 
authority to terminate the employment of undesirable, 
inefficient, corrupt, indolent and disobedient employees, but it 
must be exercised fairly, objectively and independently; and the 
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occasion for the exercise must be delimited with precision and 
clarity. Further, there should be adequate reason for the use of 
such a power, and a decision in this regard has to be taken in a 
manner, which should show fairness, avoid arbitrariness and 
evoke credibility. And this is possible only when the law lays 
down detailed guidelines in unambiguous and precise terms so 
as to avoid the danger of misinterpretation of the situation. An 
element of uncertainty is likely to lead to grave and undesirable 
consequences. Clarity and precision are, therefore, essential 
for the guidelines. Examining in this background Regulation 
9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of 
Appointment and Service) Regulation 1952 cannot be upheld 
for lack of adequate and appropriate guidelines.   
Per Sawant  J 
Clause (b) of Regulation 9 contains the much hated and 
abused rule of hire and fire reminiscent of the days of laissez 
faire and unrestrained freedom of contract.  (Para 219) 
There is need to minimize the scope of the arbitrary use of 
power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good 
sense of the individuals, however, high-placed they may be, it is 
all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious 
rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries 
of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that 
individuals are not and do not become wise because they 
occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection 
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and fairness does not go with the posts, however, high they 
may be. There is only a complaisant presumption that those 
who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The 
presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not 
support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a 
society pledged to uphold the rule of law, it would be both 
unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be 
governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be 
covered by the rule of law.   
The employment under the public undertakings is a public 
employment and a public property. It is not only the 
undertakings but also the society, which has a stake in their 
proper and efficient working. Both discipline and devotion are 
necessary for efficiency. To ensure both, the service conditions 
of those who work for them must be encouraging, certain and 
secured, and not vague and whimsical. With capricious service 
conditions, both discipline and devotion are endangered, and 
efficiency is impaired.   
The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to 
livelihood therefore cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals 
in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can 
its survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of many 
fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, 
the right to work becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental 
rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined 
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premises and uncertain applications. That will be a mockery of 
them.  
Both the society and the individual employees, therefore, have 
an anxious interest in service conditions being well defined and 
explicit to the extent possible. The arbitrary rules which are also 
sometimes described as Henry VIII Rules, can have no place in 
any service conditions.   
Beyond the self-deluding and self-asserting righteous 
presumption, there is nothing to support the so called "high 
authority" theory. This theory undoubtedly weighed with some 
authorities for some time in the past. But its unrealistic 
pretensions were soon noticed and it was buried without even 
so much as an ode to it.   
Per K. Ramaswamy, J 
Law is a social engineering to remove the existing imbalance 
and to further the progress, serving the needs of the Socialist 
Democratic Bharat under rule of law. The prevailing social 
conditions and actualities of life are to be taken into account to 
adjudging whether the impugned legislation would subserve the 
purpose of the society. The arbitrary, unbridled and naked 
power of wide discretion to dismiss a permanent employee 
without any guidelines or procedure would tend to defeat the 
constitutional purpose of equality and allied purposes. Courts 
would take note of actualities of life that persons actuated to 
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corrupt practices are capable to manoeuvre with higher 
echelons in diverse ways and also camouflage their activities 
by becoming sycophants or cronies to the superior officers. 
Sincere, honest and devoted subordinate officers are unlikely to 
lick the boots of the corrupt superior officer. They develop a 
sense of self-pride for their honesty, integrity and apathy and 
inertia towards the corrupt and tend to undermine or show signs 
of disrespect or disregard towards them. Thereby, they not only 
become inconvenient to the corrupt officer but also stand an 
impediment to the ongoing smooth symphony of corruption at a 
grave risk to their prospects, in career or even to their tenure of 
office. The term efficiency is an elusive and relative one to the 
adept capable to be applied in diverse circumstances. If a 
superior officer develops likes towards sycophant, though 
corrupt, he would tolerate him and found him to be efficient and 
pay encomiums and corruption such cases stand on 
impediment. When he finds a sincere, devoted and honest 
officer to be inconvenient, it is easy to cast him / her off by 
writing confidential with delightfully vague language imputing to 
be 'not up to the mark', 'wanting public relations' etc. Yet times 
they may be termed to be "security risk" (to their activities). 
Thus they spoil the career of the honest, sincere and devoted 
officers. Instances either way are galore in this regard. 
Therefore, one would be circumspect, pragmatic and realistic of 
these actualities of life while ambulating constitutional validity of 
wide arbitrary uncannalised and unbridled discretionary power 
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of dismissal vested in an appropriate authority either by a 
statute or a statutory rule. Vesting arbitrary power would be a 
feeding ground for nepotism and insolence; instead of sub 
serving the constitutional purpose, it would defeat the very 
object, in particular, when the tribe of officers of honesty, 
integrity and devotion are struggling under despondence to 
continue to maintain honesty, integrity and devotion to the duty, 
in particular, when moral values and ethical standards are fast 
corroding in all walks of life including public services as well. It 
is but the need and imperative of the society to pat on the back 
of those band of honest, hardworking officers of integrity and 
devotion to duty, It is the society's interest to accord such 
officers security of service and avenues of promotion.   
That apart, the haunting fear of dismissal from service at the 
vagary of the concerned officer would dry up all springs of 
idealism of the employee and in the process coarsens the 
conscience and degrades his spirit. The nobler impulses of 
mind and the higher values of life would not co-exist with fear. 
When fear haunts a man, happiness vanishes. Where fear is, 
justice cannot be, where fear is, freedom cannot be. There is 
always a carving in the human heart for satisfaction of the 
needs of the spirit, by arming by certain freedom for some basic 
values without which life is not worth living. It is only when the 
satisfaction of the physical needs and the demands of the spirit 
co-exist, there will be true efflorescence of the human 
personality and the free exercise of individual faculties. 
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Therefore, when the Constitution assures dignity of the 
individual and the right to livelihood the exercise of the power 
by the executive should be cushioned with adequate 
safeguards for the rights of the employees against any arbitrary 
and capricious use of those powers.   
As a court of constitutional functionary exercising equity 
jurisdiction, Supreme Court would relieve the weaker parties 
from unconstitutional contractual obligations, unjust unfair, 
oppressive and unconscionable rules or conditions when the 
citizen really unable to meet on equal terms with the State. It is 
to find whether the citizen, when entered into contracts or 
service, was in distress need or compelling circumstances to 
enter into contract on dotted lines or whether the citizen was in 
a position of either to "take it or leave it" and if it finds to be so, 
Supreme Court would not shirk to avoid the contract by 
appropriate declaration. Therefore, though certainty is an 
important value in normal commercial contract law, it is not an 
absolute and immutable one but is subject to change in the 
changing social conditions.   
In the absence of specific head of public policy which covers a 
case, the court must in consonance with public conscience and 
in keeping public good and public interest invent new public 
policy and declare such practice or rules that are derogatory to 
the constitution to be opposed to public policy. The rules which 
stem from the public policy must of necessity be laid to further 
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the progress of the society in particular when social change is 
to bring about an egalitarian social order through rule of law. In 
deciding a case which may not be covered by authority courts 
have before them the beacon light of the trinity of the 
Constitution and the play of legal light and shade must lead on 
the path of justice social, economical and political. Lacking 
precedent, the court can always be guided by that light and the 
guidance thus shed by the trinity of our Constitution.   
Before depriving an employee of the means of livelihood to 
himself and his dependents, i. e. job, the procedure prescribed 
for such deprivation must, therefore, be just, fair and 
reasonable under Arts. 21 and 14 and when infringes Art. 19(1) 
(g) must be subject of imposing reasonable restrictions under 
Art. 19(5). Conferment of power on a high rank officer is not 
always an assurance, in particular when the moral standards 
are generally degenerated that the power would be exercised 
objectively, reasonably, conscientiously, fairly and justly without 
inbuilt protection to an employee. Even officers who do their 
duty honestly and conscientiously are subject to great 
pressures and pulls. Therefore, the competing claims of the 
"public interest" as against "individual interest" of the 
employees are to be harmoniously blended so as to serve the 
societal need consistent with the constitutional scheme.   
Regulation 9(b) is arbitrary, unjust, unfair and unreasonable 
offending Arts. 14, 16(1), 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. It 
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is also opposite to the public policy and thereby is void under 
Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.    
Permanent employee cannot be thrown out by simple notice. 
The Supreme Court has observed that “conferment of 
'permanent' status on an employee guarantees security of 
tenure. It is now well settled that the services of a permanent 
employee, whether employed by the Government, or 
Government company or Government instrumentality or 
Statutory Corporation or any other "Authority" within the 
meaning of Article 12, cannot be terminated abruptly and 
arbitrarily, either by giving him a month's or three months' notice 
or pay in lieu thereof or even without notice, notwithstanding 
that there may be a stipulation to that effect either in the 
contract of service or in the Certified Standing Orders539”.   
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd and another vs. 
Brojo Nath Ganguly and another540. This is a landmark  case 
relating to service contracts. On interpretation of the relevant 
Service Rule the Supreme Court held that the Rule empowering 
the Government Corporation to terminate services of its 
permanent employees by giving notice or pay in lieu of notice 
period is opposed to public policy and violative of Art. 14 and 
directive principles contained in Arts. 39(a) and 41. 
                                                 
539 Uptron India Ltd., vs. Shammi Bhan and another, AIR 1998 SC 1681 
 
540 AIR 1986 SC 1571 
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Syndicate Bank, vs. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff 
Association and another541, in this case delinquent bank 
employee absented himself from work for a period of 90 or 
more consecutive days. The Bank sent show cause notice to 
delinquent for his continued absence and to report back for 
work before mentioned date failing which he would be deemed 
to have been voluntarily retired from the services of the Bank 
for his continued absence. The said notice was sent by 
registered post but it was returned with the report of the postal 
authority that he refused to receive the same. The Bank by 
virtue of Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement treated the 
delinquent as having voluntarily abandoned his services. This 
order of the Bank was similarly sent to delinquent under 
registered cover but was returned with the endorsement of the 
postal authority "not found during delivery time". Industrial 
dispute was raised by the union which led the reference by 
Government to the Tribunal for adjudication. The Tribunal was 
of the view that since the Bank did not examine the postman 
that delinquent in fact refused to receive the notice, it could not 
be said that there was service of notice to him. Therefore, the 
Bank could not in the circumstances invoke the provisions of 
Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement and on that score alone 
reinstatement of delinquent was ordered. The High Court 
upheld the order of Tribunal. 
                                                 
541 AIR 2000 SC 2198 
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Held, the notice was sent on the correct address of delinquent 
and it was received back with the postal endorsement 
"refused". A clear presumption arose in favour of the Bank and 
against delinquent. Yet the Tribunal held that no notice was 
given to him as postman was not produced by the Bank.  This 
would be rather an incongruous finding by the Tribunal. Bank 
has followed the requirements of Clause 16 of the Bipartite 
Settlement. It rightly held that delinquent has voluntarily retired 
from the service of the Bank. Under these circumstances it was 
not necessary for the Bank to hold any inquiry before passing 
the order. An inquiry would have been necessary if delinquent 
had submitted his explanation which was not acceptable to the 
Bank or contended that he did report for duty but was not 
allowed to join by the Bank. Nothing of the like has happened in 
this case. Assuming that inquiry was necessitated, evidence led 
before the Tribunal clearly showed that notice was given to 
delinquent and it is he who defaulted and offered no 
explanation of his absence from duty and did not report for duty 
within 30 days of the notice as required in Clause 16 of the 
Bipartite Settlement. Thus, undue reliance on the principles of 
natural justice by the Tribunal and even by the High Court has 
certainly led to miscarriage of justice as far as Bank was 
concerned. There was no occasion for the Tribunal to direct 
that delinquent be reinstated in service or for the High Court not 
to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the 
Constitution to set aside the Award. 
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The requirements of principles of natural justice, which are 
required to be observed, are: (1) workman should know the 
nature of the complaint or accusation; (2) an opportunity to 
state his case; and (3) the management should act in good faith 
which means that the action of the management should be fair, 
reasonable and just. It is no point laying stress on the principles 
of natural justice without understanding their scope or real 
meaning. There are two essential elements of natural justice 
which are: (a) no man shall be judge in his own cause; and (b) 
no man shall be condemned, either civilly or criminally, without 
being afforded an opportunity of being heard in answer to the 
charge made against him. In course of time by various judicial 
pronouncements these two principles of natural justice have 
been expanded, e.g., a party must have due notice when the 
Tribunal will proceed; Tribunal should not act on irrelevant 
evidence or shut out relevant evidence; if the Tribunal consists 
of several members they all must sit together at all times; 
Tribunal should act independently and should not be biased 
against any party; its action should be based on good faith and 
order and should act in just, fair and reasonable manner. These 
in fact are the extensions or refinements of the main principles 
of natural justice stated above. 
The Supreme Court in D. K. Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd542.,  
has laid down that where the Rule provided that the services of 
an employee who overstays the leave would be treated to have 
                                                 
542 Supra  
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been automatically terminated, would be bad as violative of 
Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. It was further held 
that if any action was taken on the basis of such a rule without 
giving any opportunity of hearing to the   employee, it would be 
wholly unjust, arbitrary and unfair. The Court reiterated and 
emphasized in no uncertain terms that principles of natural 
justice would have to be read into the provision relating to 
automatic termination of services. 
Stay of Enquiry proceedings by civil court: 
Stay of Enquiry Proceeding by Civil Court - not permissible. The 
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to stay the Enquiry Proceedings 
against an employee is barred by the provisions of Industrial 
Disputes Act, 1947. Also the Civil Court cannot interfere at the 
stage of show-cause notice after the conclusion of domestic 
enquiry against the employee as any relief prayed for by the 
employee at the stage would fall within the domain of the 
forums as created under the ID Act only. The same issue was 
discussed by the Madras High Court in the case of Indian 
Oxygen Ltd., Madras vs. Ganga Prasad543.  
Whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant stay?  Held No. It is 
settled law that the civil court has no jurisdiction to enforce a 
personal contract. The right to continue in service is a right 
conferred on the Industrial worker by the ID Act. De hors, the 
                                                 
543 1990 LLR 115 
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statute a termination of the service may give rise to a cause of 
action to claim damages and not reinstatement. Granting of the 
letter relief will amount to enforcement of personal contract, 
which is not the province of civil court544.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
544 1985 LLR  636 (Kar. HC). 
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Chapter  06:  DISCIPLINARY ENQUIRY- 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE IN VOGUE / 
ADOPTED BY THE EMPLOYERS 
6.1  Procedure provided under various statutes: 
6.1.1 Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946; & 
Rules;  
6.1.2 Shops and Commercial Establishments Act (s); 
6.1.3   Provisions under the Indian Constitution;    
6.2 Procedure adopted by employers – Public and Private; 
6.2.1    Central Civil Service Conduct and Appeal Rules; 
6.2.2 Procedure adopted by semi Govt., bodies; 
6.2.3 Procedure adopted by private bodies; 
6.3 Presentation of Data procured through Questionnaire;  
6.1 Procedure provided under various Statutes: 
6.1.1:Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 & 
Rules framed there under: 
The legislative intent of the Act is that to require employers in 
industrial establishments formally to define conditions of 
employment under them. And the Act further facilities   
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employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient 
precision the conditions of employment under them and to 
make the said conditions known to workmen employed by 
them. 
 
This Act applies / extends to the whole of India. And it applies 
to every industrial establishment wherein one hundred or more 
workmen are employed, or were employed on any day of the 
preceding twelve months; 
 
PROVIDED that the appropriate government may, after giving 
not less than two months’ notice of its intention so to do, by 
notification in the Official Gazette, apply the provisions of this 
Act to any industrial establishment employing such number of 
persons less than one hundred as may be specified in the 
notification. 
According to Sec.2 (e) "industrial establishment" means- 
(i)  an industrial establishment as defined in clause (ii) of 
section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936); 
or 
(ii)  a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the 
Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948); or 
(iii)  a railway as defined in clause (4) of section 2 of the 
Indian Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890), or 
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 (iv)  the establishment of a person who, for the purpose of 
fulfilling a contract with the owner of any industrial 
establishment, employees workmen: 
(g)  "standing orders" means rules relating to matters set out 
in the Schedule; 
Sec. 3 of the Act denotes about submission of draft 
standing orders: 
(1)  Within six months from the date on which this Act 
becomes applicable to an industrial establishment, the 
employer shall submit to the Certifying Officer five copies 
of the draft standing orders proposed by him for adoption 
in his industrial establishment. 
(2)  Provision shall be made in such draft for every matter set 
out in the Schedule which may be applicable to the 
industrial establishment, and where model standing 
orders have been prescribed, shall be, so far as is 
practicable, in conformity with such model. 
(3)  The draft standing orders submitted under this section 
shall be accompanied by a statement giving prescribed 
particulars of the workmen employed in the industrial 
establishment including the name of the trade union, if 
any, to which they belong. 
(4)  Subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, a group 
of employers in similar industrial establishments may 
submit a joint draft of standing orders under this section. 
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Sec. 4 of the Act denotes about conditions for certification 
of standing orders 
Standing orders shall be certifiable under this Act if - 
(a) provision is made therein for every matter set out in the 
Schedule which is applicable to the industrial 
establishment, and 
 
(b)   the standing orders are otherwise in conformity with the 
provisions of this Act, and it shall be the function of the 
Certifying Officer or appellate authority to adjudicate upon 
the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of any 
standing orders. 
Sec. 10A of the Act denotes about payment of subsistence 
allowance: 
 (1) Where any workmen is suspended by the employer 
pending investigation or inquiry into complaints or charge of 
misconduct against him, the employer shall pay to such 
workman subsistence allowance 
 
(a) at the rate of fifty per cent of the wages which the workman 
was entitled to immediately preceding the date of such 
suspension, for the first ninety days of suspension; and 
(b) at the rate of seventy-five per cent of the such wages for the 
remaining period of suspension if the delay in the completion of 
disciplinary proceedings against such workman is not directly 
attributable to the conduct of such workman. 
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(2) If any dispute arises regarding the subsistence allowance 
payable to a workman under sub-section (1) the workman or 
the employer concerned may refer the dispute to the Labour 
Court, constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 
1947), within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial 
establishment wherein such workman is employed is situate 
and the Labour Court to which the dispute is so referred shall, 
after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide 
the dispute and such decision shall be final and binding on the 
parties. 
 
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing 
provisions of this section where provisions relating to the 
payment of subsistence allowance under any other law for the 
time being in force in any state are more beneficial than the 
provisions of this sections, the provisions of such other law 
shall be applicable to the payment of subsistence allowance in 
the state. 
Sec. 13B of the Act denotes about Act not to apply to 
certain industrial establishments 
Nothing in this Act shall apply to an industrial establishment 
insofar as the workmen employed therein are persons to whom 
the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services 
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services 
(Temporary Services) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil 
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Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence Service 
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway 
Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that may 
be notified in this behalf by the appropriate government in the 
official Gazette, apply. 
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules 
1946: 
The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 
1946, extend to all Union territories, and shall also apply in any 
State (other than a Union territory) to industrial establishments 
under the control of the Central   Government or a Railway 
administration or in a major port, oilfield or mine. Apart from the 
said Central Rules, every State has its own Rules to regulate 
the terms and conditions of employment. 
  
SCHEDULE I 
MODEL STANDING ORDERS IN RESPECT OF INDUSTRIAL 
ESTABLISHMENTS NOT BEING INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN 
COAL MINES 
  
2. Classification of workmen-- (a) Workmen shall be 
classified as -- 
  (1) permanent, 
  (2) Probationers, 
  (3) badlis, 
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  (4) temporary, 
  (5) casual, 
  (6) apprentices. 
  
Rule 13. Termination of employment 
(1) For terminating employment of a permanent workmen, 
notice in writing shall be given either by the employer or the 
workmen - one month’s notice in the case of monthly-rated 
workmen and two weeks’ notice in the case of other workmen: 
one month’s or two week’s pay, as the case may be, may be 
paid in lieu of notice. 
 
(2) No temporary workman whether monthly-rated, weekly-rated 
or piece-rated and no probationer or badli shall be entitled to 
any notice or pay in lieu thereof if his services are terminated, 
but the services of a temporary workman shall not be 
terminated as a punishment unless he has been given an 
opportunity of explaining the charges of misconduct alleged 
against him in the manner prescribed in Paragraph 14. 
(3) Where the employment of any workmen is terminated, the 
wages earned by him and other dues, if any, shall be paid 
before the expiry of the second working day from the day on 
which his employment is terminated. 
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Rule 14. Disciplinary action for misconduct 
(1) A workman may be fined up to two per cent of his wages in 
a month for the following acts and omissions, namely: 
...............................   ...............   ....................................   
   
Note.--Specify the acts and omissions which the employer may 
notify with the previous approval of the appropriate Government 
or of the prescribed authority in pursuance of section 8 of the 
Payment of Wages Act, 1936. 
 
(2) A workman may be suspended for a period not exceeding 
four days at a time, or dismissed without notice or any 
compensation in lieu of notice, if he is found to be guilty of 
misconduct. 
 
(3) The following acts and omissions shall be treated as 
misconduct. 
(a)  wilful in subordination or disobedience, whether alone or 
in combination  with others, to any lawful and 
reasonable order of a superior, 
(b) theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the 
employer’s business or property, 
(c)     willful damage to or loss of employer’s goods or property, 
(d) taking or giving bribes or any illegal gratification, 
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(e) habitual absence without leave or absence without leave 
for more than 10 days, 
(f) habitual late attendance, 
(g) habitual breach of any law applicable to the 
establishment, 
(h)    riotous or disorderly behaviors during working hours at the 
establishment or any act      subversive of discipline, 
(i)      habitual negligence or neglect of work, 
(j)      frequent repetition of any act or omission for which a fine 
may be imposed to a maximum of 2 per cent of the wages 
in a month. 
(k)     striking work or inciting others to strike work in 
contravention of the provision of any law, or rule having 
the force of law. 
(4) (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against a workman is 
contemplated or is pending or where criminal proceedings 
against him in respect of any offence are under investigation or 
trial and the employer is satisfied that it is necessary or 
desirable to place the workman under suspension, he may, by 
order in writing suspend him with effect from such date as may 
be specified in the order. A statement setting out in detail the 
reasons for such suspension shall be supplied to the workman 
within a week from the date of suspension. 
 
 448
(b) A workman who is placed under suspension under Cl. (a) 
shall, during the period of such suspension, be paid a 
subsistence allowance at the following rates, namely: 
 
(i) Where the enquiry contemplated or pending is  
departmental, the subsistence allowance shall, for the first 
ninety days from the date of  suspension, be equal to one-half 
of the basic wages, dearness  allowance and other 
compensatory allowances to which the workmen would have  
been entitled if he were on leave with wages. It the 
departmental enquiry gets prolonged and the workman 
continues to be under suspension for a period exceeding ninety 
days, the subsistence allowance shall for such period be equal 
to three-fourths of such basic wages dearness allowance and 
other compensatory allowances: 
 
Provided that where such enquiry is prolonged beyond a period 
of ninety days for reasons directly attributable to the workman, 
the subsistence allowance shall, for the period exceeding ninety 
days, be reduced to one-fourth of such basic wages, dearness 
allowance and other compensatory allowances. 
 
(ii) Where the enquiry is by an outside agency or, as the case 
may be, where criminal proceedings against workman are 
under investigation or trial, the subsistence allowance shall, for 
the first one hundred and eighty days from the date of 
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suspension, be equal to one half of his basic wages, dearness 
allowance and other compensatory allowances to which the 
workman would have been entitled to if he was on leave. If 
such enquiry or criminal proceedings gets prolonged and the 
workman continues to be under suspension for a period 
exceeding one hundred and eighty days, the subsistence 
allowance shall for such period be equal to three-fourths of 
such wages: 
 
Provided that where such enquiry or criminal proceeding is 
prolonged beyond a period of one hundred and eighty days for 
reasons directly attributable to the workman, the subsistence 
allowance shall, for the period exceeding one hundred and 
eighty days, be reduced to one-fourth of such wages. 
 
(b-a) In the enquiry, the workman shall be entitled to appear in 
person or to be represented by an office-bearer of a trade union 
of which he is a member. 
 
(b-b) The proceedings of the enquiry shall be recorded in Hindi 
or in English, the language of the State where the industrial 
establishment is located, whichever is preferred by the 
workman. 
 
(b-c) The proceedings of the inquiry shall be completed within 
a period of three months: 
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Provided that the period of three months may, for reasons to be 
recorded in writing, be extended by such further period as may 
be deemed necessary by the enquiry officer. 
 
(c) If on the conclusion of the enquiry or, as the case may be, of 
the criminal proceedings, the workman has been found guilty of 
the charges framed against him and it is considered, after 
giving the workman concerned a reasonable opportunity of 
making representation on the penalty proposed, that an order of 
dismissal or suspension or fine or stoppage of annual 
increment or reduction in rank would meet the ends of justice, 
the employer shall pass an order accordingly: 
 
Provided that when an order of dismissal is passed under this 
clause, the workman shall be deemed to have been absent 
from duty during the period of suspension and shall not be 
entitled to any remuneration for such period, and the 
subsistence allowance already paid to him shall not be 
recovered: 
 
Provided further that where the period between the date on 
which the workman was suspended from duty pending the 
inquiry or investigation or trial and the date on which an order or 
suspension was passed under this clause exceeds four days, 
the workman shall be deemed to have been suspended only for 
four days or for such shorter period as is  specified in the said 
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order of suspension and for the remaining period he shall be 
entitled to the same wages as he would have received if he had 
not been placed under suspension, after deducting the 
subsistence allowance paid to him for such period : 
 
Provided also that where an order imposing fine or stoppage of 
annual increment or reduction in rank is passed under this 
clause, the workman shall be deemed to have been on duty 
during the period of suspension and shall be entitled to the 
same wages as he would have received if he had not been 
placed under suspension, after deducting the subsistence 
allowance paid to him for such period: 
 
Provided also that in the case of a workman to whom the 
provisions of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution apply, 
the provisions of that article shall be complied with. 
 
(d) If on the conclusion of the inquiry, or as the case may be, or 
the criminal proceedings, the workman has been found to be 
not guilty of any of the charges framed against him, he shall be 
deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension 
and shall be entitled to the same wages as he would have 
received if he had not been placed under suspension after 
deducting the subsistence allowance paid to him for such 
period. 
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(e) The payment of subsistence allowance under this 
standing order shall be subject to the workman concerned not 
taking up any employment during the period of suspension. 
 
(5) In awarding punishment under this standing order, the 
authority imposing the punishment shall take into account any 
gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the 
workman and any other extenuating or aggravating 
circumstances, which may exist. A copy of the order passed by 
the authority imposing the punishment shall be supplied to the 
workman concerned. 
 
(6) (a) A workman aggrieved by an order imposing punishment 
may within twenty-one days from the date of receipt of the 
order, appeal to the appellate authority. 
 
(b) The employer shall, for the purposes of Cl. (a) specify the 
appellate authority. 
 
(c ) The appellate authority, after giving an opportunity to the 
workman of being heard shall pass order as he thinks proper on 
the appeal within fifteen days of its receipt and communicate 
the same to the workman in writing. 
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6.1.2: Shops and Commercial Establishments Act(s): Every 
state has its own Act to regulate the terms and conditions of 
employment. Let us pick up one State Act and analyze its terms 
with specific reference to research under context.  
  
BOMBAY SHOPS AND ESTABLISHMENTS ACT, 1948:  
Section 38B - Application of Industrial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Act to establishments 38B. Application of Industrial 
Employment (Standing Orders) Act to establishments 
The provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) 
Act, 1946 (XX of 1946), in its application to the State of 
Maharashtra (hereinafter in this section referred to as "the said 
Act"), and the rules and standing orders (including model 
standing orders) made thereunder, from time to time, shall, 
mutatis mutandis, apply to all establishments wherein fifty or 
more employees are employed and to which this Act applies as 
if they were industrial establishments within the meaning of the 
said Act. 
Section 66 - Notice of termination of service: No employer shall 
dispense with the services of an employee who has been in his 
continuous employment- 
(a) for not less than a year, without giving such person at least 
thirty days notice in writing, or wages in lieu of such notice; 
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(b) for less than a year but more than three months, without 
giving such person at least fourteen days' notice in writing, or 
wages in lieu of such notice: 
Provided that such notice shall not be necessary where the 
services of such employees are dispensed with for misconduct. 
Explanation - For the purposes of this section, "misconduct" 
shall include- 
(a) absence from service without notice in writing or without 
sufficient reasons for seven days or more; 
(b) going on or abetting a strike in contravention of any law for 
the time being in force; and 
(c) causing damage to the property of his employer.] 
6.1.3:  Provisions under the Indian Constitution: 
"310. Tenure of office of persons serving the Union or a 
State. 
(1) Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every 
person who is a member of a defence service or of a civil 
service of the Union or of an all-India service or holds any post 
connected with defence or any civil post under the Union holds 
office during the pleasure of the President, and every person 
who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil 
post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the 
Governor of the State. 
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(2) Notwithstanding that a person holding a civil post under the 
Union or a State holds office during the pleasure of the 
President or, as the case may be, of the Governor of the State, 
any contract under which a person, not being a member of a 
defence service or of an all-India service or of a civil service of 
the Union or a State, is appointed under this Constitution to 
hold such a post may, if the President or the Governor, as the 
case may be, deems it necessary in order to secure the 
services of a person having special qualifications, provide for 
the payment to him of compensation, if before the expiration of 
an agreed period that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not 
connected with any misconduct on his part, required to vacate 
that post." 
 The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, made 
certain amendments in the substituted clause (2) of Article 311 
with effect from January 3, 1977. Article 311 as so amended 
reads as follows: 
 
"311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons 
employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. - 
(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or 
an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil 
post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed 
by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. 
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(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed 
or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been 
informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges :  
 
Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose 
upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on 
the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it 
shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of 
making representation on the penalty proposed: 
 
Provided further that this clause shall not apply –  
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank 
on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on 
a criminal charge; or 
 
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a 
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some 
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not 
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or 
 
(c) where the President or the Governor, as. the case may be, is 
satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is 
not expedient to hold such inquiry. 
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(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question 
arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry 
as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon  of the 
authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to 
reduce him in rank shall be final." 
 
6.2: Procedure adopted by employers – Public and Private;  
6.2.1 CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICES (CLASSIFICATION, CONTROL & 
APPEAL) RULES, 1965:  In exercise of the powers conferred by 
proviso to Article 309 and Clause (5) of Article 148 of the 
Constitution and after consultation with the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General in relation to persons serving in the Indian 
Audit and Accounts Department, the President here by makes 
the following rules Central Civil Service Conduct and Appeal 
Rules…… 
Classification of Services: 
(1)  The Civil Services of the Union shall be classified as 
follows:  
(i)   Central Civil Services, Group 'A'; 
(ii)  Central Civil Services, Group 'B'; 
(iii)  Central Civil Services, Group 'C'; 
(iv)  Central Civil Services, Group 'D'; 
 458
(2)       If a Service consists of more than one grade, different 
grades of such Service may be included in different groups. 
Constitution of Central Civil Services 
The Central Civil Services, Group 'A', Group 'B', Group 'C' and 
Group 'D', shall consist of the Services and grades of Services 
specified in the Schedule. 
Classification of Posts 
Civil Posts under the Union other than those ordinarily held by 
persons to whom these rules do not apply, shall, by a general 
or special order of the President, be Classified as follows :- 
(i)      Central Civil Posts, Group 'A'; 
(ii)     Central Civil Posts, Group 'B'; 
(iii) Central Civil Posts, Group 'C'; 
(iv) Central Civil Posts, Group 'D'; 
PART IV: SUSPENSION 
 (1)  The appointing authority or any authority to which it is 
subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other 
authority empowered in that behalf by the President, by 
general or special order, may place a Government 
servant under suspension- 
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(a)    where a disciplinary proceeding against him is 
contemplated or is pending; or  
(aa)   where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has 
engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of 
the security of the State; or 
(b)    where a case against him in respect of any criminal 
offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial: 
 
Provided that, except in case of an order of suspension made 
by the Comptroller and Auditor - General in regard to a member 
of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and in regard to an 
Assistant Accountant General or equivalent (other than a 
regular member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service), 
where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower 
than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith 
report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which 
the order was made. 
(2)    A Government servant shall be deemed to have been 
placed under suspension by an order of appointing 
authority - 
(a)     with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained 
in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for 
a period exceeding forty-eight hours; 
(b)     with effect from the date of his conviction, if, in the event 
of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of 
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imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not 
forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired 
consequent to such conviction. 
EXPLANATION -   The period of forty-eight hours referred to in 
clause (b) of this sub-rule shall be computed from the 
commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for 
this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall 
be taken into account. 
(3)    Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory 
retirement from service imposed upon a Government 
servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or on 
review under these rules and the case is remitted for 
further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the 
order of his suspension shall be deemed to have 
continued in force on and from the date of the original 
order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and 
shall remain in force until further orders. 
(4)     Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory 
retirement from service imposed upon a Government 
servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in 
consequence of or by a decision of a Court of Law and 
the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the 
circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further 
inquiry against him on the allegations on which the 
penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement 
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was originally imposed, the Government servant shall be 
deemed to have been placed under suspension by the 
Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of 
dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall 
continue to remain under suspension until further orders : 
Provided that no such further inquiry shall be ordered unless it 
is intended to meet a situation where the Court has passed an 
order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits 
of the case. 
(5)(a)  An order of suspension made or deemed to have been 
made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until 
it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do 
so. 
(b)      Where a Government servant is suspended or is deemed 
to have been suspended (whether in connection with any 
disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other 
disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during 
the continuance of that suspension, the authority 
competent to place him under suspension may, for 
reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the 
Government servant shall continue to be under 
suspension until the termination of all or any of such 
proceedings. 
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(c)    An order of suspension made or deemed to have been 
made under this rule may at any time be modified or 
revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to 
have made the order or by any authority to which that 
authority is subordinate. 
(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been 
made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority 
competent to modify or revoke the suspension, before 
expiry of ninety days from the date of order of 
suspension, on the recommendation of the Review 
Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders 
either extending or revoking the suspension.  Subsequent 
reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended 
period of suspension.  Extension of suspension shall not 
be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at 
a time.   
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (5), an 
order of suspension made or deemed to have been made 
under sub-rules (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid 
after a period ninety days unless it is extended after 
review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety 
days”. 
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Timely payment of subsistence allowance: - (1) In the case 
of Ghanshyam Das Srivastava Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh545, 
the Supreme Court had observed that where a Government 
servant under suspension pleaded his inability to attend the 
inquiry on account of financial stringency caused by the non-
payment of subsistence allowance to him the proceedings 
conducted against him exparte would be in violation of the 
provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as the person 
concerned did not receive a reasonable opportunity of 
defending himself in the disciplinary proceedings. 
 
2. In the light of the judgment mentioned above, it may be 
impressed on all authorities concerned that they should make 
timely payment of subsistence allowance to Government 
servants who are placed under suspension so that they may 
not be put to financial difficulties.  It may be noted that, by its 
very nature, subsistence allowance is meant for the 
subsistence of a suspended Government servant and his family 
during the period he is not allowed to perform any duty and 
thereby earn a salary.  Keeping this in view, all concerned 
authorities should take prompt steps to ensure that after a 
Government servant is placed under suspension, he received 
subsistence allowance without delay. 
3. The judgment of the Supreme Court referred to in para 1 
above indicates that in that case, the disciplinary authority 
                                                 
545 AIR 1973 SC 1183 
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proceeded with the enquiry ex-parte notwithstanding the fact 
that the Government servant concerned had specifically 
pleaded his inability to attend the enquiry on account of 
financial difficulties caused by non-payment of subsistence 
allowance.  The Court had held that holding the enquiry ex-
parte under such circumstances would be violative of Article 
311 (2) of the Constitution on account of denial of reasonable 
opportunity of defence. 
 
PART V: PENALTIES AND DISCIPLINARY AUHTORITIES 
Penalties: 
The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons 
and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a Government 
servant, namely:- 
Minor Penalties - 
(i)           censure; 
(ii)          withholding of his promotion; 
(iii)       recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any 
pecuniary loss caused by him to the Government by negligence 
or breach of orders; 
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(iii a)   reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay by 
one stage for a period not exceeding three years, without 
cumulative effect and not adversely affecting his pension. 
(iv)       withholding of increments of pay; 
Major Penalties - 
(i)        save as provided for in clause (iii) (a), reduction to a 
lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period, with 
further directions as to whether or not the Government servant 
will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction 
and whether on the expiry of such period, the reduction will or 
will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of 
his pay: 
(ii)       reduction to lower time-scale of pay, grade, post or 
Service which shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the 
Government servant to the time-scale of pay, grade, post or 
Service from which he was reduced, with or without further 
directions regarding conditions of restoration to the grade, or 
post or Service from which the Government servant was 
reduced and his seniority and pay on such restoration to that 
grade, post or Service; 
(iii)    Compulsory retirement; 
(iv)    Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification 
for future employment under the Government; 
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(v)       Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a 
disqualification for future employment under the Government. 
Provided that, in every case in which the charge of possession 
of assets disproportionate to known-source of income or the 
charge of acceptance from any person of any gratification, 
other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing 
or forbearing to do any official act is established, the penalty 
mentioned in clause (viii) or clause (ix) shall be imposed: 
Provided further that in any exceptional case and for special 
reasons recorded in writing any other penalty may be imposed. 
EXPLANATION - The following shall not amount to a penalty 
within the meaning of this rule, namely:- 
(i)  withholding of increments of a Government servant for his 
failure to pass any departmental examination in accordance 
with the rules or orders governing the Service to which he 
belongs or post which he holds or the terms of his 
appointment;  
(ii)  stoppage of a Government servant at the efficiency bar in 
the time-scale of pay on the ground of his unfitness to cross 
the bar; 
(iii) non-promotion of a Government servant, whether in a 
substantive or officiating capacity, after consideration of his 
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case, to a Service, grade or post for promotion to which he is 
eligible; 
(iv) reversion of a Government servant officiating in a higher 
Service, grade or post to a lower service, grade or post, on the 
ground that he is considered to be unsuitable for such higher 
service, grade or post or on any administrative ground 
unconnected with his conduct; 
(v)   reversion of a Government servant, appointed on probation 
to any other service, grade or post, to his permanent service, 
grade or post during or at the end of the period of probation in 
accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and 
orders governing such probation;  
(vi)   replacement of the services of a Government servant, 
whose services had been borrowed from a State Government 
or any authority under the control of a State Government, at 
the disposal of the State Government or the authority from 
which the services of such Government servant had been 
borrowed;  
(vii) compulsory retirement of a Government servant in 
accordance with the provisions relating to his superannuation 
or retirement; 
(viii)  termination of the services - 
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(a)  of a Government servant appointed on probation, during or 
at the end of the period of his probation, in accordance with 
the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing 
such probation, or 
(b)   of a temporary Government servant in accordance with the 
provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil 
Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, or 
(c)    of a Government servant, employed under an agreement, 
in accordance with the terms of such agreement. 
PART VI: PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING PENALTIES 
14.        Procedure for imposing major penalties  
(1)    No order imposing any of the penalties specified in 
clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 shall be made except after an 
inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this 
rule and rule 15, or in the manner provided by the Public 
Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850), where such inquiry 
is held under that Act. 
(2)   Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that 
there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of 
misconduct or misbehaviour against a Government servant, it 
may itself inquire into, or appoint under this rule or under the 
provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the 
case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. 
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Provided that where there is a complaint of sexual harassment 
within the meaning of rule 3 C of the Central Civil Services 
(Conduct) Rules, 1964, the complaints Committee established 
in each ministry or Department or Office for inquiring into such 
complaints, shall be deemed to be the inquiring authority 
appointed by the disciplinary authority for the purpose of these 
rules and the Complaints Committee shall hold, if separate 
procedure has not been prescribed for the complaints 
committee for holding the inquiry into the complaints of sexual 
harassments, the inquiry as far as practicable in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in these rules. 
EXPLANATION - Where the disciplinary authority itself holds 
the inquiry, any reference in sub-rule (7) to sub-rule (20) and in 
sub-rule (22) to the inquiring authority shall be construed as a 
reference to the disciplinary authority. 
(3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a 
Government servant under this rule and rule 15, the disciplinary 
authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up- 
(i)  the substance of the imputations of misconduct or 
misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge; 
(ii) a statement of the imputations of misconduct or 
misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which shall 
contain- 
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(a) a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or 
confession made by the Government servant; 
(b) a list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by 
whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. 
(4) The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be 
delivered to the Government servant a copy of the articles of 
charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or 
misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which 
each article of charges is proposed to be sustained and shall 
require the Government servant to submit, within such time as 
may be specified, a written statement of his defence and to 
state whether he desires to be heard in person. 
(5)(a)  On receipt of the written statement of defence, the 
disciplinary authority may itself inquire into such of the articles 
of charge as are not admitted, or, if it considers it necessary so 
to do, appoint, under sub-rule (2), an inquiring authority for the 
purpose, and where all the articles of charge have been 
admitted by the Government servant in his written statement of 
defence, the disciplinary authority shall record its findings on 
each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit and 
shall act in the manner laid down in rule 15. 
(b)  If no written statement of defence is submitted by the 
Government servant, the disciplinary authority may itself inquire 
into the articles of charge, or may, if it considers it necessary to 
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do so, appoint, under sub-rule (2), an inquiring authority for the 
purpose. 
(c)   Where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into any 
article of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for holding an 
inquiry into such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a 
Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as the 
"Presenting Officer" to present on its behalf the case in support 
of the articles of charge. 
(6) The disciplinary authority shall, where it is not the inquiring 
authority, forward to the inquiring authority- 
(i)      a copy of the articles of charge and the statement of the    
imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour; 
(ii)     a copy of the written statement of the defence, if any, 
submitted by the Government servant; 
(iii)     a copy of the statements of witnesses, if any, referred to 
in sub-rule (3); 
(iv)    evidence proving the delivery of the documents referred 
to in sub-rule (3) to the Government servant; and 
(v)     a copy of the order appointing the "Presenting Officer". 
(7)    The Government servant shall appear in person before 
the inquiring authority on such day and at such time within ten 
working days from the date of receipt by the inquiring authority 
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of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of 
misconduct or misbehaviour, as the inquiring authority may, by 
notice in writing, specify, in this behalf, or within such further 
time, not exceeding ten days, as the inquiring authority may 
allow. 
(8)(a) The Government servant may take the assistance of any 
other Government servant posted in any office either at his 
headquarters or at the place where the inquiry is held, to 
present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal 
practitioner for the purpose, unless the Presenting Officer 
appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner, or, 
the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of 
the case, so permits; 
Provided that the Government servant may take the assistance 
of any other Government servant posted at any other station, if 
the inquiring authority having regard to the circumstances of the 
case, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, so permits. 
Note:  The Government servant shall not take the assistance of 
any other Government servant who has three pending 
disciplinary cases on hand in which he has to give assistance. 
(b) The Government servant may also take the assistance of 
a retired Government servant to present the case on his behalf, 
subject to such conditions as may be specified by the President 
from time to time by general or special order in this behalf. 
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(9) If the Government servant who has not admitted any of 
the articles of charge in his written statement of defence or has 
not submitted any written statement of defence, appears before 
the inquiring authority, such authority shall ask him whether he 
is guilty or has any defence to make and it he pleads guilty to 
any of the articles of charge, the inquiring authority shall record 
the plea, sign the record and obtain the signature of the 
Government servant thereon. 
(10) The inquiring authority shall return a finding of guilt in 
respect of those articles of charge to which the government 
servant pleads guilty. 
(11) The inquiring authority shall, if the Government servant 
fails to appear within the specified time or refuses or omits to 
plead, require the Presenting Officer to produce the evidence 
by which he proposes to prove the articles of charge, and shall 
adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding thirty days, after 
recording an order that the Government servant may, for the 
purpose of preparing his defence: 
(i) inspect within five days of the order or within such further 
time not exceeding five days as the inquiring authority may 
allow, the documents specified in the list referred to in sub-
rule (3); 
(ii) submit a list of witnesses to be examined on his behalf; 
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NOTE: If the Government servant applies orally or in writing for 
the supply of copies of the statements of witnesses mentioned 
in the list referred to in sub-rule (3), the inquiring authority shall 
furnish him with such copies as early as possible and in any 
case not later than three days before the commencement of the 
examination of the witnesses on behalf of the disciplinary 
authority. 
(iii) give a notice within ten days of the order or within such 
further time not exceeding ten days as the inquiring 
authority may allow, for the discovery or production of any 
documents which are in the possession of Government but 
not mentioned in the list referred to in sub-rule (3). 
NOTE: The Government servant shall indicate the relevance of 
the documents required by him to be discovered or produced 
by the Government. 
(12) The inquiring authority shall, on receipt of the notice for 
the discovery or production of documents, forward the same or 
copies thereof to the authority in whose custody or possession 
the documents are kept, with a requisition for the production of 
the documents by such date as may be specified in such 
requisition: 
Provided that the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be 
recorded by it in writing, refuse to requisition such of the 
documents as are, in its opinion, not relevant to the case. 
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(13) On receipt of the requisition referred to in sub-rule (12), 
every authority having the custody or possession of the 
requisitioned documents shall produce the same before the 
inquiring authority: 
Provided that if the authority having the custody or possession 
of the requisitioned documents is satisfied for reasons to be 
recorded by it in writing that the production of all or any of such 
documents would be against the public interest or security of 
the State, it shall inform the inquiring authority accordingly and 
the inquiring authority shall, on being so informed, 
communicate the information to the Government servant and 
withdraw the requisition made by it for the production or 
discovery of such documents. 
(14) On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and 
documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are 
proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the 
disciplinary authority.  The witnesses shall be examined by or 
on behalf of the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined 
by or on behalf of the Government servant.  The Presenting 
Officer shall be entitled to re-examine the witnesses on any 
points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on any 
new matter, without the leave of the inquiring authority.  The 
inquiring authority may also put such questions to the witnesses 
as it thinks fit. 
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(15) If it shall appear necessary before the close of the case 
on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the inquiring authority 
may, in its discretion, allow the Presenting Officer to produce 
evidence not included in the list given to the Government 
servant or may itself call for new evidence or recall and re-
examine any witness and in such case the Government servant 
shall be entitled to have, if he demands it, a copy of the list of 
further evidence proposed to be produced and an adjournment 
of the inquiry for three clear days before the production of such 
new evidence, exclusive of the day of adjournment and the day 
to which the inquiry is adjourned.  The inquiring authority shall 
give the Government servant an opportunity of inspecting such 
documents before they are taken on the record.  The inquiring 
authority may also allow the Government servant to produce 
new evidence, if it is of the opinion that the production of such 
evidence is necessary, in the interests of justice. 
NOTE: New evidence shall not be permitted or called for or any 
witness shall not be recalled to fill up any gap in the evidence.  
Such evidence may be called for only when there is an inherent 
lacuna or defect in the evidence which has been produced 
originally. 
(16) When the case for the disciplinary authority is closed, the 
Government servant shall be required to state his defence, 
orally or in writing, as he may prefer.  If the defence is made 
orally, it shall be recorded and the Government servant shall be 
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required to sign the record.  In either case, a copy of the 
statement of defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer, if 
any, appointed. 
(17) The evidence on behalf of the Government servant shall 
then be produced.  The Government servant may examine 
himself in his own behalf if he so prefers.  The witnesses 
produced by the Government servant shall then be examined 
and shall be liable to cross-examination, re-examination and 
examination by the inquiring authority according to the 
provisions applicable to the witnesses for the disciplinary 
authority. 
(18) The inquiring authority may, after the Government servant 
closes his case, and shall, if the Government servant has not 
examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances 
appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of 
enabling the Government servant to explain any circumstances 
appearing in the evidence against him. 
(19) The inquiring authority may, after the completion of the 
production of evidence, hear the Presenting Officer, if any, 
appointed, and the Government servant, or permit them to file 
written briefs of their respective case, if they so desire. 
(20) If the Government servant to whom a copy of the articles 
of charge has been delivered, does not submit the written 
statement of defence on or before the date specified for the 
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purpose or does not appear in person before the inquiring 
authority or otherwise fails or refuses to comply with the 
provisions of this rule, the inquiring authority may hold the 
inquiry ex parte. 
(21)(a) Where a disciplinary authority competent to impose 
any of the penalties specified in clause (i) to (iv) of rule 11 (but 
not competent to impose any of the penalties specified in 
clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 11), has itself inquired into or caused 
to be inquired into the articles of any charge and that authority, 
having regard to its own findings or having regard to its decision 
on any of the findings of any inquiring authority appointed by it, 
is of the opinion that the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) 
of rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, that 
authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to such 
disciplinary authority as is competent to impose the last 
mentioned penalties. 
(b) The disciplinary authority to which the records are so 
forwarded may act on the evidence on the record or may, if it is 
of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses is 
necessary in the interests of justice, recall the witness and 
examine, cross-examine and re-examine the witness and may 
impose on the Government servant such penalty as it may 
deem fit in accordance with these rules. 
(22) Whenever any inquiring authority, after having heard and 
recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry 
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ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by 
another inquiring authority which has, and which exercises, 
such jurisdiction, the inquiring authority so succeeding may act 
on the evidence so recorded by its predecessor, or partly 
recorded by its predecessor and partly recorded by itself: 
Provided that if the succeeding inquiring authority is of the 
opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses whose 
evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the 
interests of justice, it may recall, examine, cross-examine and 
re-examine any such witnesses as hereinbefore provided. 
(23)(i) After the conclusion of the inquiry, a report shall be 
prepared and it shall contain- 
(a)    the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations 
of misconduct or misbehaviour;  
(b)   the defence of the Government servant in respect of each 
article of charge;  
(c)    an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article 
of charge;  
(d)    the findings on each article of charge and the reasons 
therefor.  
EXPLANATION- If in the opinion of the inquiring authority the 
proceedings of the inquiry establish any article of charge 
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different from the original articles of the charge, it may record its 
findings on such article of charge: 
Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be 
recorded unless the Government servant has either admitted 
the facts on which such article of charge is based or has had a 
reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such article 
of charge. 
(ii) The inquiring authority, where it is not itself the disciplinary 
authority, shall forward to the disciplinary authority the 
records of inquiry which shall include:- 
(a)     the report prepared by it under clause (i).  
(b)     the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the 
Government servant;  
(c)      the oral and documentary evidence produced in the 
course of the inquiry;  
(d)     written briefs, if any, filed by the Presenting Officer or the 
Government servant or both during the course of the 
inquiry; and  
(e)     the orders, if any, made by the disciplinary authority and 
the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry.  
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Inquiry by the disciplinary authority: -    
 The Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms OM 
No. 39/40/70-Estt. (A) dated the 9th November, 1972, inter-alia, 
provides that only those Inquiry Officers who are free from bias 
should be appointed by the disciplinary authority to conduct 
departmental inquiries.  It is, further been provided that 
wherever an application is moved by a Government servant, 
against whom disciplinary proceedings are initiated, against the 
Inquiry Officer on grounds of bias, the proceedings should be 
stayed and the application referred to the appropriate reviewing 
authority for considering the matter and passing appropriate 
orders thereon.  In this connection, the Staff Side raised the 
following points, at the National Council (JCM) meeting held in 
November, 1975 : 
 
(a) The orders contained in the Department of Personnel & 
AR OM dated 9th November, 1972 are not being 
implemented in some Departments; and  
  
(b) The OM dated 9.11.1972 did not contain instructions 
regarding disciplinary authority inquiring into the cases 
itself. 
 
2. Regarding (a) above, Ministry of Finance etc. are 
requested to observe and implement scrupulously the aforesaid 
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instructions contained in this Department’s OM of 9th 
November, 1972. 
 
3. The second point raised by the Staff Side has been 
further examined in this Department.  According to Rule 14 (5) 
of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the disciplinary authority may 
itself inquire into the charges against the accused Government 
servant or appoint an Inquiry Officer for the purpose.  However, 
it should be possible in a majority of cases, and the more 
serious ones at any rate, to ensure that the disciplinary 
authority himself does not conduct the inquiry.  It may still be 
not practicable to ensure in all cases that the disciplinary 
authority himself would not be the Inquiry Officer.  Such a 
course may be necessary under certain circumstances 
particularly in small field formations where the disciplinary 
authority as well as the Inquiry Officer may have to be one and 
the same person.  It has accordingly been decided that unless it 
is unavoidable in certain cases as mentioned above, the 
disciplinary authority should refrain from being the Inquiry 
Officer and appoint another officer for the purpose546. 
 
Permission to engage a Legal Practitioner547:-   
 Rules 14 (8) (a) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, 
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 provides, inter-alia that a 
                                                 
546 [Deptt. of Personnel & AR OM No. 35014/1/76-Ests. (A) dated the 29th July, 1976]  
 
547 [Deptt. of Personnel & AR OM No. 11012/7/83-Estt.(A) dated the 23rd July, 1984] 
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delinquent Government servant against whom disciplinary 
proceedings have been instituted as for imposition of a major 
penalty may not engage a legal practitioner to present the case 
on his behalf before the Inquiring Authority, unless the 
Presenting Officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a 
legal practitioner, or the disciplinary authority, having regard to 
the circumstances of the case, so permits.  It is clarified, that, 
when on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the case is being 
presented by a Prosecuting Officer of the Central Bureau of 
Investigation or a Government Law Officer (such as Legal 
Adviser, Junior Legal Adviser), there are evidently good and 
sufficient circumstances for the disciplinary authority to exercise 
his discretion in favour of the delinquent officer and allow him to 
be represented by a legal practitioner.  Any exercise of 
discretion to the contrary in such cases is likely to be held by 
the court as arbitrary and prejudicial to the defence of the 
delinquent Government servant. 
 
Action on inquiry report 
(1) The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself the inquiring 
authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit 
the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report 
and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the 
further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 14, as far as 
may be. 
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(2) The disciplinary authority shall forward or cause to be 
forwarded a copy of the report of the inquiry, if any, held by the 
disciplinary authority or where the disciplinary authority is not 
the inquiring authority, a copy of the report of the inquiring 
authority together with its own tentative reasons for 
disagreement, if any, with the findings of inquiring authority on 
any article of charge to the Government servant who shall be 
required to submit, if he so desires, his written representation or 
submission to the disciplinary authority within fifteen days, 
irrespective of whether the report is favourable or not to the 
Government servant. 
(2A) The disciplinary authority shall consider the 
representation, if any, submitted by the Government servant 
and record its findings before proceeding further in the matter 
as specified in sub-rules (3) and (4). 
(3) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or 
any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties 
specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of rule 11 should be imposed on the 
Government servant, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in 
rule 16, make an order imposing such penalty: 
Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the 
Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the 
disciplinary authority to the Commission for its advice and such 
advice shall be taken into consideration before making any 
order imposing any penalty on the Government servant. 
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(4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on 
all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the 
evidence adduced during the inquiry is of the opinion that any 
of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of rule 11 should 
be imposed on the Government servant, it shall make an order 
imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the 
Government servant any opportunity of making representation 
on the penalty proposed to be imposed: 
Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the 
Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the 
disciplinary authority to the Commission for its advice and such 
advice shall be taken into consideration before making an order 
imposing any such penalty on the Government servant. 
Reasons for disagreement, if any should be communicated –   
 
(1) The Supreme Court has decided the matter finally in its 
judgment dated 01.10.1993 in the case of Managing Director 
(ECIL), Hyderabad vs. B. Karunakar (JT 1993 (6) SC.I).  It has 
been held by the Supreme Court that wherever the Service 
Rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded 
and when the inquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority; the 
delinquent employee will have the right to receive the inquiry 
officer’s report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment.  
Necessary amendment providing for supply of copy of the 
inquiry officer’s report to the delinquent employee has been 
 486
made in Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 vide 
Notification No. 11012/4/94-Estt. (A) dated 03.05.1995.  All 
disciplinary authorities are, therefore, required to comply with 
the above mentioned requirement without failure in all cases. 
 
2. A question has been raised in this connection whether the 
disciplinary authority, when he decides to disagree with the 
inquiry report, should also communicate the reasons for such 
disagreement to the charged officer.  The issue has been 
considered in consultation with the Ministry of Law and it has 
been decided that where the Inquiring Authority holds a charge 
as not proved and the disciplinary authority takes a contrary 
view, the reasons for such disagreement in brief must be 
communicated to the charged officer along with the Report of 
Inquiry so that the charged officer can make an effective 
representation.  This procedure would require the Disciplinary 
Authority to first examine the report as per the laid down 
procedure and formulate its tentative views before forwarding 
the Report of Inquiry to the charged officer548. 
Procedure for imposing minor penalties 
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of rule 15, no 
order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties 
specified in clause (i) to (iv) of rule 11 shall be made except 
after- 
                                                 
548 [Department of Personnel & Training OM No. 11012/22/94-Estt. (A) dated 27.11.1995] 
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(a)      informing the Government servant in writing of the 
proposal to take action against him and of the imputations 
of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to 
be taken, and giving him reasonable opportunity of 
making such representation as he may wish to make 
against the proposal;  
(b)      holding an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub-rules 
(3) to (23) of rule 14, in every case in which the 
disciplinary authority is of the opinion that such inquiry is 
necessary; 
(c)     taking the representation, if any, submitted by the 
Government servant under clause (a) and the record of 
inquiry, if any, held under clause (b) into consideration; 
(d)    recording a finding on each imputation or misconduct or 
misbehaviour; and  
(e)      consulting the Commission where such consultation is 
necessary. 
(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of sub-
rule (1), if in a case it is proposed after considering the 
representation, if any, made by the Government servant under 
clause (a) of that sub-rule, to withhold increments of pay and 
such withholding of increments is likely to affect adversely the 
amount of pension payable to the Government servant or to 
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withhold increments of pay for a period exceeding three years 
or to withhold increments of pay with cumulative effect for any 
period, an inquiry shall be held in the manner laid down in sub-
rules (3) to (23) of Rule 14, before making any order imposing 
on the Government servant any such penalty. 
(2) The record of the proceedings in such cases shall include- 
(i)       a copy of the intimation to the Government servant of the 
proposal to take action against him;  
(ii)      a copy of the statement of imputations of misconduct or 
misbehaviour delivered to him;  
(iii)     his representation, if any;  
(iv)     the evidence produced during the inquiry; 
(v)      the advice of the Commission, if any; 
(vi)    the findings on each imputation of misconduct or 
misbehaviour; and 
(vii)    the orders on the case together with the reasons therefor. 
Communication of Orders 
Orders made by the disciplinary authority shall be 
communicated to the Government servant who shall also be 
supplied with a copy of its finding on each article of charge, or 
where the disciplinary authority is not the inquiring authority, a 
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statement of the findings of the disciplinary authority together 
with brief reasons for its disagreement, if any, with the findings 
of the inquiring authority and also a copy of the advice, if any, 
given by the Commission, and where the disciplinary authority 
has not accepted the advice of the Commission, a brief 
statement of the reasons for such non-acceptance. 
6.2.2:   Procedure adopted by semi Govt., bodies;  
National Dairy Development Board (NDDB): The NDDB is an 
autonomous body of Government of India constituted under the 
Act of Parliament called the National Dairy Development Act, 
1987 (no.37 of 87). The Act has given a mandate to NDDB to 
implement and support cooperative strategy in the Country and 
replicate the ‘anand pattern’ (popularly known as amul) the 
three tier co-operative strategy, across the country and make 
the country self sufficiency in milk and milk products. Section 48 
of the Act inter-alia provides for power to make regulations 
specifying the conditions of service of officers and other 
employees. In exercise of powers conferred by section 48 of 
the Act, the NDDB has framed regulations to regulate the 
conditions of services of officers and workmen. To be precise 
for the purpose of research under context; the following 
regulations are of relevance: 
(1)  National Dairy Development Board Officers (Conduct, 
Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1988 
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(2) National Dairy Development Board Workmen (Conduct, 
Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1988  
On perusal and study of the aforesaid regulations, it has been 
observed that there is no difference between the procedure 
provided for to deal with disciplinary enquiry matters. Therefore, 
in order to avoid repetition, we have concentrated on 
regulations applicable for workmen.  
Regulation 4 : Liability to abide by regulations  
Regulation 5: Obligation to maintain secrecy  
Regulation 6 : Confidentiality agreements for certain jobs  
Regulation 8: Performance of duties   
Regulation 9: Absence without justification and 
consequences thereof : Taking casual leave in conjunction 
with any other workmen or remaining absent from office in that 
manner shall deemed to be a misconduct and be punishable as 
such.  
Regulation 13: Prohibition against participation in election. 
Regulation19: Private trade or employment prohibited 
Regulation 23: Gifts  
Regulation29: Prohibition of giving or taking dowry 
Regulation 31: Misconducts : there are 57 misconducts listed 
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out most of them are based on the premises of misconducts 
listed out in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 
1946. 
Regulation 32: Suspension: Right of Suspension has been 
vested with the Employer under the circumstances that (a) 
where disciplinary proceedings against him / her contemplated 
or pending or (b) where a case against him / her in respect of 
any criminal offence is under investigation or trial or (c) in the 
opinion of employer, the employer is engaged in any criminal 
activity which is prejudicial to the public order. 
Regulation 33: Subsistence Allowance: This is again has 
been termed on the lines of the similar provision denoted in the 
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. 
Regulation 35: Penalties: The following penalties have been 
provided with: 
Minor penalties: 
 (a) censure 
(b) fine 
(c) withholding of increments of pay with or without 
cumulative effect 
(d) withholding of promotion 
(e) recovery from the pay or from any other amount due 
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Major Penalties: 
(a) reduction to lower service or post or to a lower pay scale 
(b) compulsory retirement 
(c) removal from service 
(d) dismissal 
However the following shall not amount to penalty within the 
meaning of this regulation: 
(i) stoppage of workman at the efficiency bar in a time scale, 
or on the ground of his/her unfitness to cross the bar; 
(ii) non-promotion  
(iii) reversion to a lower grade or post during probation when 
an employee holding post on promotion; 
(iv) compulsory retirement, withholding of LTC; 
(v) termination of services:- 
(a) during probation  
(b) appointed on temporary capacity 
(c) appointed under contract or agreement in 
accordance with the terms of such contract / 
agreement 
(d) of any workman on reduction of establishment or 
consequent on redundancy 
(e)  on loss of lien 
(f) on continued ill health or where found medically 
incapacitated or otherwise medically unfit in 
accordance with these regulations. 
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Regulation 36 : Disciplinary Authority : The Disciplinary 
Authority, which shall be the Appointing Authority or any 
Authority higher than it, may impose any of the penalties on the 
workman as specified in regulation 35. 
Regulation : 37 : procedure for minor penalties  :   
(1) Where it is proposed to impose any of the minor penalties 
specified in clause (1) of regulation 35, the workman concerned 
shall be informed in writing of the allegations and the charges of 
misconduct or misbehaviour against him and where his past 
service is also relied upon a copy of his past service record as 
well be given an opportunity to submit his written statement of 
defence within the specified period not exceeding fifteen days 
and the defence statement, if any, submitted by the workman, 
shall be taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority 
before passing orders. 
(2) The record of proceedings shall include :- 
(a)   a copy of the statement of imputations of misconduct or 
misbehaviour delivered to the workman; 
(b)     his defence statement, if any; and 
(c) the orders of the Disciplinary Authority together with 
reasons thereof; 
(d) past service record wherever the same is relied upon. 
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Regulation 38 : Procedure for imposing major penalties: 
(1) No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in 
the clause (2) of the regulation 35 shall be made except 
after an enquiry is held in accordance with this regulation. 
(2) Wherever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that 
there are grounds for enquiring into the truth of any 
allegations and charges of misconduct or misbehaviour 
against a workman, it may itself enquire into or appoint 
any other person as it deems fit (hereinafter called the 
Enquiring Authority) to enquire into the truth thereof. 
(3) A charge sheet stating the allegations and charges shall 
be given to the workman concerned and shall be given an 
opportunity to explain in writing within the period 
specified. If no explanation or reply is received from the 
workman concerned within the specified period, it shall be 
presumed that employee has accepted the charges. 
(4) If the allegations of the charges are denied by the 
workman the enquiry may be held by the Disciplinary 
Authority itself, or by nay other person appointed as the 
Enquiring Authority.  
(5) On receipt of the written explanation of the workman, or if 
no such written statement is received within the time 
specified, an enquiry may be held by the Disciplinary 
Authority itself, or by any other person appointed as an 
Enquiring Authority under sub-regulation (2); 
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Provided that it may not be necessary to hold an enquiry in 
respect of the charges admitted by the workman in his written 
explanation the Disciplinary Authority shall, however, record its 
findings on each charge  
(6) Where the Disciplinary Authority itself enquires or 
appoints an Enquiring Authority for holding an enquiry it 
may, by an order, appoint a person to be known as the 
“presenting Officer” to present the case in support of the 
charges. 
(7) The workman may take assistance of any other employee 
(who is not a co-worker or who has not on hand any other 
disciplinary proceeding or against whom there is not other 
disciplinary proceedings or criminal proceedings) working 
in the same department or the regional office in the same 
town as the case may be.  He will have no right to engage 
a legal practitioner in such enquiry except where the 
presiding officer is a legally trained person. 
(8) On the date fixed by the Enquiring Authority, the workman 
shall appear before that Authority at the time, place and 
date specified in the notice, when the Enquiring Authority 
shall ask the workman whether he pleads guilty or has 
nay defence to make and if he pleads guilty to any of the 
charges, the Enquiring Authority shall record the plea, 
sign the record and obtain the signature of the workman 
concerned thereon and return a finding of guilt in respect 
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of those charges to which the workman concerned pleads 
guilty. 
(9) If not …adjourn the proceedings not later than 15 days.  
(10)  Allowing and dis-allowing of documents submitted by 
workman  
(11)  Brief procedure of examination and cross examination of 
witnesses. 
(12) The Enquiring Authority may, at its discretion, allow the 
Presenting Officer to produce not included in the charge-
sheet or may itself call for new evidence or recall or re-
examine any witness and en every such case the 
workman shall be given an opportunity to inspect the 
documentary evidence, if any, before it is taken on record, 
or as the case may be, to cross-examine the witness, who 
has been so summoned. 
(13) The Enquiring Authority may, after completion of the 
evidence, hear the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed, 
and the employee, or permit them to file written briefs of 
their respective cases, if they so desire.  
(14)  Incase workman does not appear in person or otherwise 
fails or refuses to comply with any of the provisions of the 
regulations, the Enquiring Authority may hold the enquiry 
exparte.  
(15)  Whenever any Enquiring Authority, after having heard and 
recorded the whole or nay part of the evidence in an 
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enquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is 
succeeded by another Enquiring Authority which has, and 
which exercises, such jurisdiction, the Enquiring Authority 
so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by its 
predecessor, or party recorded by his predecessor and 
partly by itself.  
(16)  After conclusion of the enquiry, a report shall be prepared 
and submitted to the Disciplinary Authority.  
(17)   The Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiring Authority as 
the case may be shall complete the proceedings, as far 
as may be, within three months from the date of issue of 
the chargesheet. 
Regulation 39: Action on the enquiry report  
(1) The Disciplinary Authority having regard to the findings on 
all or any of the charges and the past service record, after 
giving the concerned employee a reasonable opportunity 
of making representation on the penalty proposed, make 
an order imposing penalty. The Disciplinary Authority, 
having regard to its findings on all or any of the charges, 
is of the opinion that the same has not been made out, it 
may pass an order exonerating the workman concerned.    
(2) The Disciplinary Authority, shall if it disagrees with the 
findings of the Enquiring Authority on any of the charges, 
record its reasons for such disagreement and record its 
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own findings on such charge, to effect that evidence on 
record is sufficient for the purpose, and make an order 
imposing any minor penalty and of the same is not felt 
adequate under the circumstances, proceed under sub-
regulation (4). 
(3) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the enquiring 
Authority may, for reason to recorded in writing, remit the 
case to the Enquiring Authority for fresh or further enquiry 
and report thereon, and the Enquiring Authority shall 
thereupon proceed to hold further enquiry, as for as may 
be, according to regulation 38.  
(4) Regulation 40 : Communication of orders :  Every order 
made by the Disciplinary Authority after enquiring under 
regulation 37 or regulations 38 shall be communicated to 
the workman concerned, who shall also be supplied with 
a copy of the report of the enquiry, if any.  
(5) Appeal: Appeal against any decision of the Disciplinary 
Authority, imposing penalty under regulation 37 or 38 may 
be made to Chairman and the decision is that of the 
Chairman, to the Board. 
(6) Review: Notwithstanding anything contained in these 
regulations, the Board may, on its own motion or 
otherwise, call for the records of nay case relating to 
disciplinary proceedings within 180 days of the date on 
which final order is made.  
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6.2.3 : Procedure adopted by private bodies 
The Madras Aluminium Company Limited., a company 
incorporated under the companies Act, 1956 and having its 
registered and plant at Mettur Dam R.S (Salem District), Tamil 
Nadu (hereinafter referred to as malco for short). Malco owns 
aluminium queries in Salem District and Ooty District of Tamil 
Nadu and has two aluminium smelters in Mettur, employs more 
than one thousand workmen and officer staff. As the Malco is 
required to follow the Standing Orders to regulate the terms and 
conditions of employment of workmen. Accordingly, Malco is 
following the standing orders certified by the certifying Officer, 
Coimbatore dated 28th January 1967. The text of the said 
standing orders which are important to our research under 
context are discussed hereunder: 
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Order no. 52: The maintenance of discipline among workmen 
by laying down rules and instructions and enforcing the same 
by appropriate action is the legitimate right and responsibility of 
the employer. 
Order no. 53 enlists 47 types of the misconduct – all of them 
are in sync with Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 
1946. 
Order no. 54 (a) denotes about punishment for Misconduct – a 
workman found guilty of misconduct may be: 
 
 
(ii) Suspended for a period not exceeding even (7) days. 
(iii) Fined in accordance with payment of wages Act, 1936, 
or 
(iv) Degraded or demoted, or  
(v) His increment may be fully or partly withheld, or 
(vi) His promotion may be stopped for such   period and to 
such extent as may be considered fit, or 
(vii) Dismissed without notice or any compensation in lieu 
of notice. 
(b) Procedure for suspension: The order of suspension under 
the above clause shall be in writing and may take effect 
immediately on communication thereof to the workmen. Such 
order shall set out the alleged misconduct and the workman 
shall be given opportunity of explaining the circumstances 
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alleged against him.  If on enquiry the order is confirmed or 
modified the workman shall be deemed to be absent from duty 
for the periods of suspension and shall not be entitled to any 
remuneration for such periods. If, however, the order is 
restricted, the workman shall be entitled t the same wages as 
he would have received if he had not been suspended.      
Order no. 55: Procedure for dismissal: 
(a) No order of dismissal shall be made unless the workman 
concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and 
is given time of not less than 72 hours to explain the 
circumstances alleged against him. 
 
(b) Pending enquiry in the misconduct, the workman may be 
suspended from work. 
 
(c) The manager may himself or through other officer make 
such enquiry and the workman shall present himself at the time 
and date fixed for such enquiry. 
 
(d) At the enquiry, the manger or enquiring officer may, at his 
discretion, either require the workman or his witnesses to file 
their written and signed statement or proceed to record their 
statements which they shall sign after it is read out to them and 
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found correct. The workmen and the witness shall be bound to 
answer truthfully all such questions as are put to them by the 
manager or the enquiring officer. 
 
(e) If on an enquiry, the workman is found guilty of 
misconduct, he may be dismissed and such dismissal shall take 
place from the date of suspension and shall not be entitled to 
any remuneration for the period of suspension. 
 
(f) If on enquiry, the workman is found not guilty of 
misconduct, he would be permitted to resume work and shall be 
entitled to the same wages as he would receive if he had not 
been suspended. 
 
(g) Where under the provisions of any law, it is necessary to 
obtain the permission of any court, tribunal or authority for the 
dismissal the workman or workmen concerned may be kept 
under suspension pending disposal of such court, tribunal or 
authority of the application for grant of such permission. The 
payment of wages for the period of such suspension will either 
be made or not made as provided in such clause (e) or (f) 
above depending upon whether permission to dismiss the 
worker is not or is granted by the tribunal, court or other 
authority.  
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Order no. 56 - - In awarding the punishment  under the above 
Standing Order, the manager shall take into account the gravity 
of the misconduct, the previous record of the workman if any, 
and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that 
may exist. And order no. 57 denotes that a copy of the order by 
the manager shall be supplied to the workman concerned. 
6.3  Presentation of Data procured through   
Questionnaire- 
 
In order to understand the practical implementation part and the 
ground realities in the matters of misconduct, disciplinary 
enquiries and imposition of punishment thereof by the 
employers, a surveillance been maintained through 
observations and enquiries through circulation of structured 
questionnaire and over an interview / interaction with 
professionals (Enquiry Officers) involved in the Industry and 
Legal Profession. The questionnaire has been mailed to more 
than 25 Industries and other professionals such as Enquiry 
Officers, Trade Union Leaders and Legal (Labour Law) 
Practitioners. The data collected and procured through 
questionnaire and personal interviews and interaction with 
enquiry officers, legal practitioners and Trade Union Leaders is 
enormous.  The questionnaire contains 181 questions inter-alia     
covering all aspects of Disciplinary Enquiry and Industrial 
Relations and for ease of reference to the respondent the same 
has been divided in to following categories with 05 point scale 
objective type answer scheme: 
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1) Organization culture 
2) Industrial Relations 
3) Conflict Resolution Style 
4) Grievance Handling Machinery 
5)  Disciplinary Action Against Misconduct 
6) Suspension 
7) Disciplinary Proceedings vis-à-vis Criminal Proceedings 
8) Imposition of Punishment  
9) Statements with regard to existing procedure and 
procedure required n the matters of Disciplinary Enquiry. 
 
Out of 181 questions, and the responses thereto, the following 
questions and responses of respondents are marked out while 
the most relevant to the research under context and the same 
is depicted herein below:- 
 
(1) Organization culture: 
Scale points: (1) NOT AT ALL  (2) TO A SLIGHT EXTENT (3) TO A 
MODERATE EXTENT (4) TO A GREAT EXTENT (5) TO A VERY GREAT 
EXTENT 
 
Question scale 
point 
-5  
 scale 
point 
-4 
scale 
point  
-3 
scale 
point 
-2 
scale 
point  
-1 
manpower   is its greatest asset  
  
 4    
to maintain discipline, disciplinary 
action is imperative   
5     
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Discretion in  disciplinary power is 
often exercised     
 4    
Suspicion and caution is practiced 
in every dealing 
  3   
no difference between hard 
working and insincere employees 
  3   
Employees maintain status quo out 
of fear 
 4    
Employees agree with superiors to 
avoid their wrath 
 4    
Employees believe in worshipping 
boss 
 4    
Promotions are linked to 
employees' affinity to boss 
  3   
Employees compelled to play a 
role of conspirator  against their 
subordinates 
  3   
Mistakes in work are not tolerated  4    
Shrewd and cunning employees 
command respect 
  3   
Employees do things that earn 
superiors' goodwill 
5     
Trusted allies are nurtured and 
protected 
 4    
One is expected to win irrespective 
of the means 
 4    
Employees pretend good 
interpersonal relationship 
 4    
Employees participation   3   
Openness in dealings   3   
 
 
(2) Industrial Relations 
Scale points: (1) NOT AT ALL (2) TO A SLIGHT EXTENT (3) TO A 
MODERATE EXTENT (4) TO A GREAT EXTENT (5) TO A VERY GREAT 
EXTENT 
 
Question  scale 
point 
-5 
 scale 
point 
-4 
 scale 
point  
-3 
scale 
point  
-2 
scale 
point 
-1 
Management believes in collective 
bargaining 
   2  
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existence of Trade Union is a 
barrier to the industrial growth, 
peace & harmony 
 4    
Fact finding enquiries play an 
important role in improving I.R. 
5     
intervention of  third party conflict 
resolution  
 4    
Workers and union avoid hostile 
reactions 
  3   
Union is open and willing to 
negotiate on various issues 
  3   
Management does not believe that  
“Discipline can be enforced by 
penalizing employees" 
   2  
Employees are not castigated and 
reprimanded unnecessarily 
   2  
Management disapproves of 
terminating people on unjustified 
grounds 
   2  
Management is not over-strict in 
enforcing discipline 
    1 
will resort to lay off or lock out, as 
a last alternative 
  3   
Workers don't indulge in causing  
intentional waste and  inefficiency 
 4    
I.R in organization is untouched by 
changes in political scene in the 
country 
   2  
Labour relations remain healthy 
even if the company's supply and 
demand in market is hard hit 
   2  
Workers and union disapprove 
steps like strike as a  tool to 
resolve conflicts /issues / demands 
5     
Workers are aware of complete 
situation of organization 
   2  
Grievances of the employees are 
handled rationally through a well 
defined grievance handling 
procedure 
    1 
fair amount of mutual trust 
between management       and the 
union. 
   2  
 
 507
(3) Grievance Handling Machinery:  
Scale points: (1) NOT AT ALL (2) TO A SLIGHT EXTENT (3) TO A 
MODERATE  EXTENT (4)TO A GREAT EXTENT (5) TO A VERY GREAT 
EXTENT 
Question scale 
point 
-5 
scale 
point  
-4 
scale 
point  
-3 
 scale 
point  
-2 
 scale 
point  
-1 
We have effective grievance 
handling committee 
   2  
We involve third party member     1 
All the Complaints/Grievances 
are referred to the committee 
   2  
exists established procedure to 
be followed by Committee 
   2 1 
Time limit has been set to 
dispose of the complaint / 
grievance   
    1 
Committee enjoys the 
confidence and  trust of the 
employees 
    1 
Rotation of committee 
members 
    1 
every employee knows about 
the existence of  Grievance 
handling Committee 
    1 
Members of the Committee are 
well acquainted with  all the 
aspects of Grievance 
   2  
The procedure for grievance 
handling committee has been 
formulated in consultation of 
employees/union 
    1 
Are you satisfied with the 
existing grievance handling 
committee & procedure 
    1 
(4) Disciplinary Action against misconduct: 
Scale points: (1) NOT AT ALL (2) TO A SLIGHT EXTENT (3) TO A 
MODERATE EXTENT (4) TO A GREAT EXTENT (5) TO A VERY GREAT 
EXTENT 
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Question scale 
point 
-5 
scale 
point 
-4 
scale 
point 
-3 
scale 
point 
-2 
scale 
point  
-1 
Service Rules/Standing Orders 
are formulated with due  
consultation of 
employees/unions 
   2  
We do not go for preliminary 
enquiry prior to regular enquiry 
 4    
We generally initiate 
disciplinary action both on 
complaint as well as suo-moto 
5     
Disciplinary procedure in full  
and at length has been  laid 
down in our Service 
Rules/Standing orders 
   2  
List of misconducts have been  
enlisted in the Service Rules / 
Standing Orders 
   2  
acts of misconducts have been 
divided and denoted to impose 
minor and major penalties 
    1 
Types of punishment to be 
inflicted has been denoted in 
the Service Rules/Standing 
Orders 
   2  
exists a separate procedure to 
impose minor and major 
penalty 
    1 
We have in-house expertise to 
draft charge-sheet 
   2  
While issuing charge-sheet we 
generally decide to go for a 
major or minor penalty 
  3   
Sometimes we appoint enquiry 
officer in the charge-sheet itself 
  3   
We also initiate disciplinary 
action against the misconduct  
committed at employee's club, 
Establishment Residential  
Colony and in public premises 
 4    
We invariably place employees 
on suspension on the issuance 
of charge-sheet 
  3   
We evaluate the nature of   3   
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charges and other exigencies 
and  then place a charge-
sheeted employee on 
suspension 
Once the charge sheet is 
issued, we see that the charges 
are  proved by all means 
  3   
Our Service Rules/ Standing 
Orders contain the procedure 
to  impose penalty 
   2  
Standing Orders / Service 
Rules contain full fledged 
procedure   to conduct 
disciplinary enquiry 
    1 
Generally legal 
retainers/Advocates of the 
company      will be appointed 
as the Enquiry Officer  
 4    
Management will appoint E.O 
and pay remuneration 
5     
Workmen will have a say in the 
appointment of E.O  
    1 
Presenting Officer (PO) is 
guided by the Co's legal team 
  3   
E.O. is instructed by the 
management from time to time 
  3   
Always charge-sheet is 
accompanied  with the 
documents  relied thereof 
   2  
The delinquent employee is 
enquired to bear the cost of   
producing witnesses for his 
defence 
  3   
Only on the specific request 
from the delinquent employee 
we supply the documents 
 4    
Enquiry report will be submitted 
to the Disciplinary Authority 
5     
 
(5) Suspension:  
Scale points: (1) NOT AT ALL (2) TO A SLIGHT EXTENT (3) TO A 
MODERATE EXTENT (4) TO A GREAT EXTENT (5) TO A VERY GREAT 
EXTENT 
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Question scale 
point 
- 5 
scale 
point  
-4 
scale 
point 
-3 
scale 
point 
-2 
scale 
point 
-1 
We follow laid down procedure 
while suspension 
   2  
It is pure discretion of the 
management to place 
employee 
under suspension 
5     
No time limit for suspension
 period 
5     
Consideration of suspension as 
punishment 
 4    
Revocation of suspension only 
after the disposal of the 
disciplinary enquiry 
 4    
Payment of subsistence 
allowance during suspension is 
the discretion of the employer 
 4    
Suspension is the right vested 
in the employer 
5     
 
(6) Disciplinary Proceedings vis-à-vis Criminal proceedings 
Scale points: (1) NOT AT ALL (2) TO A SLIGHT EXTENT (3) TO A 
MODERATE EXTENT (4) TO A GREAT EXTENT (5) TO A VERY GREAT 
EXTENT 
Question scale 
point 
 -5 
scale 
point  
-4 
scale 
point 
-3 
scale 
point 
-2 
scale 
point 
 -1 
Our Rules contain the 
guidelines about the 
Disciplinary proceedings 
 vis-a-vis criminal 
proceedings 
    1 
There should be such codified 
guiding principles / norms in 
the matters of parallel 
proceedings of disciplinary 
5     
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and criminal 
Criminal court order is not 
binding on domestic enquiry 
   2  
Enquiry is not 
essential/importance on 
conviction in criminal case 
5     
Standard of proof in 
disciplinary enquiry & in 
criminal  
proceedings is common 
  3   
 
(7) Imposition of Punishment: 
 Scale points: (1) NOT AT ALL (2) TO A SLIGHT EXTENT (3) TO A 
MODERATE EXTENT (4) TO A GREAT EXTENT (5) TO A VERY GREAT 
EXTENT 
 
Question  scale 
point 
 -5   
 scale  
point 
 -4   
 scale  
point 
 -3   
 scale  
point 
 -2 
 scale 
point 
-1 
Our rules contain elaborate 
procedure to be followed on 
receipt of enquiry report 
    1 
There should be such codified 
guiding procedure to be 
followed by the employer on 
and after receipt of enquiry 
report 
5     
We supply the Enquiry Report 
only on the request of the 
delinquent employee 
irrespective of the existing 
procedure 
 4    
Our Service Rules specify that 
enquiry report along with 
documents relied are to be 
supplied to delinquent 
employee. 
   2  
Non-furnishing of enquiry 
report will quash the 
proceedings of the enquiry 
held 
   2  
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 Essential ingredients of valid 
enquiry constitutes : definite 
charges, evidence, reasonable 
opportunity, findings of EO 
based on  material placed, 
adhere to principles of natural 
justice       
 
5     
Personnel Officer/Labour 
Welfare Officer/ I.R. Cell of the 
establishment is not fully 
acquainted with the basic 
features/essentials of the valid 
disciplinary enquiry as they are 
not codified 
 4    
Issuing of second show-cause 
notice is not a Rule of thumb 
5     
As soon as we receive the 
report of the EO, punishment 
will be imposed 
     
Selecting the punishment is the 
discretion of the employer 
5     
We follow laid down criteria for 
inflicting punishment 
   2  
We do not have codified 
guidelines for inflicting 
appropriate/ proportionate 
punishment 
5     
In case the findings are not 
favourable we do not agree 
with the findings of the EO  
 4    
If the findings are not as per 
our expectations, we go for de 
- novo enquiry 
 4    
We offer personal hearing 
before inflicting punishment 
    1 
The disciplinary authority and 
appellate authority can be one 
and the same 
 4    
Generally the appellate 
authority will not interfere in the 
order of punishment 
irrespective of existence of any 
alleged  
anomaly in the punishment 
    1 
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Sec. 11A of the ID Act, 1947 
interferes in the jurisdiction and 
powers of the employer in the 
disciplinary matters 
5     
One who has power to appoint 
has inherent right to  terminate 
the same 
5     
Social justice is the basis of 
judicial interference in the 
matters of employee discipline 
 4    
We have laid down procedure 
for review of the punishment
  
    1 
Generally we do not pardon 
the proved charges 
5     
We challenge the orders of 
reinstatement by Labour Court 
by way of filing appeals in the 
Higher Courts 
5     
HOW DO YOU AGREE WITH FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? 
Scale points: (1) STRONGLY AGREE (2) AGREE (3) 
UNDECIDED (4) DISAGREE (5) STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Statement  scale 
point 
-5 
  scale 
point -
-4 
  scale 
point --
-3 
 scale 
point 
-2 
 scale  
point 
 -1 
Whatever procedure available 
on this day on the Disciplinary 
Proceedings is based on the 
court rulings & precedents 
from time to time  
   2  
The industry badly requires 
codified procedures containing 
all nitty-gritty on the procedure 
of disciplinary proceedings   
beginning from initiation of 
disciplinary enquiry to inflicting 
punishment 
    1 
The codified procedure may 
clear existing doubts and pave 
foundation for restoring 
confidence and transparency 
in the matters 
of disciplinary proceedings 
    1 
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between employer and 
employee 
Not satisfied with the patch 
work quasi legislation being 
done by the judiciary in the 
matters of disciplinary 
proceedings  by way of giving 
rulings from time to time 
    1 
Industrial Employment 
(Standing Order) Act, 1946, 
respective State Shops & 
Establishment Acts and 
Conduct, Rules and 
Regulations of the PSU's, 
autonomous bodies, Public 
Cos., must possess the 
codified Rules regarding 
procedure to be followed while 
initiation and conducting 
disciplinary proceedings. 
    1 
 
A pro-forma used is annexed hereto and marked as ‘appendix-
1’ and the critical analysis of the material referred hereinabove 
in this chapter is narrated in the forthcoming chapter i.e.Chapter 
–7. 
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Chapter  07: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
EXISTING SYSTME OF DISCIPLINARY 
ENQUIRY  
7.1 Critical analysis of the procedure provided under various 
statutes: 
7.1.1 Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946; 
& Rules  
     7.1.2 Shops and Commercial Establishments Act (s); 
  7.1.2 Provision of the Constitution of India 
7.2 Critical analysis of the procedure adopted by employers – 
Public and Private; 
7.2.1 Central Civil Service Conduct and Appeal Rules; 
7.2.2 Procedure adopted by semi Govt., bodies; 
7.2.3 Procedure adopted by private bodies; 
7.3 Critical analysis of Data procured through questionnaire 
and depicted in chapter - 6   
 
7.1 Critical analysis of the procedure provided under 
various statutes: 
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7.1.1  Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946; & 
Rules:  
All the relevant existing sections and rules have been denoted 
and captured in Chapter – 6 above; However the Act of 1946 
and the Rules framed there under is not complete and self 
sufficient and proved to be grossly inadequate in the matters / 
issues of Disciplinary Enquiry in view of the mass of case law 
developed in the area of this research. The Following are the 
main areas among the other areas of Disciplinary Enquiry, 
where the Act and Rules fall short / being felt grossly 
inadequate: 
(1) Misconduct:  The Act has been passed in the year 1946, 
most of the misconducts have conceived and denoted based on 
the Industrial environment and situation existed in that 
particular point of time. The same needs to be changed and 
new set of misconducts needs to be updated, introduced for 
better Industrial Relations and Industrial peace. The Act is not 
self content with regard to classification of misconducts as per 
their degree, nature and seriousness via-a-vis the quantum of 
punishment to imposed on their establishment.    
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(2) Initiation of Disciplinary Enquiry: This is least to say 
that such provision is in existence. As the Act is not containing 
full fledged enquiry procedure, obviously, provisions relating to 
guide, to initiate inquiry and to conduct enquiry are not existing;   
that is to say initiation of enquiry (a) suo-moto, (b) on complaint 
(c) on secondment, (d) transfer and (e) after retirement 
(including VRS) (f) after resignation (g) after death of an 
employee and who can initiate. 
(3) Charge-sheet: Act does not contain any of the following 
information relating to the charge-sheet: (a) standard pro-forma 
of the Charge-sheet, (b) essential elements to be followed in 
the charge-sheet (c) language to be deployed while framing of 
the charges, etc. 
(4) Procedure to be followed in the Disciplinary Enquiry:  
The Act does not contain the detail procedure to be followed 
while conducting disciplinary enquiry. That is to say, service of 
charge-sheet, providing with documents to delinquent, etc,.   
(5) Appointment of Enquiry Officer / Bias: There is no hard 
and fast rule to appoint Enquiry Officer (E.O). The Act is not 
provided with procedure to appoint Enquiry Officer. Any body 
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can be appointed as E.O, payment to E.O is being made by the 
Employer, no transparency in appointment of E.O and he can 
be easily subjected to all kind of bias. 
(6) Applicability of Principles of Natural Justice:  Act is 
very silent on applicability of principles of natural justice. The 
Act is not explicit under what circumstances and under what 
stage full and fair opportunity to be given to other side by 
following the principles of natural justice. 
(7) Representation through lawyer by delinquent employee: 
No such provision is present in the Act or under the Standing 
Orders framed there under. 
(8) Record keeping of enquiry proceedings: The existing 
practice of record keeping of the enquiry procedure does not 
inspire the confidence of the delinquent employee. There is no 
standardized procedure. It is left wide open to the vagaries and 
discretion of the Enquiry Officer. When the delinquent questions 
the validity and legality of such erratic procedure, courts are not 
keen to interfere on the ground / issue of extent of prejudice 
caused to delinquent employee. 
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(9)  Examination and cross examination: The existing 
practice and the Acts and Rules discussed herein does not 
contain about the modus operandi of examination / cross 
examination and re-examination of each of the parties 
witnesses and documents. 
 
(10) Admission of charges: There exist no guidelines in the 
matters of administration of admission / confession of charges 
by the delinquent employee. 
(11) Form and content of Enquiry Report: No such guidelines 
have been laid down about the form and content of the enquiry 
report. In the interest of delinquent employee and in the interest 
of the justice equity and fairness it is advisable to have 
guidelines about the form and content of the Enquiry Report. 
(12) Imposition of Punishment: This is very important aspect 
in the entire process of the disciplinary proceedings. Act should 
contain all the minute aspects over imposition of punishment 
i.e. study of enquiry report, supply of enquiry report, second 
show cause notice, personal hearing to the delinquent etc. 
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(13) Remedies and Penal provisions:  The Act should 
specifically contain inter-alias that the remedies i.e. review, 
revision and appeal against the order passed by the disciplinary 
Authority.   
7.1.2       Shops and Commercial Establishments Act (s): 
The Shops and commercial establishment Act promulgamated 
by the center and the respective States not at all contain any 
kind of provisions / procedure with regard to disciplinary 
enquiry, least to state about the exit / termination of an 
employee. It is intoto left to the discretion of the employer. 
Therefore, it is advisable that all the provisions discussed 
herein above under the Standing Orders Act / Rules, should 
find place in the respective State Shops and Commercial 
Establishment Acts enacted by center and States.    
 
7.1.3 Provisions of the Indian constitution:  Analysis 
discussed here under the provisions of Central Civil Service 
Conduct and Appeal Rules is the reflection of Article 311 of the 
Indian Constitution.  
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7.2 Critical analysis of the procedure adopted by 
employers – Public and Private; 
 
7.2.1 Central Civil Service Conduct and Appeal Rules; 
 
7.2.2    Procedure adopted by semi Govt., bodies; 
 
7.2.3   Procedure adopted by private bodies; 
The following are the common lacunae’s found in the procedure 
adopted under the said Central Civil Service Conduct and 
Appeal Rules, Semi Govt., bodies and Private bodies: (below 
points provided for in order to avoid repetition of text and to avoid 
overlapping) 
?? Inadequate guidelines about initiation of disciplinary 
enquiry 
?? Improper procedure of drawing up of charge-sheet 
?? Articles of Charges / statement of imputation 
?? Service of Charge-sheet –not guided 
?? Qualifications of Enquiry Officer – not guided 
?? Appointment of Enquiry Officer – not guided 
?? Fee to the Enquiry Officer  - not guided 
?? Appointment of Presenting Officer – not guided 
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?? Improper maintenance of daily order sheet to be 
maintained by the Enquiry Officer 
?? Recording of statement of witnesses – not guided 
?? Cognizance of Documents – not guided 
?? Examination in chief of witnesses – not guided 
?? Cross examination / re-examination of witnesses – not 
guided 
?? Ill-equipped to deal with the situation when delinquent 
confesses / pleads guilty 
?? Privileged documents – not guided 
?? Functions of Enquiry Officer – not guided 
?? Representation by legal practitioner – not guided 
?? Exparte Enquiry – not guided 
?? Time limit – not properly guided 
?? Principles of natural justice – not being fully applied 
?? Standard of proof – not applied 
?? Adjournment – not guided 
?? Stay by court – no specific provision to guide 
?? Form and content of Enquiry report – not guided 
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?? Action on the Enquiry report – not guided 
?? Denovo / further Enquiry – not guided 
?? Imposition of penalty – not guided 
?? Major and minor punishment – not guided 
?? Show cause notice / second show cause notice – not 
guided 
?? Personal hearing  - not guided 
?? Remedies – not provided for properly 
 
7.3  Critical analysis of Data procured through 
questionnaire and depicted in chapter - 6   
As depicted in the Chapter – 6 supra, the data procured on 
plight of existing Disciplinary Enquiry procedure and the method 
and process of imposition of punishment is critically examined 
and evaluated herein below: 
 
1) Organization culture: All most all the respondent from 
whom the opinion has been sought through Questionnaire and 
interviews have candidly expressed that Organisation Culture 
with regard to maintain discipline at the work place, to upkeep 
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time, output, avoid gossips, etc., often resorted to a strict 
disciplinary action. It has been revealed from the responses 
that out of five point scale, an healthy higher percentage of 
respondents responded with point scale at 4 points denotes 
that the human resource is treated as chattels and having poor 
work culture. Transparency in the relation between the 
employer and employer is abysmally low, therefore, among the 
other factors, employees inculcating a culture of Boss 
worshiping is common feature and as a result an unhealthy 
organizational culture is being developed. 
        
2) Industrial Relations:  Again, it has been revealed in the 
responses to questionnaire both oral and written that in order to 
have orderly and healthy industrial relations often resorted to 
disciplinary action by the employers. Lack of faith in Collective 
Bargaining, existence of Trade Union in the setup has been 
perceived as detrimental to good Industrial Relations. Principle 
of workers participation in the management has been remained 
as paper tiger. Management often approves termination of 
employees on unjustified grounds. Lay of and Lockouts has 
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been presumed and practiced as rights of employer. 
Inadequate system of conflict resolution in an organization has 
been noticed. All the above factors, among the other factors 
drives towards unhealthy Industrial Relations. 
 
3) Grievance Handling Machinery: Most of the organizations, 
which have responded to the questionnaire have openly come 
out that they do not have adequate / full fledged / foolproof 
Grievance Handling Machinery. It is pertinent to mention that 
having a Grievance Handling Machinery is the first step 
towards having better / codified Disciplinary Enquiry 
Procedure. It has been further revealed the following: 
 
a) No effective grievance handling committee 
b) No involvement of third partying the process – to 
inspire confidence of workmen and transparency. 
c) No procedure laid down to be followed by the 
Committee 
d) Committee does not enjoy the confidence and trust of 
employees 
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e) Members of the Committee are not acquainted / 
updated aspects of grievance handling.  
 
Apropos, the existing grievance handling machinery is not 
effective and it needs to be given appropriate shape and teeth 
and having grievance handling machinery, in every industry, 
factory should be made compulsory by statute.   
      
4) Disciplinary action against Misconduct: The responses 
to the questionnaire reveal that there exists no uniform 
procedure for conducting Disciplinary Enquiry.  The employers 
believe that, the existing procedure though it is inadequate, it 
places them in the comfort zone as they can take decisions to 
suite their convenience. With the exiting scheme of things, 
employer may easily discharge / remove and dismiss the 
targeted workmen / employees. The responses to questionnaire 
reveals the following: 
 
(1) Power of suo moto initiation of enquiry 
(2) Faulty Disciplinary Enquiry Procedure 
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(3) No differentiation between acts of misconduct vis-à-vis 
imposition of punishment 
(4) Faulty charge-sheet 
(5) Appointment of Enquiry Officer & fee is being paid by 
management 
(6) Enquiry Officers are just rubber stamps in the hands of 
employers 
(7) No laid down procedure to be followed by Enquiry Officer 
(8) Workman will not have any say in the appointment of 
Enquiry Officer 
(9) Enquiry report in not binding the Management 
(10) Employer may always institute a de nova  enquiry. 
 
In view of the above, one can easily conclude that the system 
perse is not at all inspired the confidence and trust of 
employees.  
    
5) Suspension: Even this is not an exception from the 
defects. The privilege of employer to place an employee under 
suspension is exercised sans responsibility. We have seen in 
the earlier chapters that, very often, courts have interfered in 
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settling the matters related suspension, subsistence allowances 
and other benefits. It is imperative have a clear laid down policy 
in the matters of suspension. 
     
6) Disciplinary Proceedings vis-à-vis Criminal 
Proceedings: This is another area of disciplinary enquiry, 
wherein, as of date, only court rulings are filling the gaps. It is 
imperative that a clear procedure to be in built in the 
Disciplinary Procedure that to avoid discomfort and growing  
litigation. 
 
7) Imposition of Punishment: The imposition of 
punishment is again very, very subjective and based on 
surmises, conjunction and bias, as there exist no laid down 
procedure. There is lot of inconsistency and discrimination 
while inflicting proportionate penalty. In order to meet the ends 
of justice and to control the unbridled power of the employers in 
imposition of penalty, section 11A was introduced in the 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It has been revealed to a great 
extent in responses to the questionnaire that there exists no 
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elaborate procedure to be followed while imposition of penalty. 
It is relevant to state that we have examined catena of 
judgments in this regard in the earlier chapters. Time and again 
the law courts are guiding about the proportionate punishment 
to be inflicted on the delinquent employees.     
 
It is pertinent to mention here that all most all the respondents 
to the questionnaire referred supra have vehemently responded 
affirmative with regard to adequacy of the existing scheme of 
things and requirement of full-fledged disciplinary enquiry 
procedure inter-alia agreeing to the following questions / 
statements specifically posed them: 
 
(a) Whatever procedure available on this day on the 
Disciplinary Proceedings is based on the court rulings & 
precedents from time to time      
    
(b) The industry badly requires codified procedures 
containing all nitty-gritty on the procedure of disciplinary 
proceedings   beginning from initiation of disciplinary 
enquiry to inflicting punishment     
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(c) The codified procedure may clear existing doubts and 
pave foundation for restoring confidence and 
transparency in the matters of disciplinary proceedings 
between employer and employee   
      
(d) Not satisfied with the patch work quasi legislation being 
done by the judiciary in the matters of disciplinary 
proceedings by way of giving rulings from time to time 
      
(e) Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946,  
respective State Shops & Establishment Acts and 
Conduct, Rules and Regulations of the PSU's, 
autonomous bodies, Public Cos., must possess the 
codified Rules regarding procedure to be followed while 
initiation and conducting disciplinary proceedings.  
 
7.4 Graphic analysis of responses to the Questionnaire:   
Analysis of the responses to the said questionnaire has been 
processed in the form of graphical charts, the said charts are 
provided in below for ready reference.  
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Chapter 08: CONCLUSIONS  
                    AND SUGESSIONS 
 
8.1 Conclusion  
8.2 Suggestions 
8.2.1  Need for panel of enquiry officers 
8.2.2  Guidelines for full-fledged enquiry 
procedure 
8.2.3  Effective and compulsory grievance 
handling machinery 
 
8.1 CONCLUSION:   
Everyone is talking change in labour laws and even the 
recommendations of the Second Labour Commission have not 
touched the vital issues for holding of enquiries when an 
employee is charge-sheeted and his explanation has not been 
found satisfactory. In India there are more than 175 labour 
legislations but none of these deals at length with the procedure 
of holding enquiries. That apart the main drawback in labour 
administration pertains to appointment of enquiry officers. 
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Invariably, in every disciplinary proceeding, the enquiry officer 
has been appointed by the employer which does not inspire the 
confidence of the delinquent employee. There is thus great 
need to change procedure of the disciplinary / domestic 
enquiries. It is pertinent to mention here that in the development 
of legal system, the decisions of the Court play a very important 
role, particularly the verdicts in the nature of ratio decidendi and 
obiter dicta. That is how, in effect, virtually every stage / aspect 
of disciplinary proceeding is being guided by court rulings. This 
aspect has been clearly dealt at length by us in chapter 1 to 5 
above.  As discussed in the above chapters with specific 
reference to the principles of natural justice viz; adi alterm 
partem and nemo judex causa sua are the two important 
principles of principles of natural justice. In view of this, the 
need of effective system and procedure while holding 
disciplinary enquiries is imperative. As discussed supra in 
disciplinary enquiries opportunity is given to the person against 
whom certain imputations of charges have been leveled and to 
contend himself and tell the Enquiry Officer records the 
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evidence of the parties and gives its findings to the effect 
whether the charges as levied have been proved or not. 
It is revealed by the above study and through observations that 
more than 90 percent cases pending for adjudication pertain to 
termination, discharge and or dismissal of workmen / employee. 
Gone are the days when employer could dispense with services 
of an employee at his whims and fancies.  With the withering 
away of the principles of lassie faire which were governing the 
relationship between an employer and employee, an employer 
cannot summarily terminate, discharge or dismiss simplicitor an 
employee howsoever undisciplined, undesirable or unwanted 
he maybe. The current labour legislations, judicial 
pronouncements which have for their objective the amelioration 
of the lot and betterment of the service conditions of the 
working class, have to a great extent restricted rights of an 
employer and secured the corresponding extent the job security 
of a workmen. For better appreciation of this position it is 
reiterated that the organs of the State i.e. Legislature, Executive 
and Judiciary through their respective functionaries have 
tighten their lose ends to place job security of an employee on 
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higher platform and to see that the employers are not exploited 
the workfolk to sub-serve their vested interest. Accordingly, we 
have perused catena of provisions which deals about the said 
situation. The following are the main Acts / provisions / case 
laws among the other which inter-alia deals about employees 
job / social security and social welfare which we have dealt at 
length in the chapters discussed hereinabove: -   
(a) Article 311 of the Indian Constitution, 1950 
(b) Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946   
(c) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 
(d) Shops and Establishment Acts 
(e) Union of India v/s Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 
(f) Kulwant Singh v/s state of Punjab, 1990 (61) FLR 635  
(g) M/s Scooters India Ltd., v/s Moh. Yaqub & anr, 1999 SC   
(h) Uptron India Ltd., v/s Shammi Bhan & anr (1998 (6) SCC 
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(i) D.K Yadav v/s JMA Industries 1993 LLR 584 (SC) 
(j) Central Inland water transport corporation v/s Brojonath 
ganguly, 1986 (3) SCC 156 
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(k) Delhi Transport Corporation v/s DTC Mazdoor congress, 
1991 (sppl) 1 SCC 600 
It is relevant and worth while to mention here the observations 
of the Supreme Court in the Delhi Transportation case549 that 
“…There is need to minimize the scope of the arbitrary use of 
power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good 
sense of the individuals, however, high-placed they may be, it is 
all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious 
rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries 
of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that 
individuals are not and do not become wise because they 
occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection 
and fairness does not go with the posts, however, high they 
may be. There is only a complaisant presumption that those 
who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The 
presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not 
support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a 
society pledged to uphold the rule of law, it would be both 
unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be 
                                                 
549 1991 (sppl) 1 SCC 600 
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governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be 
covered by the rule of law……...   
…… The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to 
livelihood therefore cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals 
in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can 
its survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of many 
fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, 
the right to work becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental 
rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined 
premises and uncertain applications. That will be a mockery of 
them. Both the society and the individual employees, therefore, 
have an anxious interest in service conditions being well 
defined and explicit to the extent possible. The arbitrary rules 
which are also sometimes described as Henry VIII Rules, can 
have no place in any service conditions… 
…. Law is a social engineering to remove the existing 
imbalance and to further the progress, serving the needs of the 
Socialist Democratic Bharat under rule of law. The prevailing 
social conditions and actualities of life are to be taken into 
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account to adjudging whether the impugned legislation would 
sub serve the purpose of the society. The arbitrary, unbridled 
and naked power of wide discretion to dismiss a permanent 
employee without any guidelines or procedure would tend to 
defeat the constitutional purpose of equality and allied 
purposes. Courts would take note of actualities of life that 
persons actuated to corrupt practices are capable to 
manoeuvre with higher echelons in diverse ways and also 
camouflage their activities by becoming sycophants or cronies 
to the superior officers…. Vesting arbitrary power would be a 
feeding ground for nepotism and insolence; instead of sub 
serving the constitutional purpose, it would defeat the very 
object, in particular, when the tribe of officers of honesty, 
integrity and devotion are struggling under despondence to 
continue to maintain honesty, integrity and devotion to the duty, 
in particular, when moral values and ethical standards are fast 
corroding in all walks of life including public services as well… 
As a court of constitutional functionary exercising equity 
jurisdiction, Supreme Court would relieve the weaker parties 
from unconstitutional contractual obligations, unjust unfair, 
 538
oppressive and unconscionable rules or conditions when the 
citizen really unable to meet on equal terms with the State. It is 
to find whether the citizen, when entered into contracts or 
service, was in distress need or compelling circumstances to 
enter into contract on dotted lines or whether the citizen was in 
a position of either to "take it or leave it"… 
… Before depriving an employee of the means of livelihood to 
himself and his dependents, i. e. job, the procedure prescribed 
for such deprivation must, therefore, be just, fair and 
reasonable under Arts. 21 and 14 and when infringes Art. 19(1) 
(g) must be subject of imposing reasonable restrictions under 
Art. 19(5). Conferment of power on a high rank officer is not 
always an assurance, in particular when the moral standards 
are generally degenerated that the power would be exercised 
objectively, reasonably, conscientiously, fairly and justly without 
inbuilt protection to an employee…” 
Upon perusal of the above and with reference to the said 
observations of the apex court, one would easily reach an 
understanding that there exists system of strong legislations 
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and aggressive judicial mechanism to protect the interest of the 
workfolk. This being the state of things; there is one loose end 
with the employer i.e. unbridled power / authority of dispense 
with services of the employees by way of bleak mechanism 
called disciplinary action. 
Accordingly, the entire study and research is dedicated on the 
very issue of how vulnerable the workfolk is against the 
disciplinary authority vested with the employer. We have 
witnessed through chapter – 1 to chapter 7 that:- 
(a) what is misconduct how it has been read and presumed 
under Industrial Jurisprudence, Constitutional 
perspective, master – servant relationship  
(b) Scope and purpose of Disciplinary Enquiry and 
applicability of principles of natural justice 
(c) Initiation of Disciplinary proceedings, charge-sheet, 
Enquiry officer, Presenting officer, stay of Enquiry by 
law courts 
 540
(d) Delinquent employee represented by legal practitioner, 
disciplinary proceedings vis-à-vis criminal proceedings, 
witness, bias in the enquiry 
(e) Form and content of enquiry report by the enquiry 
officer, supply of enquiry report, imposition of penalty 
and remedies available 
(f) Practice and procedure adopted by the employers – 
collection of data through structured questionnaire as 
well as oral interface / interview with professionals and 
people associated with the subject under context. 
(g) Critical analysis of the existing practice and procedure 
of the Disciplinary Enquiry. 
On perusal and examination of the above material which inter-
alia includes text, law, rules, regulations, standing orders, 
procedure, case law etc., goes to suggest and establish that 
there is no systematic laid down / codified or otherwise – 
enforceable procedure which contains all steps, procedure 
which secure the equity, justice and fair play of the interested 
parties, especially to delinquent employees in the matters of 
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disciplinary enquiries or departmental enquiries. Lot of areas in 
the enquiry process are still left wide open and are in the grey 
and waiting to be filled by assumption / presumptions and court 
rulings.   Therefore, in view of the above narrated procedure as 
studied and depicted in chapter 1 to 5 and critical research and 
analysis narrated in chapter – 6 and chapter – 7, based on 
which I have no hesitation to reach conclusion and accordingly 
the present research and study concludes and declares the 
finding as affirmative to the hypothesis. That is to say - YES 
DISCIPPLINARY ENQUIRY IS A WEAPON IN THE HANDS 
OF THE EMPLOYER. And such weapon can be used and 
being used to sub-serve their comfort and convenience at 
the cost of workfolk, inter-alia taking full advantage of the 
existing confused state of things (with specific reference to   
existing Indian Judicial superstructure and Constitutional 
perspective) in the matters of disciplinary enquiry process.    
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8.2 SUGGESTIONS:  
8.2.1 Urgent need for a panel of independent Enquiry 
Officers: Under the present system and enquiry officer does 
not inspire the confidence of the delinquent employee.  In the 
backdrop of the facts herein before, when we talk of disciplinary 
proceedings, a domestic / disciplinary enquiry is that of mistrust 
which arises essentially because the charge sheet is given by 
the employer and enquiry is also held by an officer or an 
outsider appointed by the employer. The employer, as such, 
represents the both prosecutor and the judge. A suspicion of 
bias is inevitable in such a situation. This is one of the main 
reason among others the delinquent employee do not have the 
faith in the Enquiry Officers. They participate reluctantly and 
take every possible to frustrate the enquiries. They raise 
number of objections including that of validity of the 
appointment of Enquiry Officer.  
Since the workmen have a perceived feeling that the 
management has already taken a decision to get rid of them 
 543
and the enquiry is only a postmortem to comply with legal 
formalities, the Enquiry Officer, howsoever impartial he may be, 
does not inspire the confidence of the delinquent workmen. 
This feeling will frustrate the very essence of natural justice. 
Therefore, it necessary that the law should provide, a “Panel of 
Enquiry Officers” who may be, amongst retire judges including 
the retired judges of labour court, Industrial Tribunals, Labour 
Law Practitioners, Labour Inspectors / Officers. They should be 
empowered with semi / quasi-judicial powers while holding 
enquiries. As a result of such enquiries, the due weightage will 
be given to the findings of such Enquiry Officer and the number 
of Industrial disputes will be considerably reduced since the 
parties will know their fate on the conclusion of the enquiries. 
When such panel is constituted the enquiries will generate a 
sense of trust and confidence among the workers and 
employers alike.   
8.2.2 Guidelines for full-fledged enquiry procedure:  
Let the following frugal procedure among the other nitty-gritty 
find place in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 
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1946 and the Rules / Standing Orders framed / provided there 
under, CCA Rules, and the Regulations:- 
(a) Preliminary (if necessary to be held) after the report of the 
complaint. 
(b) Issue and service of show-cause notice / charge-sheet 
(c) Explanation of workman complained against the issue of 
charge-sheet 
(d) In case explanation is not satisfactory. Management may 
appoint an enquiry officer (guide lines). 
(e) Appointment of Presenting Officer  
(f) Enquiry Notice 
(g) Admission of guilt 
(h) Legal assistance to delinquent employee 
(i) Oral enquiry if required. 
(j) Reports of the findings and conclusions. 
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(k) Disciplinary authority to issue second show cause notice 
with a copy of the Enquiry Report as to why proposed 
penalty should not be imposed and accept the findings of 
the Enquiry Officer. 
(l) Personal hearing 
(m) Communication of disciplinary orders to employee 
concerned. 
(n) Appeal Review and Revision; 
ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS IN EACH STEP: 
Report or complaint against the delinquent: 
(vii) The report must contain specifically: 
- Date 
- Time 
- Specific acts or omission of the employee against whom 
complaint has been reported. 
- Effect of such act or omission on the organization 
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- Names of the persons who were eye-witnesses. 
(viii) The report must be made immediately after the occurrence 
of the act or omission. 
(ix) The report must be made by the supervisor/reporting officer 
concerned or affected with the matter of complaint. 
(x) It should be addressed to the head of the Department. 
(xi) It must be noted through proper channel. 
(xii) It must be forwarded in original with his remark to the 
appointing authority / Disciplinary Authority. 
Action on the report / complaint by the management: 
(c) The officer concerned should give his opinion in brief about 
the reported acts or omission. And record if disciplinary action is 
necessary with reasons. 
(d) The forwarding officer / complainant should send all the 
papers and documents connected with or throwing light on the 
acts or omissions and the behaviour in the department / section 
/ plant of the employee concerned. 
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Preliminary Enquiry: 
When necessary:- 
(iv) If the employee is to be corrected in the department itself, it 
may serve the purpose; the workman may apologize. 
(v) It can be useful where the facts are complicated or the 
employer for his satisfaction want to ascertain the truth of the 
complaint or take action if desired. 
(vi) Nature of preliminary enquiry:- 
A preliminary enquiry is of very informal character and the 
methods are likely to vary in accordance with the requirements 
of each case. The delinquent employees have no vested right 
in any form or procedure of holding preliminary enquiry.  The 
procedure is wholly at the discretion of the officer holding the 
enquiry.  After the preliminary enquiry, the disciplinary authority 
need not record its satisfaction in writing nor is it required to 
give reasons for initiating the regular departmental enquiry.  Ex 
- parte subjective satisfaction can be reached regarding prima 
facie case.  The authority need not give any opportunity to the 
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delinquent to have his say in the preliminary enquiry.  Principles 
of rationality and fairness in action cannot be read into such 
enquiry.  The doctrine of principles of natural justice is not 
applicable to preliminary enquiries. 
 
Preliminary inquiry is only for the purpose of satisfaction of the 
disciplinary authority as to the existence of a prima facie case 
against the concerned employee for instituting a regular 
departmental inquiry.    The disciplinary authority can get a 
fresh preliminary inquiry conducted by another officer and 
institute a regular departmental inquiry on its basis if it was not 
satisfied with the investigation and report of an earlier 
preliminary inquiry. 
Wherein and whenever conducted it must be - 
c) under oral instructions or written orders. 
d) Conducted on the same day or as early as possible 
e) Statements need not be recorded. 
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f) Only some explanatory questions to the employee 
complained against and one or two or three eye witnesses if 
any may be asked. 
Who should conduct the preliminary enquiry:- 
There cannot be a broad and unqualified proposition that an 
officer who conducted a preliminary enquiry is disqualified from 
acting as a disciplinary authority on the ground of bias.  Also, 
there is no proposition that official bias can never be attributed 
to the authority who conducted a preliminary enquiry and later 
on held the disciplinary enquiry as well.  It depends on the facts 
and circumstances of each case. In a given case there may be 
circumstances to show that a disciplinary authority who was a 
party to the preliminary enquiry report was so overwhelmed by 
his findings in the preliminary report that had approached the 
entire issue with a closed mind.  The manner of conducting the 
disciplinary enquiry and process of decision making may be 
suggestive of an inference that the disciplinary authority 
considered the domestic enquiry as a mere formality to fortify 
his own view point.  In such cases, bias can be a ground for 
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invalidating the decision of the disciplinary authority. But where 
the order passed by the disciplinary authority indicates that he 
scanned and made an independent appraisal of the entire 
evidence and gave additional reasons in support of its 
conclusions and was not mechanically led away by what was 
said in the preliminary enquiry report, an inference of strong 
likelihood of bias may not be drawn.  However, it would be 
prudent for the disciplinary enquiry not to conduct the 
preliminary enquiry himself. The same view was held in the 
case of Rajendra Prasad Singh vs. Union of India550.  
Generally, either the head of the department or under his 
instructions someone else of the department who is possibly 
should not be junior to the complainant. 
g) Someone other than the complaining officer. 
h) Not by one who is to be appointed as Enquiry Officer in the 
matter. 
Submission of report of the Preliminary enquiry:- 
                                                 
550 1996 I LLJ 1003 (Cal. H.C ) 
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d) The officer conducting preliminary enquiry should as far as 
possible submit a written report to the Head of the Department 
who had ordered the Preliminary enquiry. 
e) The Head of the Department should forward preliminary 
report along with the report of the complainant to the 
disciplinary authority. 
f) Even if the employee has apologized, the head of the 
department should always send his report to the disciplinary 
authority. 
 Issue of show-cause notice or charge-sheet to the 
delinquent 
1) If any action whether it is punishing or pardoning, the 
employee complained against, is contemplated by the 
management, show cause notice or charge-sheet should be 
issued.  It may however be issued in those cases also if the 
objective is to drop the enquiry or if the delinquent realises his 
lapses or defaults and tenders apology.  
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2) The show cause notice or charge-sheet is the very basis 
of any disciplinary action. The scope of charges mentioned in 
the show cause notice or charge-sheet will never be widened at 
any time after issuance of show cause notice or charge-sheet. 
3) If the disciplinary enquiry has to be carried to its 
conclusions a charge-sheet should be issued and not a show-
cause notice. If the object is merely reprimand the delinquent or 
enquiry is not intended in any reason, a show-cause notice may 
be issued. 
2. Drafting of charge-sheet or show cause notice: 
As per the Standing Orders / Staff Rules / Conduct Rules of the 
organization where it is proposed to hold an enquiry, the 
disciplinary authority shall frame the definite charges on the 
basis of the allegations against an employee. The charges 
together with a statement of the allegations, on which they are 
based, a list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by 
whom the articles of charges are proposed to be sustained, 
shall be communicated in writing to the employee who shall be 
required to submit within such time as may be specified by the 
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disciplinary authority (not exceeding 15 days), a written 
statement whether he admits or denies of or all the articles of 
charges. 
Explanation It is advisable to show the documents listed with 
the charge-sheet or any other document to the employee at this 
stage itself. 
There is no standard or prescribed form, for drafting charge-
sheet or show cause notice, it may be in a form of a letter or a 
notice.  However the following essentials ought to mention: 
It should be signed by the Disciplinary authority / appointing 
authority. 
3. Show-cause Notice/Charge-sheet must be served on 
the Delinquent: 
(a) If not served on the delinquent no enquiry could be 
proceeded with. 
(b)The service must be on the delinquent employee himself 
unless otherwise provided by the service rules or standing 
orders. 
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(c)The service may be - 
i) By hand delivery 
ii)     By displaying on the Notice Board ;   If the Service 
Rules provide and authorise the same. 
iii) By Registered AD Post Acknowledgement Due. 
iv) Through substituted services / thru newspaper as a 
last resort. 
Refusal to accept the notice or charge-sheet by the workman 
when delivered in persons or by Registered post with 
acknowledgement due: If the workman refuses to take delivery 
of the letter, there should be record of this fact with signatures 
of the persons effecting the delivery and the witnesses to the 
(minimum 2). Whereas service under Postal Certificate is not a 
conclusive proof of service. 
4. Workman's explanation and how to deal with it: 
The workman complained against may or may not submit  his 
explanation. 
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The explanation when received - 
a. Must be received by putting thereof the date and 
time of its receipt. 
b. Must be immediately forwarded to appointing 
authority/disciplinary authority through 
Administration Division. 
c. Must be minutely examined vis-à-vis the show 
cause notice or the charge sheet. 
d. Should be from and be signed by the workman 
concerned and not by any person or representative 
on his behalf unless it is accompanied by written 
authority or unless the representative is a legal 
practitioner. 
e. Its contents should be brought  to the notice of the 
complaining Head of the Department. 
5. Admission of charges and action thereof: 
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(a) If the workman complained against accepts the charges 
levelled in the Show Cause Notice or Charge-sheet the 
management may take the matter in view of the gravity of the 
offences from the nature of an apology tendered by him in 
explanation.  If in any case of absolute apologies, a warning for 
the sake of record must be issued to the workmen concerned 
though this time he is being excused or let off with minor 
punishments, he would be dealt with seriously if he indulges 
often again in similar or other misconduct. 
(b) Admission should be unconditional. 
(c) If the explanation is not satisfactory, the case should be 
fixed for enquiry and the delinquent should be informed 
accordingly. 
6. Enquiry Notice: 
 A. (i) Drafting of notice 
The Enquiry Officer should clearly inform the delinquent about - 
(a) Place, date and time of the enquiry; 
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(b) Name or names of officer(s) who would conduct the enquiry; 
(ii) The enquiry notice should mention - 
(a) The delinquent would be allowed to be assisted by 
another workman of the same department. As per the 
Staff Rules of the organization the employee may take the 
assistance of any other employee of the organization but 
may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose. 
(b) That in case the delinquent workman fails to attend the 
enquiry; the same would be held ex-parte and that 
whatever the decision would be binding on him. 
(c) It should be signed by the management in case of first 
notice and later on by the Enquiry Officer. 
B. Copy of notice to Enquiry Officer :  
Copy of enquiry notice or separate letter must also be 
addressed to the Enquiry Officer authorizing him to hold the 
enquiry at the stipulated time and submit his report of finding 
after satisfactory completion of the enquiry. 
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C.        Nomination of Presenting Officer : 
The management should nominate any of its officer to present 
its side in the enquiry proceedings. 
7. Commencement of oral enquiry: 
Oral enquiry     :  Name  of  : 
(a) Object  :The very purpose of holding the enquiry is to give a 
chance of hearing to the workman so that he is not punished 
without getting a reasonable and proper opportunity to explain 
the charges made against him. 
(b) Distinguished with the court trials: 
The domestic or departmental enquiry differs from the ordinary 
court trial in as much as the court trials are held and according 
to well laid and codified laws of the land, the domestic enquiries 
are guided and regulated by principles of natural justice. 
(c)    A domestic enquiry should be started as soon as possible, 
should not be un-necessarily prolonged. 
8. WHO SHOULD BE THE ENQUIRY OFFICER? 
 559
Appointment of Enquiry Officer – as stated supra, appointed 
amongst the ‘panel of enquiry officers’   
(I) The Enquiry Officer could be an outsider and also an 
advocate but as far as possible the EO should be from the 
‘panel of enquiry officers’. 
(II) He should act independently of his other duties towards the 
parties. 
(III) The EO should not have before hand personal knowledge 
of misconduct or its facts - he should not be witness. 
(IV) He should be impartial man with an open mind and not 
biased against the delinquent. 
(V) As per the existing Staff Rules of the organization, where 
the disciplinary authority itself enquiries or appointing an 
enquiry officer for holding an enquiry, it may by an order appoint 
a person to known as the presenting officer on its behalf the 
case in support of the articles of charge. 
9.        INQUIRY PROCEEDINGS: 
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(I) It is mandatory that the EO maintains written records of the 
inquiry proceedings. 
(II) Enquiry Officer should - 
a) Record the adjournment of the proceeding. 
b) Sign the proceedings himself, besides taking signatures of 
management representative as well as the delinquent workman 
in duplicate. 
c) Every page of the proceedings should also be marginally 
signed or initiated by both the parties as well as the EO. 
d) On the first date, the EO read over the charges to the 
delinquent workman and ask him whether he wants to add in 
his explanation and this should be recorded. 
(I) As per the Staff Rules of the organization on the date fixed 
by the EO, the employee shall appear before the EO at the 
time, place and date specified in the notice. The Enquiry Officer 
shall ask the employee whether he pleads guilty or has any 
defence to make and if he pleads guilty to anyone of the 
charges levelled against him, the Enquiry Officer shall record 
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the plea, sign the record and obtain the signatures of the 
charge-sheeted employee thereon. The EO shall return a 
finding of guilt in respect of those charges to which the 
employee concerned pleads guilty. 
If the employee does not plead guilty, the inquiry officer shall 
adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding 05 days, after 
recording an order that the employee may, for the purpose of 
preparing his defence: 
(i) Inspect the document listed with the charge-sheet; 
(ii) Submit a list of additional documents and witness that he 
wants to examine, and 
(iii) Be supplied with the copies of the statements of witnesses if 
any, listed in the charge-sheet. 
10.   CONDUCTING ENQUIRY EX-PARTE: 
(f) If the delinquent workman does not appear at the scheduled 
enquiry and has not applied for adjournment or if applied it has 
been refused, the EO may proceed to complete the inquiry ex-
parte. 
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(a)If the inquiry is conducted ex-parte the EO should mention in 
the proceedings before recording the statements whether or not 
the inquiry notice has been served on the workman complained 
against. 
(b) The EO should allow some grace time for the delinquent 
workman and should record the same mentioning the specific 
time allowed by him. This is, however, essential every time and 
is under the discretion of the EO. 
(c) If the workman comes to participate thereafter, he may be 
read over the proceedings so far recorded and be allowed to 
join thereafter. 
(d) Even in case of ex-parte enquiry, the EO has to be satisfied 
that the mis-conducts are proved by the reliable evidence. 
11. DELINQUENT WORKMAN'S REPRESENTAION AT 
THE ENQUIRY: 
(a) As an offshoot of one, principles of natural justice it is now 
well established that the workman should be allowed to be 
assisted or represented by another workman from the same 
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department and if not available from the same department, the 
same establishment.  
(b) The workman's representative is only to watch the 
proceedings and assist the workman but not to interfere in the 
conduct of inquiry. 
(c) The EO has discretion to permit representation of 
delinquent workman by an outsider like a lawyer or trade union 
representative. If the facts of the enquiry or the charges are 
completed or the management is represented by a lawyer 
through in employment of the employer or in the interest of 
justice he thinks if necessary. 
12. RULES OF EVIDENCE: 
Although the Indian Evidence Act is not applicable to the 
departmental proceedings yet, the fundamental principles of 
evidence and their appreciation are no doubt applicable. Before 
a worker is held guilty there must be reliable and legal evidence 
from which an inference of guilt can be drawn. 
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13.  HOW TO RECORD STATEMENT / ORAL EVIDENCE IN 
AN INQUIRY: 
(a) Statement is the oral evidence given by witness before the 
EO. 
(b) Every statement comprises of three parts and should be 
recorded in the following order: 
i) First:  Chief of direct examination conducted, the party calling 
the witness.  
ii) Second: Cross examination conducted by the opposite party. 
iii) Third: Re-examination conducted by the party conducting the 
direct Examination. 
(c)In the above the Enquiry Officer, may if he thinks fit essential 
and not otherwise put any questions to the witnesses.  
14.    CLOSING PROCEEDINGS: 
As soon as the workman closes his evidence, the Enquiry 
Officer should write in the end that "workman concerned has no 
more witnesses to examine and the proceedings closed" and 
sign the statement himself and should also get the same signed 
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by the management representative or the complainant workman 
- complained against and his representative. 
Time frame to complete the enquiry: The Enquiry Officer 
should complete the enquiry within 45 days of matter referred to 
him. 
 15. REPORT OF FINDING AND CONCLUSIONS IS 
NECESSARY: 
After the completion of the enquiry the Enquiry Officer should 
immediately start preparing his report of the enquiry conducted, 
however, he should examine very minutely not orally the 
proceedings recorded by him, but also the show cause 
notice/charge-sheet and the reply received from the employee 
concerned. 
As per the staff rules of the organization once the enquiry 
officer concludes enquiry, the report shall prepared, which shall 
contain: 
(a) a gist of the articles of charge and the statement of the 
imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour; 
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(b) a gist of the defense of the employee in respect of each 
articles of charge. 
(c) As assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of 
charge. 
(d) The finding on each article of charge and the reasons 
thereof. 
The report of the finding should be submitted by the Enquiry 
Officer to the appointing authority/disciplinary authority. 
As per the staff rules, the disciplinary authority, if it is not itself 
the enquiry authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in 
writing remit the case to the enquiry officer for fresh or further 
enquiry and report, and the enquiry officer shall thereupon 
proceed to hold the further enquiry according to the provisions 
of the Staff Rules. 
16.   PASSING ORDERS OF PUNISHMENT ON REPORT : 
The Disciplinary authority while passing the order should 
mention that - 
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(i) He/she has gone through the report of the findings as well 
as, 
(ii) The entire record of the enquiry and 
(iii) Confirms of disagree with the views of the Inquiry Officer 
(iv) Thereafter the Disciplinary authority should mention that 
he/she has considered the circumstances of the case, gravity of 
misconduct and past record of the workman and propose 
appropriate punishment in his/her opinion would meet the ends 
of justice. 
As per Staff Rules of the organization orders made by the 
disciplinary authority shall be communicated to the employee 
concerned, who shall also be supplied with a copy of the report 
of the enquiry. 
(v) The order must also reveal that decision taken by him/her is 
necessary for the sake of discipline in the Board. 
(vi) Should be given minimum 15 days time to delinquent to 
explain himself against the proposed punishment. 
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17.    IMPOSING OF PUNISHMENT : 
On receiving the explanation from the delinquent, the 
appointing/disciplinary authority may pass order of the 
proposed punishment or may reduce depending on any 
extenuating circumstances which might have been brought out 
by the workman in his explanation and if disciplinary authority 
things it necessary to do so. 
18.    APPEALS: 
As per the Staff Rules of the organization the appeal over the 
decision of the appointing authority will be with Chief Executive 
Officer /Board of Directors. 
An appeal shall be preferred within the stipulated period from 
the date of the communication of the order appealed against.  
The appeal shall be addressed tot he appellate authority as 
aforesaid and submitted to the authority whose order is 
appealed against. The authority whose order is appealed 
against shall forward the appeal together with its comments and 
the records of the case to the appellate authority within 
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stipulated period.  The appellate shall consider whether the 
findings are justified or whether the penalty is excessive or in 
adequate and pass appropriate order. The appellate authority 
may pass order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting 
aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which 
impose the penalty or to any other authority within such 
direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. 
The Supreme Court in the case of Sur Enamel and Stamping 
Works Ltd.  vs. The Workmen551, held that the mere form of an 
enquiry would not satisfy the requirements of complete 
adjudication to protect the disciplinary action against a 
workman. An enquiry cannot be said to have been properly 
held unless: 
(i) the employee proceeded against has been informed clearly 
of the charges levelled against him  
 
 (ii) the witnesses are examined - ordinarily in the presence of 
the employee-in respect of the charges  
 
                                                 
551 AIR 1963 SC 1914 
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(iii) the employee is given a fair opportunity to cross examine 
witnesses  
 
(iv) he is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses 
including himself in his defence if he so wishes on any relevant 
matter, and  
 
(v) the enquiry officer records his findings with reasons for the 
same in his report. 
 
In the recent judgment the supreme court of India in the case of 
Union of India and others, Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan552, once 
again reiterated that Disciplinary inquiry is quasi-judicial in 
nature. There is a charge and a denial followed by an inquiry at 
which evidence is led and assessment of the material before 
conclusion is reached. These facets do make the matter quasi-
judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. With the 
Forty-Second Amendment, the delinquent officer is not 
associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of 
                                                 
552 AIR 1991 SC 471 
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evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the 
material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. 
In case his conclusions are kept away from the delinquent 
officer and the Inquiry Officer submits his; conclusions with or 
without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent is 
precluded from knowing the contents thereof although such 
material is used against him by the disciplinary authority. The 
report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records a 
finding of guilt and proposes a punishment so far as the 
delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the 
delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material 
against him though the same is made available to the punishing 
authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of 
natural justice would be affected. 
 
8.2.3     Grievance Handling Machinery is condition 
precedent for codified procedure of holding 
disciplinary enquiries:  
 
 It is strongly advised to have a better grievance handling 
machinery in place in the Industry, which will in turn prevent 
occurring of misconducts and disputes, differences, 
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commissions and omission on the part of the employees will be 
resolved at plant / shop-floor level which inter-alia lessens the 
burden of disciplinary authority and judiciary. Therefore, having 
good and employee friendly grievance handling mechanism is a 
condition precedent for full-fledged codified procedure in the 
matters of holding of Disciplinary Enquiry.        
 
The present law is deficient in this respect but it deals mainly 
with the employees, misconduct and prescribes what 
disciplinary action to be taken against them. But law ignores 
entirely the causes which lead to indiscipline from among the 
working class. Absence of effective grievance procedure and 
proverbial delay in industrial courts induce tremendous feelings 
of frustration among workers and force them to take belligerent 
postures in dealing with day to day disagreements. Small 
issues like non-supply of uniforms, cafeteria issues, drinking 
water, electric fans, punching of attendance etc., become 
magnified out of proportion. In case grievance handling 
procedure is put in place, all these issues may be thrashed and 
solved at this level itself. 
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According to Mr. J.A Pankal who is long associated with Tata 
Iron and Steel Company Ltd., Jamshedpur is of the opinion that 
the grievance procedure should consist of :- 
a. The attitude and support of the management; 
b. Belief in the utility of the procedure by all concerned; 
c. Introduction of procedure with concurrence of the 
employees’ representatives and their union; 
d. Simple and expeditious grievance handling; 
e. Codification of Company’s policies, rules and practices and 
availabilities of copies of different levels of handling 
grievances; 
f. Personnel department functioning in a advisory capacity at 
all levels of management; 
g. Fact oriented instead of employee oriented, discussion of 
grievances; 
h. Respect for decisions taken at each level; 
i. Publicity of the procedure and its achievement in the 
company; and 
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j. Periodic review of the working of the procure553. 
 
Model grievance procedure: The National Commission 
Labour, Ministry of Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation, 
Govt., of India, has formulated a scheme for grievance 
procedure. It has adopted the ‘step-ladder’ system.  The 
scheme says the procedure to be custom made to industry 
specific and it envisage the following main points among other: 
(1) presentment of the grievance within 48 hours 
(2) further reference to Head of the Department and he shall 
dispose of the same within 3 days 
(3) Grievance Committee – shall give its recommendation 
within 7 days 
(4) Workers right to appeal to the management 
(5) Grievance voluntary arbitration 
(6) Workers representative on the Grievance Committee 
(7) Time limit of appeal from step to another 
 
                                                 
553 J.A Panakal Grievance Procedure, Indian Labour Journal, July 1968 
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Guiding Principles for grievance procedure: The existing 
labour legislations does not provide for well-defined and 
adequate procedure for redressal of day-to-day grievances in 
Industrial units. Clause 15 of the Model Standing Orders in 
Schedule 1 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) 
Central Rules 1946 specifies that “all complaints arising out of 
employment including those relating to unfair treatment or 
wrongful exaction on the part of the employer or his agent, shall 
be submitted to the manager or the other person specified in 
this behalf with right to appeal to the employers”  
A grievance procedure should take note of the following 
principles: 
(i)  Conformity with existing legislation: 
  (ii)  Need to make the machinery simple and expeditious 
(iii) Constitution of Grievance Committee 
Statutory provisions for setting up of Grievance Settlement 
Authorities and reference of certain individual disputes to 
such authorities:  
 
By the amending Act no. 46 of 1982 the provision for setting up 
of Grievance Settlement Authorities was introduced as Sec. 9 C 
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under new Chapter II-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 
This Section imposes an obligation on the employer of every 
industrial establishment employing fifty or more workmen or 
such number of workmen on any day in the preceding 12 
months to set up a Grievance Settlement Authority in 
accordance with the rules made in this behalf under this Act. 
The object is to settle promptly any industrial dispute connected 
with individual workman employed in the establishment.  
 
Section 9 C provides as follows: 
9C. (1) the employer in relation to every industrial 
establishment in which fifty or more workmen are employed or 
have been employed on nay day in the preceding 12 months, 
shall provide for, in accordance with the rules made in that 
behalf under this Act, a Grievance Settlement Authority for the 
settlement of industrial disputes connected with an individual 
workman employed in the establishment. 
 
(2) Where an industrial dispute connected with an individual 
workman arises in an establishment referred to in sub-section 
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(1), a workman or any trade union of workmen of which such 
workman is a member, refer, in such manner as may be 
prescribed, such dispute to Grievance Settlement Authority 
provided for by the employer under that sub-section for 
settlement.      
 
(3) The Grievance Settlement Authority referred to in sub-
section (1) shall follow such procedure and complete its 
proceedings within such period as may be prescribed. 
 
(4) No reference shall be made under Chapter III with respect 
to any dispute referred in this section unless such dispute has 
been referred to the Grievance Settlement Authority concerned 
and the decision of the Grievance Settlement Authority is not 
acceptable to any of the parties to the dispute.  
 
It is clear from the provision that the emphasis is on the 
individual grievance, Sub section (2) also imposes an obligation 
on the aggrieved workman or the Union of which he is a 
member to refer such dispute to the Grievance Settlement 
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Authority in the manner prescribed thereof.  However, no 
respite and benefit to the ultimate user / workman, because, the 
said provision was not made mandatory and compulsory on the 
part of the employers. 
  
Therefore, it is advised that to have rather compel by way of 
statute the employers to have grievance settlement procedure 
on the above guidelines. 
 
Scope for further study: The utility of this study and research 
has been high lighted in the preface portion of this thesis. The 
researcher has touched upon only the disciplinary enquiry part 
of topic. In this topic itself there are many areas, apparently 
they may appear as minute / small areas; they are subjects at 
length and further research may be carried out namely: 
 
(1) Principles of natural justice 
(2) Forms and precedents of suspension, show cause 
notice, charge-sheet, minor and major penalty, 
discharge, termination, dismissal 
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(3) Suspension 
(4) Remedies available to workmen and non-workmen 
category 
(5) Re-visiting of labour legislations with specific 
reference to disciplinary enquiries and suggestions / 
remedies thereof. 
(6)   Retrenchment, lay of and strikes and misconducts 
(7) Standing orders and service Rules with specific 
reference to Disciplinary Enquiries and 
recommendations and suggestions. 
(8) Comparison of disciplinary procedure in vogues vis-
à-vis western countries – suggestions and 
recommendations.  
 
 
********************* 
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Appendix -1 
Schedule – A: Pro-forma of the Questionnaire 
  
        Faculty of Law 
      Saurashtra University, Rajkot 
      Researcher: Shivaji Rao 
      Guide   :  Dr. B.G. Maniar 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
PERSONAL DETAILS  
 
1. Name of the Respondent & Org.  : 
 
2. Age & Education   : 
 
3. Designation    : 
 
4. Category    :   (i) Supervisor/Officer/Executive 
          (ii) Technical/non-technical 
 
5.  Number of years of service with 
the Organisation   : 
 
6. Total Experience   : 
 
7. Monthly Income   : 
 
ORGANISATION CULTURE: 
 
You are requested to read the following statements carefully and give your frank 
opinion as to whether the same are true for your organization on the below 
mention 5 point scale.  This data is being collected purely for research purpose 
and your fair and frank opinion will be highly appreciated.  Utmost confidentiality 
will be maintained and neither the identity nor the responses of the respondents 
will be disclosed to anyone. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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(1) NOT AT ALL     (2) TO A SLIGHT EXTENT  (3) TO A 
MODERATE  EXTENT (4) TO A GREAT EXTENT (5) TO A VERY 
GREAT EXTENT 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
01. Does your organisation believe that  manpower  
            is its greatest asset       [________]  
 
02. We believe that to maintain discipline, disciplinary action is 
imperative        [________] 
 
 
03. Discretion in disciplinary power is often exercised       
        [________] 
 
04.        Lot of time is wasted in gossiping      
        [________] 
          
05. Everybody expects that the other will take the initiative to be on 
safer side       [________] 
 
06. Members are usually late in starting work    [________] 
 
07. Important decisions are kept in abeyance with a feeling 
that the time will solve it     [________] 
 
08. Constant verbal acrimony and altercation is a regular 
            feature between dept. heads      [________] 
 
09. Suspicion and caution is practiced in every dealing  [________] 
 
10. Agents are used to contain dedicated people   [________] 
 
11. There is no difference between hard working and insincere 
employees       [________] 
 
12. Employees maintain status quo out of fear that they might  
fail or their weaknesses might get exposed   [________] 
 
13. Employees agree with superiors to avoid their wrath           [________] 
 
14. Employees pretend as "Yes sir" or "I agree with you sir"  to 
please boss       [________] 
 
15.        Everyone wants to be ahead of others    [________] 
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16.  "You can never be wrong or I can never disagree with you 
            Sir", are the criteria of success and failure   [________] 
 
17.       Employees believe in worshipping boss than doing their work  
        [________] 
 
18. Promotions are linked to employees' affinity to boss and not  
      their work       [________] 
 
19.      Employees are generally lethargic and uninterested in work [________] 
 
20. Secret information of subordinates are passed on to the boss 
      to gain advantage       [________] 
 
21. Winners are rewarded and lossers are doomed/neglected [________] 
 
22. Employees are compelled to play a role of conspirator       
           against their subordinates     [________] 
 
23. Mistakes in work are not tolerated    [________] 
 
24. To clip the wings colleagues are pitted against each other 
in fight/competition           [________] 
 
25.       Bias, prejudice and suspicion is widespread amongst the 
            employees        [________] 
 
26. Is it  a fact that, when one tries to go up and the other tries to  
            pull him down       [________] 
 
27. Shrewd and cunning employees command respect while the 
            the sincere ones have to swallow non-recognition  [________] 
 
28.       Good policies are not pursued and fail after initial enthusiasm  
        [________] 
 
29. Employees isolate themselves from taking more responsibilities 
 and challenges      [________] 
 
30. Competing rather than co-operating is more esteemed [________] 
 
31. Power concentration is centralized and restricted  [________] 
 
32. Employees do things that earn superiors' goodwill  [________] 
 
33. Trusted allies are nurtured and protected   [________] 
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34. Consensus and unanimity is established by suppressing    
every objection      [________] 
 
35. Work is accomplished by hook or crook during exigencies [________] 
 
36.       Employees go out of their way to seek opportunities where    
            they can develop a liking and acceptance of others  [________] 
 
37.       One is expected to win irrespective of the means he uses [________] 
 
38. Employees pretend interpersonal relationship are excellent  
even when it is not so      [________] 
 
39. Established systems are deemed indispensable  [________] 
 
40. Employees approve of the superiors to get their appreciation  
        [________] 
 
41. Employees are encouraged to be innovative   [________] 
 
42. Challenges are accepted and worked upon    [________] 
 
43. Openness in dealings is encouraged    [________] 
 
44. Employees want to advance and grow in their career  [________] 
 
45. Employees plan things in advance and act without waiting   
for others       [________] 
 
46. Employees participation in deciding policies etc. is 
            prevalent       [________] 
 
47. Colleagues help and co-operate irrespective of personal  
            guide and prejudices      [________] 
 
48. There is more involvement in group projects and activities [________] 
 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS : 
 
49. Management believes in collective bargaining   [________] 
 
50. We believe that existence of Trade Union is a barrier to the  
industrial growth, peace & harmony    [________] 
 
51. Trade Union Act should be repealed     [________] 
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52. We practice collective bargaining to settle disputes   [________] 
 
53. By practicing collective bargaining the I.R. have been improved   
        [________] 
 
54. There is no inter union & intra union rivalry in the organisation  
        [________] 
 
55. Union refrains from direct attack on production for pressurising 
to settle their demands     [________] 
 
56. Management and union leadership in the organization is open, 
trust worthy, matured and based on democratic principles [________] 
 
 
57. Fact finding enquiries play an important role in improving I.R.   
        [________] 
 
58. I.R. has been affected by the existence of the Trade Unions   
        [________] 
 
59. Personnel Officers/Labour Administrator's role  help minimising  
disputes and maintaining harmonious I.R.    [________] 
 
60. Union avoids taking agitational recourses like morchas and 
gheroes on unreasonable grounds    [________] 
 
61. Management does not encourage autocratic supervision [________] 
 
62. Workers work with full vigour and don't withhold their efforts  
        [________] 
 
63. Most of the issues/conflicts are settled without the intervention of   
third party       [________] 
 
64. Workers stick to discipline and rules of the Company [________] 
 
65. Workers and union avoid hostile reactions   [________] 
 
66. Union is open and willing to negotiate on various issues [________] 
 
67. Management does not believe that "Discipline can be enforced 
by penalizing employees"     [________] 
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68. Employees are not castigated and reprimanded unnecessarily  
        [________] 
 
69.      Workers' participation in management is encouraged in various ways  
        [________] 
 
70. Communication between the management and the union is effective 
        [________] 
 
71. Union is generally co-operative and does not indulge in 
unnecessary arguments     [________] 
 
72. Management disapproves of terminating people on unjustified 
  grounds       [________] 
 
73.  Union does not support ind iscipline    [________] 
 
74.  Workers regularly attend duties    [________] 
 
75.  Management is not overstrict in enforcing discipline [________] 
 
 
76. There is good level of understanding, inter and intrapersonal relationship 
between and within the management and the union  [________] 
 
77. Management will resort to lay off or lock out, as a last  
  alternative       [________] 
 
78. There have been no instance of strike or lock out in the  
  organisation in recent past     [________] 
 
79. Workers don't indulge in causing intentional waste and  
inefficiency       [________] 
 
80. Industrial Relations in organisation is untouched by changes  
  in political scene in the country.     [________] 
 
81. Union discourages situation that leads to unnecessary stress and  
tension with management     [________] 
 
82. Labour relations remain healthy even if the company's  
  supply and demand in market is hard hit    [________] 
 
83. Union is flexible and does not resort to practice of `work to rule`  
        [________] 
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84.       Improvement and upgradation of production technology 
  and methods done rationally does not face union's acrimony and 
  rejection       [________] 
 
85. Workers and union disapprove steps like strike as a  
  tool to resolve conflicts /issues / demands   [________] 
 
86. Management and union are transparent in their approach 
  and dealings.       [________] 
 
87. Workers are aware of complete situation of organization [________] 
 
88.      Grievances of the employees are handled rationally through 
a well defined grievance handling procedure    [________] 
 
89.     There is a fair amount of mutual trust between management  
           and the union.        [________] 
 
 
 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION STYLE: 
 
90.     Please indicate, which one of the statement is most relevant in your 
organisation. 
 
- Managers in the organization are : 
 
[_]  Less co-operative and assertive 
 
[_]  More co-operative and assertive 
 
[_]  More co-operative but less assertive 
 
[_]  Less co-operative and assertive to some extent 
 
[_]  Highly co-operative and assertive 
 
 
GRIEVANCE HANDLING MACHINERY: 
 
91. We have effective grievance handling committee  [________] 
 
92. Our grievance handling committee is very active  [________] 
 
93. We involve third party member in the committee to 
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demonstrate transparency & bonafidenes    [________] 
 
94. All the Complaints/Grievances are referred to the committee [________] 
 
95. There exists established procedure to be followed by Committee 
while dealing with the complaints/grievances  [________] 
 
96. Time limit has been set to dispose of the complaint / grievance   
by the Committee      [________] 
  
97. Committee's observations are   implemented in its   
 letter and spirit       [________] 
 
98. Committee enjoys the confidence and  trust of the employees  
        [________] 
 
99. Committee members are not static, once in a year or two   
new committee members will be inducted in the place of old[________] 
 
100. Each and every employee knows about the existence of  
Grievance handling Committee    [________] 
 
101. Role of Personnel Officer/Labour Administrators in the contest of 
grievance handling procedure is significant in our organisation[________] 
 
102. Members of the Committee are well acquainted with  all the  
aspects of Grievance handling including education, competence, 
tactfulness, attitude etc.     [________] 
 
103. The procedure for grievance handling committee has been 
formulated in consultation of employees/union  [________] 
 
104. Are you satisfied with the existing grievance handling committee & 
procedure       [________] 
 
DISCIPLINARY ACTION FOR MISCONDUCT: 
 
105. Service Rules/Standing Orders are formulated with due   
consultation of employees/unions     [________] 
 
106. We do not go for preliminary enquiry prior to regular enquiry  
        [________] 
 
107. We generally initiate disciplinary action both on complaint as 
well as suo-moto      [________] 
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108. Disciplinary procedure in full  and at length has been  laid down 
in our Service Rules/Standing orders    [________] 
 
109. List of misconducts have been enlisted in the Service Rules / 
Standing Orders      [________] 
 
110. Acts of misconducts have been divided and denoted to impose 
minor and major penalties     [________] 
 
111. Types of punishment to be inflicted has been denoted in the 
Service Rules/Standing Orders    [________] 
 
112.     There exists a separate procedure to impose minor penalty [________] 
 
113. There exists separate procedure to impose major penalty [________] 
 
114. We have in-house expertise to draft charge-sheet  [________] 
 
115. While issuing charge-sheet we generally decide to go for a 
major or minor penalty     [________] 
 
116. Sometimes we appoint enquiry officer in the charge-sheet itself  
        [________] 
 
117.     We also initiate disciplinary action against the misconduct  
committed at employee's club, Establishment Residential  
Colony and in public premises    [________] 
 
118. We invariably place employees on suspension on the issuance 
of charge-sheet       [________] 
 
119. We evaluate the nature of charges and other exigencies and  
then place a charge-sheeted employee on suspension  [________] 
 
120. We also place employees under suspension, pending or in 
contemplation of charge-sheet/disciplinary proceedings [________] 
 
121. Once the charge sheet is issued, we see that the charges are  
proved by all means       [________] 
 
122.  Our Service Rules/ Standing Orders contain the procedure to 
             impose penalty       [________] 
 
123. Standing Orders / Service Rules contain full fledged procedure 
  to conduct disciplinary enquiry viz.      [________] 
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a) Notice of enquiry 
b) Appointment of E.O 
c) Recording of enquiry proceedings 
d) Procedure to be followed regarding admission of guilt 
e) Procedure of Exparte enquiry 
f) Procedure regarding workman to be represented by lawyer/ 
co-workmen/union leader 
g) procedure regarding recording of statement & Principles of  
Natural Justice 
h) Particulars with regard to writing of the enquiry report 
 
 
124. Generally legal retainers/Advocates of the company  
     will be appointed as the Enquiry Officer (EO)  [________] 
 
125.     Management will appoint E.O and pay remuneration  [________] 
 
126.     Workmen will have a say in the appointment of E.O   [________] 
 
127.     Presenting Officer (PO) is guided by the Co's legal team [________] 
 
128.     E.O. is instructed by the management from time to time [________] 
 
129.     Always charge-sheet is accompanied with the documents  relied 
thereof        [________] 
 
130. The delinquent employee is required to bear the cost of  
            producing witnesses for his defence    [________] 
 
131. Only on the specific request from the delinquent employee 
we supply the documents      [________] 
 
132.     Enquiry report will be submitted to the Disciplinary Authority  
        [________] 
 
SUSPENSION 
 
133.     We follow laid down procedure while suspension   [________] 
 
134.      It is pure discretion of the management to place employee 
under suspension      [________] 
 
135.     Generally suspension is followed by charge-sheet & vice-versa  
        [________] 
 
136.      No time limit for suspension period    [________] 
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137.      Consideration of suspension as punishment    [________] 
 
138.      Revocation of suspension only after the disposal of the  
disciplinary enquiry      [________] 
 
139. We pay or not to pay subsistence allowance during suspension  
in the discretion of the employer     [________] 
 
140.    Suspension is the right vested in the employer  [________] 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS VIS-A-VIS CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
141.     Our Rules contain the guidelines about the Disciplinary proceedings 
  vis-a-vis criminal proceedings     [________] 
 
 142.   There should be such codified guiding principles / norms in the matters of 
parallel proceedings of disciplinary and criminal  [________] 
 
143.     Criminal court order is not binding on domestic enquiry [________] 
 
144.      Enquiry is not essential/importance on conviction in criminal case  
        [________] 
 
145.    Standard of proof in disciplinary enquiry & in criminal  
proceedings is common      [________] 
 
 
IMPOSITION OF PUNISHMENT 
 
146.   Our rules contain elaborate procedure to be followed on receipt 
of enquiry report      [________] 
 
147. There should be such codified guiding procedure to be followed 
by the employer on and after receipt of enquiry report [________] 
 
148. Our Service Rules specify that enquiry report along with  
documents relied are to be supplied to delinquent employee.[________] 
 
149. We supply the Enquiry Report only on the request of the  
delinquent employee irrespective of the existing procedure [________] 
 
150. Non-furnishing of enquiry report will quash the proceedings 
of the enquiry held       [________] 
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151. Essential ingredients of valid enquiry constitutes : 
 
a) that there are definite charges    [________] 
b) evidence is  adduced during enquiry   [________] 
c) reasonable opportunity is given to the delinquent employee  
        [________] 
d) findings of the E.O. on the material/evidence adduced  
        [________] 
e) application of mind by E.O. to the material produced 
while concluding the findings of the enquiry  [________] 
f) enquiry has been conducted following the rules/ 
procedures and Principles of Natural Justice  [________] 
 
152. Generally the Personnel Officer/Labour Welfare Officer/ 
I.R. Cell of the establishment is not fully acquainted with the basic 
features/essentials of the valid disciplinary enquiry as they are  
not codified       [________] 
 
153.  Issuing of second show-cause notice is not a Rule of thumb  
        [________] 
 
 
154.  As soon as we receive the report of the EO, punishment 
will be imposed      [________] 
 
155.     Selecting the punishment is the discretion of the employer [________] 
 
156.     We follow laid down criteria for inflicting punishment  [________] 
 
157.     We do not have codified guidelines for inflicting appropriate/ 
proportionate punishment     [________] 
 
158.     In case the findings are not favourable we do not agree with 
the findings of the EO      [________] 
 
159.     If the findings are not as per our expectations, we go for  
de - novo enquiry      [________] 
 
160. We offer personal hearing before inflicting punishment [________] 
 
161.     The disciplinary authority and appellate authority can be 
one and the same      [________] 
 
162.     Generally the appellate authority will not interfere in the  
order of punishment irrespective of existence of any alleged  
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anomoly in the punishment     [________] 
 
163.     Sec. 11A of the ID Act, 1947 interferes in the jurisdiction  
and powers of the employer in the disciplinary matters [________] 
 
164.    One who has power to appoint has inherent right to  
terminate the same      [________] 
 
165.     Social justice is the basis of judicial interference in the 
matters of employee discipline    [________]   
 
166. We have laid down procedure for review of the punishment [________] 
 
167. Generally we do not pardon the proved charges  [________] 
 
168. We challenge the orders of reinstatement by Labour Court 
by way of filing appeals in the Higher Courts   [________] 
  
How do you agree with the following Statements? 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
(1) STRONGLY AGREE (2)   AGREE   (3) UNDECIDED   (4) DISAGREE   
(5) STRONGLY DISAGREE 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
169. Whatever procedure available on this day on the Disciplinary  
Proceedings is based on the court rulings & precedents from  
time to time       [________] 
 
170. The industry badly requires codified procedures containing all nitty-gritty 
on the procedure of disciplinary proceedings   beginning from initiation of 
disciplinary enquiry to inflicting punishment    [________] 
 
171. The codified procedure may clear existing doubts and pave 
foundation for restoring confidence and transparency in the matters 
of disciplinary proceedings between employer and employee[________] 
      
172. Not satisfied with the patch work quasi legislation being done by the  
judiciary in the matters of disciplinary proceedings  by way of 
giving rulings from time to time    [________] 
 
173. Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946, respective  
State Shops & Establishment Acts and Conduct, Rules and Regulations of 
the PSU's, autonomous bodies, Public Cos., must possess the codified 
Rules 
regarding procedure to be followed while initiation and conducting  
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disciplinary proceedings.     [________] 
 
 
 
 
Please list down any other modes of responding which you think are not covered 
by the list above, and rate each using the same rating scale. 
 
174. __________________________________________     ___________ 
 
175. __________________________________________     ___________ 
 
176.  __________________________________________     ___________ 
 
 177. __________________________________________     ___________ 
 
178. __________________________________________     ___________ 
 
180. __________________________________________     ___________ 
 
181. __________________________________________     ___________ 
 
Any other comments, ideas or information you wish to share are welcome. Please 
mention them briefly in the space below. 
 
 
 
THANK YOU 
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Appendix – 2 
 
List of articles published by researcher during the 
study for this PhD degree: 
 
 
01. Assessment of sales tax vis-à-vis works contract tax – Indian 
context 
02. Soliciting assistance of co-employee /lawyer in the disciplinary 
enquiry – judicial structure 
03. Implications of employment of personnel on fixed term contract 
– views of the Supreme & below. 
04. Whether P F is required to deducted / contributed foe personnel 
engaged as consultants / experts? 
05. Proposition of law holding the field – on admission of guilt 
during / prior disciplinary enquiry 
06. Whether perks made under productivity Bonus / Incentive 
schemes will attract the EPF Act? 
07. Principles of retrospective operation of law and ultravires 
08. The Report of the Second Indian National Labour Commission 
– 2002 an overview 
09. Re-visiting chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act with 
special reference to the retrenchment and approach 
10. Thesis by the Court of Highest wisdom on anti-thesis of acts 
committed out side the precincts of employment 
11. Judicial activism by the court of Supreme wisdom in the 
matters of employees (statutory-non-statutory) vis-à-vis section 
46 of the Factories Act, 1946. 
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12. General principles of law holding the field in the matters 
termination of contract of agency (agreements) 
 
Books under advanced stage of publication: 
 
13. A nutshell of Contract (R&A), 1970 r/w Rules 1971 with a 
capsule of ratio decidendi and full text judgements of the 
Supreme Court – up to 2005. 
14. F A Q’s under Labour Legislations.  
 
 
************ 
 
 
  
